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EMBARGOED UNTIL FRIDAY, APRIL 13, 2018 AT 8:10 A.M.; OR UPON DELIVERY

The U.S. Economy: An
Optimistic Outlook, But With
Some Important Risks
Eric S. Rosengren
President & CEO
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
April 13, 2018
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce
Economic Outlook Breakfast 2018
Boston, Massachusetts
bostonfed.org

Recent Data
▶ Mildly disappointing employment report
▶ 103,000 jobs created in March
▶ However, 202,000 jobs per month (average) over
quarter
▶ Average hourly earnings continues upward trend
▶ Unemployment rate at 4.1 percent

▶ Tight labor markets – common concern of New
England businesses

2

March Forecast of FOMC for 2018
▶ Quite positive median forecast
▶ Strong real GDP – 2.7 percent
▶ Inflation – 1.9 percent
▶ Unemployment – 3.8 percent
▶ Conditioned on two additional increases this year

▶ My own forecast – a bit more inflation and a bit
lower unemployment
▶ So, somewhat more tightening may be needed

3

Some Important Risks to Forecast
▶ Forecasts not outcomes – assumptions about
hard-to-predict variables matter
▶ Will international trade be better or worse this year?
▶ Will oil prices tighten further?
▶ Will other central banks begin tightening their
monetary policy?

▶ Many model assumptions are about political
outcomes not underlying economic relationships
▶ Today, will focus not only on the positive
forecast, but also on risks to the forecast

4

Figure 1: Core PCE Inflation Rate: Actual and
Forecast from the Summary of Economic Projections
Actual, 2015:Q1 - 2017:Q4 and Forecast, 2018:Q4 - 2020:Q4
3

Percent Change from Year Earlier
Actual
SEP Median

2

1

0
2015:Q1

2017:Q1

2019:Q1

Note: SEP median projected values are for the percent change in the Core PCE Index from the previous fourth quarter to the fourth
quarter of the year specified. The Core PCE Index excludes food and energy.
Source: FOMC, Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), March 21, 2018; BEA; Haver Analytics

5

Figure 2: Unemployment Rate: Actual and
Forecast from the Summary of Economic Projections
Actual, 2015:Q1 - 2018:Q1 and Forecast, 2018:Q4 - 2020:Q4
6

Percent
Actual
SEP Median

5

4

SEP Median Longer-Run
Unemployment Rate

3
2015:Q1

2017:Q1

2019:Q1

Note: SEP median projected values are for the unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year specified.
Source: FOMC, Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), March 21, 2018; BLS; Haver Analytics

6

Figure 3: Federal Funds Rate: Actual and
Forecast from the Summary of Economic Projections
Actual, 2015:Q1 - 2018:Q1 and Forecast, 2018:Q4 - 2020:Q4
4

Percent
Actual
SEP Median

3

2

1

0
2015:Q1

2017:Q1

2019:Q1

Note: SEP median projected values are for the federal funds rate in the fourth quarter of the year specified.
Source: FOMC, Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), March 21, 2018; BEA; Haver Analytics

7

A Positive Forecast
▶ Some of the underlying strength in this positive
outlook comes from fiscal stimulus and still
relatively accommodative monetary policy
▶ My own forecast is even a bit more positive –
which is why somewhat more tightening, in my
view, may be appropriate this year
▶ Despite the positive outlook, it is important to
consider the risks around this forecast
▶ In my view, two short-run risks
▶ Role of international trade
▶ Potential for boom-bust

8

Figure 4: Exports of Goods and Services as a
Share of GDP
2015:Q1 - 2017:Q4

16

Percent

14

12

10

8
2015:Q1

Source: BEA, Haver Analytics

2016:Q1

2017:Q1

9

Figure 5: Percent Change in Import Price Indices
January 2015 - March 2018

6

Percent Change from Year Earlier
All Imports

3

All Imports Excluding Fuel

0

-3

-6

-9

-12
Jan-2015

Source: BLS, Haver Analytics

Jan-2016

Jan-2017

Jan-2018

10

Figure 6: Unemployment Rate minus CBO
Natural Rate of Unemployment
1970:Q1 - 2018:Q1

6

Percentage Points

3

0

-3
1970:Q1 1977:Q3 1985:Q1 1992:Q3 2000:Q1 2007:Q3 2015:Q1
Recession

Source: BLS, CBO, NBER, Haver Analytics

11

Figure 7: Corporate Bond Spreads over 10-Year
U.S. Treasury Yield
1995:Q1 - 2018:Q1

20

Percentage Points
High-Yield Corporate Master II
Moody's Seasoned Baa

15

10

5

0
1995:Q1

2002:Q3

2010:Q1

2017:Q3

Recession

Note: Dashed lines are averages over the period.
Source: ICE/BofA Merrill Lynch, Moody’s, Haver Analytics

12

Risks
Short-Run
▶ Not expecting these risks, only identifying them
▶ Important to watch incoming data to see if they
indicate that these risk scenarios are becoming
more likely
Long-Run
▶ Longer-run policy risks: potentially inadequate
buffers:
▶ Fiscal buffers
▶ Monetary buffers

13

Figure 8: Gross Federal Debt as a Percentage of GDP
Actual, 1990 - 2017, Projection, 2018 - 2028

120

Percent

100

80

60

40

20

0
1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

Note: CBO projections for the U.S. (2018 - 2028) were released on April 9, 2018 and include the recent tax changes and increases
in the federal budget.
Source: OMB, CBO, Haver Analytics

14

Figure 9: Federal Funds Rate
1970:Q1 - 2018:Q1

18

Percent

15

12

9

6

3

0
1970:Q1 1977:Q3 1985:Q1 1992:Q3 2000:Q1 2007:Q3 2015:Q1
Recession

Source: Federal Reserve Board, NBER, Haver Analytics

15

Concluding Observations
▶ March FOMC / SEP – positive outlook for the
economy
▶ Short-run risks that could be problematic – but
I am not expecting to occur
▶ More serious trade concerns
▶ Boom-bust economy

▶ Longer-run risks – do we have sufficient policy
buffers?
▶ Current fiscal stimulus may leave less room to
react to negative shocks
▶ Monetary policy buffer will be limited if rates
remain low
16