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Remarks of
Frederick H. Schultz
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Commonwealth Club of California
San Francisco, California

August 15, 1980

As I REFLECT UPON THE CURRENT ECONOMIC DOWNTURN,

I'M REMINDED OF A DENNIS THE MENACE CARTOON I ONCE SAW IN
which

De n n i s

emerges

from

a

mud

puddle, with

mud

NOSE, COMMENTING "UNTIL YOU REACH THE BOTTOM,
TO KNOW HOW DEEP A MUD PUDDLE REALLY IS,"
recessions.

Cl e a r l y ,

economic

activity

SHARPLY SINCE EARLY THIS YEAR.

up

to

his

IT'S DIFFICULT

SIMILARLY WITH

has

been

falling

THE DROP THIS SPRING IN THE

NATION'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION,
WAS ONE OF THE MOST SEVERE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

SUCH

AN ABRUPT FALL OFF OF ACTIVITY SO EARLY IN A RECESSION
raises

De n n i s

the

Menace

type

questions

about

how

deep

this

R ECESSION IS LIKELY TO BE AND WHEN ARE WE LIKELY TO TOUCH
bottom.

Although

forecasting

the

ALWAYS FILLED WITH UNCERTAINTIES,

course

of

the

economy

is

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THE

END OF THE RECESSION MAY SOON BE IN SIGHT.
B u t WHATEVER THE NEAR-TERM COURSE OF THE ECONOMY,
WE MUST NOT LET OUR ATTENTION BE DISTRACTED FROM THE MAJOR
LONG-TERM PROBLEM OF INFLATION.

RISING INFLATION OVER THE

LAST 15 YEARS HAS CREATED OUR DIFFICULTIES.
CAUSED THIS RECESSION,

INFLATION

INFLATION WILL SLOW THE RECOVERY,

AND UNLESS WE GET IT UNDER CONTROL INFLATION WILL GENERATE
A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE WHICH CANNOT HELP BUT RESULT IN MAJOR
CHANGES IN OUR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS.




-

I975- I9 7 9 :
Th is

2

-

Growing Strains
difficult

situation

of

recession

and

inflation

HAD ITS GENESIS IN THE VIETNAM WAR BUT A LOOK AT THE FUNDA­
MENTAL FORCES AT WORK IN THE ECONOMY THESE PAST FEW YEARS
CAN IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHY THE PROBLEM HAS REACHED
SUCH MAJOR PROPORTIONS,
GATHERING STEAM,

FROM 1975 TO 1979 THE ECONOMY WAS

THE UPTURN, THE NATION'S LONGEST PEACETIME

EXPANSION SINCE 1945, BROUGHT WITH IT IMPRESSIVE GAINS IN
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOMES.

h'OWEVER, IN 1979, INCREASING UTILIZATION

RATES OF CAPITAL AND LABOR RESOURCES WERE BEGINNING TO PUT
SERIOUS UPWARD PRESSURES ON PRICES,

A t THE SAME TIME,

GROWTH OF PRODUCTIVITY— AN OFFSET TO RISING INFLATIONARY
PRESSURES— WAS NONEXISTENT.

INTO THIS INFLATIONARY SITUATION

WAS ADDED THE MASSIVE 150 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF
IMPORTED OIL.

In COMBINATION WITH THE ALREADY EXISTING

DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON RESOURCES, THE OIL PRICE RISE TRIGGERED
AN INFLATIONARY SPIRAL.
In f l a t i o n -I n d u c e d E x c e s s e s
With prices accelerating, a speculative fever began
to develop as consumers and business sought w a y s of hedging




-

AGAINST INFLATION.

3

-

FUNDS AND EFFORTS THAT NORMALLY WOULD

BE FUNNELLED INTO PRODUCTIVE USES WERE CHANNELLED INTO
NONPRODUCTIVE USES.

SPECULATIVE EXCESSES LED TO NEAR

STAMPEDES TO BUY GOLD AND OTHER PRECIOUS METALS.

At

THE SAME TIME, NEW AND EXISTING HOUSES AND CONDOMINIUMS
WERE SNATCHED UP AS SOON AS THEY HIT THE MARKET AS
PEOPLE TRIED TO SPECULATE ON THE RISE IN HOME PRICES.
In s t e a d

saving, households

of

Co n s u m e r s

took

on

a

record

went

amount

on
of

a
new

borrowing
debt

spree.

last

year

AND THE SHARE OF INCOME NEEDED TO SERVICE OUTSTANDING
DEBT ALSO REACHED A RECORD HIGH LEVEL.

THE PREVAILING

ATTITUDE SEEMED TO BE, "BUY NOW, AND ON CREDIT, FOR
TOMORROW THE CAR, HOUSE, AND STEREO WILL COST MORE,
MUCH MORE."

Such

SELF-FULFILLING.

an

ATTITUDE,

of

COURSE, TENDS

to

be

AND AN EXPANSION, BASED ON INFLATIONARY

PSYCHOLOGY AND ON SPECULATION IS A VERY UNHEALTHY AND
UNSTABLE ONE.
Po l i c y Re s p o n s e

To PREVENT A SEVERE COLLAPSE OF THE ECONOMY UNDER
THE STRAINS OF THESE INFLATION~INDUCED EXCESSES, MONETARY




_z*_
AND FISCAL POLICIES WERE INSTITUTED TO RESTORE PRICE STABILITY
AND TO CORRECT THE WORSENING IMBALANCES IN THE ECONOMY.
F e d e r a l R e s e r v e B o a r d 's
tives

strategy

for

achieving

these

THE

objec­

HAS BEEN TO RESTRAIN THE SUPPLY OF MONEY AND CREDIT.

AT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL, THE EFFORT WAS TO CURB
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES.
Na t u r e

ON

of

Re c e s s i o n

the

In

the

meantime, the

incomes

and

on

activity.

output

Although

the

corrosive

resulted
effects

effects

of

in a d o w n t u r n

of

the

inflation

in

recession

economic

can

be

SEEN IN MOST SECTORS, THE SHARPEST DECLINES GENERALLY HAVE
BEEN IN SALES OF CONSUMER DURABLE GOODS, ESPECIALLY AUTOMOBILES,
AND IN HOUSING-RELATED I N D U S T R I E S ~ S E C T O R S WHERE THE STRENGTH
LAST YEAR WAS BASED ON BORROWING.

AREAS OF THE COUNTRY WITH

HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF SUCH INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN MOST SEVERELY
AFFECTED BY THE DOWNTURN.

MICHIGAN, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH ITS

RELIANCE ON THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY,
Un e m p l o y m e n t

in

M ichigan

has

about

IS AMONG THE HARDEST HIT.

doubled

in t h e

past

year

AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN JULY WAS NEARLY 14 PERCENT.
contrast,

Ca l i f o r n i a ,

has

considerably




had

a

with

its

smaller

diverse

economic

rise

unemployment

in

resource

In
base,

during

-

5

-

THE PAST YEAR; THE JULY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WAS UNDER 7 PERCENT,
ABOUT HALF THAT OF MICHIGAN.

HOWEVER, EVEN IN THIS RELATIVELY

PROSPEROUS STATE, THE HOUSING SECTOR HAS UNDERGONE A SHARP
RETRENCHMENT WITH HOUSING STARTS OFF ABOUT 50 PERCENT IN THE
PAST YEAR.
In d i c a t i o n s

of

a

Ne a r -Te r m Tr o u g h

Encouragingly, the most recent data for a wide variety
of economic indicators suggest that we may be approaching the
bottom of this recession.

It appears that the adjustments

that normally occur throughout a recession, and which bring
about a recovery, are being compressed into the early stage
of this recession.

W e have already seen a sharp, in fact a

record, fall in interest rates, bringing about an upturn in
the housing market.

The number of new houses started in June

increased by nearly a third, and permits for new residential
construction rose by a similar amount.

Qualitative reports

from around the country also support the view that an upturn
in the housing market is already underway.

In the household sector, there has been a sharp c u r ­
tailment OF BORROWING AND A REDUCTION IN THE SHARE OF INCOME
NEEDED TO PAY OFF EXISTING DEBT.

SUCH AN ADJUSTMENT LAYS THE

FOUNDATION FOR A HEALTHY RECOVERY OF CONSUMER SPENDING.

ALSO,

SURVEYS OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE SHOW AN IMPROVEMENT IN CONSUMER'S
ATTITUDES.




THE MOST RECENT DATA ON CONSUMER SPENDING SUPPORT

-6

-

THIS VIEW THAT THE DECLINES IN CONSUMER SPENDING ARE MODERATING,
To t a l

personal

consumption

expenditures

in

real

terms

LEVELLED OFF AFTER FOUR CONSECUTIVE MONTHLY DECLINES.

in

June

AND

MORE R E C E N T L Y , AUTOMOBILE SALES IN JULY PICKED UP NOTICEABLY.
AN IMPROVEMENT IN CONSUMER SPENDING AND HOUSING DOES
NOT MEAN THAT THE RECESSION HAS ENDED.

HOWEVER, CONSUMER

EXPENDITURES AND RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION ACCOUNT FOR TWOTHIRDS OF TOTAL SPENDING IN THE ECONOMY AND AN UPTURN IN
THESE AREAS, OR EVEN JUST AN END TO THE DECLINES, WOULD SUGGEST
THAT THE RECESSION MAY BE APPROACHING ITS END.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE BOTTOMING PROCESS DOES NOT OCCUR
SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALL SECTORS.

BUSINESSMEN HAVE REACTED VERY

QUICKLY AND PRODUCTION HAS BEEN CUT BACK IN RESPONSE TO SHRINKING
SALES.

But THE INVENTORY SALES RATIO IS STILL HIGH, AND FURTHER

INVENTORY ADJUSTMENT IS LIKELY.

BUSINESS SPENDING ON PLANT

AND EQUIPMENT TENDS TO LAG IN THE CYCLE.
OF THE DROP IS LIKELY AHEAD OF US.

In THIS SECTOR MOST

So ALTHOUGH SOME

INDUSTRIES ARE MOVING UP AND OTHERS ARE BEGINNING TO HIT BOTTOM,
ANY OVERALL RECOVERY I S ’
STILL SOME MONTHS IN THE FUTURE.

S l u g g i sh Rec .q v .
e ry
When

the

recovery

does

b e g i n , it

is

likely

to

be

quite

SLUGGISH BECAUSE INFLATION AND INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS WILL
STILL BE MUCH TOO HIGH.




IT IS TRUE THAT THE SLACK UTILIZATION

-

7

-

OF RESOURCES ASSOCIATED WITH RECESSIONS TENDS TO REDUCE
INFLATION, AND THIS PRESENT DOWNTURN SHOULD BE NO EXCEPTION.

1960s,

However, since the early

each recession has had less

OF AN EFFECT ON REDUCING INFLATION THAN THE PREVIOUS EXPANSION
HAD ON INCREASING IT.
Pr i c e

In d e x

will

look

SINGLE DIGIT LEVELS.

OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THE CONSUMER
better, probably

much

dropping

BUT WE MUST NOT BE FOOLED.

to

THE UNDER ­

As

LYING RATE OF WAGE AND PRICE INFLATION REMAINS HIGH.

A

MATTER OF FACT, HOURLY COMPENSATION IN THE SECOND QUARTER
INCREASED EVEN FASTER THAN BEFORE THE RECESSION BEGAN.
In f l a t i o n

and

In f l a t i o n ,

as

productive

activities

we

have

a

sound

recovery

seen, penalizes
and

are

saving, promotes

speculation, and

BUSINESS AND HOUSEHOLD PLANNING.

compatible.

not

prevents

non­

confident

EXPECTATIONS OF HIGHER

PRICES ALSO PUSH UP INTEREST RATES SINCE LENDERS DEMAND RATES
OF RETURN AT LEAST SUFFICIENT TO COVER THEIR LOSSES DUE TO
inflation.

H igher

interest

r a t e s , in t u r n , c a n

curtail

HOUSING ACTIVITY, BUSINESS INVESTMENT, AND CONSUMER SPENDING.
M o n e t a r y P o l i c y M u s t F i g h t In f l a t i o n
It IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT DEALING WITH INFLATION
HAS BEEN, AND MUST REMAIN, THE FIRST PRIORITY OF ECONOMIC
policy.

Bo a r d ,




Mo n e t a r y

has

a

po l i c y , a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the

crucial

role

to

play

in t h i s

Fe d e r a l Re s e r v e

effort

to

restore

-

PRICE STABILITY.

8

-

HlSTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT INFLATION IS

NURTURED BY EXCESSIVE GROWTH OF MONEY AND C R E D I T ~ ESPECI ALLY
IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A RECOVERY__AND THAT THE PROCESS OF
UNWINDING AN INFLATIONARY SPIRAL REQUIRES MONETARY DISCIPLINE.
T h e Fe d e r a l Re s e r v e
last

Oc t o b e r ,

we

is

have

committed
placed

much

to

such

greater

discipline.
emphasis

on

IMPORTANCE OF LIMITING THE GROWTH OF THE MONEY STOCK.

S ince
the

THIS

IMPLIES THAT INTEREST RATES MIGHT MOVE OVER A WIDER RANGE
THAN PREVIOUSLY, REFLECTING CHANGES IN THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
AND CREDIT.

SUCH A LARGE SWING OCCURRED THIS SPRING WHEN

INTEREST RATES REACHED

RECORD HEIGHTS AND THEN FELL BACK

FASTER THAN EVER BEFORE.

THE RECENT DECLINE IN INTEREST

RATES HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY SOME AS AN EASING OF FEDERAL
Re s e r v e

policy.

Le t

me

emphasize

that

this

is

not

the

c a s e --

JUST AS THE EARLIER RISE DID NOT REPRESENT A TIGHTENING OF
policy.

Ra t h e r ,

monetary

policy

throughout

this

year

has

MAINTAINED A STEADY ANT I- 1NFLATIONARY COURSE BASED UPON A
SET OF TARGETS FOR THE MONETARY AGGREGATES THAT ARE WIDELY
ACCEPTED AS APPROPRIATE AND CONSISTENT WITH REDUCING INFLA­
TIONARY PRESSURES OVER TIME.
F o r NEXT YEAR, THE FEDERAL RESERVE HAS ANNOUNCED TARGET
RANGES FOR THE MONETARY AGGREGATES THAT ARE GENERALLY 1/2
PERCENTAGE POINT LOWER THAN FOR 1980.




WlTH INFLATION RATES

-9LIKELY TO REMAIN HIGH NEXT YEAR AND WITH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
PICKING UP, PRIVATE DEMANDS FOR CREDIT WILL ACCELERATE,
IF GOVERNMENT CREDIT DEMANDS REMAIN HIGH,
COULD COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE.

INTEREST RATES

A DISCI PLINED

M ONETARY POLICY EARLY IN AN EXPANSION RUNS SOME RISK OF
LIM ITING THE RECOVERY.

TYPICALLY, THE FEDERAL RESERVE HAS

A C CO M MO D AT E D THE RENEWED DEMANDS FOR MONEY AND CREDIT AT
THE EARLY STAGE OF AN UP SWING— A TIME WHEN THERE IS E XT EN ­

To

SIVE UNDERUTILIZATION OF CAPITAL AND LABOR RESOURCES.

ABANDON OUR POLICY OF RESTRAINED MONETARY GROWTH, HOWEVER,
WOULD BE A MISTAKE.

It IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE STICK TO A

FIRM POLICY OF SLOWLY LOWERING THE GROWTH OF MONEY TO
NON INFLATIONARY LEVELS.

ONLY IN THAT WAY WILL WE BE ABLE

TO BREAK THE EXPECTATIONS THAT INFLATION WILL CONTINUE TO
ACCELERATE.
N e e d Co o r d i n a t e d Pr o g r a m
Mo n e t a r y
inflationary
deeply

rooted

policy

process.
in o u r

to

At t a c k

alone

The

In f l a t i o n

cannot

succeed

expectations

attitudes

and

of

in

undoing

inflation

institutions

to

be

the

are

too

reversed

BY A SINGLE POLICY INSTRUMENT OR TO BE UNWOUND IN A SHORT
PERIOD OF TIME.

WE NEED A COORDINATED PROGRAM TO FIGHT

INFLATION AND ONE THAT IS MAINTAINED FOR A LONG TIME.

SUCH

A PROGRAM NEEDS TO ATTACK INFLATION FROM AT LEAST THREE
D IFFERENT A N G L E S — NAMELY, REDUCE OUR DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN
OIL; IMPROVE OUR PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE; AND CONTINUE TO
DI RECT OUR GOVERNMENT POLICIES TO CURBING INFLATION.




10

-

1.

Re d u c e D e p e n d e n c e
First, the

on

-

Fo r e i g n O i l

OPEC situation.

Seven years after the

OPEC PRICE RISE, WE ARE STILL EXTREMELY

INITIAL MASSIVE

VULNERABLE TO THE PRICING DECISIONS OF THAT CARTEL.

1973, 40

PERCENT OF OUR TOTAL OIL CONSUMPTION CAME FROM

ABROAD; BY

1979

THIS WAS APPROACHING

$8-1/2

the United States paid about
oil.

$90

In

50

IN 1973,

PERCENT.

billion for imported

This year the bill for imported oil will be nearly

We

BILLION.

are about

5

PERCENT of the world's p opula­

tion, BUT WE CONSUME A THIRD OF ITS OIL PRODUCTION.

ALTHOUGH

PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS IN CONSERVING ENERGY,
IT IS CLEAR THAT WE STILL NEED TO MAKE CO NSIDERABLY GREATER
EFFORTS IN CONVERTING TO MORE ENERGY-EFFICIENT SYSTEMS.

At

THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO DEVELOP FURTHER OUR INDIGENOUS
ENERGY SOURCES.

THE SYNTHETIC FUEL PROJECTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S

ENERGY PROGRAM ARE EXAMPLES OF THE KIND OF INNOVATIVE MEASURES
WE NEED TO BOOST OUR OWN ENERGY PRODUCTION.

SIMILARLY, THE

PROGRESSIVE D ECONTROL OF DOMESTIC OIL PRICES SHOULD HELP BOOST
PRODUCTION BY STIMULATING DRILLING AND ENCOURAGING NEW T E C H ­
NIQUES TO INCREASE RECOVERY.

2.

Improve Productivity
The

to

improve

that




second
our

i s , in t h e

approach

productivity
output

for

attaining

price

stability

performance.

Ga i n s

in

produced

per

hour

by

our

is

productivity,

workforce,

-II-

HAVE BEEN ON A DECLINING TREND OVER THE POST-WAR PERIOD.
During the first 15 years after the war, productivity rose

ABOUT

3-1/4

PRODUCTIVITY GAINS AVERAGED ONLY

1973

In

PERCENT ON AVERAGE PER YEAR.

ON, PRODUCTIVITY ROSE ONLY

THE NEXT DECADE,

2~3/4 PERCENT; AND FROM
1/2 PERCENT PER YEAR. THE

LESS PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH THERE IS, THE MORE DIFFICULT WILL
BE THE TASK OF CONTAINING INFLATION AND THE SLOWER WILL BE
THE ADVANCE IN OUR STANDARD OF LIVING.
Th e r e

is n o

simple, single

IN PRODUCTIVITY.

down

explanation

for

slow­

the

BUT ONE OF THE CAUSES APPEARS TO HAVE

BEEN INADEQUATE BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION— THAT IS, THE
BUILDING OF NEW PLANT AND EQUIPMENT.

DURING THE PERIOD FROM

1948 TO 1973, THE NET ADDITIONS TO THE NATION'S PRIVATE
CAPITAL STOCK WERE AT ABOUT A 4 ~ 1/2 PERCENT ANNUAL RATE.
Since then, however, additions to the capital stock have
SLOWED TO ABOUT A 2~3/4 PERCENT RATE.
OF THE LABOR FORCE HAS ACCELERATED.

MEANWHILE, GROWTH

As

A RESULT, THERE HAS

BEEN VERY LITTLE INCREASE IN RECENT YEARS IN THE AMOUNT OF
CAPITAL AVAILABLE ON AVERAGE TO EACH WORKER.
Mo r e o v e r ,

compared

to

our

trading

p a r t n e r s , we

DEVOTING LESS OF OUR RESOURCES TO CAPITAL FORMATION.

are

BUSINESS

INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF OUTPUT IS ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT IN
the

Un i t e d St a t e s ,




about

half

the

share

devoted

to

investment

-12in

Ja p a n ,

s h a r e , we

example.

for
will

be

a

Un l e s s

we

s e c o n d -c l a s s

increase

our

industrial

investment

nation

plagued

BY HIGH INFLATION AND SLOW GROWTH.
The SLOWDOWN IN capital formation over the LAST HALF
OF THE 1970s IS DUE TO SOME EXTENT TO THE TAX CODE, WHICH IS
BIASED AGAINST THE SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PROCESS.

U N FO R ­

TUNATELY, THERE IS NO SURE'FIRE WAY TO AUGMENT SAVING AND
INVESTMENT AND TO RESTORE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH.

BUT A MOST

PROMISING AP PROACH IS TO MODIFY THE TAX SYSTEM TO ENCOURAGE,
RATHER THAN TO INHIBIT, SAVING AND INVESTMENT.
L __ G o v e r n m e n t P o l i c i e s
This

leads

directly

to

the

final

aspect

of

a

coordinated

PROGRAM DESIGNED TO CURB INFLATION, NAMELY GOVERNMENT POLICY.
Th e r e

is a

lot

of

talk

these

OF ANY POSSIBLE TAX CUT.

days

about

the

wisdom

and

timing

In THE LONG RUN, IT IS A GOOD IDEA

TO CUT TAXES AND RESTORE SPENDING POWER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR.
AT THIS CRUCIAL JUNCTURE IN THE FIGHT FOR CONTRO L OF INFLATION,
HOWEVER, A TAX CUT RISKS AGGRAVATING INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS.
IT WOULD BE A GREAT TRAGEDY IF CONGRESS RUSHED THROUGH A TAXCUTTING BILL WITHOUT CAREFULLY STUDYING ITS INFLATIONARY
RAMIFICATIONS.

A n ILL-CONCEIVED TAX PACKAGE, ONE BASED ON

POLITIC AL EXPEDIENCIES, COULD EASILY AND ALL TOO QUICKLY UNDO
ANY GAINS BEING MADE ON THE INFLATION FRONT.




I f A TAX CUT

-13EVENTUALLY SHOULD PROVE NEEDED,

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT BE

CAREFULLY STRU CTURED SO AS TO BOOST INVESTMENT RATHER THAN
INCREASE CONSUMER SPENDING.

A TAX CUT THAT IMPROVES THE

PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF THE ECONOMY COULD AID THE FIGHT
AGAI NST INFLATION WHILE ONE THAT JUST RAISES HOUSEHOLDS'
AF TE R-TAX INCOME MIGHT REIGNITE THE INFLATIONARY SPIRAL,
Another

element

in a

federal

government

ant i-inflation

PROGRA M WOULD BE TO REDUCE THE REGULATORY BURDEN ON THE
PRIVATE SECTOR.

W e NEED TO COMPARE THE COSTS OF COMPLYING

WITH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS WITH THE BENEFITS REAPED.
Ob s o l e t e

regulations

raise

costs

of

production, inhibit

EFFICIENCY, AND, THEREBY, CONTRIBUTE TO INFLATION.
WHEN SOME REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED, FOR EXAMPLE,

EVEN

IN THE FIELDS

OF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT, WE MUST SEEK THE LEAST
COSTLY MEANS TO ACHIEVE A GIVEN AIM.

In RECENT YEARS, THERE

HAS BEEN AN INCREASING AWARENESS OF THE COSTS OF REGULATION,
AND MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO EASE THE REGULATORY BURDEN.
B u t MORE CAN AND MUST BE DONE IN THIS AREA.
Su m m a r y

of

Pr i o r i t i e s

It

is

far

and

from

Pr o g r a m

easy

to

decide

upon

the

appropriate

POLICY PRESCRIPTION AT A TIME OF BOTH SERIOUS RECESSION AND
RAPID GROWTH OF PRICES.




HOWEVER,

IJ APPEARS TO ME THAT GIVEN

-

14

-

THE GROWING SIGNS THAT THE RECESSION WILL SOON BE COMING
TO AN END, WE MUST PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON CURBING
INFLATION AND MAINTAIN THAT PRIORITY EVEN DURING THE

WE NEED TO PURSUE A M U L T I “FACETED PROGRAM

RECOVERY.

DESIGNED TO REDUCE OUR DEPEN DENCE ON FOREIGN OIL, INCREASE
OUR BUSINESS INVESTMENT, AND IMPROVE OUR PRODUCTIVITY.
the

Fe d e r a l

government

l e v e l , we

need

to

modify

our

At

tax

STRUCTURE TO PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS.
W e NEED TO CURB GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND EASE THE REGULATORY
BURDEN.

A t THE SAME TIME, THE FEDERAL RESERVE M U S T — AND I

CAN ASSURE YOU IT W I L L — MAINTAIN A STEADY AN T I- I NF LATIONARY
COURSE FOR MONETARY POLICY.
Un w i n d i n g

of

W ill
will

.

No t

by

In f l a t i o n E x p e c t a t i o n s L i k e l y O v e r T i m e
such

a

program

t o m o r r o w , not

consistent , firm

work?
by

next

anti-inflationary

BACK OF INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS.

I

am

confident

y e a r , but
policy

will

over

that

it

time, a

break

the

JUST AS EXPECTATIONS OF

HIGHER INFLATION BECOME SELF-FULFILLING, SO, TOO, CAN
EXPECTATIONS THAT INFLATION IS WINDING DOWN.
BY MAINTAINING A FIRM MONETARY POLICY DURING
THE UPSW ING— EVEN THOUGH THIS MAY MEAN A SLOWER RE C OV E RY —
WE CAN MAKE CONSIDERABLE INROADS INTO LOWERING THE RATE




-

OF INFLATION,

A

15

-

LOWER RATE OF INFLATION WILL FEED IN

TURN INTO LOWER RATES OF WAGES, AND BACK AGAIN INTO
LOWER PRICES.

As

PROGRESS IS MADE, MORE AND MORE H O U S E ­

HOLDS AND BUSINESSES WILL BEGIN TO ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION
OF A SLOWER GROWTH OF PRICES AND WAGES IN THE YEARS AHEAD,
RATHER THAN THE ASSUMPTION OF AC CELERATING INFLATION.

As

THIS UNWINDING OF INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS TAKES HOLD, WE
WILL PROBABLY SEE A FASTER DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF ACTU AL
INFLATION RATES THAN MANY OBSERVERS ARE CURRENTLY PREDICTING.
WE ARE NOW AT A CRITICAL POINT IN OUR ATTACK ON
INFLATION, A POINT WHERE SOME PEOPLE ARE URGING A CHANGE IN
PRIORITIES AND AN EASING UP IN ANTI-INFLATIONARY POLICIES.
To DO SO NOW WOULD BE FOOLISH, FOR THE FIGHT TO RESTORE PRICE
STABILITY IS ALSO THE FIGHT TO ACHIEVE STABLE LONG-TERM
GROWTH OF OUTPUT,

INCOME, AND EMPLOYMENT.

UNLESS WE CONTROL

INFLATION, WE CANNOT GENERATE THE FAITH IN THE FUTURE WHICH
IS NECESSARY FOR CONSUMERS TO SAVE AND BUSINESSMEN TO INVEST.
Such a course is not painless.

It requires a firm and

COURAGEOUS COMMITMENT TO POLICIES THAT MAY, IN THE SHORT RUN,
RESULT IN SOME LOST OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT.

HOWEVER, OVER

THE LONGER TERM, SUCH POLICIES WILL NOT ONLY CREATE JOB
OPPORTUNITIES BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, CAN RESTORE OUR COUNTRY'S
BASIC STRENGTH AND SPIRIT.