View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

r

AGENDA
FOR
THE NATION

Remarks of

John J. Balles
President
Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco

Meeting with Phoenix Community Leaders
and Directors, Los Angeles Branch,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Phoenix, Arizona
November 25,1980






Inflation is usually defined as "too many
dollars chasing too few goods,” says Mr.
Balles, so two m ajor approaches should be
followed in the search for a solution.
" A solution should involve the development
of long-term measures to increase the
supply of goods, which means overcom ing
the energy crisis, im proving productivity,
and taking other measures to unleash the
productive powers of the U.S. economy.
But the solution also should involve
lim iting the supply of dollars, which
means follow ing a conservative monetaryand fiscal-policy course."







I’m glad to be back in Phoenix again, to renew
acquaintances with the leaders of one of the
most dynamic communities in the dynamic Sun
Belt. Arizona like the nation has many problems,
but the state’s record supports an argument
that I’ve always made— the problems of growth
are much less serious than the problems of no
growth. I’d like to spend my alloted time today
discussing some of the problems— problems of
both types— that the new Administration will
have to face when it takes office. But first let me
pause to discuss another purpose of this
meeting, which is to give Phoenix’s community
leaders a chance to get together with the
directors of our Los Angeles office. Our
directors are an able and diverse group of
individuals, and they help in many important
ways to improve the performance of the Federal
Reserve System, the nation’s central bank.
Role of Directors
The directors at our five offices are involved
with each of the major tasks delegated by
Congress to the Federal Reserve. That
encompasses the provision of “ wholesale”
banking services such as coin, currency and
check processing; supervision and regulation
of a large share of the nation’s banking system;
administration of consumer-protection laws;
and in particular, the development of monetary
policy. We are fortunate in the advice we get
from them in each of these areas.
Our directors constantly help us improve the
level of central-banking services, in the most
cost-effective manner. This is a crucial role at
the present time, because under the terms of
the new Monetary Control Act, the Federal
Reserve is moving into a new operating
environment. Over the next year, the Fed’s
services will be made available to all depository




institutions offering transaction (check-type)
accounts and nonpersonal time deposits, and
those services will be priced explicitly for the
first time.
Yet above all, our directors help us improve the
workings of monetary policy. As one means of
doing so, they provide us with practical first­
hand inputs on key developments in various
regions of our district and various sectors of the
economy. Our directors thus help us anticipate
changing trends in the economy, by providing
insights into consumer and business
psychology which serve as checks against
our own analyses of statistical data.
Outlook for the Nation
We need their insights today more than ever,
because of the vast uncertainty which
surrounds the outlook for the year ahead. There
is nothing uncertain, however, about the
mandate which the new Administration and the
new Congress bring to Washington. The people
have spoken, and spoken loudly, of their desire
for an improvement in the nation’s economic
performance. Specifically, they have set forth
an agenda centered around the necessity to
bring inflation finally under control.
Before we consider how to accomplish that task
of mastering inflation, let’s consider what lies
ahead for the real economy in the period
immediately ahead. The basic question is,
“ Will 1981 be a year of recovery or of renewed
recession?” The nation suffered from a severe
downturn in the late winter and spring months,
but business activity then began to recover in
the third quarter. For four straight months we’ve
witnessed increases in the set of leading
indicators which usually foretell changes in the
business climate. Moreover, industrial




production and nonfarm employment have risen
significantly throughout the past three months,
and the jobless rate has stabilized after a surge
during the recession period.
A look at the statistical record suggests a useful
rule-of-thumb for measuring the strength of the
recovery. In the typical business cycle, real
GNP rises at about a six-percent annual
average rate over the first six quarters of
recovery. Well, this isn’t a typical business
cycle, and so you shouldn’t expect to see that
type of surge in business activity in the year
ahead. The latest statistics suggest that real
GNP will decline by just one or two percentage
points between the fourth quarter of 1979 and
the fourth quarter of 1980, and most forecasters
expect an increase of similar modest size over
the course of 1981.
We’re not out of the woods yet, as shown by the
fact that industrial production lags more than
four percent below the year-ago level. And the
recovery may continue uneven, with some
quarters next year back in minus territory. The
basic reason for the expected weakness of the
recovery is inflation. Inflation pushes up
interest rates, and thus undermines the strength
of housing and other interest-sensitive
industries; and inflation restricts the options of
policymakers, who might otherwise adopt
stimulative policies to get the economy
off dead center.
Still, there are many elements of strength in the
economy, as evidenced by the boom conditions
in the energy and defense industries. The
consumer sector, which accounts for two thirds
of total spending, is now in better financial
shape than it was during the late 1970’s, and




that sector’s recovery has bolstered total
spending. In addition, the summer and earlyfall improvement in overall demand has
reduced the likelihood of a major inventory
liquidation, and thus of a serious slide in total
output. But the overall prospect is for an uneven
and sluggish recovery.
Outlook for Arizona
“ Sluggish recovery” appears to be a useful
description of current conditions in the regional
as well as the national economy. Throughout
the past decade, we could usually assume that
Arizona would prosper despite whatever
happened to the national economy. We’ve seen
this year, however, that Arizona’s prosperity can
be undermined by major national develop­
ments. Copper demand has suffered because of
the deep recession affecting the durable-goods
manufacturing industries of the Northeastern
states. (Indeed, prices for the red metal would
have weakened considerably had it not been for
the prolonged strike in the industry.) The state’s
tourist industry also has suffered to some
extent because of the depleted incomes and
high fuel prices affecting out-of-state visitors.
Still, the factors that provided the foundation
for the boom of the 1970’s— led by the
continued in-migration of new people and new
industries— should keep the state on an upward
growth path. Also, in typical Sunbelt fashion,
Arizona doesn’t have to worry about declining
manufacturing industries, such as autos and
steel, which are concentrated in Snowbelt
States. Rather, Arizona can benefit from a
manufacturing sector concentrated in
industries, such as aircraft and electronics,
which have strong growth prospects.




Arizona’s Sunbelt-type industrial structure, and
the state’s Sunbelt-type business environment,
thus should support significant growth through­
out the decade ahead. In 1981 as in 1980, the
state may grow at a slower pace than you’ve
become accustomed to, because of the
continuing impact of a sluggish national
economy. But in 1981 and in the decade as a
whole, Arizona’s $24-bi!lion economy should
continue to outpace the national economy. As
you well know, Arizona outdistanced all other
states in terms of population growth during the
1970’s, with a 52-percent increase that was five
times larger than the national percentage gain.
The foundations are in place for another
increase of a million or more people in the
1980’s, with all that that means for job prospects
in manufacturing, construction, trade, services
and other industries.
Inflation— Basic Agenda Item
The regional and national recovery could yet be
undermined by inflation— and here we return to
the basic item on our agenda for the future. The
problem is obvious. Inflation, as measured by
the consumer price index, doubled within the
single decade of the 1970’s, and would have
doubled again within only a half-decade if the
pace of early 1980 had been maintained.
Luckily, the pace has since decelerated;
between March and September, consumer
prices increased at a 9-percent annual rate,
compared with the 16-percent pace of the
preceding six-month period. Much remains to
be done, however, to reduce the inflation rate
to more acceptable levels.
The problem reflects not just external price
“ shocks” — of which we’ve had more than our
share— but also the uptrend in the underlying
rate of inflation. American households are now




suffering from their second major oil-price
shock, as evidenced by the two-thirds increase
in the energy component of the consumer price
index over the past two years. Moreover,
despite the current glut, most energy analysts
expect a rising trend of prices over the longerterm, with the gradual depletion of the world’s
low-cost oil reserves. Food prices meanwhile
seem likely to rise sharply in the near-term
future, as a result of the severe weather
problems affecting food production worldwide.
By some estimates, food prices could rise at a
15-percent annual rate over the next year—
almost double the gain of the past year.
Still, food and energy account for only about
one-fourth of our household budget, and
inflation has been rampant in the other threefourths of our budget as well. Throughout much
of the past decade, the underlying or core rate
of inflation remained high, but still below six
percent a year. Over the past year, however, the
underlying rate has exceeded nine percent.
That price spiral reflected two factors. One was
an upsurge in unit labor costs, because of sharp
gains in labor compensation and severe
declines in the productivity of the nation’s
workforce— although productivity improved last
quarter with the business upturn. The price rise
of course reflected also the excessive money
growth of past years, when monetary policy was
pushed off course by the excessive credit
demands created by Federal deficit financing
and other forces.
Inflation has frequently been defined, quite
simply, as “ too many dollars chasing too few
goods.” A solution thus should involve the
development of long-term measures to increase
the supply of goods, which means overcoming
the energy crisis, improving productivity, and




taking other measures to unleash the
productive powers of the U.S. economy. But the
solution also should involve limiting the supply
of dollars, which means following a conserv­
ative monetary and fiscal-policy course.
Limiting the Supply of Dollars
Monetary policy will have a crucial role to play
in carrying out the national agenda, especially
in view of the part played by excess money
creation in the development of the inflation
problem. The Federal Reserve, recognizing that
price stability requires a progressive reduction
in money-supply growth, moved aggressively a
year ago to enforce a stronger anti-inflation
policy. To that end, the Fed began to place
more emphasis on controlling money-supply
growth and less emphasis on minimizing short­
term fluctuations in interest rates, since the
latter indirect approach had failed in the past
to limit money growth. The policy has been
broadly successful,despite unfortunately large
fluctuations around the growth trend. In the sixmonth period prior to the policy shift, the M-1B
measure of the money supply increased at more
than a 10-percent annual rate; over the
following year, however, the money supply
increased about 7-percent— a substantial
improvement, although above the top of the
Fed’s target range for the year. The M-1B
measure, incidentally, consists primarily of
currency plus demand and other check-type
deposits.
The historical record suggests that any
prolonged reduction of money growth will be
followed, with a lag of two years or so, by a
reduction in the underlying inflation rate. The
past year’s deceleration in money growth thus
should have favorable results for prices,
especially if the Fed is successful with its




announced policy of bringing about further
deceleration in coming years— for example,
with a half-percentage-point reduction in the
target range for 1981. But a period of sustained
price stability cannot be assured until we
control those forces which have led to the past
record of excessive money creation— primarily
such factors as excessive Federal-deficit
spending.
Limiting Federal Deficit Financing
No one can deny the close connection between
the doubling of prices and the upsurge of
deficit financing over the past decade. The
combined Federal deficits of the 1970’s reached
$315 billion— about the same as the total of all
deficits recorded in the nation’s entire earlier
history. Moreover, the Federal government ran
huge deficits, instead of surpluses as it should,
throughout the 1975-79 period— one of the
longest business expansions of the past
generation. Then, in fiscal 1980, the deficit
reached a near-record $59-billion figure. And
in the new fiscal year, despite all the earlier talk
of a surplus, the deficit could be almost as
large, according to many private analysts. The
new Administration will make its presence felt
here, of course, but the fiscal year may be fairly
far advanced before Congress acts on these
new plans.
In fiscal 1981, Federal revenues could jump
about 15 percent above 1980 levels. This would
reflect windfall profits taxes on the energy
industry, increases in both the tax rate and the
taxable income base for social security, and the
impact of inflation upon effective tax rates.
These pressures thus would far more than
offset the initial impact of the expected tax-cut
package. But at the same time, Federal
spending could increase substantially— perhaps




12 percent or so— because of the combined
impact of inflation, recession, and increased
military spending. Federal spending increased
by $85 billion in fiscal 1980— incidentally, an
amount equal to the entire Federal spending
total of two decades ago— and strenuous
efforts will be required to limit the increase in
fiscal 1981. The new Administration hopes to
shave two percentage points off this fiscal
year’s increase, but most of the impact of its
cuts will be felt in fiscal 1982.
The new team in Washington recognizes that
sharp spending cutbacks are essential if we
want to reduce the government’s excessive
demands on the nation’s resources. The task
won’t be easy, especially in view of the
bipartisan support for a 25-percent increase in
defense spending (in real terms) over the next
half-decade. But prudent reductions across a
wide range of nondefense programs are both
possible and necessary. In this connection, the
Congressional Budget Office last spring
provided Congress with a list of 58 areas which
could yield perhaps more than $230 billion in
budget cutbacks over a five-year period. For
example, changes in indexing requirements for
social-security benefits and other programs
alone could yield $70 billion savings over that
period.
The dangers of deficit financing can be seen
vividly in today’s credit markets, where the
long-standing threat of “ crowding out” may
finally become a reality. The danger is
aggravated by the presence in the market of a
number of “ off budget” Federal entities and
government-sponsored private enterprises.
Altogether, total Federal and Federally-assisted
credit demands could exceed $100 billion in
this calendar year— almost 30 percent of all




credit demands. The markets probably could
handle such heavy borrowing demands in a
recession period, but the pressures could be
overwhelming in the 1980-81 recovery period—
as we have seen from the recent upsurge in
interest rates. In a word, the Federal
government threatens to preempt the loanable
funds crucially needed for financing capital
formation, while undercutting housing and
other interest-rate sensitive industries.
Increasing the Supply of Goods
The national agenda meanwhile calls for a long­
term effort to improve the nation’s efficiency
and increase the supply of goods available in
the marketplace. This means, above all,
increased emphasis on productivity growth.
Now, we should have expected the decline in
productivity that occurred during the 1979-80
boom and recession, and we also should have
expected the recent recovery-associated upturn
in productivity, simply because such movements
followed the typical cyclical pattern. But there’s
no excuse for the long-term downtrend in
productivity growth that we’ve experienced
throughout the last decade or more.
These abnormally low increases in productivity
largely reflect the use of old, inefficient capital
stock. Thus we must stimulate investment as a
means of modernizing and expanding the
nation’s capital resources. And with the
enormous increase in energy prices, we must
make the capitaj stock more fuel-efficient.
Investment can be stimulated by increasing
the investment tax credit, or by reducing tax
lives or accelerating depreciation rates, or
simply by reducing corporate tax rates. All of
these approaches can influence investment
decisions, because they reduce the user cost of




capital or improve the rate of return. The new
Congress thus would be well-advised to
implement these various productivityenhancing measures.
Parallel efforts must be made to develop an
energy-efficient economy, and in the process to
reduce the massive “ tax” imposed on us by the
OPEC oil cartel. (The U.S. paid less than $5
billion a year to oil-exporting nations prior to
the 1973 embargo, but the oil bill now is roughly
$80 billion a year.) Price incentives already
have led industry to expand the search for new
domestic sources of energy, and have led
consumers to adopt rather stern conservation
measures. (In this respect, I need only point out
that gasoline demand this year will be
about 11 percent below the 1978 level.) But with
the final dismantling of price controls on the
domestic energy industry, I feel confident that
we’ll make even greater strides in conserving
available supplies and augmenting the nation’s
energy base.
Improving the nation’s aggregate supply
situation also involves getting rid of the many
self-defeating measures that have hobbled the
growth of the economy so badly in recent
decades. Congress has made a useful start in
some respects, by introducing greater compe­
tition into the transportation industry and,
closer to home, into the financial industry. But
our new national agenda requires that we take
a closer look at all the “ sacred cows” that now
overpopulate the range. The list of course is
lengthy— including minimum wage laws, farm
price supports, protectionist measures for the
steel and textile industries, and the many
health-and-safety regulations which (despite
laudable aims) result mainly in higher costs
and lower production.




Concluding Remarks
To sum up, the first item on the national agenda
— and the second and third as well— is to stop
inflation. We in the Federal Reserve have a key
role to play in this effort, by gradually reducing
money-supply growth over a period of years.
But the Fed can’t do the job alone. Because of
the uneven impact of monetary policy on various
sectors of the economy, a one-sided Fed drive
on inflation could seriously harm home builders,
small business firms, farmers, and other sectors
that rely heavily on bank credit for financing. A
balanced attack on inflation thus must involve
sharp reductions in Treasury borrowing pres­
sures through a balanced budget, along with
the various long-term measures that I’ve listed
to improve productivity and increase
competition in the national economy.
There’s no reason to be defeatist about the
problem. After all, we’ve fought our way through
various inflationary episodes in the past; for
example, we were able to cut the inflation rate
in half just between 1974 and 1976. But to be
successful in the present instance, we’ve got to
reverse some recent trends that have built up a
considerable head of steam. The task will be
difficult, but the voters have told us that it must
be accomplished.