View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

TIGHT MONEY M D IT3 COMMERCIAL BANKING IMPLICATIONS

Panel Discussion before the
Philadelphia Chapter, Robert Morris Associates
KARL R. BOPP

- Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

WM. R. K. MITCHELL - Chairman of Board, Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia
Member Federal Advisory Council (rep. 3rd F.R. District)
WILLIAM F. KELLY

- President, First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Company
The Barclay Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa.
October 4-, 1956 - 6:15 p. m.

Karl R.

Bopp

Introduction
N.S.F.

-

Not you - us!

What I have been asked to do:

I.

(1)

Give a background on development of tight money

(2)

Since Bill Mitchell and Bill Kelly preferred answering
questions to giving talks, to ask appropriate questions
of them - handed in

(3)

Clay Anderson before A.I.B. will give statistical
presentation. I shall use precious few figures.

If in banking 20 years, have heard of tight money only in the past

4 years on 2 occasions:
1952 - 1953
1955 - date
A.

Why not in preceding 15-16 years?
1.

2.

B.




From revaluation to World War II
Inflow of gold f supply
Government, business & individual

little demand

World War II - March J+, 1951
Era of the pegs
DidnH hear of tight money - but of inflation!

The Accord and its meaning
No longer tolerate inflation
Direct monetary policy toward ftill employment of
resources at stable prices,
i.e. lean against the wind

- 2 -

C.

An over-all program
Effective demand = flow of goods and services at
current average price level
In a flexible economy with great freedom by consumer to spend
for one thing or another, a profit - and loss ~ economy cannot
thru monetary policy build a floor under demand for every product
e.g. automobiles
without inflation elsewhere
Monetary policy can*t do the whole job •

D.

The real test of whether credit is too tight is are we using our resources fully at stable prices?
Employment release for September
Price Indexes

E.

II.

The future:
What will be true next May-June?
Should fear of that close our eyes to what is going on now?
Bi-weekly meetings of F.O.M.C.

Money supply for economic growth
A . Perspective
60 million
In 184-3 Aggregate deposits in U.S.
60 billion
194-3 Demand deposits adj.
End of July 1956
107 billion
By 19[66 substantially higher still but how we get there
in detail from day-to-day is another question;
also from area to area!
B . Recent developments
About 3% a year
BUT not every year
Greater in 1954Less in 1955
Still less in 1956
Why? Briefly, more efficient use of money-velocity
Corporate investment policy
Implications for future cycles and money supply

III.

Philadelphia
has hiiit mi id*
rerss balance

Regional changes

- Why is Philadelphia hit especially hard?

A.

Expectation of normal national growth in deposits

B.

Expectation of sharing normally in that growth

C.

Expectation of normal growth in credit demands

D.

In 1954 actively seeking new accounts
Opportunity to acquire national customers

E.

Where funds have come from
Larger liquidation of investments
Larger borrowings




QUESTIONS SENT IN IN ADVANCE
For M r . Bopp:

What factors are responsible for the present tightness of money?
To what extent and in what ways has the Federal Reserve System
influenced the situation?
What are the objectives of Federal Reserve monetary and credit
policies?
What has been the relative impact of tight money on commercial
banks in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve District compared with
banks in the other Districts, and what factors have been respon­
sible for the difference?
Has the relative position of the banks in the Third District been
changing recently for better or worse?
Wage rates have been rising more or less steadily since World War II,
without an accompanying equivalent rise, in the aggregate, in the
productivity of labor. This certainly appears to be an inflationary
trend and one, which if continued over a period of years would seem
to present a real dilemma to the Federal Reserve System authorities
in their efforts to combat inflation through control of the money
supply. Mounting wage costs have served to stimulate the demand for
more labor-saving machinery and for funds with which to finance same.
Are higher interest rates going to effectively deter business men
from borrowing for such purposes?
There is a vast segment of the money supply in this country which
the Federal Reserve System has very little control of, namely, the
savings and loan business, the savings banks, the insurance com­
panies, pension funds and labor union funds. Both of these sources
might be said to supply long-term capital needs rather than short­
term. If these two premises are correct, generally speaking, then
how can the system effectively control inflationary trends, long
range, in our economy?

For Mr. Mitchell:
What factors should influence a bank's decision regarding tax
switches in its bond portfolio?
Will you comment on the basic principles which should motivate bank
portfolio management during the present tight money period?
Is this a good time to extend bond maturities in view of the present
levels of bond prices?
Should a commercial bank liquidate short, intermediate or long-term
securities linder present circumstances to provide funds to lend to
its customers?
As a commercial banker, what is your view of Federal Reserve monetary
and credit policies and their implementation during the recent past
with respect to their effectiveness in achieving their objectives?



F o r Mr . Kelly:

More attention has been focussed recently upon the subject of
compensating deposit balances. What constitutes a proper rela­
tionship between credit lines and deposit balances in the case
of different types of borrowers, and how can the bank's require­
ments best be sold to customers?
To what extent should the continuing rise in the operating costs
influence interest rates?
In the matter of loan interest rates, is it proper to charge all
that the traffic will bear, recognizing that borrowers will give
expression to their bargaining power when credit and money rates
ease?
Will you comment on some of the customer and public relations
aspects of credit rationing?
What general principles should be observed in the rationing of
credit during a period of tight money?