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LIBRARY
JUN26 1989
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

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Remarks by

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L. William Seidman
Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Before

CP New

York Financial Writers
New York, NY
June 21, 1989 ,

Ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor for me to be here this
evening with this distinguished group: the peerage of
financial writers.

Tonight, I would like to outline for you my observations on
the S&L debacle —
—

how it originated —

where we now stand

and what the future may bring.

This S&L financial problem is one more costly than the
Marshall Plan, Chrysler, New York City, and Penn Central
bailouts, all combined, and by a mile!

In fact, it will

probably cost every man, woman, and child in the U.S. about
$1000 each!

Let's take a brief look at how we got ourselves into the
S&L mess.

Historically, S&Ls were restricted to providing long-term
fixed rate mortgages financed by short-term deposits.

This

process was strongly supported by deposit insurance.

The thrift industry prospered during the period when
interest rates were relatively stable.

But the nature of the thrift business had always meant that
S&Ls were vulnerable to changing interest rates.




2

In fact, the basic premise of the industry's strategy was
that one could borrow «short" and lend "long."

One could

use the yield curve difference to provide lower priced
mortgages for the American home buyer.

In this simpler

time, long-term interest rates were higher than short-term
rates.

However, as we know, the world has changed.

In the late

seventies, inflation was on the rise, and with it, interest
rates soared.

S&Ls had to be allowed to pay higher

interest rates on deposits or depositors would move their
money elsewhere.

At this point, the basic interest rate risk in the S&L
industry was exposed.

The response to this revealed truth

was most unfortunate.

What were the basic solutions proposed?

In summary, there were four parts:




(1)

Allow thrifts to grow out of their interest rate

mismatch with new products that did not depend on the
yield curve differential.

(2)

Allow special regulatory accounting that misstated

the facts, and, for all practical purposes, eliminated
capital requirements.

(3)

Limit government supervision of this newly

deregulated and capital starved industry.

In other

words, get the government off the thrift executives'
backs so they could become entrepreneurs and earn their
way back to solvency.

(4)

Increase the amount of deposit insurance to

$100,000 to keep the money in the thrifts.

While some thrifts exercised these new rules judiciously,
many —

and particularly those with little capital to lose

—- sought fast growth with large investment risks to try to
recover their profitability.

It was the worst of all worlds.

A substantial part of the

thrift industry had now added credit risk to interest rate
risk.

Mix in this brew lax supervision, reduced regulatory
capital requirements, slackened accounting standards, and
virtually unlimited deposit insurance,

and you have all

the ingredients for the disaster that has occurred.




4

So what are the broader lessons for today from this most
costly event?

First, get the facts.

Don't allow devices like phony

accounting to obscure the situation and distort the truth.

Both the government and the private sector failed to learn
the magnitude of the thrift crisis until it had reached
huge proportions.

Second, use the real facts to develope a plan.

As Alice

learned on her way through Wonderland, when you don't know
where you're headed, any road will do.

In this case, no

strategy was developed to meet the basic problem of low
capital, lack of market discipline, and rate risk.

Further, the government refused to realize that deposit
insurance gives insured institutions a government
guaranteed credit card to raise money for any purpose.

Remember, unpleasant facts require tough decisions.

Finally, act on the facts —
worse.
watch.”

Haul down the flag that states:

"Not on my

It's a flag that flies over too much of the

Washington scene.




procrastination will make it

5

In the context of the S&Ls, the painful answer of tougher
rules and closing down insolvent institutions was never
accepted.

Tough decisions require action.

So much for looking back -- where do we stand today?

With real leadership, President Bush —
office —

just 16 days in

provided the Congress with a sound program.

Congress, under the leadership of Committee Chairmen
Gonzalez and Riegle, moving with unusual speed has improved
the plan.

Each house has passed a bill and the conference

should begin in the next couple of weeks.

The legislation is designed to correct the mistakes of the
last decade.

It does make the tough decisions necessary

for future safety.

First, the bills require stronger capital for thrifts, with
bank capital standards providing the baseline, and tangible
capital required of all institutions.

Second, the bills require factual accounting, rather than
the ill-fated "smoke and mirrors” of the past.
will be phased-out tangible capital.




Goodwill

6

Let me say a word about goodwill as used in the context of
the thrift industry.

Goodwill normally was meant to be a balance sheet
adjustment to account for circumstances where the value the
of enterprise exceeds the value of assets on the books.

As

applied by the thrift industry, however, it measures the
shortfall when the value of the enterprise is less than the
assets on the books.

That's not goodwill —

that's bad

will, or maybe better, ill will.

Third, the bill requires double supervision for S&Ls, with
the FDIC serving as the backup supervisor for the thrift
industry.

There will be an independent insurer with a

clear mandate for using its powers and supervisors to
control risk-taking and minimize costs to the insurance
fund.

An important feature of this supervisory process will be to
restrict growth until adequate capital is on hand.

Finally, fourth, the bill provides for a comprehensive
vehicle to handle insolvent S&Ls —
Corporation.
institution.




the Resolution Trust

I want to stress the key importance of this

7

The RTC, which I estimate may have to handle at least three
to four hundred billion dollars in assets —

has a

massive

challenge ahead of it.

To give you a view of the size of the job, the FDIC in its
entire existence has dealt with about 160 billion dollars
in assets.

It appears that the FDIC will have to play a role in
operating the RTC —

though that role is still being

determined.

In the interim, we have assumed a conservatorship role in
over 223 thrifts in the last several months.

We expect

that number to increase to almost 300 by the time the
President signs the S&L bill.

Let me stress that the FDIC will not be significantly
diverted from its bank supervisory functions by this
undertaking.

First of all, most of the work in the S&L

area will fall on our non-supervisory people —

leaving

over 95 percent of our bank supervisory personnel free to
concentrate on supervision.

Moreover, as far as we can

foresee at this time, the FDIC is going to have a much
better year in 1989 than we had in 1988.




1988 was our most challenging year ever, requiring us to
book the cost of handling over $80 billion of assets —
about what we handled in all our previous years combined.
In contrast, we anticipate handling about $10 billion of
assets in 1989, or about 12 percent of what we handled last
year.

These numbers reflect an anticipated 150 to 180 bank

failures.

We make this prediction on the basis of the

decline in our problem bank list —
its high of 1,624 in June 1987.

now at 1,282, down from

We expect our bank fund to

grow by a modest amount this year.

Looking to the future, the new legislation should go far
toward eliminating both the former causes and the
likelihood of a return of the thrift crisis.
Unfortunately, the future is when we will feel the real
pain for this historic government error.

Institutions will have to be closed.
their jobs.

People will lose

Defaulting borrowers will be sued.

Large

amounts of property will be sold in difficult markets.
of course, the taxpayers will bear the burden through
future taxes.

And —

and this is a big And —

there is one continuing

problem that must be addressed in the future.




And

9

The current legislation will go far to address the problems
of the past in the thrift industry by returning discipline
to the system.

But an underlying structural problem

remains in many institutions.

That is the threat to

thrifts inherent in the interest-rate risk that has been
assumed by the industry.

The challenge for the nineties for much of the thrift
industry and its regulators will be to deal with this
inherent mismatch problem —

otherwise the thrifts will not

be able to obtain deposit insurance at reasonable cost.

As insurers, we are gearing up for this job.

We recently

changed our examinations procedures to improve our
monitoring of interest-rate risk and liquidity problems.
The regulators are considering ways to factor interest-rate
risk into the risk-based capital formula.

The thrift industry must help by seeking to control rate
risk.

Approaches available include the increased use of

variable rate mortgages and loans, securitization of
assets, and management of liabilities.




10

Ultimately, we must recognize that as long as we mandate
the existence of a class of depository institutions that
specializes in long-term assets and thus prevent
diversification, we will have an interest-rate sensitive
breed that needs lots of capital and our closest
supervision.

In closing, I commend all of you on your good work —
bringing understanding of these admittedly complex issues
to the American public.

Without that information, the public's voice would never
have made it through the barrage of lobbyists and special
interests who stalk Washington's streets as they did during
the recent vote on the S&L legislation in the House. You
did a great job on the capital issue!

I hope you will be able to tell your readers that their
government is now doing a creditable job at addressing this
historic S&L problem.

We at the FDIC will be doing our

best to make that a credible statement.

I thank you for your kind attention this evening.




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