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For release on delivery
9:30 a •m • E»S•T*
March 17, 1993

Testimony by
John P. LaWare

Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and
Chairman, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council

before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs
of the
Committee on Government Operations
U.S. House of Representatives

March 17, 1993

I am happy to be here to discuss the topic of
regulatory burden and particularly the efforts of the Federal
Reserve and the other bank regulatory agencies to reduce burden
administratively.
The issue of the appropriate level of regulation of
banking organizations, although not new, recently has been a
focus of concern.

Banking institutions serve a vital role in

determining the growth of the economy.

Consequently, in an

increasingly global and competitive financial market, the U.S.
can ill afford to handicap its banking institutions —

and

therefore the individuals and businesses they serve —

with

stifling and constantly changing rules and regulations.

The

ever-increasing number and detail of regulatory requirements and
restrictions have increased the costs and reduced the
availability of service from banking institutions.

Further,

aggregate burden frustrates the purpose of stability and safety
regulations by driving traditional banking functions toward
alternative, less regulated providers.
In an effort to counter the trend toward costly over­
regulation, the banking agencies have worked both individually
and as a group to identify administratively imposed burden and,
insofar as possible, to reduce it.

These efforts are represented

in initiatives such as the agencies' "Regulatory Uniformity
Project,"

the Federal Financial Institutions Examination

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Council's (FFIEC) "Study on Regulatory Burden," and, most
recently, last week's announcement by the President of an
interagency program designed to reduce the cost and burden of
lending, particularly to small and medium-sized businesses.

The Interagency Policy Statement on Credit Availability
On March 10, the President announced that all of the
banking regulatory agencies will, over the next few months, take
actions in five areas to promote greater availability of credit
to credit-worthy borrowers.

The actions to be taken in each of

the areas are as follows:
Eliminate impediments to small and medium-sized business
lending by permitting banks to make and carry a basket of
loans to such borrowers with minimal documentation
requirements. In addition, guidance will be issued to make
it clear that banks and thrifts, in making loans to such
borrowers, particularly those loans to be placed in the
basket, are encouraged to give important consideration to
character and general reputation in assessing a borrower's
credit worthiness.
Reduce appraisal burden and improve the climate for real
estate by altering existing rules so that institutions
taking real estate as "additional" collateral for a business
loan that is not to acquire or refinance real estate will
not be required to have such property appraised by a
certified or licensed appraiser. In addition, the agencies
will be re-examining their existing rules to make sure that
thresholds below which formal appraisals are not needed are
at reasonable levels.
Enhance and streamline arrangements by which bankers can
obtain a fair and speedy review of complaints about examiner
decisions, while providing assurance that neither banker nor
examiner will be subject to retribution as a result of an
appeal.
All examination processes and procedures are to be improved
by eliminating unneeded duplication of examinations and
increasing coordination of examination activities,
particularly centralizing and streamlining examinations of
multibank organizations. The agencies have also agreed to

3

heighten emphasis in examinations on risks to the
institution and to issues involving fair lending, as well as
to reduce regulatory uncertainty by eliminating ambiguous
language in regulations and interpretations — and delays in
publishing regulations and interpretations.
All regulations and interpretations are to be reviewed
to find ways to minimize paper work and other regulatory
burden.
We certainly expect that these changes will affect the
willingness of the banking industry to lend to creditworthy
borrowers, and we are working together to implement them fully.

The FFIEC Study on Regulatory Burden
I have been asked by the Subcommittee to describe the
agencies' recently completed Study on Regulatory Burden.

The

study, mandated by Congress in Section 221 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), required the
FFIEC to review the regulatory policies and procedures of the
banking agencies and the Treasury Department to determine whether
they impose "unnecessary" burden on banking institutions, and to
identify any revisions that might reduce burden without
endangering safety and soundness or diminishing compliance with
or enforcement of consumer laws.

The FFIEC was directed to

report its findings by December 19, 1992.
During early 1992, the four federal banking agencies
and the Department of the Treasury undertook extensive internal
reviews of their policies, procedures, recordkeeping and
documentation requirements.

In addition, an interagency task

force assembled and reviewed the public comments that the Federal

4
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) had received in response to their Spring 1992
requests for comments on regulatory burden.

The FFIEC also

requested and received public comments specifically on ways that
burden might be reduced and held public hearings on this topic in
Kansas City, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.
At the outset, the FFIEC stated its belief that the
goal of this process was not to examine and develop proposed
revisions to the overall statutory scheme governing financial
institutions.

Rather, it appeared to the Council that the

Congressional intent was to accept the statutory scheme as a
given and instead to examine the manner in which the federal
banking agencies and the Treasury Department have implemented
that scheme by means of regulations, policy statements,
procedures and recordkeeping requirements.
Many commenters, as well as the agencies themselves,
recommended changes which were within the jurisdiction of the
agencies.

During the year, the agencies acted on many of these

suggestions for regulatory improvement, particularly those
related to required reports, examination procedures, and
application processes.

The study included a summary of those

actions.
Interagency working groups reviewed other specific
recommendations for regulatory change and divided them into three

categories.

The first category included specific recommendations

5
from the public and areas of concern that the FFIEC agreed were
worthy of further consideration.

In many cases, the agencies

agreed on the general approach and developed a consensus position
which is described in the study.

In some cases, an agency

supported a recommendation in part or preferred an alternative
approach to meet the goal of the recommendation, and in a few
cases, the agencies felt that further consideration and possibly
some compromise may be required to address the issues.
Other suggestions from the public which, after careful
consideration, were found not to meet fully the standards set
forth in Section 221 are discussed in the study while those that
concerned non-Council member agencies are simply listed.

In

addition, an analysis of the public recommendations concerning
the rules implementing the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) was contributed
by the Department of the Treasury.
During the course of the study, the FFIEC also reviewed
the small number of existing studies of the costs of regulation.
Despite methodological and coverage differences, their findings
are reasonably consistent that regulatory costs might be in the
range of 6 to 14 percent of non-interest expenses.

This estimate

includes the cost of deposit insurance premiums, but does not
include any measurement of the opportunity cost of reserve
requirements or prohibited activities.

This range applied to the

actual 1991 non-interest expenses for commercial banks of $124.6
billion suggests that regulatory costs could have been between
$7.5 and $17 billion in that year.

6

In the weeks since the study was submitted to the
Congress, the agencies have continued to consider the
suggestions, and I anticipate that further action will be taken
in the near term.

However, many of the public recommendations as

well as the actions taken by the regulatory agencies address
problems which are technical in nature and not highly significant
in terms of their impact on total regulatory burden.

Indeed,

significant relief from regulatory burden will require more
substantial changes.

Because legislation is often very detailed

in its requirements and the regulations must track the statutory
provisions, the agencies are limited in their ability to address
many provisions which impose substantial burdens.
Accordingly, the Council's member agencies have agreed
to continue meeting to identify and recommend possible statutory
changes to reduce regulatory burden further.

The Council hopes

to provide a separate report to Congress on those issues by late
spring.

Recommendations for the Future
Banking institutions are regulated because of important
public poli'"' considerations, and much of the regulation arises
ultimately from four fundamental public policy concerns:

bank

safety and soundness, banking market structure and competition,
systemic stability, and consumer protection.

The safety and

stability of the banking system is vital to the economy.

Further, it is difficult to quarrel with the purposes of

7

individual consumer protections.

Nevertheless, the aggregate

effect of the implementation of a substantial number of desirable
policies may result in burdening individual banking transactions
to an unacceptable degree.
In the aggregate, this burden has become substantial,
raising the costs of banking services and thus encouraging bank
customers to seek less costly loans and services or higheryielding investments from other financial intermediaries that are
not subject to the same regulatory requirements and restrictions.
The movement of business from banking institutions to other
intermediaries and directly to money and capital markets may
frustrate the purposes for which banking regulations were
adopted.

I believe this burden has already begun to threaten the

competitiveness of the banking industry itself.
What is needed is fundamental review of approaches to
regulation in search of mechanisms that will achieve the same
goals but with less burden and without the problems which
accompany the current approach.

New approaches to regulation

which are more sensitive to cost/benefit tradeoffs must be sought
and considered.

In particular, existing market forces and

incentives should be harnessed as much as possible to achieve
regulatory goals, rather than relying on micro-level regulations
that eliminate the flexibility that is important in a dynamic
industry.

We should consider, as well, changes that can reduce

burden by reducing regulatory prohibitions on banking activities.
As you know, the Federal Reserve Board has long supported

8

nationwide interstate banking, insurance sales and full
investment banking powers to provide the public the benefits of
wider competition, and it supports the payment of interest on
required reserves to reduce the costs imposed on banking
institutions as regulated entities.
To the greatest extent possible, banking regulation
should provide flexibility by tailoring requirements to specific
facts and circumstances and by distinguishing among institutions
according to meaningful criteria such as condition, size, and
management competence.

Regulations that provide insufficient

flexibility can cause unnecessary regulatory burden and create
inefficiencies by preventing depository institutions from finding
the most cost-effective means of complying with the law or
regulation and by impairing the ability of banking institutions
to react to changing market conditions.
These approaches must be applied not only to future
regulatory actions, but to existing regulations as well.

Efforts

to reduce regulatory burden substantially will undoubtedly raise
difficult questions about the tradeoffs to be made between
competing public policies, much like the on-going discussion of
the federal budget.

Because achieving political consensus for

change may be difficult, in my judgement, an independent
nonpolitical commission charged with exploring possibilities for
legislative change would be useful.

Such a commission could

address a broad range of banking issues, such as regulatory
burden and the competitive position of U.S. banking

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organizations, offer suggestions and guidance for legislative and
regulatory changes, and assist Congress in developing a specific
legislative agenda.

Conclusion
The regulatory burden on banking institutions is large
and growing.

The cumulative regulatory burden on the banking

industry may well be more than the sum of its parts.

This burden

has grown slowly but relentlessly over the years, layer by layer
by layer, and the pace of additional regulation has increased
sharply in recent years.

While there may be genuine public

policy benefits from any single regulatory proposal, it is
important to recognize that the banking regulations and
prohibitions, taken together, create a burden that is
substantial, if not approaching unmanageable, for many
institutions.

When aggregated, these burdens affect the economy

by reducing the efficiency and competitiveness of the banking
industry.
Recent actions by the regulatory agencies and the plan
announced by the President represent important steps in an
ongoing process to address the problem of regulatory burden on
the banking industry, and I look forward to working with this
Subcommittee and others in considering additional proposals.
Perhaps regulatory relief, like regulatory burden, can be
cumulative.