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K.

R. Bopp prepared outline.

Material in parentheses are notes he
made on his copy when leading the
discussion at the Presidents' Conference
on March 1, 1955.




Hap - You have asked for an informal discussion.

I appreciate
your invitation. I wish I had answers, but I do not
communicate with any burning bush.
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS
March 1, 1955

THE DISCOUNT RATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE CREDIT MARKETS
Hap - It is a pleasure to introduce discussion - informal.
From time to time I have talked with you - may call on you.

Leif
Allan
A1
Wilbur
Hugh
Malcolm
Hap
DC
Oliver
Gavin
Bob *
Cecil

Outline of Introduction to the Discussion

I.
tablish F.R. Banks
iscount com'l paper
Elastic currency
supervision )

erhaps inevitable
but tragic)

Historical background
A.

Initially discounting was considered the most important
function of the Federal Reserve Banks (both for itself
and to provide an elastic currency) and the discount
rate was considered the most important tool.

B.

During the 1920's open market operations were given an
increasingly significant role and became, in fact, the
primary tool, (or at least equally important as discounting and the rate)

C.

While Government security prices were pegged, emphasis
was shifted to changes in reserve requirements. (An inevitable but
tragic interlude)
With the Accord, the System began a systematic reap­
praisal of all instruments.

D.

(Committee report
published in Flandss
2. With the flurry in discounting during the period
Hearings)
have been on committees
of restraint in 1952 and 19 53 , attention was
forking on these matters directed to the discount rate and the discount
nd have squirmed!
mechanism.
(Led to Revised Reg. A - in its initial draft
ut we all have a job
and final draft
c do !
That concerns the rules or administration)
(what is peculiar about discounting?^
II* / A crucial feature of discounting - and its implication




1.

A.

Open market operations - almost Immediately

Discounting is the chief means by which member banks
may take the Initiative in influencing the volume of
reserves (or excess reserves) with which they operate.
Other factors that determine the volume of reserves
are largely beyond the Influence of the member banks:
currency, gold, float, Treasury balances, the open
market portfolio, reserve requirements.

B.

We can't say much that is very useful about the rate
until we have decided how Important we want discounting
to be and the degree to which we want to regulate it
through administration of rules.

We shall come back to each!
presenting the spectrum.

This is merely

2 :There are real people who favor each degree
The Range or Spectrum[of emphasis - I shall be Devil's advocate at times
Alternative degrees of emphasis on discounting - with some
implications for rate policy
A. All credit is via discounting - extreme I (The only avenue - outside of
A. Discounting as a major means of providing the market
gold!)
with reserves.
-

III.

1.

During the 1920's when the level of member bank
reserves was $2-$2^ billion, the volume of borrow­
ing was usually above
billion and reached more
than $1 billion In 1928 -29 , so that members as a
whole were generally borrowing from 20 to 25 per (at least)
cent or more of their required reserves.
At the present time the level of required
reserves is $l8-$20 billion.

2.

This decision would envision a sizable amount of
borrowing at all times with rather wide fluctua­
tions to accommodate the seasonal flows of cur­
rency, etc.

3 • Some pros:
(a)

One of the four enumerated purposes of the
Federal Reserve Act is "to afford means of
rediscounting” - "commercial paper” to be
sure, but still rediscounting.

(b)

Would tie member banks more closely to
Reserve Banks.

(c)

Would put funds into the banking system
directly where they are needed rather than
in the central money market.(in the hope that they would
trickle out where needed)
if. Some cons:

Even if desirable

ilf it can be done




5.

(a)

Will destroy the "tradition against borrowing" a desirable characteristic for bankers to have.

(b)

m view of the liquidity habits of banks and
the tradition against borrowing, this state of
affairs could not be brought about over night.

(c)

It really can't be done - will have continual
Contractive effect and reduced availability of
credit.

(d)

Will reduce ability of System to make fine
adjustments.

(e)

Borrowing will be subject to widespread abuse.

(f)

Difficult or impossible to police impartially.

Implications for the rate
Rate would have to be placed and kept relatively
low in the galaxy of rates.

- 3 -

B.

Discounting as a principal method of influencing the
availability of credit.

1.

The volume of discounting would virtually disappear
in periods of active ease and might rise - to
perhaps $2 billion - in periods of active restraint.

2.

Some pros:
(a) Makes use of the tradition against borrowing.
(b)

Essentially what the System has done in the
past.

Some cons:
(a)
»ally what was done in the
l
.920» s - and
lore recently.
Itability of total reserves
lisct-^» Open Market portfolio

C.

P
neral notion that they
tre very flexible - textboks say so - we know.

Implications for the rate

k.

Really makes open market operations the
primary instrument.

(b)

Rate would lag behind changes in market rates
and would be changed relatively infrequently.

(a)

Although they can be made in amounts precisely
specified in advance,

(b)

There is no way to determine accurately how
large they should be.

Discounts are available precisely where and to the
extent they are needed - and allowed by the System.
Would be integrated with more extensive use of
repurchase agreements.
Implications for the rate

- but reason your job
Simore valuable - your abilities
)jre scarce than Congressmen!/




(a)

Discounting as a method of daily adjustment. (Has never been discussed,
Harold Roelse)
1. Open market operations are not adaptable to day to
day adjustments.

Magic in the rate (its
elation to maricet rates)
2.
Ither. Policy - should
e tighten or ease and how
ach - is still the problem! 3»
t is not answered by teenies!
here do you want to go? /

eConcerting

Gives discounting too small a role - or
alternatively - too large a role.

The rate would have to be kept close to market
rates - which in turn, however, are greatly
influenced by open market operations. This
might imply that closer attention be paid to
market rates (as contrasted with the volume of
free reserves) in determining open market
operations.
Even so, changes in rate would probably be
more frequent than in recent years.

-

D.

-

Limit borrowing to real emergencies

evil's Advocate
The "real” problem is
: b control of M + M^- as
uch - there are too many
tidden and gradual changes
the demand for cash
lances (e.g. Korea - or
Merse June 1, 19531) The
eal problem is control of
isB terms under which this
enand can be satisfied,
bat is essentially the rate
f interest. Permit tightenig with Korea - but not
m e 1, 1953 )

IV.

4

So long as member banks can take the initiative in
borrowing, they can escape any pressure the System
wishes to impose. (E. S. Shaw in "Money, Income
and Monetary Policy", p. 2 l k , says: "Rediscount
is a breach in the armament of monetary control...
Unless rediscount is restrained, monetary control
is a fiction.")
Discounting would normally be at very low levels
with the discount window kept open essentially to
discharge the responsibility of "lender of last
resort."
Implications for the rate
Rate always high relative to market rates and possibly tight administration of rules
as well.

Implications of recent rate history

(What would an historian say?)

Think of our actions - not in terns of politics - but in terms of history.1)

A.

Until the Accord, the System was really following the
emergency principle.
It should be remembered this was the period when
the System was limited in its use of open market
operations. The rate was raised relatively early
in terms of market rates to indicate the System's
view as to the need for restraint.

B.

Since the Accord, the System has been following the
principle of influencing availability.
Rate changes have lagged behind changes in market
rates - at times considerably "behind.
But changes in the rate have been made to reflect
the System's judgment as to the degree of desirable
restraint or ease.
This raises the question as to whether the volume
of "free" reserves is an appropriate guide or
whether attention should be directed to market
rates as such.

(if you favor A or D - market rates not very important
- except in A keep discount rate' low enough and
in D keep discount rate high enough1
(But B + C - pay more attention to market rates
and conduct open market operations to control theml)