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Statement by

G. William Miller

Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the

Committee on Finance

United States Senate

September 6, 1978

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to participate in the Finance
Committee1s hearings on tax legislation.

While decisions regarding

taxation fall outside the province of the Federal Reserve, the
System is certainly not a disinterested observer.

I hope that my

appearance today will contribute to the development of a coherent
set of public policies to deal equitably and effectively with the
economic problems confronting the nation*
Economic achievements and concerns^
The past three-and-one~half years of economic expansion
have brought substantial gains In production and employment.
may be seen in the first of the attached charts.

This

Real gross national

product has increased more than 18 per cent, and total employment has
risen by almost 10-1/2 million.

A larger proportion of our people

have jobs today than at; any time in the nation2 s history.
Even so, unemployment remains unacceptably high among some
segments of the population—especially certain minority groups and
youth,

And there are areas of the country that, owing to their par-

ticular industrial mixes or to other factors, have lagged noticeably
in economic recovery.

We must make certain that all of our people

have an opportunity to achieve a greater measure of prosperity.

But

in setting monetary and fiscal policy we must also recognize that many
of these lingering elements of weakness in the economy reflect
structural problems that will not be solved through rising levels
of aggregate demand alone.




-2-

Indeed, while there is a clear need to maintain the
upward momentum of economic activity, we must be increasingly alert
to the need to avoid excessively rapid growth.

It is desirable that

the pace of expansion moderate as a business cycle upsx^ing matures and
the economy approaches high levels of utilization of labor and
industrial capacity.

At times in the past aggregate demand over-

shot the level at which these resource constraints became significant, and inflationary pressures mounted dramatically.

We can not

run the risk of repeating that mistake.
Inflation is the pre-eminent economic concern of our
people today, and the greatest threat to the vitality of the current
expansion.

The advance in prices has accelerated sharply this year,

averaging almost 10 per cent, at an annual rate, at the consumer
level*

Food prices have been a major element in this step-up in

inflation,

While there have been signs recently of improvement in

that sector, other prices are continuing to rise briskly, as may be
seen in Chart 2,

Across the economy, cost pressures have remained

intense, reflecting in part the effects of a rise in the minimum
wage and of increased employer contributions for social security and
unemployment insurance.

At the same time, the depreciation of the

dollar in international exchange markets has raised import prices
and reduced the competitive pressures on prices of domestically
produced goods.




Sett ing the dimensions of the tax cut
Under the circumstances, Congress must weigh with great
care the size and composition of its tax program,

A tax cut certainly

should provide no more stimulus than is necessary to sustain moderate
economic expansion; anything more could jeopardize our chances of restraining inflation.

It should also be structured in a way that recog-

nizes that our tax system exerts a powerful influence on our economy
through the incentives it provides for work and for capital formation.
The Congress can take a significant step toward the enhancement of




our nation's economic welfare by paying heed to these
effects„

!?

supply-side"

In the remainder of my statement, I want to discuss briefly

both the size and shape of a desirable tax cut today.
It is ray judgment that a tax reduction in the vicinity of
$15 billion being discussed by Congress would be appropriate
for the coming calendar year.

Despite some bumpiness related to

strikes and weather this past winter, the recent pace of economic
expansion has on balance been satisfactory,

However, available in-

dicators of future economic trends suggest that, in the absence of
some fiscal adjustment, private demands might well prove insufficient
to sustain growth that is strong enough to prevent the unemployment
rate from rising in the next year.
As illustrated in Chart 3, consumer buying sentiment remains
generally favorable, but the savings rate is already at a fairly low

-4level and debt repayment burdens are at a record high.

Consequently,

consumption expenditures, which up to now have been a dynamic factor
in the expansion, are likely to provide little impetus to activity*
Housing starts (shown in Chart 4) have remained at a high level thus
far this year; given

the tighter conditions that have developed in

the mortgage market, however, it is probable that residential construction activity will begin to taper off in upcoming months.

Business-

men meanwhile remain hesitant about undertaking major capacity-expanding outlays for plant and equipment.

Recent data on orders for

machinery and other capital goods have been on the weak side, as may
be seen in Chart 5, and these suggest that real business fixed investment may grow rather sluggishly over the next few quarters.
Against this backdrop, a reduction in Federal taxes next
year would provide timely support to spendable income.

It must be

remembered that without a tax cut we would actually be facing a
substantial tax increase in 1979. Mandated social security tax increases alone will boost Federal revenues by about $8 billion; in
addition, taxes for individuals will be increased another $8 billion
or more by the interaction of inflation and the progressive income
tax structure.

As a result, a tax cut on the order of that embodied

in the House-passed bill would serve only to neutralize the impact
of these other revenue changes already in train.




-5-

Of course, it is also essential to consider the expenditure
side of the budget ledger when determining the size of tax cut that
can be afforded.

If we are to have any real hope of containing

inflationary pressures, it is imperative that the budget deficit
be reduced from the $50 billion level projected for the current fiscal
year.

Spending cuts of the dimension recommended recently by the

Administration would permit reasonable progress toward the longerrange objective of restoring budgetary balance—even with a tax cut.
A narrowing of the deficit to the $40 billion area also would be
consistent with sustained economic expansion and further sizable gains
in employment.
Providing tax relief to the household sector
The next question is how a tax cut of the proper over-a11
size should be structured in order to make the maximum contribution
to the achievement of the goals of full employment, price stability,
and a sound dollar.

The fact that there will be substantial contem-

poraneous increases in taxes on individuals suggests the desirability
of allotting to this group a large share of the tax reduction.
Rising prices of food and other necessities have strained the budgets
of many households, and these hardships should not be intensified.
In this respect, the distribution of the tax cuts between the
household and corporate sectors implied by H.R. 13511 appears
reasonable.

However, I have some doubts regarding the particular

devices employed in delivering this tax relief.




-6-

As I noted earlier, a significant portion of the tax cuts
would serve only to offset the revenue impacts of scheduled social
security tax increases.

It might reasonably be asked, I think, whether

it would not be more desirable simply to defer the 1979 social security
tax changes.
advantages.

This course of action would have some significant
Besides bolstering disposable personal income, it would

avert another inflationary impulse to the structure of labor costs.
The Board's staff has estimated that the scheduled increase in employer
contributions to social security would add roughly one-half percentage point to inflation next year.
A one-year deferral of the further tax increases dictated
by the Social Security Amendments of 1977 would not place undue strain
on the resources of the trust funds.

Nevertheless, a deferral should

be enacted only with an explicit and urgent commitment to action that
deals realistically with the remaining long-range problems of the
Social Security System.

Last year f s legislation did ensure the

System1s financial viability by making much needed corrections of the
benefit computation formula and by increasing contributions.

But

the people of this country are faced with the prospect of a rapidly
growing financial burden, and a social security tax that is both inflationary and regressive.

I would recommend that Congress undertake a

comprehensive study of the Social Security System so that needed legislation could be enacted next year.







-7-

The need to increase business investment
In considering the corporate and capital gains tax provisions
of H.R. 13511, I would hope that this Committee would focus its attention particularly on how the proposed cuts would contribute to the
enhancement of business fixed investment.

The performance of capital

spending in this economic expansion has been most unsatisfactory*
Real business fixed investment reattained its previous peak level
only in the second quarter of this year--much later than has been
the case in other cyclical upswings.

Furthermore, the growth of

the nation's capital stock has not kept pace with the increases in
its work force.

Indeed, as may be seen in Chart 6, throughout the

1970s the ratio of capital stock to labor has fallen ever shorter of
its earlier growth trend line, and this undoubtedly has been a significant factor in the slower growth of productivity we have experienced
over this period.
Capital accumulation is a critical ingredient in the longrange growth of labor productivity and the raising of living standards.
To compensate for the neglect of recent years, as well as to accommodate to the reality of scarcer and more expensive energy, a larger
share of GNP must now be devoted to the expansion and modernization
of the nation 1 s capital stock.

It will not be enough simply to reach

the investment proportion of 10% to 11 per cent that has been characteristic of past periods of prosperity and low unemployment.

In my

-8-

opinion, the nation must set an ambitious goal of, say, 12 per cent
of GNP for an extended period--a level that would foster more rapid
improvement in productivity and faster economic growth*
Some shortcomings of the capital gains and corporate income tax cuts
The capital gains and corporate income tax cuts in the
House bill should provide some impetus to business capital formation and
represent moves in the right direction.

What must be considered is

whether they are the most effective measures that might be taken at
this time.

I have some reservations on this score.

There is, as you know, considerable controversy about the
effects of a capital gains tax cut on investment and on Federal revenues.

This is not surprising.

A change in capital gains treat-

ment would work its influence through a complex and uncertain set of
channels.

In assessing the impact on business capital formation, one

must contend with the fact that the tax change would affect investment
by both households and businesses in all sorts of assets, ranging
from diamonds to real estate.

How much effect the tax cut would have

on the price of corporate stock and thus on the cost and availability
of equity capital is unclear; and how this would translate into acquisition of new plant and equipment is a further uncertainty.
Still, a reduction in capital gains taxes does have its
attractions.




It would, for example, bring some relief to investors

-9-

who are confronted with very high effective real tax rates--ofttimes
exceeding 100 per cent—because their cost bases in calculating capital
gains do not rise to reflect inflation.

It would also benefit young,

emerging firms which have little current income and thus are not in
a position to benefit from other changes in business taxes; lower
capital gains taxes would encourage equity investment in such enterprises.

All things considered, I would conclude that some cut in

capital gains taxes would be appropriate, but I would not assign it
as high a priority as other tax actions whose impacts on investment
are more direct.
My reservation about the capital gains provisions of the
House bill extends to the corporate tax changes as well*

Again,

insofar as incentives for business investment are concerned, the bill
uses a shotgun approach rather than a rifle.

It does provide for a

phased liberalization of the investment tax credit, with an estimated
first year impact of $500 million, but the bulk of the corporate tax
reduction occurs through a lowering of the rate structure.

Although

lower tax rates would improve after-tax profits, the linkage between
this improvement in cash flow and spending on new plant and equipment
is a loose one.

The additional cash might be channeled into any of

a number of uses — including the acquisition of other firms, the purchase of securities, or an increase in dividends.




It thus seems

-10-

quite likely that a smaller gain in real investment would be achieved
for a given dollar of tax revenue loss than would be the case with tax
reductions that are linked directly to capital expenditures.

While

some cut in corporate tax rates is desirable—in part to enhance
the profitability of businesses in less capital-intensive sectors
such as services and finance—greater emphasis should be placed on
other, more efficient, tax incentives for investment.
The advantages of more direct tax incentives for investment
Accelerated depreciation is a very efficient way to
encourage investment.

The tax benefits of faster depreciation accrue

to a firm only after new plant and equipment has been put in place.
In addition^ enlarged depreciation allowances would redress--if
in an indirect way—the serious drag on real corporate profitability
that has occurred in recent years as inflation has caused replacement
costs to exceed depreciation deductions by a wide margin.
Larger investment tax credits also provide direct incentives
to capital formation and therefore are more efficient in stimulating
investment than are corporate tax rate cuts.

As with accelerated

depreciation, a firm only receives a tax benefit if it acquires—or,
under the current proposal, rehabilitates—a capital good.

There

are, however, likely to be differences in the cost-effectiveness of
accelerated depreciation and investment credits—that is, in the degree







-11-

of investment stimulus per dollar of tax relief.

These differences

will hinge on some rather technical factors, among the most critical
of which is the importance that businesses attach to the time-pattern
of their income.

When firms require very short pay-off periods for

investment, accelerated depreciation will tend to be more cost-effective
than tax credits in stimulating capital outlays,

There unfortunately

is no simple, direct way to measure the relevant variables; however,
it is my judgment that at the present time, when changes affecting
the environment in which firms operate seem to occur rapidly and
unpredictably and businessmen are highly risk-averse., faster depreciation is likely to yield the greatest addition to investment per
dollar of tax reduction.
A new challenge for fiscal .p.o 1 ic^ig^g^^s
I hope that the Committee will find the foregoing remarks
helpful in its deliberations on the tax bill.
must address are many and complex*

The issues that it

The Congress has made notable

progress in the past few years in bringing better order to the
nation's finances.

The Congressional Budget Act has accomplished

a great deal in providing for a more effective means for setting the
over-all levels of revenues and expenditures consistent with the prospective strength of aggregate demand.

But traditional demand manage-

ment policies are not sufficient to solve many of the basic problems
of the economy.

Thus the Congress now faces a further challenge--to

-12-

structure its fiscal actions so as simultaneously to satisfy the
criterion of equity, to minimize inflationary pressures, and to provide adequate incentive for growth and productivity enhancing capital
formation.

This is no small order, but conditions in the domestic

and international economy demand that you aim for no less.




Chart 1

OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Billions of 1972 dollars
REAL GNP

1400

1300

1200

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978
Millions

TOTAL EMPLOYMENT

92

88

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978
Per cent

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

1974



1975

1976

1977

1978

Chart 2

MEASURES OF PRICES AND LABOR COSTS
Percentage change from previous period, annual rate
CONSUMER PRICES
All Ite ms
T

II
ill

r

\1 iI
|I

i IijlI!
I

: ' I
llI I!i

I

I

'' III i

!I

iI ||

fi

II •
i! I

i

i

r

l ~I
i

i

i!

I
Ii

i i ii

i

ill

1975

!

i

I
I

!

II

Iji

I

*»

'
I

II
i

i

o

I !

!

I

i

i

I

— 9

i

iil II
i

i

|

I
July

1976

1978

1977

CONSU MER PRICES
All Item s less Food

— 9
T

u

i
I ii

i

— «a

—
!

!

i
1975

July

1976

1977

1978

1976

1977

1978

UNIT LABOR COSTS
i i
Private Nonfarm Sector




1975




Chart 3

CONSUMER ATTITUDES

Index

100

Conference Board*

80

60

* Conference board index of
consumer confidence, 1969 — 70 = 1 0 0
* * Michigan survey index of
consumer sentiment. 1966 Q1 = 100

1974

1975

1976

1977

SAVING RATE

40

1978
Per cent

10

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

HOUSEHOLD DEBT REPAYMENTS
Relative to Disposable Personal Income

Per cent

20

19

18

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

Chart 4

Annual rate, millions of units

PRIVATE HOUSING STARTS

2.5

1.5

0.5

Mult i-Family
1970




1972

1974

1976

1978

Chart 5

BUSINESS CAPITAL SPENDING ACTIVITY
Billions of 1972 dollars
REAL NEW ORDERS FOR NONDEFENSE CAPITAL GOODS

12

10

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978
Billions of 1972 dollars

REAL NONRESIDENTIAL FIXED INVESTMENT




140

130

120

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978




Chart 6

RATIO OF CAPITAL STOCK
TO LABOR FORCE

Thousands of constant dollars
per person

12

1948-1973 Trend
11

10

I
1968

1970

I
1972

I
1974

I
1
1976

PRODUCTIVITY
Output per hour, Nonfarm Business

I
1978

Ratio scale,
index, 1967=100

120

1948-1973 Trend

100

80

I I I I I I I II
1962

1966

1970

1974