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R E P IN RECORDS SECTION SEP 2 1 1970 /- Remarks of J 0 L. Robertson Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces Washington, D. Co February 14, 1968 MR FILES Mb Gnhin " ^EC'" If! RECORDS SECTION S E P 2 1 1970 The Role of the Federal Reserve Practically everyone today in this country has heard °f the Federal Reserve System, for better or worse, but sometimes I wonder if those of us who are directly concerned with the System would not be a little shocked at the understanding, rather the lack of it, by the man on the street. s Even ome bankers, who should know better, believe that the System supports itself by using their banks' reserves to invest in government bonds, and hence argue that the profits should be divvied up among member banks. We do hold a large portfolio United States Government securities - some $49 billion the earnings from which last year were large enough to cover °ur expenses and permit us to turn over to the Treasury $1.9 b il]-ion. As all of you know, however, we actually create the ^oney we use to buy those securities; hence, we have no need use any of the reserves of commercial banks that are d e - to P o s i t e d with us. Policies of the System cannot be fully effective un~ 1g ss they arc correctly understood and interpreted by those af' fe cted by them. People who do not understand the significance Federal Reserve actions may react by swinging from one ex- | tr Gme to the 'other, from bullishness to bearishness, or vice - 2 versa, and thus increase the difficulty of formulating and executing monetary policy. I do not want to suggest that understanding Federal Reserve policy will solve all of our problems. There are very real differences in political and economic philosophy even a niong those who understand our operations quite well. On the °ne hand, there are some who believe that our duty is to stimulate economic activity to the highest possible level, even at the price of a "little" inflation. ar e some who feel that a depression every now and then is a 8°od therapeutic purge. Gl The Federal Reserve does not hold -ther extremity of belief. Cr a On the other extreme, there For this reason we can expect itics to be on either side of us: one group spurring us head and the other group advising even greater caution. In- deed, the range of view is so great that I should become a little concerned if we did not receive criticism from all sides, u t found the attack coming from only one direction. Federal Reserve_Scrves With the view of understanding it better, let us take a look at the Federal Reserve System, which includes the Board Governors, the Federal Reserve Banks, approximately 6,100 - 3 member banks (holding about five-sixths of the. deposits of all commercia 1 banks) , the Fcdera 1 Open Market. Committee, and the Federal Advisory Council. First: of all, let me clear away some of the areas that you do know fully as well as I. The Federal Reserve System was originally designed as a service institution - to Provide a more elastic currency and to put to an end the ^oney panics which had beset this country from time to time. I believe there is universal agreement that in this respect, a t least, the System has been a great success. The service functions are still important and over 95 cent of our 19,000 employees are engaged in performing them. Practically all of the currency of the country goes ° u t to banks, directly or Indirectly, from the Federal Reserve Ba nks and is returned to them from circulation for destruction ° r reissuance. The amount of paper currency handled by the Re- Sci -*ve Banks last year would make a stack more than 350 miles hi gh. Even more awesome are the mountains of checks - num- k° r ing j.n the billions - that arc cleared through the System year. n Most checks traveling any distance pass through the d s of a Reserve Bank in the process of effecting prompt - /,. - and orderly movement of funds from payers to payees. Suffice it to say that these activities alone make a real contribution to the smooth operation of the economic machinery upon which our way of life is based. In addition, the Federal Reserve Banks act as fiscal agents for the government, issuing and redeeming government securities, paying coupons, and performing other banking services for the Treasury and other government; agencies. Another basic job given to the Federal Reserve by Congress Was to improve bank supervision. That we have attempted to do, not only through examination of state member banks, W through the promulgation of regulations relating to all Member banks (state and national), as well as in our administration of the Bank Holding Company Act and the Bank Merger Act • 1n addition, in collaboration with the Federal Deposit insurance Corporation, we have a school for bank examiners ^signed to improve the caliber of supervision at both na- tional and state levels 0 Ur bu Incidentally, the better we train examiners, the faster we lose them to commercial banks, t a i s o the faster the commercial banks are themselves be- a m i n g better manned. In addition, wo prescribe margin requirements on .securities transactions, recently enlarged to apply to previously nonregulated self, lenders - almost a full-time job in it- And in a week or so we will be saddled with the job administering the new Truth-in-Lending legislation, to Congress is putting the finishing touches. Finally, you know that the Federal Reserve performs a function even more vital to the welfare of our country. It ^s, first and foremost, the central bank of the nation. As s Uch, it is the creator of bank reserves, the lender of last Resort, and the regulator of the money and credit supply. s In hort, it formulates and executes monetary policy, one of the ^°st potent of all economic forces, £fae_Role of Monetary Policyr What is our monetary policy? Stated broadly and sim- P^-y, it is to make available all of the money and credit the °c-onomy needs for both normal operation and healthy growth, hopefully not so much as to induce inflation or so litas to set the stage for a depression. To carry out mone- policy, the Federal Reserve raises or lowers the disc °unt rate, increases 03* decreases reserve requirements, and - 6 through open market operations, provides the banking system with additional reserves by purchasing government securities, 0r pulls out reserves by sales of such securities. Our aim to see that "boom-and-bust" cycles do not arise from money a nd credit causes, and to moderate (within the limits of our Power) cyclical movements stemming from other causes. Since both inflation and deflation have causes other than the misbehavior of money and credit, we can never achieve Perfection. is Our critics seem to expect perfection, but this only a further reason v;hy a widespread knowledge of the System is so vital 0 to People who understand it: are not likely be misled as some have been, and others will be, by catch Phrases such as "hard money policy" or "easy money policy", ^hich are tossed back and forth frequently with a good deal heat but a minimum of light. Of course, the remarkable thing about economic developments in this country in this decade is not that we have had s Qnie inflation, which is intolerable, or that we have occa- Sl -Onally had considerable unemployment, which is of great c °ncern to us, Much more important is the fact that we have on average a vigorous rate of growth and general pros Parity without a wild speculative boom followed by a disastrous 7 and prolonged depression* Monetary policy is entitled to some of the credit for this generally favorable course of e vents. Please do not infer that I think monetary policy can control the economy. It is a powerful influence but, ob- viously, we cannot control many of the most potent factors, such as public psychology, spending and saving habits, fiscal policy, or even the pressures from labor, agriculture, a nd industry groups that result in wage and price increases a s well as government guarantees or subsidies of one sort or another. The most the Federal Reserve System can do is to Provide money and credit conditions which are conducive to economic stability and healthy growth. Furthermore, it can enly bring its influence to bear on the economic situation as hat •situation is created by the actions of businesses, labor Ov ^Sanitations, consumers and governments. It does this through the medium of fractional reserve ec luirements and the power to expand or contract the volume reserves - thus stimulating or curtailing the expansion money and credit. Needless to say, if banks have excess Reserves, they are eager to lend and thus to put idle funds 0 Work (even if they must shave interest rates in order to - 8 do it) . Their eagerness to .lend contributes to expanding business activity. Contrnrivri.se, a deficiency of reserves causes banks to be reluctant to lend, to restrict credit, a nd to charge more for any credit: that is extended 0 turn discourages undue expansion and speculative This in tendencies by putting a crimp in the plans of people who desire to bormoney for these purposes. Of course, the big job is to see that the supply of money and credit is kept in proper alignment with the volume of goods and services available for purchase. If too ^Uch money is chasing after too few goods and services, inflat ion usually results; and if there is too little money in * e lation to the volume of goods and services, the result is Usually deflation. It is not quite so simple as that, but difficult problem is to determine what is the "right" Amount of money and credit for the economy at any given time. Some of you, or your children, have raised tropical and consequently you may have learned through experienc Qc e , as I have, that the health, clarity, and beauty of the luarium depend upon the maintenance of a proper balance among ^°ur factors: v °getation. water, fish, snails or other scavengers, and When a proper balance is maintained, the water - 9 remains clear and the fish healthy,but if those elements get Out of balance, the water becomes cloudy and the fish start turning over on their backs. All factors except the plant life are uncontrollable; the aquarium is only so large so the Volume of water cannot be altered; and the fish and do not effectively practice birth control. scavengers Therefore, one tries to maintain an ideal environment by regulating the a mount of plant life - taking out or putting in as conditions seem to warrant. There is a slight similarity between the aquarium and the economy. In the aquarium, the plant life is the factor ^e can control; in (.lie business world the variable under Federa 1 Reserve influence is money and credit. In each case, the aim is a healthy environment, either aqueous or economic, 9n d there are no precise rules with which to measure, in ad- d u c e , the appropriateness of any given action. the interference should be kept to a minimum. Is at least one real difference. VJe In both, However, there When we add more plant life, know it will begin immediately to manufacture oxygen, but Vj hen vje put more reserves into the banking system, their ef- fectiveness in producing more money and credit: for the economy depends on the psychological attitude of people„ You can - 10 make money available, but you cannot make bankers lend or people borrow. Furthermore, a given volume of money and credit may be exactly right at one time and wholly wrong at another, simply because of an unexpected Increase or decrease in the velocity of its turnover. Obviously, a ten dollar bill spent once in a given period of time constitutes less spending power than a ten dollar bill which flows in and out of the Pockets of ten spenders during the same period. Realization °f this contributes to a suitable humility in the Reserve Sys tem - an understanding that all it can do through adjustments the volume of reserves, in the light of the best information that can be assembled by what we believe to be the world best economic staff, is to help create an environment that is c °nducive to economic stability and the fullest sustainable u se of our human and material resources. This is the mechanism then - based on the institution fractional reserves - by which the Federal Reserve seeks to make its contribution tp an American economy that is at the same time growing and stable, ^grspectlve from Receiit History How has this mechanism been functioning in actual prac. •ice? Historical perspective can be a great teacher. Many - 11 °f you probably recall the disappoi.ntment that was felt back in 1960-61 when it appeared that some of the high hopes that had been placed in the "soaring 'sixties" were not going to be realized. Now with the benefit of a longer perspective ue find that the 'sixties'have soared after all - too much, l n fact. Vie are now in the eighty-fourth month of economic a dvanc.e uninterrupted by recession - the longest such period lr ) American history. This record did not just happen. As the present decade S°t under way, the most pressing economic task at hand was to e stablish a more stimulative economic environment which would h • Dr m g about fuller use of our productive capacities. Gra The Fed- l Reserve contributed to this objective by pursuing a gen- i a l l y expansionary monetary policy. We provided commercial banks with ample reserves to encourage them Lo accommodate demands for credit from both the private and public sectors of khc economy. This supplemented an expansionary fiscal policy, in°Uiding a judiciously timed tax cut. Monetary and fiscal P°licy worked hand-in-hand to stimulate demand, boost ornate growth, encourage investment, and reduce both unem- ployment and the underutilization of plant and equipment. - 12 - As a result, since 1960 our industrial output has risen almost 50 per cent. We have created jobs for more than an addi- tional eight and one-half million men and women, and the number of unemployed has fallen by nearly one million. Through the first half of the decade wholesale prices were virtually stable and the cost of living rose little more than 1 per cent a year 0 This was a remarkable record of growth with stability Advent of Inflation However, as 1965 drew toward its close and 1966 got Under way, there appeared a rising number of portents of a build-up in inflationary pressures 6 s Prices were rising, and ° were credit demands and interest rates 0 The combination the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the consequent acCe leration in the pace of defense spending, and a speed-up in business spending began to overtax the economy's productive capacity and cause even more rapid prj.ee increases. Moreover, be intensified demand reached beyond our national boundaries, Su cking in more and more Imports, reducing our international ra d e surplus and hampering our efforts to correct the per- ^ s t e n t deficit in our balance of payments. On the cost side, price increases became painfully PRarent. Every housewife knows what happened to retail 13 food prices. Of greater long-run significance, however, were the price increases that spread pervasively throughout our economic system. Furthermore, the growing number of seem- ingly excessive wage settlements gave rise to fears of the emergence of a wage-price spiral 0 The upsurge in investment and consumption demand that underlay the upward movement of prices and. costs was, of course, reflected in the demand for credit. The banking system found itself besieged by borrowers seeking credit to finance their burgeoning activities. It was becoming increasingly clear that: the demands on our real resources wore exceeding our to meet them. This is why prices were rising, as W t l e n e c l <,s and shortages developed* If things were to be kept on an even keel, measures had to be taken that would res toro the balance between demand and supply. One way of doing this would have been to raise taxes, ^hereby reducing spending power and thus dampening the demand goods and services. However, with little help in the form fiscal restraint, the burden of slowing down the economic Gx pansion to a sustainable pace fell almost entirely upon the Moulders of monetary policy. Hence, the monetary blade was ^°rced to cut deeper and in a different manner than it would ^ v e done had fiscal as well as monetary policy been employed. 14 Thus began what I an sure will be. regarded as one of the classic battles of monetary policy against inflation. Let me go into those 1966 struggles in enough detail to disclose the strategies and tactics involved. The Federal Reserve found itself obliged to limit the availability of reserves so that not all of the credit demands that were being ^ade upon our banking system could be satisfied. The commer- cial banks were trying to meet an extremely heavy demand for loans. We realized that if we gave them all the reserves they Wanted in order to meet this demand, we would be fueling the f ires of inflation. Therefore, the Federal Reserve elected to curtail, its buying of government securities in the open market. The commercial banks, meanwhile, were liquidating large amounts government securities to obtain loanable funds. This put Pressure on the price of government securitj.es - as bond prices clown, yields go up, and vice versa - and consequently interest rates on these issues rose quite sharply. Interest rates in other parts of the credit and capital markets also rose ^ r k e d l y , as demand in all these markets outran the supply of M a i l a b l e funds. With loan demand very heavy, the banks raised the r ates they were charging for credit. Because they wanted to get additional funds to supply the lorn demand, tlicy raised the rates they were willing to pay on savings and time deposits 0 The rates the banks were offering depositors went so high that they attracted large amounts of money that were in, or would normally have gone into thrift institutions, e . g , savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks. These institu- tions were unable to raise their rates to the level that would nave been required to prevent this, largely because such a high Proportion of their assets consisted of long-term real estate Mortgages, which, of course, carry a fixed rate of interest. This put a practical ceiling on the rates that these, institutions could pay to their depositors or shareholders. On the other hand, since a large portion of bank loans are short-term, the commercial banks were in a position to raj.se their loan ra tes and hence bid higher for deposits - which they did. What I wish to emphasize is simply that the Federal Re- Serve did not issue a decree ordering the banks to raise interest rates. Interest rates rose because the demand for loans exceeded the supply of loanable funds. n The Federal Reserve did °t try to keep rates from rising by buying the large quanti- ties of government securities the banks were selling, because we knew that if we were to do so, we would be financing a further 16 imbalance between demand and supply for real resources and t h e r eby i n t e n s i f y 1n f1a 1. jon ary pressures 0 This way of meeting the problem admittedly caused other problems. As I have said, the rise in interest rates put a severe squeeze on the nonbanlc savings institutions. Since these institutions are such important suppliers of mortgage fnoney for the building industry, financing for residential housing became very tight, as any of you who may have tried then to buy or sell a home no doubt discovered 0 Private housing starts in 1966 fell by over one-third compared with 1965, But at the same time that this intense squeeze was be3 n - g felt in the mortgage market, large business concerns in Kiost other lines of industry were being amply supplied with Cr edit, especially by bank loans, despite a restrictive mone- tary policy. s Whenever deposit growth was insufficient: to meet uch loan requests, the banks liquidated, securities, borrowed ^ n d s wherever available, and cut clown their accommodation of °ther applicants, in order to respond to the credit demands big corporate customers to whom they could not say "Ko" 0 As a consequence, though total bank credit was growln g at a pace well below that of 1965, bank loans to business -- 17 continued to expand at an extraordinary pace. The policy pur- sued by the Federal Reserve up to this point was obviously not adequately restraining the strong expansion of bank loans to business, while bank efforts to raise funds to make such loans were threatening grave effects on the money and markets, as well as on housing. securities Consequently, beginning in the summer, the Federal Reserve took a carefully co-ordinated series of steps aimed at countering the most extreme distortions in credit availability while maintaining a general climate of credit: restraint conducive to a more moderate, orderly, Q nd sustainable rate of overall economic expansion. First in July and again in September the Board of Governors increased, by one percentage point: on each occasion, reserve requirements on time deposits in excess of $5 million at each member bank. These moves were designed to temper both the solicitation of time deposits and the expansion of loans at the larger banks.* In addition, the Board r lowered Regulation Q interest atc ceilings on certain types of time deposits. This was designed to curtail the funds available for lending and to Moderate excesses in interest rate competition among depositary institutions - excesses which if continued threatened - 18 disastrous consequences for numerous individual institutions and serious damage to the whole financial community. In addition to rolling back the in terest-rate ceiling for some timk deposits, the Board, of Governors deliberately refrained from raising the ceiling for larger denomination CD's, despite the pleas of bankers and the pressure arising from higher rates that were being offered on competing market instruments. This was one of the most important deci- sions the Board made all summer. By deciding not to raise this ceiling, the Board was initiating a new variant in its implementation of monetary policy. Rather than attempt to restrain bank lending by further tightening overall policy, tohich would propel interest rates to even higher levels, the Board determined to bring pressure on banks by allowing some attrition of their large denomination CD 1 s to develop and hence curtail the banking system's ability to expand its busi n ess loans - particularly at large banks that make the bulk °f loans to big business. As part of this new initiative, on September 1, the Fed eral Reserve announced, in a letter to all member banks, lt n s interest in seeing a more restricted expansion in busi- °-ss loans. VJe were aware that by our nonaction, banks would - 19 lose deposits, (Actually, from mid-August to mid-Dccember the large banks had net CD run-offs of approximately $3 billion.) However, we made it clear in that same letter that the System stood ready to provide needed credit assistance through the discount window to those ban lis that were trying to curtail business loans, making it unnecessary for them to dump state and local government securities in a market that ^as- already congested. We wanted to strengthen the will of bankers to slow down the growing volume of loans to business customers. We hoped thereby to dampen excessively ebullient business spending that was adding to near-term inflationary Pressures 0 Restraint Succeeds--and Is Relaxed This novel and potent combination of restrictive monetary actions finally succeeded in reining back the economy an inflationary gallop to a more orderly pace of advance n the end, these measures.were helped by more restrictive fiscal proposals announced by the President in September "^66, removing extra tax incentives for business investment, d i m m i n g some spending, and moderating the pressures of fed° r al financing upon the securities markets. Host importantly these public policies led to a growing awareness on the ••• 20 » part of businesses and consumers of (ho wisdom of moderating their borrowing and spending in this environment. As these more moderate attitudes gradually permeated the economy, inflationary pressures slackened. ing of demands was first The blunt- evidenced in the financial markets. Loan growth fell off and interest rates began to soften. Then, confirming signals began to flow in from a widening range of indicators of production, sales, and price performance o More goods became available on business shelves * Price increases slowed down, and here and there decreases appeared, With these moderating trends developing, the Federal Reserve quickly relaxed the atmosphere of monetary restraint -Ln order to ward off recessionary forces. Through open mar- ket operations, the System supplied reserves to hanks with increasing liberality, thereby creating progressively easier fi'Oney market conditions. a These, operations were reinforced by reduction of reserve requirements on savings and some time deposits last March and a lowering of the Federal Reserve discount rate in April. In the resulting easier monetary environ- ment, financial institutions, businesses and consumers were ah].e to rebuild their eroded liquidity positions. Businesses particular floated large amounts of long-term securities in order to strengthen their balance sheets. and money expanded rapidly. Bank credit And flows of funds into non- bank savings institutions improved markedly, resulting in an improved situation in the mortgage market and recovery in the construction j.nclus(.ryt Private final demands for goods and services were vigorous, permitting a rapid adjustment of previously overbuilt business inventories, without the usual recessionary consequences. Undergirding the adjustment was an expansionary fed- eral deficit, which served to boost private incomes more and ™ore rapidly as 1967 progressed. £urgen ce_a nd .0verhea t in g As the prospect of readjustment and resurgence without 0 recession became increasingly clear, all the major sectors the economy began to adjust their financial planning ac- c °rdingly. ^th Key labor-management negotiations were resolved settlements that boosted wages considerably more than Productivity. On the price front, after some months of pause, increases began to break out anew. By mid-1967, more and more signs were emerging that he economy was once again beginning to overheat. 1 The need restraint on the fiscal side became increasingly obvious - 22 as the economic recovery was accompanied by intensified cost and price pressures, accelerated by an upturn in business inventory buying, and further stimulated by a still larger federal deficit. For a time last fall the underlying strength of the economy was partially masked by strikes in key industries, but as those were settled, an excessively rapid expansion emerged. Rates in the short-term market rose as the Treasury entered the market to finance its massive deficit e In the long-term market, rates were driven to new heights as corporate borrowing burgeoned, along with the credit demands °f state and local governments, partly .in anticipation of s till tighter credit and higher interest rates ahead 0 The most badly needed stabilizing action in the cir- euinstances was a stringent move toward fiscal restraint. But, despite urgent Administration appeals for a tax hike, disputes over federal expenditure restraint held up Congressional action . In the absence of fiscal restraint, and against the background of an accelerating domestic economy, deterioration in tlie United States balance of payments, and Britain's c evaluation of the pound sterling, the Federal Reserve again - 23 moved toward monetary restraint 0 raised in November. The discount rate was This was followed by a move toward more restrictive open market operations and an increase in reserve requirements. This combination of policy actions reflected a coordinated attempt by the System to provide bank reserves on terms and conditions that would foster both more sustainable economic growth at home and a significant improvement in the U. S 0 balance of payments„ 1967 ended with the financial system once again under Pressureo Growth in bank credit and money tended to slow down during late 1967. &an High yields on market securities be- to curtail the availability of funds for the financing home construction, both by reducing the inflows of con- sumer savings to institutions specializing in home finance, a nd by diverting funds from mortgages to other types of in- Ve stments at those institutions which normally do a substan- tial. mo r t gag e 1o a n b us i n c ss . As we move into 1968, it is clear that the economy is Ca ught up in another inflationary surge. Production, employ- T1K -nt, and income have climbed to new highs, and unemployment fallen off sharply - which is all to the good 0 But, un- °rtunately, the domestic surge has been accompanied by rapid - ?A - price advances and by a further deterj.oration in the balance 0 f paym ents s i t n a i; ion. Lessons Among the important .lessons learned from the experience of 1.966 and 1967 is that economic growth is not sustainable under inflationary conditions,, The distortions that in- flation induces in the structure of output and demand, and the pressures it generates in financial markets, inevitably Result in economic dislocation. And distortion in the domes- tic economy is only one of the risks of unchecked excess demands. We need to combat inflation v?ith equal fervor to main- tain the value of the dollar internationally, as well as domestically. In recent weeks, pressures in financial markets have r e lax eel somewhat:, due to a variety of influences which include seasonal factors, peace rumors, and revived hopes for fiscal Restraint 0 But in the absence of such restraint, the govern- ment's financing needs will press again on financial markets, ^his, coupled with continued inflationary pressures, could too easily lead us back into the kind of financial tensions V; e ex p e r i c n c e d i n 19 6 6 . 25 The surest way to surmount tills threat is through restraint on public and private spending. While the Federal Reserve is willing to carry its full share of public policy, the effect of monetary policy bearing an undue share of the burden of restraint is painfully clear. I hope that we all will be able to learn the evident lessons posed by the 19651967 experience, and move, forward through 1968 with a more balanced stabilization policy that casts monetary policy in a less dominant role. A lesson that has already been learned is that we can have a sound economy in this country, with relatively full Gl 'iployment and high, utilization of our resources and with ^ r t u a l freedom from inflation and all its evils, if we are f i l i n g to exercise the necessary discipline - the kind of •^scipiine we are prone to ask other countries to exercise<> should have learned that if the discipline is to be exerCl -sed only through monetary policy, that is, if the entire u i"clen of restraint is placed on the Federal Reserve, the im- pact of its.actions will fall unevenly on different sectors of M,ie economy with undesirable and painful consequences to some 0 11 1 if we must act, we will - in accordance not with what we tll3• -nk will be expedient or popular but with what we believe, - 20 - the basis of ail the information at our disposal, to be ln thc bGSt: interest of our country - despite the avalanche complaints that is sure to follow - for the path of duty is plain. Speaking of complaints, let me conclude by telling of the young man from my home town, Broken Bow, Nebraska, ^o entered a Trappist monastery where the discipline was VGry a se vere 0 year. Each monk was permitted, to speak only two words At the end of the first year the abbot had an inter- View with the new monk and asked him if everything was all ri &ht. Th e abbot said, "Yes, I suppose it is; we'll try a little moi m T])C monk used his two words and said, "Bed hard.'1 -e straw in the mattress." Another year passed and the °nk had another interview with the abbot, who asked again if was going well. a This time lie said, "Food bad." The hot allowed that it might be improved and said he would Spca k to the cook. The third year the abbot asked the monk he had any comments, and he said, "j; quit.." P] u " -d, "Well, 1 guess it is just as well. but complain ever since you came here." The abbot re- You have done noth-
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