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R e a d i n g Co p y

INFLATION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

Re m a r k s

of

J o h n J. B a l l e s , P r e s i d e n t
F e d e r a l Re s e r v e B a n k

Me e t i n g

with
and

Co e u r

d

of

Sa n Fr a n c i s c o

'A l e n e C o m m u n i t y L e a d e r s

D i r e c t o r s , Po r t l a n d B r a n c h ,

F e d e r a l Re s e r v e B a n k

of

Sa n Fr a n c i s c o

Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
August 6, 1981

In f l a t i o n
It 's

great

to be

G o v e r n m e n t Po l i c y

and

here

G o d 's C o u n t r y ,

in

for

the

first

COMMUNITY-LEADERS LUNCHEON THAT WE'VE EVER HELD HERE IN
N o r t h e r n Id a h o .

Fo r

my talk

today,

I

bring

you

a

combination

OF GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS ABOUT THE NATIONAL E C O N O M Y .
TOO MUCH OF THE LATTER,

THERE'S

I'M AFRAID, BUT THE GOOD NEWS SHOULD

PREDOMINATE IN LATER YEARS IF WE CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN OUR

I'LL GET TO THE

GOVERNMENT POLICIES AS WE HAVE RECENTLY.

DETAILS IN A MINUTE -- BUT FIRST LET ME PAUSE TO DISCUSS ANOTHER
PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING, WHICH IS TO GIVE THE DIRECTORS OF OUR
Po r t l a n d

office

a

chance

to

get

together

with

the

leaders

of

OUR DIRECTORS ARE AN ABLE AND DIVERSE GROUP

THIS COMMUNITY.

OF INDIVIDUALS, AND THEY HELP IN MANY IMPORTANT WAYS TO IMPROVE
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE NATION'S
CENTRAL BANK.
Ro l e

of

Th e

D irectors
directors

at

our

five

offices

are

involved with

each

OF THE MAJOR TASKS DELEGATED BY CONGRESS TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE.
Th a t

encompasses

such

as

the

provision

coin, currency

regulation

of

administration

a

large
of

and check
share

of

"w h o l e s a l e "

of

banking

services

p r o c e s s i n g ,- s u p e r v i s i o n

the

n a t i o n 's b a n k i n g

c o n s u m e r -p r o t e c t i o n

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MONETARY POLICY.

LAWS;

and

in

AND

system;
particular,

W e ARE FORTUNATE IN THE

ADVICE WE GET FROM THEM IN EACH OF THESE AREAS.
O u r DIRECTORS CONSTANTLY HELP US IMPROVE THE LEVEL OF
CENTRAL-BANKING SERVICES,




IN THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE MANNER.

-

Th i s

is a

crucial

role

at

the

2

-

present

time, because

under

the

TERMS OF THE NEW MONETARY CONTROL ACT, THE FEDERAL RESERVE IS
MOVING INTO A NEW OPERATING ENVIRONMENT.

THIS YEAR, THE FED

IS MAKING ITS SERVICES AVAILABLE TO ALL DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
OFFERING TRANSACTION (CHECK-TYPE) ACCOUNTS AND NONPERSONAL TIME
DEPOSITS, AND THOSE SERVICES ARE BEING PRICED EXPLICITLY FOR
THE FIRST TIME.

Y et ABOVE ALL, OUR DIRECTORS HELP US IMPROVE THE WORKINGS
OF MONETARY POLICY.

As ONE MEANS OF DOING SO, THEY PROVIDE US

WITH PRACTICAL FIRST-HAND INPUTS ON KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN VARIOUS
REGIONS OF OUR NINE-STATE DISTRICT AND IN VARIOUS SECTORS OF
the

Western

economy.

O ur

directors

thus

help

us a n t i c i p a t e

CHANGING TRENDS IN THE ECONOMY, BY PROVIDING INSIGHTS INTO
CONSUMER AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR WHICH SERVE AS CHECKS AGAINST
OUR OWN ANALYSES OF STATISTICAL DATA.

THEIR ADVICE HAS BEEN

ESPECIALLY VALUABLE TO US THESE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, WHEN WE'VE
HAD TO FACE PROBLEMS OF HIGH INFLATION, HIGH INTEREST RATES,
AND SHARP FLUCTUATIONS IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY.
F i s c a l P o l i c y Ro l e
Let's consider the steps that policymakers are now taking
to solve these problems.

In this connection, the President's

mastery of the political process gives us hope that fiscal
policy will play a stronger role in getting the economy back
on a non inflationary growth path.

In his view, many of the

nation's woes stem from excessive tax rates that retard
productivity and growth, and so last week he pushed through




-

SUBSTANTIAL
PROBLEM,

3

-

CUTS IN INCOME AND OTHER TAXES TO SOLVE THAT

BUT HE PRECEDED THAT MOVE, MORE THAN A MONTH AGO,

BY STEPS TO REVERSE THE TREND OF FEDERAL SPENDING,

IN AN

ATTEMPT TO CURB THE INFLATIONARY POTENTIAL OF CONTINUED
Fe d e r a l

massive

deficits.

The tax measures passed by Congress last week are designed
to cut taxes by nearly $38 billion in fiscal 1982 and by perhaps
$200
is

billion

the

by 1985.

25-p e r c e n t

The

centerpiece

a c r o s s -t h e -b o a r d

cut

of

this

in

individual

program

of

course

i n c o m e -t a x

RATES, BEGINNING WITH THE 5-PERCENT CUT THIS OCTOBER 1 AND
FOLLOWED BY THE 10-PERCENT REDUCTIONS OF JULY 1982 AND JULY 1983.
But the bill has many other important features -- most
IMPORTANTLY, FASTER DEPRECIATION WRITE-OFFS FOR BUSINESS FIRMS.

At

long

last,

Co n g r e s s

has

replaced

the

old

jumble

of

depreciation

SCHEDULES WITH FOUR BASIC CATEGORIES — A 3-5-10-15 SCHEDULE
WHICH, ESSENTIALLY, PROVIDES FOR VEHICLES TO BE WRITTEN OFF IN
THREE YEARS, EQUIPMENT IN FIVE YEARS, AND LONGER-LIVED PROPERTY
IN TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS.
Th e

earlier

decision

to

match

tax

cuts

with

spending

cuts

WAS EQUALLY IMPORTANT — INDEED PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT IN THE
LONG RUN, BECAUSE IT REVERSED A 50-YEAR TREND IN THE GROWTH OF
the Federal government.

About $730 billion would have been

SPENT IN THE 1982 FISCAL YEAR IF CURRENT PROGRAMS HAD CONTINUED
UNCHANGED.

B U T THAT FIGURE WAS REDUCED TO $695 BILLION BY THE

BROAD-SCALE CUTBACKS MADE IN A HOST OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN THE
BUDGET-RECONCILIATION PROCESS AT MIDYEAR.




By THAT PROCESS,

-

!\

-

the Administration and the Congress added real meaning to
THE TERM "CONTROL" IN THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 1974.
Th e Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n ,

in

its

midyear

budget

review, estimated

THAT THE RESULTANT OF THESE TAX AND EXPENDITURE DECISIONS WOULD
BE A $56-BILLION DEFICIT IN THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING NEXT MONTH,
AND A $43-3ILLION DEFICIT IN THE 1982 FISCAL YEAR.

I_AST-MINUTE

CHANGES IN LAST WEEK'S TAX BILL COULD PUSH THE 1982 DEFICIT
HIGHER, PERHAPS TO ABOUT $50 BILLION.

MOREOVER, WE SHOULD

REMEMBER THAT ACTUAL SPENDING TOTALS HAVE FAR OUTPACED INITIAL
SPENDING ESTIMATES IN MOST RECENT YEARS, PERHAPS BY A MARGIN
OF $45 BILLION THIS YEAR.

THOSE FIGURES ONLY ADD MORE URGENCY

TO THE FUTURE NEED TO KEEP SPENDING UNDER CONTROL, ESPECIALLY
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT REVENUES WILL BE HELD DOWN IN THE
MID-1980'S BY THE INFLATION INDEXING OF INCOME-TAX BRACKETS.
M o n e t a r y P o l i c y Ro l e

Now

the Federal Reserve, through its monetary policy, has

A PARALLEL TASK TO PERFORM BY KEEPING MONEY-SUPPLY GROWTH IN
LINE WITH A NON INFLATIONARY GROWTH PATH FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.
B ut

t h e r e 's a

great

deal

of

misunderstanding

about

its

role,

WHICH IS FREQUENTLY DISMISSED AS SIMPLY A "HIGH INTEREST RATE"
policy.

So let's pause to review some of the CONFLICTING VIEWS

ABOUT MONETARY POLICY, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY OFTEN LEAD TO
CONFLICTING POLICY ADVICE.

To

THE AVERAGE NEWSPAPER READER

OR LEGISLATOR, EASY MONEY MEANS LOW INTEREST RATES, AND TIGHT
MONEY MEANS HIGH INTEREST RATES.




To

THE AVERAGE ECONOMICS

PROFESSOR OR FINANCIAL ANALYST., EASY MONEY MEANS RAPID MONEY
GROWTH, AND TIGHT MONEY MEANS SLOW MONEY GROWTH.

A t TIMES

OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, WE'VE FOUND OURSELVES CRITICIZED BY
ONE SIDE AS BEING TOO EASY, AND BY THE OTHER SIDE FOR BEING
TOO TIGHT.
SO HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND?

To THE INTEREST-RATE WATCHERS,

WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT INTEREST RATES ARE DETERMINED BY MANY
FACTORS — INCLUDING BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY THE ACTIONS OF THE
F e d e r a l Re s e r v e ,

which

NOT THE DEMAND.

CERTAINLY THE FED HAS SOME EFFECT ON RATES

can

control

only

the

supply

money,

of

IN THE SHORT RUN, AS IT WORKS TO CONTROL THE AMOUNT OF RESERVES
IN THE BANKING SYSTEM AND MONEY IN THE HANDS OF THE PUBLIC.
Ho w e v e r ,
as

credit

b u s i n e s s -c y c l e

demands

rise

and

conditions

fall

with

the

also

influence

cycle.

And

rates,

above

all,

PRICE EXPECTATIONS HEAVILY INFLUENCE RATES, FREQUENTLY OFF­
SETTING OTHER MARKET INFLUENCES.

TODAY, FOR EXAMPLE, IF PEOPLE

EXPECT PRICES TO RISE BY (SAY) 10 PERCENT A YEAR, LENDERS WILL
DEMAND THAT 10-PERCENT INFLATION PREMIUM PLUS THE "REAL'"
UNDERLYING RATE OF INTEREST OF 3 OR 4 PERCENT, SO THAT THEY'LL
BE PROTECTED AGAINST AN EXPECTED LOSS IN THE PURCHASING POWER
OF THEIR MONEY.

THIS SUGGESTS, THEN, THAT CURBING INFLATION

IS THE ONLY LONG-RUN SOLUTION TO HIGH INTEREST RATES.
TO THE MONEY-SUPPLY WATCHERS, WE WOULD SAY THAT MONETARY
POLICY IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD REDUCING
MONEY GROWTH — ESPECIALLY SINCE WE SHIFTED OUR OPERATING
PROCEDURES NEARLY TWO YEARS AGO TO EMPHASIZE MONEY-GROWTH
CONTROL RATHER THAN INTEREST-RATE CONTROL.



OUR

EXPERIENCE HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT DURING
PERIODS OF HEAVY PRIVATE PLUS GOVERNMENT CREDIT DEMANDS,,
ATTEMPTS TO DAMPEN RISING INTEREST RATES RESULT IN RAPID
MONEY GROWTH.

AND HISTORY ALSO HAS SHOWN THAT RAPID MONEY

GROWTH EVENTUALLY LEADS TO INFLATION., A C C OMPANIED BY HIGH
INTEREST RATES.

THIS SUGGESTS, THEN, THAT THE FED SHOULD

CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE PATH OF GRADUAL DECELERATION ADOPTED
in October 1979.

S t i l l , w e h a v e t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e F e d 's s h i f t in
EMPHASIS AWAY FROM TRYING TO C O N TROL INTEREST RATES CAN
INVOLVE SHORT- T E R M COSTS.

HOME BUILDERS, FARMERS, SMALL

BUSINESSES, A N D OTHER INTEREST-SENSITIVE BORROWERS CAN BE
B ADLY HURT BY HIGH AND FLUCTUATING LEVELS OF INTEREST RATES.

T h e F e d t h u s m u s t s t e p in a t t i m e s t o d a m p e n e x c e s s i v e r a t e
SWINGS, EVEN AT THE COST OF TEMPORARY DEVIATIONS IN THE
GROWTH PATH OF THE MONEY SUPPLY.
ON BALANCE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE HAS NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO
CONTINUE WIT H ITS POLICY OF REDUCING MONEY-SUPPLY GROWTH OVER
TIME, TO HELP THE NATIONAL ECONOMY RETURN TO A NON-INFLATIONARY
GROWTH PATH.

I MIGHT ADD THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS STRONGLY

ENCOURAGED THE FED IN THIS POLICY OF MONETARY DISCIPLINE.

Ml-B

THE

MEASURE OF THE MONEY SUPPLY — CURRENCY PLUS TRANSACTION

(CHECK-TYPE) ACCOUNTS — DECELERATED SLIGHTLY IN EACH OF THE
PAST TWO YEARS, AND NOW IS NEAR OR EVEN BELOW THE BOTTOM OF
ITS TARGET RANGE FOR 1981.

THAT GROWTH RANGE IS 3% TO 6 PERCENT,

A F T E R A D J U S T M E N T FOR SHIFTS OF SAVINGS INTO CHECK-LIKE




NOW

-

accounts.

7

-

B u t the M-2 measure ~

primarily currency plus al l

d epository-institution deposits (except large CDs ) and moneymarket

FUND SHARES — HAS BEEN RUNNING NEAR THE TOP OF ITS

6-TO-9 PERCENT T A R G E T RANGE THIS YEAR, ALTHOUGH BELOW LAST

THE DIFFERENCE IN GROWTH TRENDS CAN BE

YEAR'S ACTUAL GROWTH.

T R A C E D ULTIMATELY TO THE IMPACT OF HIGH INTEREST RATES ON
H OUSEHOLD A N D B U S INESS CASH-MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, MINIMIZING
T HEIR USE OF T R A D I T I O N A L TRANSACTION BALANCES AND STIMULATING
THE GROWTH OF M O N E Y - M A R K E T MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER COMPONENTS
OF THE BROADER M O NETARY AGGREGATES.
For THE REMA I N D E R OF
recent

Co n g r e s s i o n a l

1981,

ACCORDING TO CHAIRMAN VOLCKER'S

testimony, the

T HAT IT W O U L D BE ACCEPTABLE TO HOLD

F e d e r a l Re s e r v e

M-1B

believes

GROWTH NEAR THE B O T T O M

OF ITS RANGE, A N D TO HOLD M “2 GROWTH NEAR THE TOP OF ITS RANGE.
And for 1982, the Fed tentatively has again reduced its projected
GROWTH RANGE FOR

M-]B,

TO BETWEEN

2k

AND 5 h PERCENT, WHILE

MAINTAINING A 6-TO-9 PERCENT RANGE FOR

M-2.

THUS, BY CARRYING

OUT OUR "GAME PLAN" OF REDUCED MONEY GROWTH IN 1981, A ND
PROJECTING SIMILAR DISCIPLINE NEXT YEAR, WE SHOULD ADD CREDIBILITY
TO THE NATION'S A N T I “INFLATION PROGRAM, AND HELP TO REVERSE
LONG-STANDING EXPECTATIONS OF CONTINUED HIGH INFLATION.
Im p l i c a t i o n s
The

for

Production

combination

of

monetary

and

fiscal measures

that

I' v e

OUTLINED SHOULD LEAD, WITHIN SEVERAL YEARS' TIME, TO A PERIOD
OF GROWTH WITH PRICE STABILITY.

BUT THE NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK,

FOR THE MOST PART, HAS ALREADY BEEN DETERMINED BY EARLIER



-

8

-

DEVELOPMENTS — PRINCIPALLY BY THE SEVERE INFLATION OF THE
PAST DECADE AND BY THE RECENT POLICY MEASURES TAKEN TO BRING
THAT INFLATION UNDER CONTROL.

THUS THE CONSENSUS FORECAST,

WHICH IS SHARED BY MY RESEARCH STAFF, CALLS FOR A FAIRLY FLAT
LEVEL OF BUSINESS A C TIVITY UNTIL ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR,
FOLLOWED BY A SIGNIFIC ANT UPTURN IN LATE 1982.

AS ALWAYS, MUCH DEPENDS UPON CONSUMER BUYING DECISIONS,
I

SINCE HOUSEHOLD SPENDING ACCOUNTS FOR ALMOST TWO-THIRDS OF

GNP.

(Indeed, for three years in a row, 1979-81, business activity
DROPPED SHARPLY IN THE SECOND QUARTER BECAUSE OF A FALL-OFF IN
C O N SUMER SPENDING.)

IN SUMMER 1981, CONSUMERS ARE CONTINUING

TO BUY CAUTIOUSLY, BECAUSE OF A SLOWDOWN IN REAL INCOME, RESTRICTIVE

THE NEW TAX

CREDIT CONDITIONS, A N D A MIXED EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK.
CUTS SHOULD EVENTUALLY BOOST CONSUMER SPENDING
TOO,

AND SAVING

I HOPE — BUT MOST OF THAT IMPACT MAY NOT BE FELT UNTIL

LATE 1982.
Business

spending

for

plant

and

equipment

also

may

remain

SLUGGISH, EXCEPT OF COURSE FOR THE VERY STRONG ENERGY SECTOR.
Re c e n t

surveys

PLANS, WHILE

indicate

new

little

strength

in c a p i t a l

spending

EQUIPMENT ORDERS AND CAPITAL-CONSTRUCTION

CONTRACTS HAVE SHOWN DECLINES RECENTLY,

IN REAL TERMS.

MEAN­

WHILE, THE DOWNTURN IN HOUSING STARTS SHOULD BE TRANSLATED,
AFTER THE USUAL LAG,
CONSTRUCTION.

INTO A CUTBACK IN SPENDING FOR NEW-HOME

BUSINESS-INVENTORY SPENDING ALSO COULD WEAKEN,

SINCE MUCH OF THE SECOND-QUARTER BUILDUP REPRESENTED AN
UNWANTED ACCUMULATION OF STOCKS.




AND IN ADDITION, THE EXPORT

-

9

-

TRADE COULD WEAKEN IN COMING MONTHS,

IN VIEW OF THE RECENT

APPRECIATION OF THE DOLLAR, ALONG WITH THE SLOWDOWN IN
ECONOMIC GROWTH ABROAD.
Go v e r n m e n t

expenditures,

SLOWLY OVER THE NEXT YEAR.

in

terms, may

real

rise

relatively

OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE AREA, FEDERAL-

GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOULD CONTRACT IN REAL TERMS, GIVEN THE
BUDGET CUTS S CHEDULED FOR FISCAL 1982.

STATE AND LOCAL G O VERN­

MENTS MEANWHILE ARE TRYING TO HOLD DOWN SPENDING,

IN RESPONSE

TO REDUCED INCOME FROM FEDERAL GRANTS AND TO SLOWER GROWTH OF
THEIR OWN T A X RECEIPTS.

So

ON BALANCE, WE MAY EXPERIENCE

LITTLE STIMULUS FROM EITHER THE PRIVATE OR PUBLIC SECTORS IN
COMING MONTHS, EXCEPT OF COURSE FOR THE DEFENSE AND ENERGY
INDUSTRIES.
Outlook

for

Prices

O n THE PRICE FRONT, THE OUTLOOK HAS BRIGHT E N E D CONSIDERABLY
SO FAR IN 1981.

A n d EVEN THOUGH SOME

bad

MONTHS MAY LIE AHEAD,

WE APPEAR AT LEAST TO BE MOVING OUT OF THE DOUBLE-DIGIT INFLATION
RANGE.

THE CONSUMER-PRICE INDEX INCREASED AT A 8^-PERCENT

A N N U A L RATE IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1981, COMPARED TO A 12%-PERCENT
INCREASE IN 1980, AS A REFLECTION OF REDUCED MONEY GROWTH AND
UNEXPECTEDLY FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE VOLATILE FOOD AND
ENERGY SECTORS.

ALSO, SCATTERED SIGNS APPEARED OF A SLOWING

IN COST PRESSURES, AS PRODUCTIVITY SPURTED IN THE FIRST QUARTER
A N D AS WAGE PRESSURES DECREASED DURING THE SPRING MONTHS.
Ca n

we

expect

ARE SOMEWHAT MIXED.

further

deceleration

in

prices?

Th e

indicators

On THE ONE HAND, THE CURRENT WEAKNESS IN

W O R L D OIL MARKETS ARGUES FOR PRICE STABILITY IN THAT SECTOR,



-

10

-

A L T HOUGH THE ECONOMY WILL CONTINUE TO SUFFER FROM THE DOUBLING
OF OIL PRICES OF THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS.

MOREOVER, WE SHOULD

CONTINUE TO BENEFIT FROM THE RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN THE FOREIGNEXCHANGE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR, WHICH HAS REDUCED THE PRICE OF
IMPORTS AND ALSO CURBED INCREASES IN PRICES OF DOMESTIC GOODS
TH A T COMPETE WITH IMPORTS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, FOOD PRICES MAY

RISE MORE RAPIDLY IN COMING MONTHS AS SUPPLY CONDITIONS TIGHTEN
IN SOME AREAS.

ALSO, LABOR-COST PRESSURES COULD INTENSIFY,

REFLECTING THE WEAK E N I N G OF PRODUCTIVITY THAT ALWAYS ACCOMPANIES
ANY SLOWDOWN IN BUSINESS ACTIVITY.
St i l l ,

we

should

emphasize

again

that

inflation

trends

OVER THE LONG RUN LARGELY REFLECT PAST MONETARY-GROWTH TRENDS.
B y THAT STANDARD, THEREFORE, THE PROSPECT LOOKS RELATIVELY
FAVORABLE.

HISTORY SHOWS THAT CHANGES IN MONEY-SUPPLY GROWTH

DEFINITELY AFFECT THE INFLATION RATE OVER TIME, USUALLY WITH
A LAG-OF A Y E A R - A N D - A - H A L F TO TWO YEARS.

THE RECENT DECELERATION

THUS SUGGESTS FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE PRICE FRONT OVER THE
COMING PERIOD.
Im p l i c a t i o n s

for

C r e d i t Ma r k e t s

A MAJOR D I S T U R B I N G ELEMENT IN THE CURRENT PICTURE, HOWEVER,
IS THE STATE OF THE CREDIT MARKETS.

THE STOCK MARKET AND

(ESPECIALLY) THE BO N D MARKET HAVE WEAKENED IN RECENT MONTHS,
DESPITE THE B R I G H T E N I N G PROSPECTS FOR PRICES AND ECONOMIC POLICY.
And THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY, PEOPLE ARE DEMANDING TO KNOW WHY
INTEREST RATES REMAIN AT SUCH STRATOSPHERIC LEVELS WHEN INFLATION
RATES HAVE COME DOWN SO NOTICEABLY,



THE ANSWER TO THIS PARADOX

-11
MAY BE FOUND, FIRST,

-

IN THE AREA OF EXPECTATIONS, AND SECONDLY

IN TERMS OF C REDIT-MARKET PRESSURES.
Co n s i d e r

the

expectations

TWICE SHY" PHENOMENON.

argument

—

"o n c e

the

burned,

CREDIT-MARKET PARTICIPANTS REMEMBER

VIVIDLY THE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AND LATE 1970'S — WHEN THE
INFLATION RATE D E C L I N E D BY HALF, AND INTEREST RATES FELL
CORRESPONDINGLY, ONL Y TO BE FOLLOWED BY A SHARP REVERSAL OF
RATES IN THE INFLATIONARY SPURT OF THE 1977-80 PERIOD.

THIS

TIME, MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE HOLDING BACK, DEMANDING A
CONTINUED LARGE INFLATION PREMIUM, UNTIL THEY SEE SUSTAINED
PROGRESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION.
Their fears have been reinforced by the continued pressures
on credit markets from Federal financing demands.

Net borrowing

by the Federal government and federally-assisted agencies
represented one-third of all funds raised by nonfinancial sectors
last year, and the Federal share could remain almost that high
THIS YEAR.

For example,

in the final quarter of 1981, THE

Treasury plans to borrow a near-record $30 billion to $33 billion.
Much of this borrowing may represent "crowding out" of other
borrowers — households, businesses, and state and local govern­
ments, WHO CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY THE INTEREST RATES THAT THE
Fe d e r a l

government

massive

Fe d e r a l

a major

cause, along

interest

So m e
continue




is w i l l i n g

presence

and able

in c r e d i t

with

high

to

markets

pay.
must

inflation, of

the

Surely,
be

this

considered

high

level

of

rates.
market
to

observers

undermine

the

fear that
strength

of

large
the

Fe d e r a l
market

deficits will

in

coming

years.

12

-

Th o s e

fears

can

be

traced

-

in t u r n

to

the

expansion

of

the

INDEXING TECHNIQUE TO THE REVENUE AS WELL AS THE SPENDING SIDE
OF THE BUDGET.

In RECENT YEARS., LARGE BUDGET DEFICITS HAVE

REFLECTED THE INFLATION-INDEXED UPSURGE IN PAYMENTS FOR SOCIAL
SECURITY AND OTHER "ENTITLEMENT" PROGRAMS.

(THESE PROGRAMS

HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF ALL BUDGET SPENDING,
OUTSIDE OF DEFENSE AND INTEREST COSTS.)
Fe d e r a l

revenues

cuts, and
income

later

taxes,

w eaken, first

will

because

Th u s ,

of

because

inflation

Co n g r e s s

if

In COMING YEARS,
of

indexing

fails

to

the
of

keep

new

tax

individual

spending

under

CONTROL, DEFICITS COULD REMAIN HIGH — EVEN IN A GROWING
ECONOMY "

AND COULD CONTINUE TO KEEP CREDIT MARKETS UNDER

PRESSURE.
Im p l i c a t i o n s
Before
of

all

concluding,

these

national

here

in C o e u r

with

mixed

A

N o r t h e r n Id a h o

for

d

'Al e n e

market

good

deal

of

that

unstable

that

the




may

l a t e -1981 b u s i n e s s

view

the

the

a

sluggish

national

could be

market.

(Of

silver demand

was

bound

correction

extent

residents

1970' s ,

late

silver

world
boom

the

that

to

when

sold

lead to

in

it h a s

a

that
bust,

commodities

.

recall

piece

Texas

means

and

of

astronomical

course,
during

scene

lumber

every

at

Pe o p l e

economy

fondly

world

necessary

limited to

for

local

of

a

N o r t h e r n Id a h o .

developments

many

boom

speculative

implications

of

inflationary

on a

the

r e g i o n 's o u t p u t

that

of

assess

this

sure

ounce

to

for

B e s i d e s , I'm

every

like

emotions, because

weakening

and

I'd

metals.
the
lumber

prices

accounted

p e r i o d .)

and

markets

w e 'r e
has

for

B ut
lucky
been

13

-

-

AS THE WORLD'S LARGEST SILVER PRODUCER, THE COEUR D'ALENE
DISTRICT IS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED BY THE UPS AND DOWNS OF THE
PRECIOUS“METALS MARKET.

SILVER PRICES OBVIOUSLY WERE FAR OUT

OF LINE LAST YEAR, WITH AN ANNUAL AVERAGE PRICE OF $20,63 AN
OUNCE — AND A PEAK PRICE MORE THAN DOUBLE THAT.

EVEN WITH

THIS YEAR'S SHARP DECLINE, PRICES ARE RUNNING CONSIDERABLY
ABOVE THE 1978 AVERAGE OF $5,69 AN OUNCE.

I'M NOT SURE WHERE

THE MARKET-CLEARING PRICE SHOULD BE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE
LARGER SUPPLIES THAT WILL COME ON THE MARKET FOLLOWING THE
SCHEDULED EXPANSION OF MINE AND REFINERY ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA.
S h o r t -t e r m
of

other

prospects

industrial

are

also

minerals

hard
where

to

assess

Id a h o

for

holds

a

the

long

list

dominant

MARKET POSITION — LEAD, ZINC, COBALT, ANTIMONY, VANADIUM,
MOLYBDENUM AND SO ON.

BUT GIVEN THE NATIONAL GOAL OF DEVELOPING

SECURE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS, AND GIVEN THE
NATIONAL GOAL OF EXPANDING AND MODERNIZING ITS INDUSTRIAL PLANT
AND DEFENSE SYSTEM, THE LONG-TERM PROSPECT FOR IDAHO'S MINERAL
PRODUCERS LOOKS BRIGHT INDEED.
A DIFFERENT SET OF QUESTIONS FACES IDAHO'S LUMBER INDUSTRY,
THE FOURTH-LARGEST IN THE NATION — AND NORMALLY AN EMPLOYER OF ONETHIRD OF THE STATE'S MANUFACTURING WORKERS. DURING THE 1970's, THE

U.S.

HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY EXPANDED ITS DEMAND ON THE NATION'S

RESOURCES, AS HOUSING STARTS FAR EXCEEDED POPULATION GROWTH,
AND AS MORTGAGE BORROWERS INCREASED THEIR SHARE OF TOTAL CREDIT
flows.

Th a t

trend

reflected

a

growing

public

realization

that

HOUSING IN AN INFLATIONARY ERA REPRESENTS A VALUABLE INVESTMENT,
AND NOT JUST SHELTER.



TODAY CONDITIONS ARE CHANGING, NOT LEAST

14

-

-

BECAUSE OF THE SQUEEZING OF THE INFLATION PREMIUM OUT OF THE
MORTGAGE MARKET.
Bo r r o w e r s

are

faced

with

the

necessity

of

paying

market-

MORTGAGE RATES — AND THUS ARE LESS ABLE THAN BEFORE TO BUILD

level

UP AN INFLATION BONUS THROUGH LOW FIXED-RATE MORTGAGES.

HENCE,

THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE CONSERVATIVE IN THEIR HOME-BUYING
DECISIONS IN THE COMING DECADE.

THIS COULD MEAN A LOWER

AVERAGE LEVEL OF DEMAND FOR IDAHO'S LUMBER PRODUCTS IN THE
1 9 8 0 'S THAN IN THE 1970'S.

BUT ONCE THE THRIFT INDUSTRY WORKS

OUT ITS PRESENT PROBLEMS, THE FINANCING BASIS OF HOUSING SHOULD
BE ON STRONGER GROUND, WITH THE INDUSTRY PAYING A MARKET RETURN
ON ITS DEPOSITS AND EARNING A MARKET RETURN ON ITS MORTGAGE
loans.

That should mean the end of the vast swings in

U.S.

HOUSING ACTIVITY, WITH STARTS DECLINING BY HALF IN EACH INDUSTRY
DOWNTURN.

A n d THAT,

IN TURN, SHOULD MEAN MUCH MORE STABILITY

IN DEMAND — AND A MORE EFFICIENT LEVEL OF OPERATIONS — FOR
THIS REGION'S LUMBER INDUSTRY.
Co n c l u d i n g Re m a r k s

To

SUMMARIZE, WE'RE NOW SHOWING SOME PROGRESS IN FIGHTING

INFLATION, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE EASING OF OIL- AND FOOD-PRICE
PRESSURES, BUT LARGELY BECAUSE OF SLOWER GROWTH OF MONEY AND
CREDIT.

But THE PROCESS OF SLOWING INFLATION THROUGH MONETARY

RESTRAINT CAN LEAD TO STRAINS ON CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY,
ESPECIALLY WHEN THE FEDERAL RESERVE CARRIES SO MUCH OF THE TASK
OF DEALING WITH INFLATION.

As

LONG AS THESE STRONG DEMANDS

PERSIST, AND INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS REMAIN INTENSE, RESTRAINED




-

15

-

MONETARY GROWTH MAY BE ACCOMPANIED BY HIGH INTEREST RATES AND
FINANCIAL-MARKET STRAINS,
Th e s e
dependent

financial

pressures

impose

hardships

upon

credit-

INDUSTRIES, SUCH AS HOUSING AND MUCH BUSINESS

INVESTMENT " A N D UPON THOSE AREAS SUCH AS NORTHERN IDAHO THAT
SUPPLY SUCH INDUSTRIES.

W e USED TO THINK THAT WE COULD

TEMPORARILY EASE THEIR PROBLEMS THOUGH A SWITCH TO MONETARY
STIMULUS AND A CONSEQUENT DROP IN INTEREST RATES.

BUT OUR

EXPERIENCE LAST FALL, AND AGAIN THIS PAST APRIL, SUGGESTS THAT
WE CAN'T EVEN COUNT ON THAT RESULT ANYMORE — THAT INCREASED
MONEY GROWTH LEADS MARKET PARTICIPANTS TO PUSH RATES UP
(RATHER THAN DOWN) BECAUSE OF INCREASED FEARS OF FUTURE
INFLATION.
Disciplined

monetary

policy

thus

is a

key

element

THE NATION'S EFFORT TO CURB INFLATIONARY FORCES.

in

HOWEVER,

FISCAL AND REGULATORY POLICIES MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE
Federal Reserve's monetary efforts.

In this regard, the

Administration's success in getting tax and spending reductions
through Congress is a very good omen.

But continued vigilance

is necessary to ensure that Federal spending is controlled
and the budget brought closer to balance,

Only then will we

see reduced pressure on financial markets, lessened expectations
OF inflation, and a long-awaited return to an environment of
noninflationary growth.




# £§