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For release on delivery
12:30 p.m. EDT
July 10, 2015

Recent Developments and the Outlook for the Economy

Remarks by
Janet L. Yellen
Chair
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
The City Club of Cleveland

Cleveland, Ohio

July 10, 2015

Thank you, President Mester, and thank you to the City Club for inviting me to
speak today. I am aware of the club’s history and its tradition of promoting the free
exchange of ideas, and I will do my best to allow plenty of time for your questions, which
I understand are an important part of that tradition.
Communicating with the public is an important part of my job. A few weeks ago,
I held a news conference after the latest meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC). Next week I will deliver the Federal Reserve’s semiannual report on monetary
policy and answer questions from members of Congress at public hearings of the House
and the Senate.
On those occasions and in appearances such as this one today, the aim is to
account for the FOMC’s policy actions and explain how they are intended to achieve the
specific goals that the Congress has assigned us. We do so because it is important that
the Federal Reserve remains accountable within the framework of our democracy. We
also do so because we can more effectively achieve our mandated goals--maximum
employment and price stability--as well as help maintain stability in the financial system
if people understand what we are doing and why. Finally, it’s important for us to hear
perspectives and experiences from a wide range of participants in the economy. This
club stands for free and open communication, and so does the Federal Reserve.
The Recovery from the Great Recession
This month marks six years since the end of the Great Recession--our nation’s
most severe economic downturn since the 1930s. U.S. economic output--as measured by
inflation-adjusted gross domestic product, or real GDP--fell more than 4 percent from the
end of 2007 to the middle of 2009. One of the hardest-hit industries was manufacturing,

-2which, as you well know, is important to Ohio. The unemployment rate peaked at 10
percent nationally, and it reached 11 percent here in Ohio. U.S. nonfarm payrolls shrank
by 8-1/2 million jobs during 2008 and 2009, or about 6 percent of the national workforce.
Over that same period, Ohio lost more than 400,000 jobs, or 7-1/2 percent of the state’s
employment.
In response to the financial crisis, the severe recession, and the risk that inflation
would fall persistently far below levels consistent with price stability, we at the Federal
Reserve took forceful actions. The FOMC aggressively cut our short-term interest rate
target, the federal funds rate, from above 5 percent to near zero by the end of 2008 to
lower borrowing costs and help spur household spending and business investment. With
short-term interest rates near zero, the FOMC provided further support to the economy
through our large-scale asset purchases--buying large amounts of Treasury and mortgagerelated securities in the open market. These purchases pushed down longer-term
borrowing rates for millions of American families and businesses. During the economic
recovery, we put additional downward pressure on longer-term borrowing rates by
explaining publicly that we intended to keep short-term interest rates low for a long time.
Longer-term borrowing rates, such as those for mortgages and automobile loans, are
lower if people expect short-term rates in the future to remain low or to rise only very
gradually.
Although evidence suggests that our policy actions were effective, the pace of the
economic recovery has been slow. 1 Growth in real GDP has averaged only about

1

A number of studies have found that the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases put downward pressure on
long-term interest rates. These include Joseph Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache, and Brian Sack
(2011), “The Financial Market Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases,”
International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7 (March), pp. 3-43; and Stefania D’Amico, William

-32-1/4 percent per year since 2009, about 1 percentage point less than the average rate
seen over the 25 years preceding the Great Recession. In Ohio, economic output has
increased at about the same pace as in the nation as a whole in recent years. In the labor
market, the U.S. unemployment rate stood at 5.3 percent in June, around half as high as
its peak after the recession and close to many economists’ assessment of its longer-run
natural rate--the level that can be sustained without risking excessive inflation. The U.S.
economy has created 12 million jobs since the labor market’s low point, and total
nonfarm payrolls are now 3-1/2 million greater than just prior to the recession. Ohio’s
unemployment rate has declined even more during the recovery than the nation as a
whole, and at 5.2 percent in May, it was somewhat below the U.S. average in that month.
Nevertheless, although nonfarm payrolls in Ohio have increased by around 400,000 jobs
since the low point for the state’s employment, payrolls have yet to surpass their level
just prior to the recession.
Manufacturing is important to Ohio, and people here are keenly aware of the
challenges that American manufacturing has faced for many years. U.S. manufacturing
output--as measured in the Federal Reserve’s index of industrial production--plunged
about 20 percent during the recession. That’s substantially more than the overall
percentage decline in economic output. Partly as a result, U.S. manufacturing
employment fell 2-1/4 million during 2008 and 2009, a significantly larger percentage
decline than occurred in overall employment. And while manufacturing employment

English, David López-Salido, and Edward Nelson (2012), “The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset
Purchase Programs: Rationale and Effects,” Economic Journal, vol. 122 (November), pp. F415-46.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s forward guidance and asset purchase policies have been estimated to have
helped lower unemployment and boost inflation; see Eric M. Engen, Thomas Laubach, and David
Reifschneider (2015), “The Macroeconomic Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Unconventional Monetary
Policies,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-005 (Washington: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, January), http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.005.

-4nationwide has increased about 850,000 since the end of 2009 as production has
recovered, there are still almost 1-1/2 million fewer manufacturing jobs than just before
the recession.
Unfortunately, the number of U.S. manufacturing jobs has been generally
decreasing since its peak in the late 1970s. A similar trend has also been seen in Ohio,
where manufacturing jobs have shrunk from about 25 percent of the state’s private-sector
employment in 1990 to about 15 percent now. So, some of the decline in manufacturing
jobs since the recession reflects the longer-term structural downtrend of employment in
this sector. But labeling a part of the losses in manufacturing jobs as structural, rather
than related to the recession, in no way diminishes how wrenching those losses have
been. This painful trend reflects a number of long-term challenges faced by domestic
manufacturers, including the relative costs of labor and investment in producing
domestically versus abroad. However, U.S. factory workers, on average, are more
productive than their counterparts abroad, and domestic manufacturers report that they
are looking for more workers with these greater skills as they increase their use of
automation and redesign their production processes.
Current Conditions in the Labor Market
As I noted, the national unemployment rate has declined markedly during the
economic recovery. But it is my judgment that the lower level of the unemployment rate
today probably does not fully capture the extent of slack remaining in the labor market-in other words, how far away we are from a full-employment economy. In assessing
labor market slack, we try to distinguish between the effects of cyclical fluctuations in the
economy and the influences of longer-term structural changes, such as the aging of the

-5workforce and other demographic trends. Cyclical and structural factors both have
affected a number of measures of labor market outcomes that bear on our assessment of
slack, including labor force participation (that is, how many people are working or are
actively looking for work), the number of people working part time who would rather
work full time, the pace of hiring, and the rate at which people are quitting jobs.
Let’s first consider the labor force participation rate. It continued to decline
substantially after the recession ended, with the pace of those declines slowing only over
the past year or so even as the unemployment rate has continued to fall. Many workingage people who are not in the labor force have chosen that status voluntarily; examples
would include retirees, teenagers and young adults in school, and people staying home to
care for children and other dependent family members. Even in a stronger job market, it
is likely that many of these individuals would prefer not to work. And, indeed, a
noticeable portion of the decline in labor force participation seen over the past decade or
so clearly relates to the aging of baby boomers and their ongoing retirements. 2 However,
the pace of decline in the participation rate accelerated during the recession, as some
individuals who lost their jobs became discouraged and stopped looking for work. It
appears that, despite a drop in the participation rate reported in June, the pace of this
decline has slowed since early last year. Nevertheless I think a significant number of
individuals still are not seeking work because they perceive a lack of good job
opportunities, and that a stronger economy would draw some of them back into the labor
force.

2

See Stephanie Aaronson, Tomaz Cajner, Bruce Fallick, Felix Galbis-Reig, Christopher Smith, and
William Wascher (2014), “Labor Force Participation: Recent Developments and Future Prospects,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, pp. 197-275,
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall-2014/Fall2014BPEA_Aaronson_et_al.pdf.

-6Another factor we consider when assessing labor market slack is the elevated
number of workers who are employed in part-time jobs but would prefer to have full-time
work--in other words, those classified as “part time for economic reasons.” At around
4-1/2 percent of employment, the share of such workers is notably larger than has been
historically typical in a growing economy. Some portion of the greater share of workers
who are part time for economic reasons may reflect structural rather than cyclical
factors. 3 For example, the ongoing shift in employment away from manufacturing and
toward services, a sector which historically relied more heavily on part-time workers,
may be boosting the share of part-time jobs. Despite these structural trends, which make
it difficult to know where the share of those employed part time for economic reasons
may settle in the longer run, I continue to think that it probably remains higher than it
would be in a full-employment economy.
Other indicators also generally corroborate the view that while the labor market
has improved, it still has not fully recovered. For example, the rate at which employees
quit their jobs for other opportunities has tended to go up in a strong economy, since
more workers voluntarily leave their jobs when they have greater confidence about their
ability to find new ones and when firms are competing more actively for new hires.
Indeed, the quits rate has picked up as the labor market has improved over the past few
years, but it still is not as high as it was through much of the early 2000s. Another
important indicator is the number of available positions, or job openings, that employers
currently have posted. Job openings have increased significantly over the past year and a

3

See Tomaz Cajner, Dennis Mawhirter, Christopher Nekarda, and David Ratner (2014), “Why Is
Involuntary Part-Time Work Elevated?” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, April 14), www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2014/why-isinvoluntary-part-time-work-elevated-20140414.html.

-7half, and, in another encouraging sign, the pace of hiring has also stepped up in the past
year or so, though it too continues to run somewhat below the levels that prevailed
through the middle part of the last decade.
Finally, the pace of wage increases also may help shed some light on the degree
of labor market slack, since wage movements historically have tended to respond to the
degree of tightness in the labor market. Here too, however, the signal is not entirely
clear, as other factors such as longer-run trends in productivity growth also generally
influence the growth of compensation. Key measures of hourly labor compensation rose
at an annual rate of only around 2 percent through most of the recovery. More recently,
however, some tentative hints of a pickup in the pace of wage gains may indicate that the
objective of full employment is coming closer into view.
Recent Inflation Developments
While the labor market has moved closer to the FOMC’s mandated goal of
maximum employment, less progress has been made in moving inflation close to the
FOMC’s longer-run objective of 2 percent, which the Committee considers to be
consistent with our mandated goal of price stability. Overall consumer price inflation has
been close to zero over the past year, in large part because the big drop in crude oil prices
since last summer has pushed down prices for gasoline and other consumer energy
products. Price inflation excluding the volatile categories of energy and food prices, or
so-called core inflation, is often a better indicator of future overall inflation. But it too is
running below our 2 percent objective and has been over most of the recovery. The
recent low level of core inflation--1.2 percent over the past 12 months--partly reflects the
appreciation of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar during the second half of

-8last year, as global financial markets seemed to judge that our economy was relatively
stronger than those of many of our trading partners. The stronger dollar has pushed down
the prices of imported goods, and that, in turn, has put downward pressure on core
inflation. In addition, the plunge in oil prices may have had some indirect effects in
holding down the prices of non-energy items in core inflation, as producers passed on to
their customers some of the cost savings from lower energy prices. In all, however, these
downward pressures seem to be abating, and the effects of these transitory factors are
expected to fall out of measures of inflation by early next year.
Very low inflation may not sound like a real problem to many people. However,
persistently low price inflation, which can tend to slow the pace of wage increases over
time, can weaken the economy by, for example, making it more difficult for households
and firms to pay off their debts. A persistent, very low inflation environment also tends
to result in chronically low short-term interest rates. This type of situation would leave
less scope for the FOMC to respond with its conventional monetary policy tool--namely,
a cut in the federal funds rate--to counteract a weakening in the economy.
The Outlook for the Economy
Let me turn now to where I think the economy is headed over the next several
years. The latest estimates show that both real GDP and industrial production actually
edged down in the first quarter of this year. Some of this weakness appears to be the
result of factors that I expect will be only transitory, such as the unusually harsh winter
weather in some regions of the country and the West Coast port labor dispute that briefly
restrained international trade and caused disruptions in manufacturing supply chains.
Also, statistical noise or measurement issues may have played some role. This is not the

-9first time in recent years that real GDP has been reported to decline, or grow unusually
slowly, in the first quarter of the year. There is a healthy debate among economists-many within the Federal Reserve System--about some of the technical factors that may
lie behind this pattern. 4 Nevertheless, at least a couple of other more persistent factors
also likely weighed on economic output and industrial production in the first quarter. In
particular, the higher foreign exchange value of the dollar that I mentioned, as well as
weak growth in some foreign economies, has restrained the demand for U.S. exports.
Moreover, lower crude oil prices have significantly depressed business investment in the
domestic energy sector. Indeed, industrial production continued to decline somewhat in
April and May. We expect the drag on domestic economic activity from these factors to
ease over the course of this year, as the value of the dollar and crude oil prices stabilize,
and I anticipate moderate economic growth, on balance, for this year as a whole. As
always, however, the economic outlook is uncertain. Notably, although the economic
recovery in the euro area appears to have gained a firmer footing, the situation in Greece
remains unresolved.
Looking further ahead, I think that many of the fundamental factors underlying
U.S. economic activity are solid and should lead to some pickup in the pace of economic

4

See Charles E. Gilbert, Norman J. Morin, Andrew D. Paciorek, and Claudia R. Sahm (2015), “Residual
Seasonality in GDP,” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
May 14), www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/residual-seasonality-in-gdp20150514.html; Glenn D. Rudebusch, Daniel Wilson, and Tim Mahedy (2015), “The Puzzle of Weak FirstQuarter GDP Growth,” FRBSF Economic Letter 2015-16 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, May), www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2015/may/weak-firstquarter-gdp-residual-seasonality-adjustment/el2015-16.pdf; Tom Stark (2015), “First Quarters in the
National Income and Product Accounts,” Research Rap--Special Report (Philadelphia: Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, May), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-anddata/publications/research-rap/2015/first_quarters_national_income_product_accounts.pdf; and Jan Groen
and Patrick Russo (2015), “The Myth of First-Quarter Residual Seasonality,” Liberty Street Economics
(blog), Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 8,
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/06/the-myth-of-first-quarter-residual-seasonality.html.

- 10 growth in the coming years. In particular, I anticipate that employment will continue to
expand and the unemployment rate will decline further.
An improving job market should, in turn, help support a faster pace of household
spending growth. Additional jobs and potentially faster wage growth bolster household
incomes, and lower energy prices mean consumers have more money to spend on other
goods and services. In addition, growing employment and wages should make
consumers more comfortable in spending a greater portion of their incomes than they
have been in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Moreover, increases in house values
and stock market prices, along with reductions in debt in recent years, have pushed up
households’ net worth, which also should support more spending. Finally, interest rates
faced by borrowers remain low, reflecting the FOMC’s highly accommodative monetary
policies. Indeed, recent encouraging data about retail sales and light motor vehicle
purchases in the beginning of the second quarter could be an indication that the pace of
consumer spending is picking up.
Another positive factor for the outlook is that the drag on economic growth in
recent years from changes in federal fiscal policies appears to have waned. Temporary
fiscal stimulus measures supported economic output during the recession and early in the
recovery, but those stimulus measures have since expired, and additional policy actions
were taken to reduce the federal budget deficit. By 2011, these changes in fiscal policies
were holding back economic growth. However, the effects of those fiscal policy actions
now seem to be mostly behind us. 5

5

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that current federal fiscal policies will have little effect on
economic growth this year, but that earlier fiscal policy actions reduced the rate of real GDP growth
roughly 1-1/2 percentage points in 2013 and about 1/4 percentage point in 2014 relative to what it would

- 11 There are a couple of factors, however, that I expect could restrain economic
growth. First, business owners and managers remain cautious and have not substantially
increased their capital expenditures despite the solid fundamentals and brighter prospects
for consumer spending. Businesses are holding large amounts of cash on their balance
sheets, which may suggest that greater risk aversion is playing a role. Indeed, some
economic analysis suggests that uncertainty about the strength of the recovery and about
government economic policies could be contributing to the restraint in business
investment. 6
A second factor that could restrain economic growth regards housing. While
national home prices have been rising for a few years and home sales have improved
recently, residential construction has remained quite soft. Many households still find it
difficult to obtain mortgage credit, but, more generally, the weak job market and slow
wage gains in recent years appear to have induced people to double-up on housing. For
example, many young adults continue to live with their parents. Population growth is
creating a need for more housing, whether to rent or to own, and I do expect that
continuing job and wage gains will encourage more people to form new households.
Nevertheless, activity in the housing sector seems likely to improve only gradually.
Regarding inflation, as I mentioned earlier, the recent effects of lower prices for
crude oil and for imports on overall inflation are expected to wane during this year.
Combined with further tightening in labor and product markets, I expect inflation will
move toward the FOMC’s 2 percent objective over the next few years. Importantly, a

have been otherwise. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2025
(Washington: CBO, January), p. 32, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49892.
6
A recent survey of this research is presented by Nicholas Bloom (2014), “Fluctuations in Uncertainty,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 28 (Spring), pp. 153-76.

- 12 number of different surveys indicate that longer-term inflation expectations have
remained stable even as recent readings on inflation have fallen. If inflation expectations
had not remained stable, I would be more concerned because consumer and business
expectations about inflation can become self-fulfilling.
Implications for Monetary Policy
My own outlook for the economy and inflation is broadly consistent with the
central tendency of the projections submitted by FOMC participants at the time of our
June meeting. Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point
later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin
normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy
and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or
accelerate this first step. We will be watching carefully to see if there is continued
improvement in labor market conditions, and we will need to be reasonably confident that
inflation will move back to 2 percent in the next few years.
Let me also stress that this initial increase in the federal funds rate, whenever it
occurs, will by itself have only a very small effect on the overall level of monetary
accommodation provided by the Federal Reserve. Because there are some factors, which
I mentioned earlier, that continue to restrain the economic expansion, I currently
anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary
policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The
projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations
for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy
and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is

- 13 more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy
accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than
anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.
Long-Run Economic Growth
Before I conclude, let me very briefly place my discussion of the economic
outlook into a longer-term context. The Federal Reserve contributes to the nation’s
economic performance in part by using monetary policy to help achieve our mandated
goals of maximum employment and price stability. But success in promoting these
objectives does not, by itself, ensure a strong pace of long-run economic growth or
substantial improvements in future living standards. The most important factor
determining continued advances in living standards is productivity growth, defined as the
rate of increase in how much a worker can produce in an hour of work. Over time,
sustained increases in productivity are necessary to support rising household incomes.
Here the recent data have been disappointing. The growth rate of output per hour
worked in the business sector has averaged about 1-1/4 percent per year since the
recession began in late 2007 and has been essentially flat over the past year. In contrast,
annual productivity gains averaged 2-3/4 percent over the decade preceding the Great
Recession. I mentioned earlier the sluggish pace of wage gains in recent years, and while
I do think that this is evidence of some persisting labor market slack, it also may reflect,
at least in part, fairly weak productivity growth.
There are many unanswered questions about what has slowed productivity growth
in recent years and about the prospects for productivity growth in the longer run. But we
do know that productivity ultimately depends on many factors, including our workforce’s

- 14 knowledge and skills along with the quantity and quality of the capital equipment,
technology, and infrastructure that they have to work with. As a general principle, the
American people would be well served by the active pursuit of effective policies to
support longer-run growth in productivity. Policies to strengthen education and training,
to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation, and to promote capital investment, both
public and private, could all potentially be of great benefit in improving future living
standards in our nation.
Thank you, again, to the City Club for inviting me to Cleveland and for the
opportunity to speak to you today.