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Statement of K. A. Randall
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Before the Committee on Banking and Currency
House of Representatives
July 16, 1968

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity to present
the views of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with respect to
H.R. 13884, 90th Congress, a bill "To prohibit federally insured banks
from voting their own stock and to provide for cumulative voting in
federally insured banks."
This bill would add to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act two
new sections relating to the voting of the stock of insured banks,
including both national banks and State banks.

These sections,

incidentally, are numbered 21 and 22 in the bill but, due to amendments
to our Act enacted subsequent to the introduction of the bill, the cor­
rect numbers would now be 23 and 24.
One new section would provide that shareholders shall have
the right to use cumulative voting in elections of directors of all
insured banks.

This provision would be identical to an existing pro­

vision of section 5144 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
(12 U.S.C. 61) covering national banks, except that it would also
apply to insured State banks.




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The other new section would prohibit any insured bank from
voting or controlling the voting of any of its own shares of stock for
any purpose.

While it could have much wider applicability, this pro­

hibition presumably is directed primarily at the voting of stock held
in fiduciary capacities.

It has been suggested, moreover, that the

potential conflicts of interest which are inherent in the right of a
bank to vote its own stock may result in abuses which could result in
losses to insured banks and ultimately in losses to this Corporation.
The right of a national bank to vote its own stock is now
limited by certain provisions of section 5144 of the Revised Statutes.
It is there provided that in the election of directors of a national
bank, shares of the bank’s stock held by the bank as sole trustee,
whether registered in its own name or in the name of its nominee, shall
not be voted by the registered owner unless under the terms of the trust
the manner in which such shares shall be voted by the sole trustee may
be determined by a donor or beneficiary of the trust and unless such
donor or beneficiary actually directs how such shares shall be voted.
It is further provided in the same section that, in the election of
directors, shares of a national bank’s own stock held by the bank and
one or more persons as co-trustees may be voted by such other person or
persons, as trustees, in the same manner as if he or they were the sole
trustee.
Insofar as national banks are concerned, the proposed legis­
lation would in effect substitute for the present restrictions upon the




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voting of stock held in a fiduciary capacity a more comprehensive pro­
hibition against a bank's voting or controlling the voting of its own
stock in any circumstances.

The present statutory provisions, however,

have been in effect for national banks for over 30 years, and we are
not aware of any evidence that they have not proven adequate.
The voting rights of shareholders of State banks are now
governed by State, rather than Federal, law.

Legislation on this

subject involves the regulation of internal corporate affairs, which
has traditionally been an area subject to State determination in the
case of State-chartered institutions.

Our records do not indicate

that existing State provisions on this subject have contributed to
significant losses to insured banks or to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation as insurer.

In view of this fact and in the absence of

evidence that the voting rights of shareholders in State-chartered
institutions are not being adequately protected under existing State
law, Federal legislation could be regarded as an unnecessary intrusion.
The holding by banks of their own stock as trustee is to a
large extent due to the fact that the owners of bank stock naturally
utilize the services of their own institutions in the management of
their property and in its distribution to members of their families
or other beneficiaries,

A recent review of insured nonmember banks

examined by the Corporation indicated that a major portion of bank
stock held in a fiduciary capacity in these banks is beneficially
owned by current and former officers, directors, and employees of




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the institution and their beneficiaries and is voted in accordance with
instructions from -- or with the knowledge of -- the owners.

No reports

of abuses of this power in insured nonmember banks have been brought
to our attention.
If the need for legislation at the Federal level governing
voting rights of shareholders of insured banks can be demonstrated,
the Corporation favors the adoption of language covering insured
State-chartered institutions similar to that now applicable to
national banks —

as contained in the provisions of section 5144 of

the Revised Statutes relating to the voting of stock held by banks
as trustees.
The Corporation, furthermore, has received no indications
of a need for cumulative voting provisions in the election of directors
of insured State banks not members of the Federal Reserve System.
Accordingly, we are not prepared at this time to recommend to Congress
the proposal providing for cumulative voting in elections of directors
of all insured banks.
The proposal relating to the voting of bank stock by insured
banks contained in H.R. 13884 is similar to one of the recommendations
of the staff of the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Banking
and Currency Committee in their report on "Commercial Banks and their
Trust Activities" that there be a




UL prohibition against all insured banks holding
or voting their own stock held in their trust
departments."

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The recommendation was advanced on the grounds that the prohibition
"would discourage the widespread use of such stockholdings to per­
petuate the officers of these banking institutions in office and would
apply the general rule of corporation law that corporations are pro­
hibited from voting stock held in the corporation’s treasury."
As a matter of fact, concrete evidence of widespread abuse in
the exercise of voting power that the proposed legislation is designed
to correct is not set forth in the Subcommittee's report, nor, to our
knowledge, in any other studies on the subject.

Enactment of legis­

lation along these lines therefore might be deferred at this time.
Nevertheless, the Subcommittee's report is concerned with an
economic problem of fundamental importance, and one that is certainly
deserving of further study.

In its report the staff of the Subcommittee

attempts to analyze the interrelationships between major banking insti­
tutions and other financial institutions and interlocking relationships
between banks and major industrial corporations.

Concern also is

voiced with respect to shifts that have taken place over the past
25 years toward increasing concentration of economic power and its
"implications for the continued viability of our competitive free
enterprise economy."

Obvious changes have occurred in our economic

institutions during this period as the economy has grown and prospered.
Banks as well as business firms are larger.

At the same time, trans­

portation and communication facilities and mobility of manpower and
other resources have improved.




The implications of these developments

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on economic power are a subject that requires intensive factual study
in order to carry on an informed discussion regarding their conse­
quences for the economy.
The possible problems that might arise as a consequence of
banks voting their own stock and thereby perpetuating undesirable
management are really but one -- and a relatively minor -- aspect of
the much more important problem -- whether the current trends in con­
centration of economic power are desirable or not.

Accordingly, the

bill under consideration might best be considered in a broader context
of the complete study’s findings and conclusions.
As indicated earlier, the Corporation to date has no evidence
that the protection afforded shareholders of insured nonmember banks is
inadequate under present State laws, particularly in relation to the
fiduciary activities of banks.

Nevertheless, we realize that the trust

activities of banks have been expanding recently, and these developments
are under continuing study here at the Corporation.