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For release on delivery
5:00 p.m. EDT
April 4, 2013

Communication in Monetary Policy

Remarks by
Janet L. Yellen
Vice Chair
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
Society of American Business Editors and Writers
50th Anniversary Conference
Washington, D.C.

April 4, 2013

Thank you for inviting me here and for offering me what I consider a perfect
opportunity to speak on a topic at the heart of the Federal Reserve’s efforts to promote a
stronger economy--the vital role and growing use of communication in monetary policy. 1
Some of you cover the Federal Reserve and are familiar with how it sets monetary
policy through the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). You know that the FOMC
pays very close attention to what it says in the statements it issues after each meeting.
This communication is supplemented by Chairman Bernanke’s postmeeting press
conferences and by providing detailed minutes of the Committee’s meetings. Getting this
message out to the public depends a good deal on the work you do in reporting on the
FOMC, analyzing its statements and actions, and explaining its role and objectives. So
let me begin by thanking you for those contributions.
But let me also say why I am particularly pleased to speak to you today. As
writers and editors, all of you are prodigious consumers and producers of communication.
At first glance, the FOMC’s communication may not seem so different from what you’ve
heard other government agencies say about their policies or businesses say about their
products. I hope to show how communication plays a distinct and special role in
monetary policymaking.
Let me offer a comparison that may highlight that difference. Suppose, instead of
monetary policy, we were talking about an example of transportation policy--widening a
road to ease traffic congestion. Whether this road project is announced at a televised
press conference or in a low-key press release--or even if there is no announcement--the
project is more or less the same. The benefit to drivers will come after the road is

1

I am indebted to members of the Board staff--Jon Faust, Thomas Laubach, and John Maggs--who
contributed to the preparation of these remarks.

-2widened and won’t be affected by whether drivers knew about the project years in
advance.
At the heart of everything I’ll be explaining today is the fact that monetary policy
is different. The effects of monetary policy depend critically on the public getting the
message about what policy will do months or years in the future. 2
To develop this idea, I will take you on a tour of past FOMC communication, the
present, and what I foresee for the future. Until fairly recently, most central banks
actively avoided communicating about monetary policy. Montagu Norman, governor of
the Bank of England in the early 20th century, reputedly lived by the motto “never
explain, never excuse,” and that approach was still firmly in place at the Federal Reserve
when I went to work there as a staff economist in 1977.
I’ll begin by discussing how a growing understanding of the importance of
transparency shaped FOMC communication in the years before the financial crisis. Next,
I’ll relate how the financial crisis brought unprecedented challenges for monetary policy
that required the use of unconventional policy tools, including some barely contemplated
before the crisis. Communication was a centerpiece of these efforts. Finally, I’ll look
ahead. I am encouraged by recent signs that the economy is improving and healing from
the trauma of the crisis, and I expect that, at some point, the FOMC will return to a more
normal approach to monetary policy. At the conclusion of my remarks, I’ll discuss the
communication challenges the FOMC will face when it comes time to make that
transition.
2

Like almost every government policy action, this hypothetical road project could affect expectations--it
might influence decisions about where people live or commercial development, for example. The crucial
difference is that these are not the primary and stated aim of this policy action, which is to reduce traffic
congestion. As these remarks go on to explain, unlike most government policy actions, monetary policy is
primarily concerned with affecting expectations of the future.

-3FOMC communication has long been a topic of great interest to me, and one I
have worked on more directly since 2010, when Chairman Bernanke asked me to lead a
new FOMC subcommittee on communications. This is probably a good moment to
remind you that, as always, I speak for myself and not the FOMC or my colleagues in the
Federal Reserve System.
From “Never Explain” to Transparency
Recently I used the word “revolution” to describe the change from “never
explain” to the current embrace of transparency in the FOMC’s communication. 3 That
might sound surprising to an audience that knows very well what it feels like to be in the
middle of a communications revolution. The speed and frequency of most
communication, it seems, never stops growing, and I will admit that the FOMC’s changes
to the pace and form of its communication seem rather modest in comparison. I’ve
mentioned the Chairman’s quarterly postmeeting press conferences, which were initiated
two years ago. While these events are televised and streamed live, the mode for most of
the FOMC’s communication is decidedly old-school--the printed word. The
Committee’s most watched piece of communication is the written statement issued after
each of its meetings, which are held roughly every six weeks. It may seem quaint that
my colleagues and I continue to spend many hours laboring over the few hundred words
in this statement, which are then extensively analyzed only minutes after their release.
The revolution in the FOMC’s communication, however, isn’t about technology
or speed. It’s a revolution in our understanding of how communication can influence the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
3

See Janet L. Yellen (2012), “Revolution and Evolution in Central Bank Communications,” speech
delivered at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, November 13,
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20121113a.htm.

-4It will help if I start with some basics. The FOMC consists of the 7 members of
the Federal Reserve Board in Washington and 5 of the 12 presidents of the regional
Federal Reserve Banks. All 12 presidents participate in FOMC meetings but only 5 get a
vote, a roster that rotates each year.
The FOMC’s job, assigned by the Congress, is to use monetary policy to promote
maximum employment and stable prices, objectives that together are known as the
Federal Reserve’s dual mandate. In normal times, the Committee pursues these goals by
influencing the level of a short-term interest rate called the federal funds rate, which is
what banks charge each other for overnight loans. When the FOMC pushes the federal
funds rate up or down, other short-term interest rates normally move in tandem.
Medium- and longer-term interest rates, including auto loan rates and mortgage rates,
generally adjust also, through a mechanism I will return to in a moment. By pushing the
federal funds rate up or down, the FOMC seeks to influence a wide range of interest rates
that matter to households and businesses.
Typically, the FOMC acts to lower the federal funds rate, with the intention of
reducing interest rates generally, when the economy is weakening or inflation is declining
below the Committee’s longer-run objective. The FOMC raises the federal funds rate
when inflation threatens to rise above its objective or when economic activity appears
likely to rise above sustainable levels. Raising and lowering the federal funds rate was
long the primary means by which the FOMC pursued its economic objectives.
It is hard to imagine now, but only two decades ago, the Federal Reserve and
other central banks provided the public with very little information about such monetary
policy moves--the spirit of “never explain” was very much alive. There were a number

-5of different justifications for this approach. One view was that less disclosure would
reduce the risk and tamp down suspicions that some could take advantage of disclosures
more readily than others. Some believed that markets would overreact to details about
monetary policy decisions. And there was a widespread belief that communicating about
how the FOMC might act in the future could limit the Committee’s discretion to change
policy in response to future developments. In sum, the conventional wisdom among
central bankers was that transparency was of little benefit for monetary policy and, in
some cases, could cause problems that would make policy less effective.
While communication and transparency steadily increased elsewhere in
government and society, change came slowly to the FOMC. It wasn’t until February
1994 that the Committee issued a postmeeting statement disclosing a change in monetary
policy. Even then, it only alerted the public that the Committee had changed its policy
stance, with scant explanation. 4
Something big was changing, however, and it would soon be the force driving
major enhancements in the FOMC’s communication. By the early 1990s, a growing
body of research challenged widespread assumptions about the how central banks, such
as the Federal Reserve, affected the economy. The reevaluation starts with a question
that puzzled many of my students when I was a professor: How is it that the Federal
Reserve manages to move a vast economy just by raising or lowering the interest rate on
overnight loans by 1/4 of a percentage point?
The question arises because significant spending decisions--expanding a business,
buying a house, or choosing how much to spend on consumer goods over the year--

4

Previously, the public inferred policy changes by observing the Federal Reserve’s behavior in securities
markets.

-6depend on expectations of income, employment, and other economic conditions over the
longer term, as well as longer-term interest rates. The crucial insight of that research was
that what happens to the federal funds rate today or over the six weeks until the next
FOMC meeting is relatively unimportant. What is important is the public’s expectation
of how the FOMC will use the federal funds rate to influence economic conditions over
the next few years. 5
For this reason, the Federal Reserve’s ability to influence economic conditions
today depends critically on its ability to shape expectations of the future, specifically by
helping the public understand how it intends to conduct policy over time, and what the
likely implications of those actions will be for economic conditions. To return to the
example I used earlier, contrast this effect on expectations with that of a road project.
Today’s commute, alas, will not be improved or changed at all by the news that a road
will be widened one day. But the effects of today’s monetary policy actions are largely
due to the effect they have on expectations about how policy will be set over the medium
term.
Let me further illustrate this with some history. Starting in the mid-1960s, the
Federal Reserve didn’t act forcefully in the face of rising inflation, and the public grew
less certain of the central bank’s commitment to fighting inflation. This uncertainty led
expectations of future inflation to become “unanchored” and more likely to react to
economic developments. In 1973, an oil price shock led to a large increase in overall
inflation. Expectations of higher inflation in the future affected the public’s behavior-workers demanded raises, and businesses set prices and otherwise acted in anticipation of

5

Another factor that adds to the importance of expectations is that changes in monetary policy affect real
activity and inflation with a substantial time lag.

-7higher costs--and this helped fuel actual inflation. The FOMC’s occasional efforts to
reduce inflation in the 1970s were ineffective partly due to the expectation that it
ultimately wouldn’t do enough.
By contrast, most of you probably know about the Federal Reserve’s successful
inflation fighting in the early 1980s. The FOMC raised the federal funds rate very high,
causing a deep recession but also convincing the public that it was committed to low and
stable inflation. Anchoring inflation expectations at low levels helped ensure that jumps
in commodity prices or other supply shocks would not generate persistent inflation
problems. This was illustrated by the effect of another escalation in oil prices starting in
2005. Unlike in the 1970s, these price shocks did not result in a broad and lasting
increase in overall inflation because the public believed the Federal Reserve would keep
inflation in check. The FOMC wasn’t forced to raise interest rates--which softened the
blow of higher fuel costs on households and businesses--because of the credibility the
Federal Reserve had built since the 1980s.
If the public’s expectations have always been important, you might wonder how
monetary policy had any effect prior to the transparency revolution. As it turns out, with
the notable exception of the late 1960s and 1970s, the FOMC usually responded in a
systematic way to economic conditions. In 1993, economist John Taylor documented
that FOMC policy changes since the mid-1980s had fairly reliably followed a simple rule
based on inflation and output. Changes in the federal funds rate were usually made in
several small steps over a number of months. In practice, the Federal Reserve’s approach
was “never explain, but behave predictably.”

-8A close analysis of the FOMC’s past behavior was a good guide to future policy,
but it had two shortcomings as a substitute for transparency: First, it gave an advantage
to sophisticated players who studied the FOMC’s behavior--something that is arguably
inappropriate for a government institution. Second, while a policy rule such as the one
developed by John Taylor explained the course of the federal funds rate much of the time,
there were cases when it didn’t and when even the experts failed to correctly anticipate
the FOMC’s actions.
The trend toward greater transparency accelerated during the early 2000s.
Starting in 2000, the FOMC issued information after every meeting about its economic
outlook. It also provided an assessment of the balance of risks to the economy and
whether it was leaning toward increasing or decreasing the federal funds rate in the
future. Such information about intentions and expectations for the future, known as
forward guidance, became crucial in 2003, when the Committee was faced with a
stubbornly weak recovery from the 2001 recession. It had cut the federal funds rate to
the very low level of 1 percent, but unemployment remained elevated, and the FOMC
sought some further way to stimulate the economy. In this situation, it told the public
that it intended to keep the federal funds rate low for longer than might have been
expected by adding to its statement that “[i]n these circumstances, the Committee
believes that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.” 6
Let’s pause here and note what this moment represented. For the first time, the
Committee was using communication--mere words--as its primary monetary policy tool.
Until then, it was probably common to think of communication about future policy as

6

See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2003), “FOMC Statement,” press release,
August 12, www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2003/20030812/default.htm.

-9something that supplemented the setting of the federal funds rate. In this case,
communication was an independent and effective tool for influencing the economy. The
FOMC had journeyed from “never explain” to a point where sometimes the explanation
is the policy.
By the eve of the recent financial crisis, it was established that the FOMC could
not simply rely on its record of systematic behavior as a substitute for communication-especially under unusual circumstances, for which history had little to teach. I think
we’re all fortunate that policymakers had learned this lesson, because the FOMC was
about to encounter unprecedented economic conditions and policy challenges. The
financial crisis and its aftermath demanded advances in FOMC communication as great
as any that had come before.
Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Financial Crisis
The situation in 2008 and 2009 was like nothing the Federal Reserve had faced
since the 1930s. In late 2008, the FOMC cut the federal funds rate nearly to zero-essentially, as low as it could go--where it has remained. With its traditional tool for
expansionary monetary policy--lowering the federal funds rate--off the table, the FOMC
turned to unconventional and, in some cases, newly invented policy options to try both to
help stabilize the financial system and to arrest the plunge in economic activity. The
public had grown accustomed to monetary policy that focused on changes to the federal
funds rate target, with occasional, and at this point fairly limited, guidance that a
particular policy stance would probably last for a while. Beyond the task of describing
the new policies, extensive new communication was needed to justify these

- 10 unconventional policy actions and convincingly connect them to the Federal Reserve’s
employment and inflation objectives.
The best known of these unconventional policies is large-scale asset purchases,
commonly known as quantitative easing. Starting in late 2008 and continuing through
today, the Federal Reserve has purchased longer-term government agency debt securities,
agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, and longer-term Treasury securities that
have added about $2.5 trillion to its assets. These purchases were intended to, and I
believe have, succeeded in significantly lowering longer-term interest rates and raising
asset prices to help further the Federal Reserve’s economic objectives. This is an easing
of monetary policy, also known as accommodation, beyond what is provided by
maintaining the federal funds rate close to zero.
It is important to emphasize that the effects of asset purchases also depend on
expectations. If the FOMC buys, say, $10 billion in longer-term securities today but is
expected to sell them tomorrow or very shortly, there will be little effect on the economy.
Current research suggests that the effects of asset purchases today depend on expectations
of the total value of securities the FOMC intends to buy and on expectations of how long
the FOMC intends to hold those securities. To make these asset purchases as effective as
possible in adding accommodation, the FOMC, therefore, needs to communicate the
intended path of Federal Reserve securities holdings years into the future. I will return in
a moment to current and possible future ways in which the FOMC does and might
communicate this information.
The other unconventional policy designed to contribute to monetary easing was
almost purely communication--enhanced forward guidance about how long the

- 11 Committee expects to maintain the federal funds rate near zero. The situation in early
2009 was similar to 2003 but even more challenging, because in that earlier episode, the
FOMC at least retained the option of a further reduction in the federal funds rate target.
In 2009, communication about the future path of the federal funds rate was the only
option.
Initially, the forward guidance was simple and familiar: The FOMC statement
noted that “economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the
federal funds rate for an extended period.” 7 The Committee enhanced its forward
guidance in August 2011, when it substituted “at least through mid-2013” for the words
“an extended period.” 8 This date was moved into the future several times, most recently
last September, when it was shifted to mid-2015. 9
This “calendar guidance” was an advance over the indefinite “extended period,”
but it suffered from an important limitation. The date failed to provide the public with a
clear understanding of what conditions the FOMC was trying to achieve or the economic
conditions that would warrant a continuation of the policy. As a consequence, it was
hard for the public to tell whether a change in the calendar date reflected a shift in policy
or a change in the Committee’s economic forecast.
To help provide greater clarity about the Committee’s objectives, in January
2012, the FOMC adopted and released a statement of its longer-run goals and monetary

7

See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009), “FOMC Statement,” press release,
March 18, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090318a.htm.
8
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011), “FOMC Statement,” press release,
August 9, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20110809a.htm.
9
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012), “Federal Reserve Issues FOMC
Statement,” press release, September 13,
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm.

- 12 policy strategy. 10 This statement laid out, for the first time, the rates of inflation and
unemployment that the FOMC considers consistent with the dual mandate. Specifically,
it stated that the longer-run inflation goal most consistent with the FOMC’s price stability
mandate is 2 percent, and that the central tendency of FOMC participants’ estimates of
the longer-run normal rate of unemployment ranged from 5.2 to 6 percent.
As the statement also made clear, economic developments may cause inflation
and unemployment to temporarily move away from the objectives, and the Committee
will use a balanced approach to return both, over time, to the longer-run goals. On the
one hand, for example, the current rate of unemployment, at 7.7 percent, is far above the
5.2 to 6 percent range in the statement and is expected to decline only gradually.
Inflation, on the other hand, has been running at or below 2 percent and is expected to
remain at similar levels for several years. In this circumstance, both legs of the dual
mandate call for a highly accommodative monetary policy. With unemployment so far
from its longer-run normal level, I believe progress on reducing unemployment should
take center stage for the FOMC, even if maintaining that progress might result in
inflation slightly and temporarily exceeding 2 percent. The Committee reaffirmed this
statement in January 2013, and I expect it to remain a valuable roadmap for many years
to come, indicating how monetary policy will respond to changes in economic
conditions. 11

10

See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012), “Federal Reserve Issues FOMC
Statement of Longer-Run Goals and Policy Strategy,” press release, January 25,
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm.
11
See “Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy,” as amended effective January 29,
2013, on the Board’s website at
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf.

- 13 Meanwhile, the FOMC has continued to enhance its communication about how it
would use the federal funds rate to return inflation and unemployment to its longer-run
objectives. Last December, the Committee replaced its calendar guidance for the federal
funds rate with quantitative measures of economic conditions that would warrant
continuing that rate at its current very low level. Specifically, the Committee said it
anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate will be appropriate “at
least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between
one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the
Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue
to be well anchored.” 12
I consider these thresholds for possible action a major improvement in forward
guidance. They provide much more information than before about the conditions that are
likely to prevail when the FOMC decides to raise the federal funds rate. As for the date
at which tightening of monetary policy is likely to occur, market participants, armed with
this new information about the Committee’s “reaction function,” can form their own
judgment and alter their expectations on timing as new information accrues over time.
These thresholds will, as a consequence, allow private-sector expectations of the
federal funds rate to fulfill an important “automatic stabilizer” function for the economy.
If the recovery is stronger than expected, the public should anticipate that one or both of
the threshold values will be crossed sooner and, hence, that the federal funds rate could
be raised earlier. Conversely, if the outlook for the economy unexpectedly worsens, the

12

See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012), “Federal Reserve Issues FOMC
Statement,” press release, December 12,
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm.

- 14 public should expect a later “liftoff” in rates--an expectation that would reduce longerterm interest rates and thereby provide more-accommodative financial conditions.
Communication and Monetary Policy Challenges Ahead
The threshold guidance for the federal funds rate looks ahead to a time when the
economy has healed from the worst effects of the financial crisis. Getting back to more
normal economic conditions will allow for a more normal approach to monetary policy. I
look forward to the day when we can put away our unconventional tools and return to
what now seems like the relatively straightforward challenge of setting the federal funds
rate.
At some point it will be appropriate to cease adding to accommodation and, later,
to begin the process of withdrawing the significant accommodation required by the
extraordinary conditions caused by the financial crisis. I believe that, once again,
communication will play a central role in managing this transition.
Let me start with our current program of asset purchases, which was launched in
September 2012 and revised in December. Notably, the FOMC has described this
program in terms of a monthly pace of purchases rather than as a total amount of
expected purchases. The Committee has indicated that it will continue purchases until
the outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability.
In its most recent statement, the FOMC also indicated that the pace and composition of
the purchases may be adjusted based on the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases,
as well as the extent of progress toward the Federal Reserve’s economic objectives. 13 In
my view, adjusting the pace of asset purchases in response to the evolution of the outlook

13

See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013), “Federal Reserve Issues FOMC
Statement,” press release, March 20, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130320a.htm.

- 15 for the labor market will provide the public with information regarding the Committee’s
intentions and should reduce the risk of misunderstanding and market disruption as the
conclusion of the program draws closer.
The Federal Reserve’s ongoing asset purchases continually add to the
accommodation that the Federal Reserve is providing to help strengthen the economy.
An end to those purchases means that the FOMC has ceased augmenting that support, not
that it is withdrawing accommodation. When and how to begin actually removing the
significant accommodation provided by the Federal Reserve’s large holdings of longerterm securities is a separate matter. In its March statement, the FOMC reaffirmed its
expectation that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain
appropriate for a considerable time after the current asset purchase program ends and the
economic recovery has strengthened. 14 Accordingly, there will likely be a substantial
period after asset purchases conclude but before the FOMC starts removing
accommodation by reducing asset holdings or raising the federal funds rate.
To guide expectations concerning the process of normalizing the size and
composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, at its June 2011 meeting, the FOMC
laid out what it called “exit principles.” In these principles, the FOMC indicated that
asset sales would likely follow liftoff of the federal funds rate. It also noted that, in order
to minimize the risk of market disruption, the pace of asset sales during this process could
be adjusted up or down in response to changes in either the economic outlook or financial
conditions. For example, changes in the pace or timing of asset sales might be warranted
by concerns over market functioning or excessive volatility in bond markets. While

14

See Board of Governors, “FOMC Statement,” March 20, in note 13.

- 16 normalization of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio is still well in the future, the FOMC is
committed to clear communication about the likely path of the balance sheet.
There will come a time when the FOMC begins the process of returning the
federal funds rate to a more normal level. In their individual projections submitted for
the March FOMC meeting, 13 of the 19 FOMC participants saw the first increase in the
target for the federal funds rate as most likely to occur in 2015, and another expected it to
occur in 2016. But the course of the economy is uncertain, and the Committee added the
thresholds for unemployment and inflation, in part, to help guide the public if economic
developments warrant liftoff sooner or later than expected. As the time of the first
increase in the federal funds rate moves closer, in my view it will be increasingly
important for the Committee to clearly communicate about how the federal funds rate
target will be adjusted.
I hope I’ve been able today to convey the vital role that communication plays in
the Federal Reserve’s efforts to promote maximum employment and stable prices.
Communication became even more significant after the onset of the financial crisis when
the FOMC turned to unconventional policy tools that relied heavily on communication.
Better times and a transition away from unconventional policies may make monetary
policy less reliant on communication. But I hope and trust that the days of “never
explain, never excuse” are gone for good, and that the Federal Reserve continues to reap
the benefits of clearly explaining its actions to the public. I believe further improvements
in the FOMC’s communication are possible, and I expect they will continue.
It has been my privilege to share these thoughts with you. Thank you for inviting
me here today.