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Statement by

Henry C. Wallich
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and insurance
of the
Conmittee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
United States House of Representatives

May 19, 1982

I am pleased to testify on H.R. 6016, a bill that would facilitate
the establishment eund operation of export trading companies.
At- the outset, I should like to restate the view of the Board
that the United States needs a strong export sector.

Export trading

companies have been proposed as a means of contributing to the achievement

of this goal by providing producers of goods and services, having additional
business opportunities, with a way of reducing the risks associated
with foreign business endeavors and offering them a wide variety of
services.

Export trading companies may be able to provide assistance

to small and medium size U.S. businesses producing goods that can be marketed
abroad.
It has been suggested that bank participation, particularly
bank ownership participation, is essential to the effective operation
of export trading companies.

In the Board's view, the question whether

export trading companies can be of significant help to U.S. exporters
does not depend upon such a role for banks, as I have testified in the
past.

But in any event there are, I believe, more important problems

of principle posed by bank equity ownership of entities directly engaged
in commerce. Bank control of trading companies runs counter to our
long-standing national policy, firmly embedded in legislation, of the
separation of banking and cornerce.
This policy has its basis in two principal concerns:

(1) the

safety and soundness of particular banks, and of the banking system
in general, might be impaired if banks were closely affiliated with
the ownership, management and operation of a potentially high risk nonbank
business, and (2) a bank might allocate available credit on bases other
than the creditworthiness of the borrower by preferring customers of
the banks' affiliates or by denying credit to competitors of the banks'
affiliates— possibilities that illustrate the basic issues of avoiding
conflicts of interest and excessive concentration of resources.



- 2-

The separation o£ banking and conmerce has served this nation
well in promoting a strong banking system and economic competition.
The Board is concerned that a breach of that traditional separation
in the case of trading companies could adversely affect the safety and
soundness of our banks as well as their role as impartial arbiters of
credit, and could be an adverse precedent for breaches of this wall
in other areas.
The Board is also concerned with the risks arising from bank
involvement as managers and controlling investors in new enterprises
at a time when bank capital generally is at an uncomfortably low level.
The Board and the Comptroller of the Currency recently issued a joint
policy statement setting forth their concerns over the secular declines
in the capital ratios of the nation's largest banking organizations,
and indicating their intention to encourage through supervisory policies
appropriate steps to improve the capital positions of the lower ranking
members of this group.

This situation suggests the need for caution

in any opening of the doors to new enterprises with largely unknown
risks.
While reiterating the view that banking organizations should
not generally have controlling interests in export trading companies,
I shall direct my remarks to the specific provisions of H.R. 6016 as
they relate to the concerns of the Board
The Board has previously supported the view that if there
is to be bank affiliation with export trading companies the investments
should be held only through bank holding companies.

I am pleased that

H.R. 6016 goes far toward meeting this objective by providing that interests
in export trading companies could be held only through bank holding
companies or Bdge Corporations.



-3There has been much discussion recently of the proper location
and amount of supervision of nonbanking activities of bank holding companies.
The Treasury, for example, has suggested that all nonbanking activities
should be required to be conducted through separate subsidiaries of
a bank holding company.

This, in its view, would adequately insulate

affiliated banks from such activities and so would make possible virtually
automatic approval of the activity and allow regulatory oversight to
remain minimal.
In the past, the Board has seen no strong need to require
banking activities to be conducted in separate subsidiaries.

Indeed,

there are, in fact, advantages in the form of economic efficiency and
easier regulatory oversight to allowing banking organizations the latitude
to develop organizational structures designed to suit their unique needs.
This approach has proven advantageous to banks and holding companies
of all sizes and locations in providing a range of banking activities
in structures that promote competition.

We continue to support this

approach as a general principle for banking activities, and particularly
for expanded securities activities that are closely related to banking.
On the other hand, the Board believes the appropriate location
for trading company activities would be in a subsidiary of a holding
company, rather than in a direct subsidiary of the bank or its Edge
Corporation.

In the case of export trading companies the Board believes

this to be a desirable arrangement since export trading companies would
represent the first instance of bank holding companies being permitted
to own companies engaged in commerce as distinguished from banking.
This arrangement would have the advantage of assuring uniform regulatory
oversight over a new and potentially risky activity.




-

4

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The Board would be further concerned if the traditional barrier
between banking and cornierce were breached not only by allowing banking
organizations to engage in nonbank activities but also by allowing banking
organizations to be partners in ventures with nonbank companies.

We

have generally opposed joint ventures involving bank holding companies
and nonbank organizations, especially where the nonbank company was
engaged in manufacturing or conmercial enterprise.

Accordingly, the

Board believes that any export trading company legislation should restrict
the ability of banking and nonbanking organizations to own jointly an
export trading company.
It has been suggested that banks below a certain size, which
might be unlikely to have a bank holding company parent, should be permitted
to invest directly in export trading companies.

But the reasons for

restricting export trading company ownership to bank holding companies
apply equally to banks that do not have a parent holding company.

While

the Board has in the past indicated that passive minority investments
in export trading companies of a purely financial nature might be permitted
for banks as well as bank holding companies, all significant investments
in trading companies, and certainly all controlling investments, should
be permitted only through a bank holding company.
In addition to prohibiting direct bank ownership of export
trading companies, there are other safeguards in H.R. 6016 that I believe
are important to limiting the risks to which a banking organization
would be exposed as a result of a controlling interest in an export
trading company.




The bill recognizes that the area in which the bank's

-5expertise is likely to be of greatest value to the trading company is
through financing, and places restrictions on the investments in and
extensions of credit to the trading company by the bank holding company.
However, the proposal in H.R. 6016 to apply section 23A of
the Federal Reserve Act to the bank holding company with respect to
its extensions of credit to its affiliate trading company would be an
unusual application of section 23A.

That provision has previously been

applied only to banks, and not to bank holding companies, with the purpose
of safeguarding the resources of banks against misuse of those resources
for the benefit of organizations under common control with the bank.
I feel bound to point out that this provision in H.R. 6016 would virtually
eliminate extensions of credit from the holding company to its controlled
export trading company, because of the stringent collateral requirements
of section 23A.

On the other hand, the effect of this approach would

be to permit without any limits extensions of credit by other nonbank
affiliates, such as a holding company's finance company subsidiary,
to the trading company.
A more effective approach would be to limit extensions of
credit by a banking organization

and its affiliates to any single export

trading company to an amount that, together with its investment in that
company, would not exceed 10 per cent of the banking organization's
capital, while total equity investment by a banking organization in one or more
trading companies could not exceed in the aggregate 5 per cent of the banking
organization's capital.

These loans could be made by the bank, its

Edge Corporations, or other holding company affiliates.




The bank's

-

6

-

lend4.ng would, of course, also be limited by the amount and collateral
requirements of section 23A.

We believe that this method of limiting

the exposure of the banking organization to this new activity would
be both workable and prudent.
In addition, I believe there are other reasonable steps that
can be taken to limit the banking organization's financial exposure.
H.R. 6016 could further be strengthened by a provision similar to that
in S.734 prohibiting a bank holding company and its affiliates from
making extensions of credit to the customers of its affiliated export
trading company on terms more favorable than those afforded similar
borrowers in similar circumstances, and requiring that such extensions
of credit should involve no more than the normal risk of repayment nor
present other unfavorable features.
The Board also believes that a bank holding company-controlled
export trading company should be prohibited from taking title to goods
or commodities except in very limited circumstances.

The export trading

company should be allowed to take title to goods or commodities only
on the basis of firm orders from customers or where necessary to effectuate
a sale.

Moreover, the bill should clearly authorize the Board to determine

that if a bank holding company-controlled export trading company holds
manufactured goods or commodities in inventory in order to speculate
in price movements in these goods such activity would constitute an
unsafe or unsound practice.




There are two additional safeguards in H.R. 6016— concerning
the use of the nane of the bank or bank holding company as the name
of the export trading company and the participation of these companies
in manufacturing— that are of particular importance to the Board in
considering this legislation.

We have in the past supported the safeguard

in H.R. 6016 that prohibits an export trading company from having a
name similar in any respect to that of the bank or bank holding company
with which it is affiliated through stock ownership.

As in the case

of REITs in the aid-1970's, public identification of a bank with another
enterprise could involve the bank in significant losses, even where
there is no bank ownership interest.
We believe that the use of the name of the bank or bank holding company
to promote the activities of an export trading company, which are not
in our view closely related to the business of banking, is inappropriate
for a number of reasons.

First, it incorrectly implies that the full

faith and credit of the affiliated bank stands behind the export trading
company.

Second, it could have an adverse effect on the reputation

and public confidence in the bank if the export trading company were
to suffer a financial setback.

Third, there would be a greater likelihood

that the assets of the braking organization would be depleted in order
to bail out a troubled export trading company with a similar name.
We have made the same recommendation for bank participation
in securities functions such as stock and bond mutual funds.

This recommendation

has even greater force with respect to bank holding company activity
that breaches the line between commerce and banking.

Accordingly, the

Roard supports die proposal that an export trading company not bear
a name similar to that of its affiliated bank or bank holding company,
even where the bank holding company has a controlling r«ner«hip interest
in the export *>rading crmpwiy.



H.R. 6016 also provides that a bank holding coapany-owned
export trading company may not engage in manufacturing.

The Board's

concern over^ bank holding company control of export trading coapanies
is based on its continuing belief that the traditional separation of
banking and commerce is a wise policy; accordingly, we favor legislation
that limits the extent to which commercial activities may be engaged
in through the export trading company, without significantly jeopardizing
the viability of that company.

I do not believe that a prohibition

on manufacturing would in any way compromise the ability of expert trading
companies to play a constructive role in facilitating exports.

For

example, if modifications to products are required it would seas both
preferable and feasible to have them performed by the manufacturer,
or by an independent manufacturer, rather than by the export trading
company.

This provision would further the basic principle of the separation

of the business of banking from the conduct of commerce.
Finally, H.R. 6016 provides that the Board approve each investment
by a bank holding company in an export trading company.

In the Board's

view it is appropriate to allow some level of non-controlling investments
(in excess of 5 per cent but less than 20 per cent) that may be made
in export trading companies without applying the standards with respect
to controlling interests in export trading coapanies that we recommend
below, provided such investments meet the criteria in section 4 of the
Bank Holding Company Act.

It would be anticipated that applications

of this type could be abbreviated and processed under expedited procedures.




-9With regard to the standards on controlling interests, H.R. 6016
as currently drafted, does not, in our view, provide sufficient guidance
as to when the Board should disapprove an application to nako a controlling
investment in an export trading company.

The bill states that the Board

may not grant approval of any application to acquire an interest in
an export trading company unless the Board has taken into consideration
the financial and managerial resources, competitive situation, and future
prospects of the bank holding company and the export trading company
involved.

The legislation also gives the Board the authority to impose

restrictions, by regulation or otherwise, as the Board deems necessary
to prevent conflicts of interest, unsafe or unsound banking practices,
undue concentration of resources, and decreased or unfair competition.
In considering applications involving control, it might be
appropriate to require that the Board find a reasonable likelihood that
the ban*, investment would bring about an increase in the level of exports
or in the penetration of foreign markets chat would not otherwise occur.
The Board should be authorized to deny an application unless the activities
of the export trading company would be limited to international trade
in specific goods and services and unless the bank investment could
contribute substantially both to the establishment of the trading company
and to exporting or facilitating the exportation of goods and services.
Also, the bill should state that if the Board £inds there
are any adverse financial, managerial, competitive, or other banking
factors associated with the particular investment it has the discretion
to spprove the application only if it determines that the export benefits




dearly outweigh any such adverse effects.

Such standards would place

a heavier burden on bank holding company applicants to demonstrate the
benefits of their proposed investment.

The balancing test would be

similar to the test that the Board administers in acting upon applications
pursuant to section 4 (c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act.

The Board

and its staff would, of course, be willing to work with the Subcommittee
in drafting appropriate language to this effect.
In addition to its provisions regarding export trading companies,
H.R. 6016 would amend the Federal Reserve Act to increase the aggregate
limitation on the amount of eligible bankers' acceptances that may be
issued by a member bank from 50 per cent of capital and surplus (100
per cent with the Board's permission) to 150 per cent of capital and
surplus (200 per cent with the Board's permission).

The limitations

would be applied also to nonmember commercial banks and to U.S. branches
and agencies of foreign banks.
The Board believes that it is both appropriate to expand the
current aggregate limitation on the issuance of eligible bankers' acceptances
and to apply those limits to the other entities with which member banks
compete in the acceptance market.

In applying the limitation on eligible

bankers' acceptances to U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks,
the Board believes that the appropriate measure of capital is the worldwide
capital of the parent foreign bank.

Use of such a measure in this country

would be consistent with the efforts being made to promote the use of
worldwide capital, rather than local-based capital, for purposes of
prudential limitations imposed in other countries.




-11The Board believes, however, that the provision as presently
drafted presents potential problems with regard to participations.
Under the existing language, a bank could expand the amount of its bankers'
acceptances outstanding virtually without limit by issuing participations
to other banks.

Such a practice would undermine the effectiveness of

the limits established by the bill and could adversely affect monetary
policy to the extent that bankers' acceptance are substituted for liabilities
that would otherwise be subject to reserve requirements.

We believe

that this problem could be corrected through a specific provision that
authorizes the Board to establish terms and conditions under which participa­
tions in bankers' acceptances may be issued.

In this connection, the

Board previously submitted a draft bill that would not give rise to
these problems, and recommends that this language be adopted in place
of the present provision.
In conclusion, I should restate the Board's position that
the U.S. economy would best be served by having baulking organizations
assist trading companies as bankers and limited investors rather than
as owner-operators of these firms.

However, in the event that the legisla­

tion is enacted that would enable braking organizations to have a controlling
ownership investment in export trading companies, the Board believes
that the restriction of the ownership interests in export trading companies
to bank holding companies, together with the other limitations on the
holding company's relationship to its controlled trading company and
on the activities of the trading company itself that I have discussed
above, are important and necessary safeguards.