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FEB 0 i

For R e l e a s e on D e l i v e r y
Wednesday, F e b r u a r y 1, 1989
1 6 : 1 5 C e n t r a l European Time
1 0 : 1 5 AM E a s t e r n S t a n d a r d Time

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MANAGING THE BANKING AND MONETARY CHALLENGES OF 1989

By
H. R o b e r t H e l l e r
Member, Board o f

Governors of

the

Federal

World Economic Forum P l e n a r y
Davos,

Switzerland

Februarv 1,

1989

Reserve Sy c tem

Session

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Managing the Banking and Monetary Challenges of 1989

Confucius expressed the hope that one may live in interesting times, but tempered that wish with the qualification
that the times should not be too interesting.

I am quite certain that 1989 will be more than interesting
because our agenda is already filled with demanding
challenges that will stretch our managerial capabilities.

In the United States we face a major crisis in the savings
and loan industry and we must continue our efforts -to
further strengthen our banking system.

We also have to make

further progress in reducing our federal budget deficit. In
the international arena, we have to tackle the existing
trade imbalances and enhance exchange rate stability. The
debt problems of the developing countries are also still
very much with us. And I can assure you that we in the
United States will remain most interested observers as you
progress toward greater European integration.
address these issues in turn.

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Let me

Th e savings and loan crisis is a key issue confronting our
policy makers.

The dimensions of the problem are awesome.

If the estimates of $85 to $105 billion in potential losses
prove to be correct, this implies a financial burden of
about $400 for every American.

The roots of the savings and loan problems lie in the
inflationary excesses of the 1970s, that were followed by
the high interest rates and recession of the early 1980s.
For institutions that funded 30-year fixed-interest loans
with short-term deposits, and whose assets were heavily
concentrated in the cyclical housing sector, these economic
circumstances were ominous.

The S&L problems were

compounded when many managers reacted to these circumstances
by "doubling the bet" and moving into ever more risky
assets.

The solution to the problem cannot consist of a simple
financial bailout. Instead, we must reform the system to
assure that the problem will not recur.

Foremost is the

need for adequate capital, not only to provide a safety
cushion, but to establish proper prudence on behalf of
management. Furthermore, the institutions must have greater
diversification both as far as asset range and geographic
coverage are concerned. A financial institution making
nothing but housing loans in one town is not likely to
generate a portfolio with sufficient resiliency to carry it
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through good and bad times.

Needless to say, proper

standards of prudence must be observed.

Fortunately, the American banking industry is in much better
shape than the S&L industry. Under pressure from the
regulators, American banks have increased their capital to
asset ratios from about 5 percent in the early eighties to
over 8 percent at present.

We have also taken steps in

conjunction with our fellow-regulators abroad to establish a
comprehensive risk-based capital standard. When fully
implemented in 1992, the new risk-based standard will assure
a risk-adjusted capital cushion of 8 percent for both onand off-balance sheet exposures.

To further strengthen our banking system, we need to move on
several fronts: we need to broaden the range of services
that banks can offer to their customers and widen the
geographic base of their operations.

These steps are needed

to allow the banks to serve their customers better and to
provide new earning sources for them.

As part of that

process, we recently granted banks limited powers to
underwrite and deal in corporate debt securities.

Greater geographic diversification would be helpful in
further insulating American banks against regional and
sectoral economic problems. We are making considerable
progress on that score, with 45 states now permitting some
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kind of interstate banking, and many more likely to do so in
coming years.

The removal of the interstate banking

barriers will also allow American banks to serve their
customers on an integrated basis at home and abroad.

Turning to domestic policy, we all agree that further
progress in reducing the federal deficit is needed. But let
me note that the consolidated U.S. government deficit now
amounts to 2-1/2 percent of GNP, and lies actually below the
average for the Western European countries. That, however,
should not be grounds for complacency.

The Administration

budget now before Congress calls for a $93 billion deficit
for next year, which would represent welcome progress,
indeed. Let me also remind you that if the Gramm-RudmanHollings target of a $100 billion deficit (plus a $10
billion error margin) is not achieved, automatic budget cuts
will be triggered.

The same legislation calls for a

balanced budget in 1993.

Thus, both a working document and a strategic plan is in
place to assure that our feet will be held to the fire and
progress must continue to be made.

Reducing the budget deficit would have many salutary
consequences. It would reduce the financing needs of the
federal government and thus permit lower interest rates than
would otherwise prevail.
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It would also help reduce our

current dependence on foreign capital. By reducing the
government's utilization of resources, it would also release
real and financial resources for domestic investment
purposes, thereby helping to build additional capacity to
keep inflation in check.

Needless to say, this would be a most welcome development as
it would widen the path between inflation and recession that
we must travel in the years ahead.
more room to maneuver.

Thus, we would have

The additional margin of safety

would assure further economic growth in a noninflationary
environment.

Let me now turn to the international challenges facing us.
Overall, the process of policy coordination now undertaken
under the umbrella of the G-7, as well as the ongoing
discussions at the BIS, the IMF, and the OECD has been most
helpful in reducing incipient imbalances and has helped to
provide a greater degree of exchange rate stability.

These

institutions will also foster an ever continuing
adaptation to new developments.

In the developing world, the debt overhang continues to be
one of the unresolved issues of the 1980s.

It is

unrealistic to expect that a problem of such magnitude,
which was caused by a multitude of factors operating over
time, can have a single magic solution.
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Its resolution

requires a confluence positive macro and micro factors.
Certainly, the performance of the world economy will have a
bearing, and there will be no real progress without sound
economic management on the part of the debtors.

Confidence

in the economic policies of the debtor nations needs to be
restored, so that flight capital will be repatriated.

In

addition, the problem calls for a commitment of all the
parties to work together toward mutually acceptable
arrangements which broaden the range of options for both
debtors and creditors.

In this regard, voluntary market-

based approaches can make a significant contribution.

This brings me to my last point: the exciting effort to
further integrate the economic and financial life of Europe.
•

You all know that we in the United States applaud the
efforts to establish a fully integrated market in Europe.
But care should be taken to remove any doubt that this
elimination of barriers inside the Community will not result
in greater barriers toward the outside.

In that connection,

it is important that the principle of national treatment,
which assures equality of competition for insiders as well
as outsiders, is firmly embodied in the new treaties.

This is particularly true for the banking and financial
service industry.

To establish a quagmire of reciprocal

arrangements would be a step backwards.
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It would result in

an impenetrable web of treaties that will create special
conditions for every conceivable country pair.

Just

imagine, in a world of about 150 nations, reliance on
reciprocity might result in up to 22,000 reciprocal
treaties.

No businessman could possibly prosper in that

kind of world!

Much of the recent discussion has focused on the
desirability of establishing a central bank for Europe.
In the United States, it took well over a century after the
formation of a central government until a permanent central
bank was established. Earlier efforts failed because
regional and sectoral interests could not be

sufficiently

reconciled. Even today, the Federal Reserve System provides
for the representation of a wide range of regional and
sectoral interests, thereby assuring a broad representation
of various viewpoints in the policy-formulation process.

Rather than moving toward the immediate establishment of a
unified European currency and central bank, I have often
thought that certain advantages might be obtained by taking
a first step toward greater currency integration by simply
revaluing all European currencies in such a fashion that one
German mark would be equal to one French franc, one Dutch
guilder, one British pound, and so on.

Pretty soon, hotels

and shops across the continent would accept the various
national currencies at par, thereby obviating the need for
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constant calculations and currency exchanges.

In effect,

one would establish unitary exchange rates for the entire
European Community.

For Europe, unitary exchange rates would be nothing totally
new as the coins issued by various kingdoms and states
circulated freely throughout the continent in past
centuries.

This step toward unitary exchange rates could be taken
within existing EMS arrangements. The changes suggested
would have to be taken anyhow if a truly common currency
were to be established at some future date.

But in this

way, one would be able to proceed one step at a time.

You may well argue that such a step would be largely
symbolic in nature.

That is true.

But perceptions and

symbols of European unity are important and may well help
increase public acceptance of the integration movement.

Thus, the adoption of unitary exchange rates would represent
a positive movement toward greater European monetary
integration, and may well be an option worth considering.

I believe we all agree that the challenges before us are
formidable, but I also believe that together we can manage
the task ahead and continue to make progress.
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