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For release on delivery
10:00 a.m. EDT (8:00 a.m. MDT)
August 26, 2022

Monetary Policy and Price Stability

Remarks by
Jerome H. Powell
Chair
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
“Reassessing Constraints on the Economy and Policy,” an economic policy symposium
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Jackson Hole, Wyoming

August 26, 2022

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.
At past Jackson Hole conferences, I have discussed broad topics such as the everchanging structure of the economy and the challenges of conducting monetary policy
under high uncertainty. Today, my remarks will be shorter, my focus narrower, and my
message more direct.
The Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) overarching focus right now is
to bring inflation back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of
the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price stability,
the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not
achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all. The burdens
of high inflation fall heaviest on those who are least able to bear them.
Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools
forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to
require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be
some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower growth,
and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will also bring some
pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation.
But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.
The U.S. economy is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of
2021, which reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession.
While the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to
show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but it is
clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding the supply of

-2available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and high inflation has
continued to spread through the economy. While the lower inflation readings for July are
welcome, a single month’s improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need
to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down.
We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently
restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent meeting in July, the FOMC
raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the
Summary of Economic Projection’s (SEP) range of estimates of where the federal funds
rate is projected to settle in the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation
running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run
neutral are not a place to stop or pause.
July’s increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as
many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate
at our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our
decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and
the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy tightens further, it
likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases.
Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance
for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening
policy. Committee participants’ most recent individual projections from the June SEP
showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent through the end of
2023. Participants will update their projections at the September meeting.

-3Our monetary policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned
about inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and
1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In particular, we
are drawing on three important lessons.
The first lesson is that central banks can and should take responsibility for
delivering low and stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and
others once needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben
Bernanke has shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation
period. 1 Today, we regard these questions as settled. Our responsibility to deliver price
stability is unconditional. It is true that the current high inflation is a global phenomenon,
and that many economies around the world face inflation as high or higher than seen here
in the United States. It is also true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the
United States is the product of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed’s
tools work principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal
Reserve’s responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability. There
is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are
committed to doing that job.
The second lesson is that the public’s expectations about future inflation can play
an important role in setting the path of inflation over time. Today, by many measures,
longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored. That is broadly true
of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of market-based measures as

See Ben Bernanke (2004), “The Great Moderation,” speech delivered at the meetings of the Eastern
Economic Association, Washington, February 20,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220; Ben Bernanke (2022), “Inflation Isn’t
Going to Bring Back the 1970s,” New York Times, June 14.

1

-4well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with inflation having run well above our
goal for some time.
If the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then,
absent major shocks, it likely will. Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of
high and volatile inflation. During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the anticipation of
high inflation became entrenched in the economic decisionmaking of households and
businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to expect it to remain high,
and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions. As former Chairman Paul
Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in 1979, “Inflation feeds in part on
itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must
be to break the grip of inflationary expectations.” 2
One useful insight into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its
future path is based in the concept of “rational inattention.” 3 When inflation is
persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and incorporate
inflation into their economic decisions. When inflation is low and stable, they are freer to
focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: “For
all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes in the average price
level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and
household financial decisions.” 4

See Paul A. Volcker (1979), “Statement before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S.
Congress, October 17, 1979,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 65 (November), p. 888,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/federal-reserve-bulletin-62/november-1979-20459.
3
A review of the applications of rational inattention in monetary economics appears in Christopher A. Sims
(2010), “Rational Inattention and Monetary Economics,” in Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael
Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland), pp. 155–81.
4
See Alan Greenspan (1989), “Statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate, February 21, 1989,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 75 (April), pp. 274–75,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/federal-reserve-bulletin-62/april-1989-20803.
2

-5Of course, inflation has just about everyone’s attention right now, which
highlights a particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues,
the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become entrenched.
That brings me to the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is
done. History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely to
increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and price setting.
The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed multiple failed attempts
to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A lengthy period of very restrictive
monetary policy was ultimately needed to stem the high inflation and start the process of
getting inflation down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of
last year. Our aim is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.
These lessons are guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are
taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment
with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are
confident the job is done.