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THE BRETTQM WOODS PROPOSALS

by

Karl R. Bopp

Before a Special Meeting of
Philadelphia Bankers
at the Rittenhouse Club
6:30 p.m., March 6, 1945




w u m m m m

m m m

Background of international relations
¿U

Introduction
1*

ajJU *M
An »Xpert 1» one who lfl*«w>gn1nnr
lnaccuraci»» as he sweeps an to the

■ajor fallacy.
2«

B.

It 1# a. fukiasental tenet of deaocragy
that it doean1t require an expert
■ake a wise ehoice aaong fundamantal
alternatives.

Major factor«
1.

SMtruotioo ha# gone so far (murt be
near |1 trillion).
Gis ii rebuild? - nip and tuck.
Determination sat to rely on old **&ods.

2#

Social revolution

a. Even before the war we had not solved
fundamental social, economic, and
political questions.
To an increasing extent people
turning to Government.
b. Aggravated by war - great masses now
refuse to believe that economic
ills are inevitable.
That if necessary Government can and
oust do something.



c. Differs #®ong countries in degree
to tihleh movement has gone.
C. Conditions of a possible solution: no one
has clear-cut answer to meet, every con­
tingency.
¿2 *t ****-' **•*»
*nrv£, u«v «hJU
^ <***^*
1. Must attack on all fronts at the same
tise.
OMyAti» ^
2« In the political sphere: Collective
Security
TUmM ¿***
iL.
a. A unified policy: no falling out
among each other.
b. Based on law and morality.
c. Must give up right to use military
force for selfish ends.
Must use military powers tOrmaintain
security of all.

3*

In the economic sphere: Mutual Aid
a. Our only hope - because of the social
revolution - is an expanding
economy.
b. To achieve it we must mutually give
up our economic weapons.
c. We must commit ourselves to economic
as well as political peace.
d. We must be assured that others will
not attack.




-3|. Method of achieving agreement.
1.

Two years of discussion among all
interested parties.

2.

Result; the miracle of the plans agreement among experts.
^

3 vr*
¿AijlCit*

3«

One person could write a better plan
but hundreds couldn't do it better.
A
'5y “>• e
f
j
The International Monetary and Financial Proposals
A*

^
B.

They are only part of a comprehensive
organization*
1.

Collective security in the political
field.

2.

Trade policies and practices.

The background of the plans.
1.

Rules of the gold standard game developed
over a century of peace and stability
following Napoleon.

2«

First World War shattered the whole
structure.

3*

Attempted restoration in the 1920's.

a* Individual instead of joint action.
Austria in 1922 to Portugal in 1929-

b. Relation to pre-war parities.



Tile nature

the effects of the Increase In the price of the

Arnd from

14*32 in June 1924 to #4.37 in June 1925 msy be illustrated clearly by reference to

« single British export industry* A correspondent of the London Economist reported
in the Jtane 27, 1925

Issue that in Brasil, American coal was being quoted at $8*85

as agtlnst 99 shillings for British coal, «hen, as in June 1924» the quotation is
#4*32 jwr pound, 39 «Hillings are equal to $8.42; but when, as in June 1925, the

quotft^ien i» $4*87» the ease number of shillings are worth $9*50. Thus with jg
fibflUBtfHI In either the dollar or the sterling quotation on coal but with a change from
$4.32 to $4.87 in the quotation on the pound, British coal ceases to bo $0.43 per ton

cheap# and beeooes Instead 10.65 per ton dearer than American coal in the Brazilian
markoi.

y jt

* /£>£ f***' ***-




4

-

-

T/Utf'
| •AACtrd ^
4. Failure of the restoration attempt

a* Causes
(1) Sterling p a r i t y 5v
(Merged 10% more than it vas
fa

^

1*rth*

Had to reduce domestic prices
and wages - unnmploywayit.
(2) firanc undervaluation*
Jfcperable balance on currant
account to pay for cheap R*nch
goods.
(3) Other errors*
b. Effects
(1) Competitive exchange depreciation
to capture vorld markets.
Retaliations by shutting the
hone market (inport quotas).
(2) Multiple currency devices.
Sigh price for goods over which
yon have a monopoly.
Iiqv prie# for coijpetitive goods.
(3) Bilateral clearing arrangeaents
with cohort surplus neighbors*
c* Conclusions

(1) Primary objective of countries
was to protect themselves acting individually.

M
I
iA
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
j# aJt+ÿ*
fa*
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

- 5(2)

Result m s to destroy ito M
trade mil arowd*

JU~

Deteyaipat.joft, to avoid in the Axbure.

III.

Tli@ lnt«roatioiml Bute for Reconstruction and
Development.

A*

Reception of the plan.
1*

B«

!?•

Widely accepted, hence need not discuss
v«ry *ach.

Principles.
1.

Head for long tern capital for specific
projects.

2.

Reluctance of inaivlciual investor to
provide sxeept at very high rates if*
'at a n .

3«

Jteternatioml 'sharing of tbs risks.

The Intenmtioml Monetary Jtand

A.

iBtroduatiaa
1.

To provide high level of productive emp&oyBetit m mast «pand world trade*

2.

Gaa't ®fceo®pHflh if m follow tact log
Of ItJO»#.




- 6 -

3« All countries would like to go along
.. ( j.
but eachxWQai<U%wo+e buy no more
-- than it sells«
(r~~'
That is, to capture as much of the world
market as possible.
B. The Fund:
1. A permanent institution to promote
international monetary cooperation.
By providing machinery for consultation
and collaboration on international
monetary problems.
To promote exchange stability, to main­
tain orderly exchange arrangements
among members, and to avoid competi­
tive exchange depreciation.
"It would facilitate the creation and
maintenance of a sowd currency basis
for the balanced growth of international
trade by establishing and by assisting
members in following rules of good
conduct based on the proposition that
exchange rates are properly matters of
international concern.*
C. The conflicts.
1. On rates.
a« Exchange stability - U.S.
b. Flexibility - others, esp. U.K. &
Australia.




-72* On controls*
a. Free exchange - U*&
b. Controls - others
B* The reconciliation*
1. On rates*
a. Others agree not to change except
to aeet fundamental lack of balance.
(I.*., fiiglandj 1925-30)
Would agree on}y if t&*gf hare a
second line of reserves*

It

b*

2.

3*

£.

We agree to permit changes but only
if really needed.
And establishment of a fund of
additional reserves.
■jj-mJ tv*f
A
i
■*
On controls.
un­
successful removals to make currencies
multilateral.
S
iw. t
't A*-.-i
*'*
On second line of reserves (the Fund).
a.

They say automatic right.

b.

We say only if live up to terms and
conditions.

Objections to the Fund*
1*

Why have two organizations?




a.

b.

Two very different full-time jobs.
(1)

The Bank loans for specific
purposes.

(2)

The Fund to see it is not misused.
Analysis of balance of payments.

If consolidated, one would tend to
become a stepchild - or so delegates
of the 44 nations believe.
No objection if could assure this
wouldn't happen.
Actually, those who would consolidate
would emasculate the Fund.

The Fund permits too much flexibility in
exchange rates and too much control
over exchanges.
a.

This was the great issue before and
at Biretton Woods.

b.

ABA says:
"The Monetary Fund...goes far beyond
the principles heretofore accepted
by the United States in recognizing
and approving changes in currency
values and the maintenance of
exchange controls."
(1)




How does the ABA propose to
meet?

"That an article be added placing
on the governors and directors
of the Bank responsibility for
arranging and negotiating
agreements between the member
countries with respect to the
stabilization of currencies,
removal of exchange controls as
rapidly as practicable, ana the
general rules of procedure in
carrying out monetary policies."

23
3b

(2)

p )

How would this secure more
stability and speed?
Fund brings all up to minimum
level - ABA each at lowest
level it will accept.

c
M

3.

ABA would not give the positive
powers the Fund will have over
rates and controls.

Access to the Fund is too easy.
a.

The purpose is consistent with the
purpose of the Fund.

b.

The amount does not exceed 25% of
the quota in any twelve-month
period or 200% of the quota in all.

c.

The member repurchases - that is,
repays - at the end of each year a
portion of its currency, depending
upon its resources.




-lO-

ci.

It pays specified charges.

e.

The Fund has not otherwise limited
the member or declared it in­
eligible to use the Fund because
of prior abuses.

f.

The Fund has not declared scarce the
foreign exchange the member wishes
to purchase.

In addition, and more importantly in
many cases, proponents of the Fund rely
upon the good faith of the member and
upon the quality of management of the
Fund.
4.

Scarce currency provisions.
If dollar becomes scarce, countries may
impose restrictions.

V.

a.

Fund will not cause dollar scarcity
but will tend to mitigate.

b.

If dollar becomes scarce, restrictions
would be imposed without the Fund
but in less orderly way.

Conclusions.
A.

B.

The position oi the State Department in
international negotiations*
^ i,
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Not a perfect document: peaeifrili^y of
revision,




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Mr. President, I conceive that there are several parts of this
Constitution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure
that I shall never approve them. For having lived long, I have
experienced many instances of being obliged by better information,
or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important sub­
jects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. * * *
In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its
faults, if they are such,
I doubt too whether any other convention we can obtain may be
able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number
°f men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably
assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their
errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views.
From such an assembly can a perfect production be expected?
It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approach­
ing so near to perfection as it doesj and I think it will astonish
our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear * * * that
our States are on the point of separation only to meet hereafter
for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. Thus, I consent,
Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because
I am not sure that it is not the best. The opinions I have had of
its errors are sacrificed to the public good.