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Statement of
J. Dewey Daane
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
on
S. 3423
To Provide for United States Participation in the
Facility Based on Special Drawing Rights in the
International Monetary Fund

May 13, 1968

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
supports the proposed Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement,
and the legislation which is being put forward to bring about U.S.
ratification of the Amendment to provide for establishment of the
Special Drawing Rights facility.

The Board believes that establish­

ment of this facility will be very much in the interests of the
United States.
Establishment of the system of Special Drawing Rights in
the International Monetary Fund will mean that the growth of
international monetary reserves will for the first time be subject
to rational international decision.

The need for establishing such

a system arises from vital interests in maximum employment,
production, and trade.

All countries want their reserves to grow

over time, with the growth of international trade and payments, but
the supply of existing kinds of reserve assets, including gold,
clearly will not be enough to meet this need.

Unless world

reserves grow at an adequate rate, some countries could gain
reserves only at the expense of the reserve holdings of other
countries.

In an effort to avoid reserve losses, and, if

possible, to achieve reserve gains, more and mor* countries would
tend to adopt much more restrictive economic policies than they
would otherwise be likely to follow.

I need not spell out the

vicious circle of world-wide deflation that general pursuit of such
policies could produce.

This is what makes Special Drawing Rights

important to every worker, every businessman, every industrialist,
and every banker in the country.




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In stressing the tremendous value that this new system
can have--for the world at large as well as for the United States-I do not want to exaggerate its probable impact in the years
immediately ahead.

We do not know when the SDR system will be

activated, or at what rate the participating countries will agree
to create SDRfs in the first years.

The growth of reserves could

be too slow for some years to come.

The only thing we can be sure

about is that with the SDR facility in existence, reserve growth
at an adequate rate will be possible; without that facility, the
world economic outlook for the medium and longer term would be
much less favorable.
I should like now to say something about the relation
between SDRfs and the March 17 decision by the member countries of
the now-defunct gold pool to establish a two-market system for
gold.

As you know, the negotiations looking to the establishment

of an SDR system were going on long before the mid-March meeting,
held here in Washington, on the gold problem.

In fact, most of

the basic principles of the SDR system were agreed upon last
September at Rio.

It was this fact, as much as anything else,

that made the two-market decision possible.
As stated in the Washington Communique of March 17, the
central-bank Governors of the gold-pool countries concluded that
"as the existing stock of monetary gold is sufficient in view of
the prospective establishment of the facility for Special Drawing




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Rights, they no longer feel it necessary to buy gold from the
market,"

Since it is therefore essential that increases in world

reserves of other types take place, SDR's should be available to
serve that purpose.
In other words, while the prospective establishment of
the SDR facility was a key factor making the two-market system
possible, the fact that the two-market system was adopted reinforces
the need to establish the SDR facility.

If the SDR system were not

to be established, the viability of the two-market system for gold
would be seriously compromised.
For the reasons I have indicated, the Federal Reserve
warmly supports the proposed Amendment of the IMF Articles of
Agreement, and the legislation which is being put forward to
provide for its ratification by the United States.