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STATEMENT BY
GEORGE W. MITCHELL
BEFORE THE

V

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE

DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
ROOM 5302

FEBRUARY 24, 1978
10 O'CLOCK

\

t

L I B R A R Y

/

/

As a member of the National Commission on Electronic Fund
Transfers 1 am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the two
bills before this Committee, S.2470 and S.2546.

The substance of both

bills falls well within the scope of Commission recommendations and
findings with respect to consumer interests in EFT as Mr. Wegner's review
has indicated.
My comments deal with three consumer-related policy issues
that were among those considered by the Commission.
resulted in positive legislative recommendations.

None of these
This was not an over-

sight but was based on the Commission view that, in some matters, primary reliance should be placed on market forces emerging from an abundance of competition between banks, thrift institutions and their
equipment and service suppliers.

It believed that payment features

consumers prefer and believe to be in their interest, both as to price
and service terms, would be competitively available.
The three consumer-related issues for my discussion are:
(1)

The implications of extending to non-depository
institutions and non-deposit accounts the legal
framework of rights, responsibilities and liabilities
for EFT transfers applicable to banks and thrifts.

(2)

Safeguarding the rights of consumers as payees.

(3)

Paying for money transfers.

I will cover these topics- briefly in my statement and in doing
so endeavor to set forth relevant Commission attitudes and differences.
To avoid misunderstanding, a few statements of fact and use of terms are
in order.

-2-

Money comes in two forms:

cash (currency and coins) and

checkable deposits in banks, savings and loan associations and credit
unions.

Cash passes from hand to hand, deposit transfers are authorized

by check, draft, debit card, magnetic tape or computers.

All other pay-

ment instruments, such as travelers checks or money orders, depend upon
credit or the prior transfer of a deposit balance or cash.

A credit

card, whether a two- or three-party card, does not make a payment.
produces evidence of an agreement to pay later.

It

In the meantime, the

merchant payee may convert these agreements to pay (receivables) into
deposits by selling (discounting) them.
Travelers checks, money orders and certain credit-based payments are employed for some types of transactions when they are safer,
more convenient or more available than cash or a check transfer.

Some

consumers use these methods of payment from necessity: they cannot
afford a deposit account in any institution.
Non-depository institutions.

The language of both bills that

could make possible a money-payment-type role for non-depository institutions appears to derive from a Commission recommendation "...that
finance companies and other credit grantors that do not normally offer
revolving credit at the point of sale should not be denied by law
access to or sharing of point of sale EFT facilities for their authorized
lines of credit for loans."—^I believe this statement should be taken
literally and that the Commission did not recommend that finance companies
should have payment powers similar to those of banks or other depository
institutions.
~~17

EFT In the United States (Final Report), p. 135.

-3-

Under the language used in both bills, however, it seems to
be implied that a finance company could offer a bill-paying service to
consumers short of cash or without a checking account.

Since a finance

company cannot accept deposits and make loans without becoming a bank,
it would pay bills from its deposit account on behalf of consumers from
the proceeds of a loan or line of credit.

Thus, if a finance company

offers a money payment service, it becomes an intermediary between the
payor and the payee, i.e., the payor borrows from the finance company
and the finance company transfers its funds to the payee.
This arrangement adds another layer to the payment process,
increases transaction costs and adds interest costs.

Moreover, it is

unlikely to provide the payor the ready access to proof of payment that
he has from a cancelled check or descriptive bank statement.

The

natural market for money transfer by the finance company or other nonbank entity, therefore, would seem to be limited to individuals who do
not have a checking account in any type of depository institution.
It is doubtful that consumers who are forced by circumstance
to use such higher cost, roundabout payment services are being given
the protection and assistance they need or are entitled to.

The Com-

mission recognized this fact when it recommended that "...Congress
should direct an appropriate existing Government agency to study and
determine what actions need to be taken by the Congress or other authorities to make the benefits of EFT available to low-income persons, while
ensuring that their rights and freedom of choice are preserved.

The

feasibility and desirability of a Giro-like system in this country is
2/
one of the alternatives that should be explored."-7
Consumers as payees.

Neither of the bills before us today

has much to do with the interests of consumers as payees.

Being paid

is fully as important as paying; most people would say more so.

How do

consumers fare when it comes to the payment of their salaries, wages,
dividends, social security, pension and welfare allowances?

How might

EFT be used to enhance consumers' interests as payees as well as payors?
Most income payments to consumers in the United States today
are by check.

Checks, unlike cash where value passes as the cash is

exchanged, are not spendable money until deposited and funds have been
finally collected from the payor's bank.

Check payment, unlike cash

payment, involves other parties than the payor and payee.

At a minimum,

the bank or banks in which the payor and payee have accounts and clearing
intermediaries must arrange for the transfer of funds.
Consider how consumers as employees and payees might benefit
from EFr.

Friday is a common payday but a check received on Friday may

not be deposited until Monday and not credited to the employee's account
before Tuesday.

If the check is drawn on a bank in another city,

crediting will be delayed another day to several days, particularly
if the check is drawn on a bank in a hard-to-reach location--a not unknown practice.

2/

It even has a name, "remote disbursement."

Ibid., p. 73.

EFT, on the other hand, has the capability of transferring
value on payday by using the device of a credit transfer.

A credit

transfer, in contrast to the check, moves funds from the payor's account
to the payee's account without question as to the time and certainty of
its availability.

The transfer takes place within the banking system

and cannot be initiated unless funds are in the payor's account.

This

service is now available on a limited basis through the automated clearing houses.

It is expected to become widespread as the capability to

handle regional and nationwide payrolls becomes available.

But there is

a barrier to acceptance of this method of payment--the somewhat selfdeceptive practice of using "float."
"Float" is a well-understood feature of our check system.
The tendering of a check to an employee or a merchant on due date is
not payment until the funds are available for expenditure from the payee'
account.

The payor's account is not charged until the check arrives

at his bank--his "float" derives from the delay in charging his account
while the check is en route to the payee's bank and is in the clearing
and transportation steps prior to deposit in his bank.

"Bank float" is

also involved and it arises from delays in crediting the payee's account.
Items cleared through the Federal Reserve System are credited to
payees' banks on a schedule of one or two days but some banks hold up
credits to payees' accounts for several days to allow for possible
reversal.

There is a name for this practice too--"deferred availability

-6-

Float is like coin clipping or non-par banking so far as
payees are concerned-they do not get paid in full.
protect themselves.

Some payees can

Merchant payees, for example, can include in the

cost of doing business, along with the cost of convenience credit, the
delay they experience in receiving payment in good funds.

Consumers,

including employees, stockholders and retirees in the past have no
effective defense.
The Commission was aware of the role of "float" in the payment of salaries, wages and other items.

It judged that the availability

of a superior--quicker, more secure, more certain-EFT-type payment
would spread in response to consumer demand given the existence of
national ACH infrastructure which it recommended be put in place.

The

Commission pointed to the action taken by the United States Treasury
Department to initiate a program over a year ago for direct deposit of
salaries and social security payments which is planned to be made available
to all government payees requesting it.

The practice of direct deposit

is common, if not virtually universal, in Western Europe.
Two legislative measures might be considered.

One would

add to the periodically disclosed listing of terms and conditions governing
the use of deposit accounts, an item respecting the availability of
deposits.

This simple step would facilitate the comparison of competi-

tively offered payment services.

Another possibility is to explore the

practicability of requiring that by some future date salaries, wages,
social security and other like payments be made in "good" funds-

•7-

spendable on payday.

The Commission's presumption is that the second

suggestion is not necessary and that competitive markets will offer
this service to all consumers with checkable deposit accounts.

That

presumption does not apply to low-income persons without deposit accounts
as the Commission was well aware.
Paving for money transfers.

The Commission's findings were

limited by the paucity of information on the costs of completing money
transfers within the banking system.

Such costs are essential to the

pricing of money payment services to encourage resource saving and to
meet rational user preferences.

The reason is obvious, costs are

fractionated and widely and haphazardly dispersed among payors, payees,
depository institutions and public agencies.
though knowable.

Many costs are unknown,

Others are obscurely joint or lost in "overheads."

Pricing policies, frequently in the absence of even as much as a knowledge
of internal costs, are blindly responsive to competitive offerings.
Bundling is pervasive but so are activity charges.

Government services

are "free" to users if the implicit interest on currency is ignored.
Unfortunately, though it tried, the Commission was not able, given its
time horizon, to put together a cost analysis that could provide a
rational basis for pricing policy.
The Commission recognized that EFT has features of convenience,
certainty, lesser cost and security which make it superior for certain
types of transactions.

The most obvious and important categories are

(1) the direct deposit of salaries, wages, social security, dividends,

-8-

and other income payments; (2) the "standing order," a preauthorized
periodic contractual payment to the same payee, and often for the same
amount, and illustrated by payments for insurance premiums, mortgage
and installment loans, rent, and utility bills; (3) bill payments for
goods and services purchased with the use of convenience credit extended
by the vendor or a third party such as a credit card company.

In total,

money transfers of the above types account for as much as two-thirds
of all check payments today.
To put the problem in its proper perspective, we need a
rough idea of the dimensions of our payments system.

Well over 100 mil-

lion checks flow through the banking system every business day.

About

40 per cent of them are mass produced by governments and employers as
income payments of various types.

Banks do not typically charge consumers

for income credits to their accounts but it is common practice to charge
employers for handling their payrolls.
Consumers generate about half of the checks written; most of
them are for cash or bill paying.

Some banks charge activity fees

(so much per check) or require balances for this service; others
advertise free payment services.

Banks usually charge merchants for

collection services on the checks they deposit.
It is evident that bank fees might be assessed on both payors
and payees-a doubling up so to speak but it is almost certain that if
enough alternative sources of services are available charges will be
policed by competition.

Check handling costs vary widely depending on

-9-

wage rates, the degree of automation and transportation costs.

In the

aggregate they are estimated to average 35-40 cents per item and,
despite the degree of automation in processing, costs have been rising
rapidly.
Consumers as payees can realize significant benefits in cost,
convenience and certainty of payment if they have depository accounts
and these accounts are directly credited with any type of income payment
whether coming from business or government.

The great bulk of these

payments are generated in volume by payors who have the capability of
using electronic technology to realize operating efficiencies for themselves.

Payors should not use a method of payment that generates "float"

at the expense of their employees.

Employees who having delivered

their services and waited until the end of a pay period of one or two
weeks or more should be paid in funds that are immediately available for
expenditure.
Most of the checks consumers write are for bill paying or
purchases at the point of sale and are made out to merchants, public
utilities and service establishments.

The retail businesses ordinarily

reimburse their bank on a volume basis for collecting consumer checks
and providing a cash service.

A high proportion of retail transaction

volume involves payment at point of sale or is in response to a bill
or statement.

Many of these statements are electronically prepared and

this practice can be grafted onto various types of electronically
arranged payment from customers' bank accounts.

By combining statement

-10-

preparation with actual payment, an efficient resource utilization is
achieved, consumers gain important convenience benefits, and retail
businesses reduce their exposure to credit losses and redundant paperwork.
Assuming consumers bear no part of the cost of credits nor
certain types of debits to their accounts, it is obvious average checkwriters (200 items per year) are costing payment system suppliers about
$75 per year.

This is clearly an unstable situation as two-thirds of

consumer checking accounts have an average balance of less than $300.
What is likely to occur?
Unnecessary check writing will be disciplined in some fashion,
by fees or balances or by a maximum number of free checks in a given
period.

Employers and governments will assume the cost of making "good"

funds available on payday.

Merchants as payees will continue to pay

the cost of collection involved in the handling of cash, checks, debit
cards or credit cards at the point of sale or for remittances on statements.

As costs continue to rise and the potential effectiveness of

EFT becomes apparent, the payment system will trend toward more costeffective methods of payment than prevail today.
It is obvious, as I indicated earlier, that the Commission did
not feel that legislation was needed to realize certain of the benefits of EFT
these would flow from the competitive efforts of depository institutions.
Other recommendations, as those authorizing saving and loan associations,
credit unions and mutual savings banks to offer money transfer services,
were intended to step up the level of competition activity.

-11-

This is a rational approach to the public policy issues
affecting the vast majority of money users but it does little or nothing
for the 15 per cent or so of the nation's income recipients that do not
have deposit accounts at any type of depository institution.

Most of

these parties, by circumstance of poverty, are forced to use currency
and money orders, the most high-priced (risk, cost and convenience
considered) of payment alternatives.

The Commission did not see the

answer to this problem and suggested further study. ^
The alternatives it faced seem clear to me.

One is to follow

the European experience and create a postal giro which accepts transferable deposits, subsidize its operation should its operating costs
exceed the yield on deposits with it, and make transfer services available to anyone.

The other would involve offering inducements to low-

income consumers (such as a direct deposit linked to a limited billpaying service) and seeking cheaper, more secure methods of operating
low-balance deposit accounts at depository institutions.

It might be

possible to achieve about the same level of service in our existing
framework that a public giro would provide.
For a conclusion, let me use a few one-liners to reflect some
of my views.
The Commission used one of two alternative solutions for
every problem; pass a law or leave it to the market place.

The statutory

solution always involves numerous specifics-the market place provides
its own specifics.

-12-

The Commission's recommendations should be viewed in the
whole because of their interaction.

Treat consumer issues separately

as long as you adopt the measures needed to achieve free market competition.
Consumer interests in money payments have been awakened by
EFT.

Turn this spotlight on cash and checks.
All of the specific measures proffered to meet consumer

interests still leave those consumers at the low end of the income

!

distribution with the least satisfactory and most costly means of
'
•
making payments.
•

•

•
•

B O A R D OF G O V E R N O R S
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON. O. C. 2Q55I
o f 'COVtRlGSj . .
••

i . u

March 10, 1978

r.u.iA Li v

Dear Senator Schmitt:
In response to your letter of March 1, 1978, in which you
asked me to comment on four questions regarding my testimony before
the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, I am enclosing a brief statement on each.
The responses speak for themselves but on the issue of whether
one bill covering all Commission legislative recommendations is preferable to a consumer bill to be followed by enactments dealing with other
issues, I am not in a position to make the best judgment. The fact
that consumer recommendations are less controversial may be a factor.
A single bill has the fundamental advantage of a complete reflection
of the Commission's findings. However, certain of these findings, such
as the removal of the prohibition on the payment of interest on demand
deposits and the authorization to the Federal Reserve to pay interest
on reserves, are only tangentially related to EFT and would be more
appropriately considered in another context.
Three other recommendations, those relating to the use and
deployment of terminals and to the sharing of EFT systems by depository
institutions, are an integral part of the Commission's legislative
package and are closely linked to the Commission's consumer recommendations. The fact that they impinge on other legislative proposals
affecting competition between classes of depository institutions should
not be a governing consideration as indicated in the case of the monetary proposals.
\

I hope these comments will be useful to you.
Sincerely,

il
Enclosures 4

The Honorable Harrison Schmitt
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

(1)

Governor Mitchell, as you will recall when Congress was
working on the Financial Institutions Reform legislation,
it was felt desirable to keep those proposals as one package.
Do you feel the best approach to Electronic Fund Transfers
would be to have an integrated and coordinated legislative
package which would include consumer protection, privacy,
sharing and competition?

ANSWER
The wisdom of including issues related to consumer protection
with those affecting depository institutions in one-legislative package
involves a reading of Congressional priorities.

It appears to me that

among the issues involved, consumer protection and privacy now seem
to have the broad support necessary to enact legislation.

The National

Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers, which included consumer and
industry representatives, concluded that consumer protection legislation
is needed at this time and recommended specific safeguards.
It is relevant to note that the Commission's findings viewed
in fine detail gave rise to over 100 specific recommendations, the
greater part dealing with consumer interests.

A majority of these %

specifics do not require Congressional action but are addressed to regulatory policy, to the monitoring of future developments, are simple
declarations, or advise against legislation at this time.
Looked at in terms of broad issues instead of specific details
Congressional action was recommended on 12 consumer issues, including
3 on privacy.

Two recommendations dealt with the branch-terminal issue

one with sharing; one with security; and two with monetary policy.

Question (1) - page 2

The security recommendation relates to penalties for computer
fraud and seems non-controversial.

Those dealing with monetary policy

should be considered in another context.

The recommendations on termi-

nals and sharing are integral to the Commission's consumer findings
but also impinge directly on depository competition and regulatory policy.
Under the above circumstances, I can perceive no conclusive
reason for taking either a one- or two-stage approach though I believe
it is clear that the privacy and computer fraud issues should be covered
in a consumer bill and that monetary policy recommendations should be
excluded.

(9)

In your statement, you state that we should turn this spotlight on cash and checks". Is it your recommendation that
if federal legislation is enacted at this time it should cover
all of the payments systems-checks, drafts, EFT debits and
credit cards — in a coordinated manner?

ANSWER
In my statement, I mentioned shortcomings in certainty, security,
and funds availability for consumers as payees when checks are used for
payroll, social security, retirement and other income payments to individuals.

I believe that payments of this kind should be made in "good"

funds on the date due; to accomplish this objective legislation may be
needed.

However, European experience with payroll crediting suggests

that depository institutions will market a service of this kind effectively under favorable conditions.
Payment delays are inherent in the check system.

These delays

have been exploited by many payors who retain control of the funds well
beyond the date the check is mailed.

The net advantages of "float" are

often more apparent than real especially for consumers.

In any event

protracted delays in settlement, unless functionally required, increase
real costs and introduce frictions

into the process.

Cash has many convenience aspects for small-value transactions
but does not provide proof of payment, involves risks of loss and theft
and is totally unsuitable for large transactions.

These are major short-

comings and are reflected in the relative decline in cash use over the
past 25 years0

Question (2) - page 2

Looking at the three payment alternatives—cash, checks and
electronics-it is apparent all have advantages and defects which users,
in the case of cash and checks, have reflected in their use patterns.
Up to the present time consumers have had little exposure to electronic
transfer and its receptivity has had a limited market test.

The test

may be biased in some degree if statutory constraints on EFT are more
onerous relative to its capability than those applied to cash or checks.
Consumer choice should not be biased by governmental' action imposing
unneeded "protection" costs.

(3)

Is there a danger of weighting down the system with regulatory
requirements which will prevent its development to bring
conveniences to the consumer and savings to the financial
institutions?

ANSWER
Yes, there is a very serious danger of weighting down the EFT
system with regulatory requirements which will prevent its development
as a lower cost, more convenient, and more secure payment system than
checks.

This is especially true with certain consumer protection pro-

posals which would add significantly to system costs.

For example, the

practice of "stop-payment" is an expensive and seldom used remedy for a
situation that can be corrected by better and far cheaper means.
The Commission's deliberation on consumer issues revolved
around the extent to which competition can protect consumer interests
and how much law and regulatory surveillance is necessary.

I believe

that in general the Commission struck a reasonable balance between law
and competition.

Specifically, I would endorse provisions relating to

privacy, account statements and terms governing the use of payment accounts
as being most appropriate for legislative consideration.

It must be borne

in mind that competition among depository institutions is not of the
"free market" variety but is circumscribed by law and policed by Federal
and State regulations.

In consequence, its capacity to provide service

alternatives is diminished.

(4)

You mention in your statement chat the "Commission's findings
were limited by the scarcity of information on the costs of
completing money transfers within the banking system." Before •
moving ahead, would it be prudent for Congress to have its
Office of Technological assessment to run a cost/benefit study
on the Commission's recommendations?

ANSWER
The cost information I alluded to relates to both check and
EFT-type deposit transfers and to the use of cash.

These three methods

of money exchange are alternatives available to most money users.
The cost of using cash is widely dispersed among banks and
other financial depositories, retailers, consumers and the Government.
A variety of costs arc involved--coining, minting, handling, counting,
accounting, shipping, storing, security, insurance, police protection,
etc.

Analysis would show that cash use for larger transactions is the

most expensive of the three alternatives, but there are no figures to
determine where the break-even point in size of transaction falls—
10, 20, 30 or more dollars.
Check costs vary widely among banks depending on labor cc)st,
degree of automation and scale of operation.

From fragmentary data and

informed estimates, I would judge such costs today would average between
35 and 40 cents per item.

In my opinion, the most knowledgeable source

of information on check costs would emanate from the Bank Administration
Institute, a research organization devoted to the study of commercial
bank operations.

Question (4) - page 2

The expenditure by the Federal Reserve for money transfer is
known.

On the basis of all direet costs and fully allocated overhead

the System in 1977 spent $24.6 million for coin use; $144.0 million for
currency use; and $223.6 million for cheek clearing.

The check cost on

a per item basis is 1.68 cents.
EFT costs depend on volume projections.

The uncertainties in

such projections arise from estimating when break-even volumes in transmission and equipment use can be achieved as a result of public preference
and what rates of obsolescence for existing equipment are appropriate to
the rate of technology advance.
In saying that the Commission needed better transaction cost
data, I was looking to the role of cost-in terms of real resourcesas a primary determinant in fixing user prices.

While money users should

be able to exercise a choice among the three payment alternatives, their
preferences should not be subsidized, which is to say that if payment by
check costs 35 cents and electronic credits for payroll or bill paying
are one-third of that amount, this differential in cost should carl'y over
to prices which will influence users' choices.