View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

a




TESTIMONY OF

L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN
CHAIRMAN
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ON

THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

10:00 a.m.
Wednesday, March 23, 1988
Dirksen Senate Office Building

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

I am pleased to be

here today to present the views of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
on enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).

Attached are detailed

answers to the questions contained in your recent letters on this subject.

Introduction

Since enactment of this important law in 1977, the FDIC has worked hard to
enforce the CRA mandate.

That mandate requires us to encourage State

chartered, nonmember banks to help meet local community credit needs,
including those of low- and moderate-income neighborhood residents, consistent
with the safe and sound operation of those banks.

In carrying out its responsibilities under the CRA, the FDIC realizes the
importance of the availability of residential mortgage credit and home
improvement and rehabilitation loans in preventing the decline of
neighborhoods, communities and entire cities.

We also are mindful of the

value of community reinvestment by banks in making small business loans and
loans for community development and redevelopment projects and programs.

Such

lending efforts help build the physical, social and economic fabric of our
nation's neighborhoods and cities and, thus, improve the quality of life for
people in our nation's neighborhoods and communities.




The FDIC views the CRA as an integral part of the comprehensive network of
fair lending laws that includes the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.

This agency works

diligently to enforce the objectives of all federal fair lending statutes for
which it has enforcement responsibility.

We view the effective enforcement of

every fair lending law within our jurisdiction as necessary, not only to
assure that our statutory mandates are being met, but also to strengthen
consumer confidence and trust in the banks supervised by the FDIC.

The FDIC's Role Under the CRA

The fundamental role of the federal financial regulators under the CRA is to
encourage the institutions we supervise to help meet local community credit
needs, consistent with safe and sound banking practices.

The FDIC performs

its role primarily through effective bank supervision and enforcement.

We

administer a compliance examination program by which FDIC-supervised banks are
regularly examined, evaluated and rated as to compliance with fair lending
laws, including the CRA.

This program is carried out according to

comprehensive, specific and detailed examination procedures used by each of
the federal financial regulators.

In order to enforce compliance with the CRA, in 1978 the FDIC adopted Part 345
of its regulations and comprehensive CRA examination procedures.

The major

measures of effectiveness in CRA compliance are the assessment factors
outlined in our CRA regulations.

After applying those factors, the FDIC rates

banks in accordance with the Uniform Interagency CRA Assessment Rating System.




33 -

The ratings range from 1 to 5, with one being the best.

We give special

supervisory attention to banks with compliance and CRA ratings of "3," "4,"
and "5."

In the CRA examination process, examiners evaluate banks on a case-by-case
basis taking into account their size, expertise and locale.

Community credit

needs often differ based on the characteristics of each local community.
Banks are evaluated on the basis of efforts to ascertain, determine and help
meet community credit needs in the context of local circumstances and
resources.

FDIC examiners also discuss their findings regarding the bank's

CRA performance with bank management.

Examiners provide appropriate

CRA-related information and technical assistance at that time, thereby helping
banks to understand the purposes of the CRA and the FDIC1s enforcement role.

Monitoring and enforcing bank compliance with the CRA mandate is critical in
the FDIC's evaluation of bank applications for deposit insurance, to establish
a branch, to relocate a home office or branch, to merge and in other specified
instances.

In making decisions on such applications, the FDIC gives due

consideration to the bank's CRA performance record.

This is required in all

cases, not merely in instances where a protest has been filed.

As a result of

these evaluations, CRA-related violations have resulted in remedial corrective
advisements, memoranda of understanding and delayed or conditional approval of
applications, as well as application denials.

In addition to enforcing the CRA as part of the examination process and in the
context of individual applications, our Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA)




- 4 -

coordinates the processing of CRA complaints filed against banks.

Such

complaints are investigated by the FDIC or referred to the appropriate federal
financial regulator, for handling.

All in all, we at the FDIC believe our CRA enforcement efforts have been
effective.

This view is based on the large number of banks which receive a

satisfactory or higher CRA rating, the low number of CRA consumer complaints
or protests we have received and the few public comments found in files of
FDIC-supervised banks relating to their CRA statement or CRA performance.

Bank Compliance with the CRA

Banks generally comply with CRA requirements.

Banks which do not comply find

that noncompliance violations can lay the groundwork for CRA protests and
complaints against banks resulting not only in denials of applications but in
costly time delays.

Our overall experience, with few exceptions, has been

that once a problem is brought to a bank's attention immediate steps are taken
to correct it.

Of the 1,228 banks examined for CRA compliance by the FDIC in 1986, 20 were
assigned less than satisfactory ratings.

Also, preliminary figures indicate

that about two percent (or 42) of the 2,155 banks examined for CRA compliance
in 1987 had less than satisfactory ratings.

We believe that the low ratio of less than satisfactory ratings indicates that
FDIC-supervised banks are in substantial compliance with the requirements and
spirit of the CRA and Part 345 of the FDIC's regulations.




A CRA rating does

not reflect an isolated instance of technical noncompliance with a regulation
but is a rating of a bank's performance record over time.

Violations, when

detected by .the FDIC, are called to the bank's attention as matters requiring
immediate corrective action.

Banks generally comply promptly.

Thus, the great majority of FDIC-supervised banks have been found to be in
satisfactory or better compliance with the requirements of the CRA.

When

banks which were rated less than satisfactory on their most recent CRA
examination apply for a branch, a relocation, or a merger, we investigate each
situation and, when deemed appropriate, conduct an on-site CRA assessment.

If

the applicant bank is again found to be less than satisfactory as to CRA
performance, the FDIC obtains commitments from the bank to favorably resolve
all CRA-related problems before approval is granted.

Such commitments may be

informal or may be stipulated in a memorandum of understanding.

No

FDIC-supervised bank rated less than satisfactory on the basis of compliance
with CRA has had its application approved without agreeing to appropriate
corrective actions to favorably resolve FDIC-identified, CRA-related problems.

Since the Act's inception, the FDIC has denied three applications for deposit
facilities due to CRA factors.

This is .01 percent of the total number of

applications subject to the CRA that were filed with the FDIC.

The rate of

application denials on CRA grounds, however, should not be considered the sole
or even a major factor in measuring the effectiveness of the FDIC's use of its
authority in enforcing the CRA.

CRA-related problems often are corrected by

banks at the request of the FDIC, prior to our action on an application.
incidence of such preapproval corrections have not been aggregated by the




The

6

-

FDIC.

-

However, in May 1987, the FDIC's Division of Bank Supervision

implemented a new Applications Tracking System which enhances our ability to
ascertain which applications were protested based on CRA performance factors
and to determine whether the FDIC imposed any CRA-related conditions in
conjunction with the approval of those applications.

The FDIC received two CRA-related application protests in 1986 (against two
banks) and nine in 198/ (against seven banks).

In addition, we received six

written CRA complaints and inquiries in 1986 and eight in 1987 that did not
concern a specific bank application.

Investigations of each of these

complaints revealed no illegal CRA practices.

Also, FDIC examiners have found

very few CRA comments in banks' public files.

The FDIC's toll-free "hotline" also is useful in measuring the effectiveness
of the FDIC's enforcement of the CRA.

During 1987, the FDIC's Office of

Consumer Affairs and our Regional Offices reported approximately 29,100
telephone calls for information and assistance.
calls involved community reinvestment matters.

Of this number, only 194
OCA also processed about 3,533

written complaints and inquiries, only eight of which involved CRA-related
issues.

Improvements in the FDIC's CRA Program

Office of Consumer Affairs.

In December 1986, the Board of Directors of the

FDIC transferred consumer-affairs responsibilities from the Division of Bank
Supervision to a newly established Office of Consumer Affairs.

That Office is

an independent component of the FDIC and its director reports directly to the
Office of the Chairman.




- 7 -

The OCA staff includes a fair-lending analyst whose primary areas are
community investment and civil rights.

Among other responsibilities, OCA

reviews all CRA-related protests filed against an FDIC-supervised bank in
relation to an application and presents a written recommendation to our
Division of Bank Supervision regarding the disposition of that bank's
application.

OCA also is charged with the task of continuously evaluating ‘the

adequacy of the FDIC's examination program as a mechanism for detecting and
correcting violations of consumer protection and civil rights laws.

This is

in addition to the monitoring of our entire examination process by DBS.

Training.

The FDIC provides CRA staff training in four primary ways.

The

bulk of compliance training, including CRA, is conducted on-site by senior
field examiners.

These individuals are generally the most experienced

examiners who handle the more complex compliance and safety and soundness
assignments.

Our Regional Office staff keeps those examiners updated on all

pertinent information relating to the scope of work assigned to them,
including CRA-related information.

More formally, the FDIC's Division of Bank Supervision Training Center
administers the Corporation's Consumer Protection School (CPS).

Most CPS

attendees are examiners with a minimum of two years' bank supervision
experience.

In 1986, there were three CPS sessions lasting eight days each

resulting in the training of 39 students.

In 1987, there were four CPS

sessions lasting five days each which provided consumer protection and fair
lending training to 62 FDIC students.

In 1988, we plan to hold six five-day

sessions with a total of 132 students scheduled to attend.




-

8

-

In addition to the above training, a two-hour overview of consumer protection
laws is included in our advanced training for assistant examiners.

We have

had approximately ten sessions which included this overview, with
approximately 25 assistant examiners (having an average of two years'
experience) attending each session.

The FDIC's Office of Consumer Affairs also conducts a 2 1/2-day compliance
seminar annually for Regional Office (DBS) Consumer Affairs and Civil Rights
Review Examiners and their assistants and/or field examiners.

Many of these

Review Examiners then provide similar training seminars to their respective
regional examination staffs.

We plan to continue our emphasis on compliance training programs, including
CRA.

Examinations.

The FDIC supervises nearly 9,000 banks.

1,069 banks were examined for compliance with the CRA.

In 1985, approximately
There were 1,228

examinations conducted in 1986 and approximately 2,155 during 1987.

Because

of the dramatic increase in the number of failed and problem banks in recent
years, the FDIC has had to devote significantly more resources to problems
involving safety and soundness.

We are working to improve examiner staffing shortfalls relative to compliance
examinations.

That endeavor will be facilitated by the provisions in the

recently enacted Competitive Equality Banking Act removing the FDIC from
certain budgetary cons traints.




We believe the significantly increased

I l l

compliance examination activity during 1987 will continue in 1988.

Additional

resources again will be allocated to compliance enforcement, including CRA, as
we hire and train new examiners and as the number of problem banks begins to
stabilize or decrease.

In fact, in the budget that was approved by the FDIC

Board of Directors on January 19, 1988, the number of compliance examinations
during 1988 is projected to increase by approximately 6Ó percent.

Conclusion

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have experienced a record number of bank
failures over the last two years.

Most have taken place in the hard-pressed

farm and energy-dependent communities of the South, Southwest and Midwest.

In

at least 70 percent of these cases, the FDIC has been able to arrange the
takeover of all or part of the failed bank by a healthy bank.

This has

important and positive social and economic consequences for the communities
affected by bank failures.

It means that along with the FDIC meeting its

mandate to safeguard bank deposits, we have been able to secure continued
access to credit for meeting local needs.

The purchase of all or part of a

failed bank by a healthy institution allows the banking relationships of local
businesses and consumers to remain uninterrupted in many cases.

At the FDIC, we encourage the banks we supervise to help meet the credit needs
of the residents of their local communities.

He plan to do more outreach in

order to increase awareness of the CRA among both consumers and bankers.

Last

March, we invited several community groups and consumer protection and civil
rights organizations to the FDIC to meet with me and senior Corporation staff
for an exchange of views on community reinvestment and other consumer and




10

community-related issues.
planned for 1988.

-

That meeting was productive and another is being

In addition, to further our industry outreach efforts in

the coming year, the FDIC plans to invite bankers from various parts of the
country to compliance seminars where CRA concerns and other consumer-related
laws and regulations will be addressed.

He continue to believe that it is

important to have regular dialogue with representatives from both community
and consumer groups and the banking industry.

Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for giving us
this opportunity to express our views on an issue of special importance to the
nation's communities and financial system.
any questions.

Attachments




Ne will be pleased to respond to

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

Washington DC 20

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

January 25, 1988

Dear Mr. Chairman:
The enclosed answers are in response to your letter of
October 22, 1987, requesting information on the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's policies, procedures and regulatory
experiences relative to the Community Reinvestment Act. As agreed
to with your staff, we will respond by February 1 to the additional
CRA questions posed in your letter of December 23, 1987.
We hope the enclosed information is helpful.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,

L. William Seidman
Chairman
Honorable William Proxmire
Chai rman
Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Enclosures




I.

GENERAL ENFORCEMENT

T.a . Question:
Since enactment of the CRA, how many applications have been denied solely or
substantially due to CRA factors? What percentage of total applications
processed subject to the CRA does this represent? Does this rate of denial
adequately enforce compliance with CRA, or would increased use of the
sanctions provision strengthen compliance?
T.a. Answer:
Since the Act's inception, the FDIC has denied three applications for deposit
facilities due to Community Reinvestment Act factors. This is .02 percent
of the total number of applications subject to the CRA. (The number of
applications processed from 1979 through August 1987 was 14,586.) The rate of
application denials on CRA grounds, however, should not be considered the sole
or even a major factor in measuring the effectiveness of CRA enforcement.
We believe the means employed by the FDIC to enforce compliance with the CRA
are generally effective. If we find a CRA problem, we issue a correction
advisement. If necessary, we follow up the advisement with a memorandum of
understanding. Other sanctions include the conditional approval of bank
applications for deposit facilities.
Banks generally comply with CRA requirements. Those which do not, however,
find that violations can lay the groundwork for CRA protests and complaints
against banks resulting not only in denials but in costly time delays. At the
FDIC, our experience has been that once a problem is brought to a bank's
attention, immediate steps are taken to correct it.
I.b. Question:
How many examinations of regulated institutions that assess CRA compliance are
conducted each year? On average, how often is a regulated institution's
compliance with the CRA assessed through an examination?
I.b. Answer:
The FDIC supervises nearly 9,000 banks. In 1985, 1,069 compliance
and visitations including CRA were conducted. There were 1,125 in
1,824 during 1987. Because of the dramatic increase in the number
and problem banks in recent years, the FDIC has had to devote more
to problems involving safety and soundness.

examinations
1986 and
of failed
resources

We are working to improve this manpower situation relative to compliance
examinations, and certainly that endeavor will be facilitated greatly by the
provisions in the recently enacted Competitive Equality Banking Act removing




-

2

-

the FDIC from certain budgetary constraints. We believe the increased
compliance examination activity during 1987 will continue in 1988. Additional
resources will be allocated again to compliance enforcement, including CRA, as
we hire and train new examiners and, eventually, as the number of failed and
problem banks begins to decrease. In fact, in the budget that was approved by
the FDIC Board on January 19, 1988, the number of compliance exams during 1988
is projected to increase by approximately 60 percent.
The FDIC's compliance examination goals differ by compliance ratings. For 1and 2-rated banks, the goal is assessment every 36 months. For 3-rated banks,
the goal is every 18 months, and for 4- and 5-rated banks, the goal is every
12 months. To the extent that we are able to continue hiring additional bank
examination staff, we will be better able to achieve our compliance
examination goals.
I.c. Question:
What quantitative and qualitative criteria does your agency use to measure the
effectiveness of regulatory enforcement of the CRA? What factors indicate
that CRA enforcement has been effective: What factors indicate that CRA
enforcement has not been effective?
I.c. Answer:
The FDIC rates banks in accordance with the Uniform Interagency CRA Assessment
Rating System. The ratings range from 1 to 5, with one being the best. We
give special attention to banks with compliance and CRA ratings of "3," "4,"
and "5."
In order to enforce compliance with the CRA, in 1978 the FDIC adopted Part 345
of its regulations along with concomitant examination procedures set forth in
our Compliance Examination Manual. The major measures of effectiveness are
based on the assessment factors outlined in Part 345. These include, but are
not limited to, activities conducted by the bank to ascertain the credit needs
of their communities and the bank's marketing of its services; the types of
credit offered and extended by the bank to the community; the geographic
distribution of the bank's loans; the impact of the opening or closing of any
offices and the services offered at these facilities; the bank's compliance
with anti-discrimination and other credit laws; and the bank's participation
in community development in order to meet local credit needs.
In conducting a CRA examination, the examiner evaluates banks on a
case-by-case basis to take into account banks that vary in size, expertise and
locale. Community credit needs often differ with the specific characteristics
of each local community, and banks are evaluated on the basis of attempts to
ascertain, determine, and help meet community credit needs in the context of
local circumstances and resources.
The main factors which indicate whether our CRA enforcement policies and
procedures are effective include the number of banks which receive a
satisfactory or higher CRA rating, the number of CRA consumer complaints or
protests we receive, and the number of public comments found in files of banks
relating to a bank's CRA statement or to the bank's performance in helping to
meet the credit needs of its community.




- 3 The FDIC received two application protests in 1986 andseven in 1987. In^
addition, we received six CRA complaints in 1986 and eight in 1987 that did
not concern a specific bank application. Investigations of each such
complaint revealed no findings of illegal practices involving the CRA. Also,
FDIC examiners have found very few CRA comments in the public files of banks.
Another means of assessing the effectiveness of the FDIC's enforcement of the
CRA is the FDIC's toll-free "hotline." For the first six months of 1987 the.
FDIC's Office of Consumer Affairs and our Regional Offices reported
approximately 14,120 calls for information and assistance. Of this number
only 77 calls involved community reinvestment matters.
Additionally, within the last year we have restructured the FDIC Office of
Consumer Affairs. That Office now operates independently of our Division of
Bank Supervision and continuously evaluates the adequacy of the Corporation's
compliance examination program.
We believe that the FDIC's CRA enforcement efforts generally have been
effective. As mentioned above, however, we plan to increase the number of
FDIC compliance examinations in 1988. We think the following factors would
indicate that FDIC enforcement was not being effective: a larger percentage
of banks with less than satisfactory ratings; a significantly increasing
number of CRA protests and/or CRA complaints along with findings of unlawful
conduct; heavier input into bank public files indicating community
reinvestment problems; or increasing communications from community groups or
individuals indicating possible problems with FDIC-supervised banks. We are
not seeing evidence of these negative indicators.
II.

CRA Ratings

II.a. Question:
How many regulated institutions were assigned CRA ratings of "3", "4", or 5
in 1986? What percentage of total rated institutions received these ratings?
Were each of these institutions examined in 1986, or did some ratings rely on
previous examinations? On what basis can the low level of "less than
satisfactory" CRA ratings be justified?
Il.a. Answer:
Of the 1,125 banks examined by the FDIC in 1986 for CRA compliance, 20 were
assigned less than satisfactory ratings. As of June 1987, under 2 percent
(or 132) of all FDIC-supervised banks examined for CRA compliance had less
than satisfactory ratings.
The low ratio of less than satisfactory ratings, we believe, indicates that
FDIC-supervised banks are in substantial compliance with the requirements of
the CRA and Part 345 of the FDIC's regulations. A CRA rating does not reflect
an isolated instance of technical noncompliance with a regulation but is a
rating of a bank's investment record over time. Violations, when detected by
the FDIC, are called to the bank's attention as matters requiring immediate
corrective action. Banks generally comply promptly.




- 4 jT.b. Question:
Have applications for institutions with CRA ratings of "3", "4", or "5" been
approved by your agency? If so, how can these approvals be justified?
TT.h. Answer:
No FDIC bank rated less than satisfactory on the basis of compliance with CRA
has had its application approved without agreeing to appropriate corrective
actions to favorably resolve FDIC-identified CRA-related problems.
As indicated above, the great majority (98%) of FDIC-supervised banks have
been found to be in satisfactory or strong compliance with the requirements of
the CRA. When banks which were rated less than satisfactory on their most
recent CRA examination apply for a branch, a relocation, or a merger, we
investigate each situation and, when.deemed appropriate, conduct an on-site
CRA assessment. If the applicant bank is again found to be less than
satisfactory as to CRA performance, the FDIC obtains commitments from the bank
to favorably resolve all CRA-related problems before approval is granted.
Such commitments may be informal or may be stipulated in a memorandum of
understanding.
In Hay 1987, the FDIC's Division of Bank Supervision implemented a new
Applications Tracking System which will enhance our ability to ascertain which
applications were protested based on CRA performance factors and to determine
whether we imposed any CRA-related conditions upon the approval of those
applications.
II.c. Question:
The regulatory agencies have long held the position that individual CRA
ratings should not be made public, to protect the confidential relationship
between a regulator and the regulated institution. However, the intent of
Congress in enacting CRA was that, consistent with safety and soundness,
sanctions could be imposed on regulated institutions with inadequate CRA
records. The use of public CRA ratings would appear to reward institutions
with good ratings and sanction institutions with less than satisfactory
ratings. Is there any movement in the direction of public disclosure of
individual CRA ratings by your agency?
II.c. Answer:
Currently there are no plans at the FDIC to publicly disclose individual CRA
ratings, and we do not believe such disclosure is necessary at this time. The
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) serves to provide the public with
important information to enable them to determine whether depository
institutions appear to be fulfilling their obligations in meeting the housing
needs of the communities and neighborhoods in which they are chartered to do
business. If there are indications of problems, the FDIC investigates. We
believe that the banking agencies' supervisory efforts regarding community
reinvestment have proven workable and effective.




- 5 III.

HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT

TTI.a. Question:
When regulatory examinations of an institution's HMDA statements show that few
or no housing loans are being made in low- or moderate-income areas, and that
the volume of loans in these areas is disproportionately low compared to the
volume of loans in other areas of the local community, how is this interpreted
by your agency? If HMDA records indicate "unreasonable" lending patterns, is
this sufficient cause for denial of an institution's application? If not,
what steps are taken by your agency to correct the imbalance?
III.a. Answer:
From a regulatory standpoint, HMDA statements serve as a tool for closer
analysis if and when problems concerning a bank's CRA compliance are
suspected. The HMDA statement is generally considered a reliable indication
of the number and dollar amount of mortgage loans extended in a bank's lending
area.
At times, a bank's HMDA statement may reveal a disproportionately low number
of loans in low- or moderate-income areas relative to other areas in the
community. If this is found, our examiners investigate further into the
reasons for any such patterns. If such a lending pattern cannot be justified,
it would serve as a basis for a less than satisfactory CRA rating. The FDIC
would advise the bank to improve its record by seeking to meet the credit
needs of those in its lending community.
We cannot conclude, however, solely on the basis of few loans in low- or
moderate income areas relative to other areas, that there has been a violation
of CRA or fair lending laws. HMDA statements alone are not capable of
supporting such conclusive interpretations. A HMDA statement which leads to
questions about a bank's lending patterns serves as a valuable indicator for
FDIC examiners. It causes an examiner to research, for example, whether
omitted census tracts are indeed zoned residential, whether a bank's
advertising of loan programs is actually reaching residents of these locales,
and whether any demand for loans has emanated from these areas and if not, why
not. These questions tie-in directly with the CRA assessment factors. As
stated earlier, findings based on these factorshave resulted in remedial
corrective advisements, memoranda of understanding, and delayed or conditional
approval of applications. They also have resulted in application denials.
ITI.b. Question:
There is an increasing call by community groups to expand HMDA to include
disclosure of small business loans. Given the fact that the CRA assessment
criteria specifically includes an institution's small business lending record,
would an expansion of HMDA to include small business loans be appropriate?
IU.b. Answer:
The focus of HMDA is on home mortgage disclosure and expanding this Act
would change this focus. Moreover, as regulators we need to become more
familiar with the views of small business borrowers before making any such
recommendation. Before requiring disclosure of small business loans, it would




-

6

-

be necessary to have an agreed-upon definition acceptable and applicable to
the various geographic regions with differing economic environments. This
will likely present considerable difficulties.
IV.

THE SECONDARY MARKET

TV.a/b. Question:

Is there any evidence that banks avoid making loans in certain low income
areas because of the need to resell all loans to the secondary market?
Have you discussed this situation with secondary market players? Can you come
to a regulatory solution?
IV.a/b. Answer:
The FDIC is not aware of any evidence that banks avoid making loans in certain
low income areas because of the need to resell all loans to thè secondary
market. We have not discussed the matter with secondary market participants,
because we have received no complaints, written or oral, concerning this
matter from either bankers or consumers. We do not believe any bank regulatory
action is warranted at this time.




P - r £ ^ AL D E ^ O ^ l T I N b U R A N C t C O R P O R A i ION

February 1, 1988

Dear Mr. Chairman:
The enclosed materials are furnished in response to your letter
of December 23, 1987, requesting additional information concerning
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's enforcement of the
Community Reinvestment Act.
We hope the enclosed information is helpful.
With best wishes.
Sincerely

L. William Seidman
Chairman
Honorable William Proxmire
Chai rman
Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Enclosures




Item (a): CRA staff training: include a profile of the staff trained, the
type of training and the average training period.
Response: FDIC CRA staff training is provided primarily in four ways. The
bulk of compliance training, including CRA, is conducted on-siteby senior
field examiners. These individuals are generally the most experienced
examiners who handle the more complex compliance and safety and soundness
assignments. Our Regional Office staff keeps these examiners updated on all
pertinent information relating to the scope of work assigned to them,
including CRA-related information.
More formally, the FDIC's Division of Bank Supervision Training Center
administers the Corporation's Consumer Protection School (CPS). Most CPS
attendees are examiners with a minimum of two years' bank supervision
experience:

Year
1987
1986
1985
1984

Total
Number of
Sessions
4
3
3
2

Length of
Each
Session
5
8
8
8

Days
Days
Days
Days

Total #
of FDIC Hours of Fai r Lendi nq Traininq Per Session
HMDA
EC0A
FH
Students CRA
62
39
38
34

2
3.5
3.5
3.5

2
2
2
2

3
5
5
5

1
2
2
2

In addition to the above training, a two-hour overview of consumer protection
laws is included in our advanced training for assistant examiners. We have
had approximately 10 sessions which included this overview, with approximately
25 assistant examiners (with approximately 2 years' experience) attending each
session.
Also, the FDIC's Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA) annually conducts a
2 1/2-day compliance seminar for Regional Office (DBS) Consumer Affairs and
Civil Rights Review Examiners and their assistants and/or field examiners.
Many of these Review Examiners then provide similar training seminars to their
respective regional examination staffs.
Item (b): CRA examination process: include an estimate of examination time
by size of institution (with thresholds of $25, $100 and $500 million); actual
examination reports on institutions which have been the subject of consumer
protests during 1985-87, and a description of supervisory procedures to
correct identified violations.
Response: For compliance examinations undertaken during 1985, 1986, and 1987,
the average examination time ranged generally from 8 hours to 40 hours for
smaller banks and up to 200 hours for larger banks. Hours, however, may
relate more to the type of bank (e .q ., commercial vs. savings bank, wholesale
vs. retail) than to asset size.' For special CRA examinations conducted in
response to a bank application or a protest during each of the 3 years cited,
the number of hours expended was substantially higher. Also, there were
several examinations where (because of type, size and/or location of the bank)
only 1 or 2 hours were spent on CRA — a factor-which lowers considerably the




-

2

-

average time expended per compliance examination. The following Table shows
the average number of hours spent per examination on CRA compliance matters.
Average Hours Expended Per Examination on CRA
Average Hours
Per Exam
1985
1986
1987

$25 million
6

5 1/2
5

$100 million

$500 million

7 1/4
10 1/2

23
18
23

8

As agreed to with your staff, in lieu of the actual compliance examination
reports initially requested, we have enclosed examples of two redacted
compliance reports. We believe these illustrate the compliance enforcement
practices followed by the FDIC.
To correct a compliance problem, including any CRA-related instance, we bring
the issue to the bank's attention both orally and in writing. We also issue a
correction advisement and, if necessary, issue a memorandum of understanding.
Other sanctions include denying (or approving upon condition of compliance
with the CRA) a bank's application for depository facilities. In extreme
cases, we also have the authority to initiate a formal enforcement proceeding
against the bank.
Item (c): CRA procedures:
include procedures governing notice, comment,
extensions and hearings, and monitoring of settlement agreements; report on
disposition of protests (1981-87); include case files on applications
protested 1985-87.
Response: Enclosed is a copy of A Citizens Guide to CRA prepared by the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. This publication contains
a general explanation of the FDIC's CRA procedures. Excerpts from our Manual
for Compliance Examinations also are provided. FDIC staff are reviewing
current procedures to determine whether revisions are needed.
The FDIC does not, as a general rule, monitor CRA-related settlement
agreements unless they were associated with a CRA protest. However,
agreements are reviewed as part of the regular examination process.
The disposition of the CRA protests filed from 1981-1984 is as follows:
Appiicant Bank

Pi sposi tion

Hamilton Bank
Lancaster, Pennsylvania

Appiication Approved

State Bank of Raleigh
Raleigh, North Carolina

Appiication Approved

1982

The Boston Five Cent Savings Bank
Boston, Massachusetts

Appiication Approved

1983

No protests received

1984

No protests received

1981




- 3 -

The enclosed CRA Protest Summary Table includes disposition information on the
CRA protests filed with the FDIC from 1985 through 1987. As agreed to with
your staff, this Table is a substitute for the case files initially requested
in your letter.




♦

cRA
APPLICANT'S NAME/ADDRESS

P-RQTiSTANT1S ADDRESS

PROTESTS AGA
laT nsi

FDIC-SUPERVISED BANKS

TYPE AND DATE OF APPLICATION

SUBJECT OF THE PROTEST

DISPOSITION

--------------- 1
The Arizona Bank
101 North 1st Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85003

Arizona Association of
Community Organizations
for Reform NOW (ACORN)
917 North 5th Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Branch - April 18, 1985

- Inadequate ascertainment
of community credit needs;
- Georgaphic distribution of
credit ;
- Service charges too high.

Informal hearing held
July 10, 1985.
FDIC approved
application
October 8, 1985.

Commercial and Industrial Bank
200 Madison Avenue
Memphis, Tennessee 38103

Mid-South Peace and
Justice Center
P.0. Box 11428
Memphis, TN 38111-0426

Branch - July 15, 1985

- Inadequate branches in low
and moderate income areas;
- Insufficient number of housing
loans;
- Inadequate advertising.

Informal proceeding held
on September 18, 1985;
FDIC approved
application
November 7, 1985.

1986
The Waterloo Savings Bank
425 Cedar Street
Waterloo, Iowa 50701

Citizens for Community
Improvement
501 Sycamore Street
P.0. Box 875
Waterloo, Iowa 50704

Merger - April 16, 1986

- Inadequate home improvement
loans and small business loans;
- Asked for increased contri­
butions to local foundations.

Examiner met with
representatives of
protestant. FDIC
approved application
September 24, 1986.

People's Trust Company
145 Westminster Street
Providence, Rhode Island

South Providence Re­
vitalization Committee,
Inc.
386 Prairie Avenue
Providence, Rhode Island
02905

Branch Relocation
April 23, 1986

- Protestants not sent current
CRA and HMDA statements.

FDIC approved
appli cation
May 21, 1986.

02901

1987
11ied Bank of Texas
08 Travis
ouston, Texas 77251

Houston Reinvestment
Al1iance
c/o Robinson & Davis
Attorneys
2905 Elgin Ave
Houston, Texas 77288

Branch May 13, 1987

ame as above

NAACP - Houston Branch
4101 San Jacinto, Suite 233
Houston, Texas 77004

Same as above

everly Bank
357 West 103rd Street
hicago, Illinois 60643

Chicago Roseland Coalition
for Community Control
c/o Legal Assistance Found­
ation of Chicago
343 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Branch - June 15, 1987




- Inadequate determination of
community credit needs;
communication with community;
inadequate geographical dis­
tribution of credit extensions.
- HMDA statement evidences
Application
failure to meet the
abeyance by
credit needs of low and
application
moderate income and minority
charter and
residents ;
acted upon.
- Inadequate distribution of
housing loans;
- Alleged violation of discrimin­
ation under CRA, the Fair Housing
Act and ECOA, including discouragement.
- Lending record of low and moderate
income residents.
- Failure to meet credit needs
of lending community;
- Bank does not make mortgage
1oans.

held in
FDIC until
for OCC
merger

Protest withdrawn
September 16, 1986,
following signed CRA
agreement between bank
and protestant;
Informal proceeding
held on October 13,
1987; FDIC approved
appli cation

CRA

rsi r u i t - s u i ' X k v ] srt»

TYPE AND DATE OF APPLICATION

SUBJECT OF THE PROTEST

DISPOSITION

- Failure to meet credit needs of
the lending community.
- Discrimination against Black
student loan applicants.

FDIC offered to meet
with protestant but
offer was declined.

- Discriminatory lending;
- Failure to involve minorities
in the affairs of the bank.

1987 exam reflected
CRA compliance; FDIC
approved application
August 4, 1987.

APPLICANT’S NAME/ADDRESS

PROTESTANT’S ADDRESS

Same as above

Same as above
Council on Employment and
Economic Development (CEED)
Coordinating Committee
c/o Chicago Urban League
4510 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60653

The Merchants and Planters
Bank of Raymond, Mississippi
P.0. Box 699
Raymond, MS 39154

Mr. Berry G. Phompson
Supervisor
Heinz County, Mississippi
1-20 N. Frontage Rd
Rte 1, Box 20-B
Bolton, Mississippi 39041

Delaware Trust Company
900 Market Street Mall
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Community Legal Aid Society, Phantom Merger - September 14, 1987 Inc.
913 Washington Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
-

Ci tytrust
961 Main Street
Bridgeport, Connecticut

Asylum Hill
Organizing Project
06601 243 Sigourney Street
Hartford, Connecticut
06105

Pf oles and Union Bank
PV. • Box 589
Lewisburg, Tennessee 37091




The Tennessee
Save the Family
Farm Alliance
Route 2, Box 46-A1
Indian Mound, Tennessee
37079

Merger September 12, 1986

Failure to meet the convenience
and needs of low and moderate
income and minority residents;
Discriminatory treatment;
Failure to adequately ascertain
credit needs or to develop
an adequate marketing program;
- Inadequate CRA statement;
- Failure to provide the CRA public
noti ce.

Following adoption by
the bank of a formal
plan to correct CRA related deficiencies,
the FDIC approved the
appli cation
November 30, 1987.

Two branches October 29, 1987
November 12, 1987

- "Very poor lending
practice in jninority
neighborhoods";
- Bank has played a major
role in the disinvestment of
the Asylum Hill Community.

FDIC offered to meet
with protestant but
no response;
application pending,

Merger - August 31, 1987

- Discriminatory lending
practices toward farmers, e.g.,
higher interest rates charged
relative to other equivalent
risk loans;
- Avoidance of FmHA guaranteed
farm loans;
- Inflexible foreclosure
practices;
- Improper linkage of farm debt
with consumer loans.

FDIC offered to meet
with protestant but no
response; application
pending.