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L. William Seidman
Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Before

Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry
Chicago, Illinois
July 21, 1988

JUL.2619*8
FEDERAL D trü o iÎ INSUftAiii/t u u ü FORATIO î I

It's a pleasure to speak today with members of the Chicago
Association of Commerce and Industry.

For example, your nearly 40 active committees address areas of
importance to every business in Chicago.

You are working to help make meaningful changes to the area's
tax structure, which your president, Sam Mitchell, has noted, is
the most complex of any metropolitan area in the U.S.

As an

ex-CPA who worked in the area, you have your work cut out for
you.

I think efforts like your's, underscore, that when anyone refers
to Chicago as the "Second City", you would be fully justified in
using that old Gary Cooper line:

"When ya say that, stranger,

smile 11

I would like to take this opportunity to tell you why I think
our deposit insurance system is at a watershed period in its 55
year history, and why that is important to every one of you.




Yes, the insurance system problems are important to every
American —

whether he or she has money in banks or not.

Last year was a challenging year for the FDIC, and its sister
institution, the FSLIC, which guarantees savings and loan
deposits.

These challenges continue.

During the first six months of this year, we have handled 87
bank failures and 14 assistance transactions.

At that pace we

should end up with over 200 failings and assets, or just about
the same number of total failed

and assisted banks as last

year.

Despite a record number of problems handled, the financial
condition of the FDIC fund remains strong.

The FDIC received a

clean GAO audit for 1987, which showed the fund had a net worth
of roughly $18.3 billion.
in cash-type reserves.

Over $15 billion of that net worth is

That makes us about as liquid as they

come in Washington, except maybe for the Fed, and they have the
extraordinary advantage of being able to print money!




We expect 1988 to continue as a busy year.
estimates of loss in 1988 —

Based on current

including the cost of handling

First Republic Bank of Dallas, Texas —

and the combined

assistance of Texas American Bancshares and National Bancshares
Corporation we announced yesterday —

we will experience some

decrease in the net worth of the fund this year, probably
somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 percent!

That will be the

first such loss in FDIC history.

That kind of news makes one reminisce about the good old days of
the recent past.

The nicest thing you could say about someone

was that he was almost as rich as John Connally, and had almost
as much religion as Jimmy Swaggert!

Notwithstanding our projected loss for 1988, we are able to deal
with any banking problem we can foresee.

With the number of

banks on our problem list declining for two quarters now, our
task could be a bit easier down the road.

We forecast that bank

failures will be significantly down next year.
back in the black in the 90's.




We should be

4

The tale of the FSLIC is, unfortunately, not as encouraging.
The thrift industry used to be a simple business designed to
encourage home construction providing low cost funding.

Not

much could go wrong, and as a result, it required minimal
supervision.

Increased competition and rising interest rates

helped change that.

In the early 1980s Congress deregulated

much of the thrift industry, hoping this would be the answer to
the their problems.

But instead many thrifts ventured into

risky real estate ventures and mail box brokered operations, and
the problems have only become worse.

By the end of 1987, according to the GAO, there were over 500
insolvent thrifts with an aggregate negative net worth of $18
billion under GAAP accounting.

Over one-third of the industry

was unprofitable, with those thrifts losing $13.4 billion last
year.

GAO concluded that the FSLIC had a negative net worth of $13.7
billion at year-end 1987.
estimate,

And, according to one congressional

the problems are getting worse at a rate of over $30

million per day, or roughly a billion dollars a month.




5

Estimates of the cost of handling the thrift industry's problems
by closing the solvent S&L's now range from $30 billion
(FSLIC's) to over $80 billion!

So deposit insurance can cost billions of dollars, which
ultimately must be paid —

or our government credit rating will

be impaired.

Now you know why I think this insurance system is at a
watershed, and needs a new look.

From a modest New Deal program started to bolster consumer
confidence in a shaky banking system, the federal deposit
insurance has grown to become an important factor in the safety
and soundness of America's banking and S&L systems.

Deposit insurance was created as a reaction to severe problems
the banking industry faced during the Depression.

The FDIC's beginning was modest in scope.
not without controversy.

But even then it was

Small depositors and small banks

supported the plan, while larger institutions stood against
anything that would help put smaller banks on a more equal
footing with them.




But the role and form of deposit insurance as conceived in the
1930's has changed dramatically as the structure of the banking
system has evolved.

Deposit insurance has become a significant factor in the total
U.S. financial system because it gives banks and thrifts our
almost unlimited power to borrow on the credit of the United
States. Bank owners are only required to put in 6 percent of a
bank's resources, while thrift owners need contribute only 3
percent.

These insured institutions have "credit cards" guaranteed by the
federally authorized insurance funds.

Every institution can

gather $100,000 deposits without the depositors worrying about
the institution's credit.

Of course, the government no longer

regulates the interest rates paid by these institutions, so they
are free to raise their rates to attract almost as much in
deposit liabilities as they desire.

In addition, new kinds of financial enterprises that compete
with banks, deregulation, new technologies, and geographic
expansion, combine to make the banking business a different, and
unfortunately, more risky business, than ever before.




Let's look at a few of the significant changes in the operation
of the deposit insurance system as a result of the current
environment.

Significant differences from the original concept

are apparent.

Let's look at the "too big to fail doctrine."

While the FDIC tries to protect all depositors, even those with
more than $100,000 in deposits, we can not always find a way to
give that protection to small banks under current law.

So

today, small banks complain they are discriminated against —
and they are sometimes correct.

A system designed to help small

banks ends up handicapping them.

Why, in recent years, has the FDIC has moved to protect
depositors and creditors in failing large banks? Because we are
only doing what the rest of the world does.

No major industrial

nation has allowed its large banks to fail since the Great
Depression.
ranging.

The financial repercussions could be too far

The international competitive ramifications alone make

it unlikely this policy will be changed by any single country.




8

As the FDIC helps large banks in trouble, it changes the lender
of last resort role.

The Federal Reserve Board, becomes the

lender of next to last resort.
liquidity lender —

The Fed was conceived as a

to stop runs on banks that were solvent —

not to save banks that were insolvent.

No one thought in those

days that insolvent banks would be “saved." even as far as
depositors were concerned.

When the huge Texas banking operation First Republic went to the
Fed window for funds to keep it afloat last winter, withdrawals
at First Republic increased.

Depositors and creditors were

aware of the Fed's policy of taking the best collateral for its
liquidity lending.

But, when the FDIC gave an unlimited guarantee to depositors and
creditors at the Texas banks, and a loan of $1 billion, the run
on those banks was stopped.

The FDIC has become the primary safety net for failing banks
that need to be protected to assure a stable banking system.
This is a role not even dreamed about by the creators of the
FDIC.




9

Another change is the withdrawal of the safety net of insurance
from bank holding companies as a result of current FDIC
policies.

When the dictum that a bank is "too big to allow depositors or
creditors to suffer" is applied, it is applicable to banks, but
not to bank holding companies.

This policy was not implemented

when your Continental Illinois was rescued —

all creditors

including holding companies were protected.

This spring, the FDIC guaranteed that all depositors and other
general creditors of First Republic's banks would be fully
protected, but these guarantees were NOT extended to the holding
company creditors or shareholders.

This FDIC policy is critical when considering the many proposals
that would allow new powers and activities to bank holding
companies, or to the banks themselves.

FDIC and FSLIC loss experience, especially in the Southwest, has
taught us that deposit insurance is a powerful tool, which if
not properly controlled, has the potential to severely damage
the financial system.




10

As I have said, deposit insurance effectively gives banks and
thrifts the ability to borrow on the credit of the federal
government.

Because of this, the deposit insurance system must

be carefully guarded.

Our deposit insurance system can be compared to a nuclear power
plant.

It can provide benefits.

But at the same time, safety

precautions are needed to keep it from going out of control.

A deposit insurance "meltdown" could damage the fabric of our
whole economy.

One has only to look at the savings and loan

industry losses to see the magnitude of the financial problems
of deposit insurance misused.

And, lest we become satisfied with our bank supervision as the
answer, look at the losses the FDIC is incurring in Texas,
despite supervision by the best federal and state bank
regulators.

In Texas, all but two of the ten major banks have had to be
rescued —

either by the FDIC or private resources.

We are dealing with our Chernobyl right now in the. Southwest.




11

If one needs to be convinced that deposit insurance is important
to the way we live, just think for a minute of what would be the
effect on banking and consumer confidence —
Congressional mail office —

not to mention

if the FDIC ceased issuing deposit

insurance, or reduced it to $2500, as it originally began.

Today's banking environment requires a new look at deposit
insurance in a world of deregulation in rates and territories,
of expanded international financial markets, and of evolving
computer based technologies.

Thus, the FDIC has undertaken a complete review of deposit
insurance and its role and operation in the current banking
environment.

Our study on this subject, ”A Deposit Insurance j

System for the '90sn , will be completed before year-end.

Here are some of the fundamental guidelines to be followed in
constructing a better deposit insurance system.

—

We must construct better Supervisory mechanisms to control

risk

This is key to the future of the system.

If supervision

doesn't work, the ability to borrow on the credit of the U.S.
could mean far ranging disruption.




12

—

We must seek wavs to increase the market's ability to control

risk in today ' s environment

Should we change coverage to

include only short-term deposits, or the introduction of
private coinsurance?

Should we control rates paid on insurance

deposits, or provide insurance only for individuals, and not for
corporations?

We should look for structural changes that reduce risks in the
system that uses deposit insurance.

Suggestions have included

the "narrow bank", that is one that invests only in "safe
assets".

Or should we have different types of insurance or

structure for large funds and small banks?

Should we restructure the insurance system?

Should there be a

merger of the FDIC and FSLIC funds?

As we have said many times, we do not favor a merger under
current conditions —

their obligations are just too big —

A better insurance system may include better coordination of the
insurance funds.




13

So we believe it's clear we need an improved system for deposit
insurance to be viable in the '90s.

This is a problem likely to be high on the agenda of our next
President.

The new President —

Mr. D or Mr. B —

may want to act on this

problem early in his honeymoon period, following the good
advice, "Get the tough ones behind you in the first 100 days."

Well, I'm at a point in this speech that reminds me of a story
that one of the presidential candidates recently told me.

He had just finished a long and rambling speech.

Afterwards a

woman came up to the speaker's table to shake his hand.

"How

did you like my speech?" he asked.

She answered, "I liked it fine.

But it seems to me you missed

several excellent opportunities."

The candidate was puzzled. "Several excellent opportunities to
do what?

"To end your speech," she replied.

Not to be accused of missing good opportunities, I'd like to say




thank you for asking me to speak, and I would be pleased to

•I

respond to any questions.




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