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The Tapering Debate

James Bullard
President and CEO, FRB-St. Louis
2013 Municipal Finance Conference

2 August 2013
Boston, Massachusetts
Any opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of others on the Federal Open Market Committee.

Introduction

This talk
In June, Chairman Bernanke was authorized by the FOMC to
discuss a roadmap for a possible reduction in the pace of
asset purchases by the Fed.
 This is often referred to as “tapering” asset purchases.

The Chairman emphasized an approach that depends on
economic conditions, but that could begin in the fall of this
year.
What types of arguments might be made for or against
tapering?
In this talk, I will provide some of my own views on the
debate without pre-judging its conclusion.

Recent Developments

The components of current policy
Current U.S. monetary policy has three components: The
policy rate, forward guidance, and asset purchases.
The policy rate itself has been near zero since December
2008 and remains there today.
There are two “unconventional” aspects to policy:
 Forward guidance is a promise to keep the policy rate near zero
at least until unemployment falls below 6.5 percent or inflation
rises above 2.5 percent.
 Asset purchases of Treasuries and MBS are continuing at $85
billion per month until there is substantial improvement in the
labor market.

A separation principle
The Chairman has emphasized that any decision on the asset
purchase program is conceptually separate from any decision
concerning the policy rate.
In particular, a decision to reduce the pace of asset purchases
does not change the nature of the Committee’s commitment
to keep the policy rate near zero.

The June FOMC meeting
At the June FOMC meeting, the Committee authorized
Chairman Bernanke to discuss possible plans for reducing the
pace of asset purchases.
 The so-called “tapering of QE.”

The financial market reaction was substantial, even though
the Committee did not actually change any policy settings at
that point or at its recently-concluded July meeting.

Nominal and real yields

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: July 25, 2013.

The expected policy rate path

Source: author’s calculations. Last observation: July 26, 2013.

St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Last observation: week of July 19, 2013.

Tapering: Pros and cons
In this talk, I will provide some of my views on how four
areas of macroeconomic performance might be interpreted
with respect to tapering:





Labor market performance
Growth
The large balance sheet of the Fed
Inflation

I will conclude by suggesting that the Committee needs to see
more data on macroeconomic performance for the second
half of 2013 before making a judgment on this matter.

Labor Market Performance

Labor market performance
When the Committee adopted QE3 last September, the stated
criterion for the program was substantial improvement in
labor market performance.
By some key measures, labor markets have indeed improved
since last September.
 Unemployment is lower.
 Payroll employment growth has generally been strong.

But other measures suggest otherwise.

Nonfarm payroll employment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Last observation: July 2013.

Unemployment rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Last observation: July 2013.

Labor force participation rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Last observation: July 2013.

Employment-population ratio

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Last observation: July 2013.

Growth in total nonfarm private hours

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Last observation: July 2013.

A key labor market issue for the tapering debate
Should the Committee focus attention primarily on nonfarm
payrolls and unemployment, or should the Committee
consider a wider range of labor market indicators?
 If the former, then labor markets have clearly improved since
September 2012.
 If the latter, then labor markets may be judged to remain weak,
but the criterion for labor market improvement would be
considerably muddied.

Growth in Real GDP

Growth in real GDP
A standard variable for the assessment of U.S.
macroeconomic performance is growth in real GDP.
Normally, the Committee would not remove accommodation
if real GDP growth was viewed as weak.
Recent real GDP growth has in fact been weak.
The Committee may still wish to remove accommodation,
however, if future growth is expected to be strong.

Real GDP growth

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation: 2013-Q2.

The case for optimism
The case for an optimistic view of future U.S.
macroeconomic performance is simple.
In a nutshell, many, but not all, of the factors slowing the
U.S. economy down are waning.
 Real estate markets are improving, equity markets have rallied,
the European sovereign debt crisis remains subdued for now,
U.S. fiscal brinksmanship has been less of a problem, and
household deleveraging is further along.

The problem with optimism
I have been optimistic in my own forecasts for the U.S.
economy over the last several years.
In part, this is because empirical models suggest that, with
the current configuration of data and policy settings, rapid
growth lies just ahead.
I have tempered these forecasts with an explicit recognition
that economies tend to grow more slowly following a
financial crisis.
Still, I have generally been too optimistic.
Given this experience, I think caution is warranted in taking
policy action based on forecasts alone.

Forecast errors: real GDP growth

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank presidents
in the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress from the previous July.

Forecast errors: unemployment

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank presidents
in the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress from the previous July.

Forecast errors: PCE inflation

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank presidents
in the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress from the previous July.

Forecast errors: core PCE inflation

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Governors and Reserve Bank presidents
in the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress from the previous July.

A key growth issue for the tapering debate

Should the Committee focus attention primarily on recent
growth performance, or on future projected growth?
 If the former, then growth has clearly been weak in recent
quarters.
 If the latter, then growth may be judged to be improving, but
forecasting performance for this variable has been poor over
the last several years.

The Size of the Fed’s Balance Sheet

The size of the Fed’s balance sheet
The Fed’s balance sheet is large by the standards of the last
several decades.
The large balance sheet has been viewed as posing risks to
the Committee’s exit from unconventional policy.
However, the balance sheet is not particularly large when
scaled by GDP and compared to other major central banks, or
when compared to historical data on the Fed’s balance sheet.

Balance sheet: Fed and other major central banks

Source: Haver Analytics and author’s calculations. Last observation: June 2013 (FRB), March 2013 (others).

Fed’s balance sheet relative to GDP

Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, BEA, and author’s calculations. Last observation: 2012.

Fed holdings of Treasury securities

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Department of the Treasury, and author’s calculation. Last observation: June 2013.

A key balance sheet issue for tapering
Should the Committee be more concerned about its exit
strategy when the size of the balance sheet relative to GDP is
30 percent versus 20 percent?
 If yes, then balance sheet size may be judged a constraint at
some point in the future.
 If no, then exit is equally difficult if the balance sheet is 30
percent or 20 percent of GDP, and the Committee need not
view balance sheet size as a constraint going forward.

Inflation

Recent inflation developments
The Committee would not normally remove policy
accommodation in an environment where inflation is below
target and is projected to remain there.
Current inflation is low.
On balance, inflation expectations have declined since
March.

PCE inflation

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation: June 2013.

Inflation expectations declining since March

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: July 30, 2013.

Why has inflation been low?
We do not have a good explanation, so we should be careful.
One sketch of a theory:
 Commodity prices globally have been soft over the last year.
 This may be due in part to the recession in Europe, coupled
with slower-than-expected growth in China.
 This may have fed through to core inflation in the U.S.

Core PCE inflation near 1 percent measured from a year
earlier is near the lower edge of acceptable outcomes.

A key inflation issue for the tapering debate
Will current low levels of PCE inflation naturally move up
toward 2 percent in the coming months and quarters?
 If yes, then current low inflation readings are an aberration and
the Committee can reduce the pace of asset purchases without
worrying about pushing inflation even further below target.
 If no, then inflation may be pushed even lower by a decision to
taper and hence the risk of deflation may increase.

Conclusions

Conclusions
I have suggested some key questions for the tapering debate
in the following areas: Labor market performance, growth,
balance sheet size, and inflation.
Most of these questions can be better addressed once we see
additional macroeconomic data from the second half of 2013.
In particular, it is important to wait to see if better
macroeconomic outcomes materialize in the months and
quarters ahead.

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
stlouisfed.org

Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/

James Bullard
research.stlouisfed.org/econ/bullard/