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EMBARGOED UNTIL WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15 AT 4:10 P.M.; OR UPON DELIVERY

Following a Balanced
Approach
Eric S. Rosengren
President & CEO
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
November 15, 2017
The Economic Policy Forum Fall 2017
Department of Economics, Northeastern University
Boston, Massachusetts

bostonfed.org

Assessing the Two Elements of the
Fed’s Dual Mandate
▶ Pattern during the recovery from the Great
Recession:
▶ The unemployment rate has been too high
▶ The inflation rate too low
▶ This justified the highly accommodative monetary
policy

▶ More recently:
▶ Inflation has remained stubbornly below the Fed’s
2 percent inflation target
▶ The unemployment rate is now below the level
viewed by most FOMC participants as
sustainable

2

To Balance the Dilemma of the Two
Mandate Elements, Consider the FOMC
Statement on Longer-Run Goals
▶ “Under circumstances in which the Committee
judges that the objectives are not
complementary, it follows a balanced
approach in promoting them, taking into
account the magnitude of the deviations and
the potentially different time horizons over
which employment and inflation are projected
to return to levels judged consistent with its
mandate.”

3

Determining the Magnitude of Deviations
of the Dual Mandate Variables
▶ How far is inflation from the 2 percent goal,
and how far are we from maximum sustainable
employment?
▶ Calculating the inflation deviation is
straightforward
▶ The total PCE inflation rate in the U.S. is currently
1.6 percent
▶ The Fed’s inflation goal is 2 percent
▶ The deviation is 0.4 percentage points

4

Determining Deviations from Maximum
Sustainable Employment
▶ Based on estimates, so less straightforward
▶ Estimates of the natural rate of unemployment
in the economy vary over time
▶ Demographic and other changes in the workforce
▶ Changes in the efficiency with which workers find
jobs

▶ Central bankers must infer the level indirectly,
using information in wages, prices,
expectations, and labor market conditions
▶ Still, indicators suggest to me that the low
unemployment rate appears to be beyond
what is sustainable
5

How Long Are Employment and
Inflation Likely to Deviate from Goals?
▶ Monetary policy works with lags
▶ Factors other than monetary policy impact
inflation and unemployment
▶ Forecasts of unemployment and inflation are
subject to substantial error
▶ Forecasts are the only means policymakers
have for assessing how long we are likely to
deviate from the Fed’s dual mandate, so we
must rely on them

6

Figure 1: Inflation Rate: Change in Personal
Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Indices
January 2012 - September 2017
3

Percent Change from Year Earlier

2% Total PCE Inflation Target
2

1
Total PCE
Core PCE
0
Jan-2012

Jan-2013

Jan-2014

Note: Core PCE excludes food and energy.
Source: BEA, Haver Analytics

Jan-2015

Jan-2016

Jan-2017

7

Figure 2: Civilian Unemployment Rate (U-3) and SEP
Estimates of the Longer-Run Unemployment Rate
2012:Q1 - 2017:Q3
9

Percent

8

7

6

5

4

Civilian Unemployment Rate (U-3)
SEP Median Longer-Run Unemployment Rate

3
2012:Q1

2013:Q1

2014:Q1

2015:Q1

2016:Q1

2017:Q1

Note: Prior to June 2015, SEP median unemployment rates are publicly available only with a five-year lag. Proxies
for the medians for 2012 – March 2015 are calculated from the distribution of participants’ projections reported in
ranges of tenths in the meeting minutes.
Source: FOMC, Summary of Economic Projections (SEP); BLS; Haver Analytics

8

Figure 3: Initial Claims for Unemployment
Insurance
January 28, 1967 - November 4, 2017

700

Thousands

600
500
400
300
200
100
0
28-Jan-67

29-Jul-78

27-Jan-90

28-Jul-01

26-Jan-13

Recession

Note: Four-week moving average
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Haver Analytics

9

Figure 4: Flow from Employed to Unemployed
Relative to the Labor Force
January 1991 - October 2017
3.0

Number of Workers as a Share of the Labor Force

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5
Jan-1991

Jan-1999

Jan-2007

Jan-2015

Recession

Note: Twelve-month moving average
Source: BLS, NBER, Haver Analytics

10

Figure 5: Flow from Not in the Labor Force to
Unemployed Relative to the Labor Force
January 1991 - October 2017
3.0

Number of Workers as a Share of the Labor Force

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5
Jan-1991

Jan-1999

Jan-2007

Jan-2015

Recession

Note: Twelve-month moving average
Source: BLS, NBER, Haver Analytics

11

Figure 6: Flow from Not in the Labor Force to
Employed Relative to the Labor Force
January 1991 - October 2017
3.0

Number of Workers as a Share of the Labor Force

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5
Jan-1991

Jan-1999

Jan-2007

Jan-2015

Recession

Note: Twelve-month moving average
Source: BLS, NBER, Haver Analytics

12

Figure 7: Wage Growth for Private Industry Workers
2012:Q1 - 2017:Q3

4

Percent Change from Year Earlier
Average Hourly Earnings
Employment Cost Index: Wages and Salaries
Excluding Incentive-Paid Occupations

3

2

1
2012:Q1

2013:Q1

Source: BLS, Haver Analytics

2014:Q1

2015:Q1

2016:Q1

2017:Q1

13

Labor Markets are Quite Tight
▶ Data seem consistent with U-3 unemployment
being below its sustainable rate
▶ Lows in initial claims (last seen over 40 years ago)
▶ Labor flows that avoid spells of unemployment
▶ Gradually rising wages and salaries

▶ Data are consistent with tight labor markets
(good news for individuals, but raises questions
more broadly)

14

Figure 8: Civilian Unemployment Rate Forecast
from the Summary of Economic Projections
2017:Q4 - 2020:Q4
5.0

Percent
Central Tendency
Median

4.5

4.0

3.5
2017:Q4

2018:Q4

2019:Q4

2020:Q4

Note: The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest observations.
Source: FOMC, Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), September 20, 2017; Haver Analytics

15

Figure 9: PCE Inflation Forecast from the
Summary of Economic Projections
2017:Q4 - 2020:Q4
2.5

Percent Change from Year Earlier

2.0

1.5
Central Tendency
Median
1.0
2017:Q4

2018:Q4

2019:Q4

2020:Q4

Note: The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest observations.
Source: FOMC, Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), September 20, 2017; Haver Analytics

16

Figure 10: Core PCE Inflation Forecast from the
Summary of Economic Projections
2017:Q4 - 2020:Q4
2.5

Percent Change from Year Earlier

2.0

1.5
Central Tendency
Median
1.0
2017:Q4

2018:Q4

2019:Q4

2020:Q4

Note: The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest observations.
Source: FOMC, Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), September 20, 2017; Haver Analytics

17

How Long Will Deviations from the
Dual Mandate Persist?
▶ Deviations from the inflation target are likely to
be relatively short-lived
▶ Deviations of unemployment from its
sustainable rate are likely to be persistent
▶ Indeed, these forecasts of inflation and
unemployment deviations generally assume
some further increase in interest rates, which
strengthens the case for additional tightening
going forward

18

Figure 11: Imports Relative to GDP
2008 - 2017

20

Percent

18

16

14

12
2008

2010

2012

2014

Note: Figure for 2017 is the average of the first three quarters of 2017.
Source: BEA, Haver Analytics

2016

19

Figure 12: After-Tax Corporate Profits Relative
to GDP
1967 - 2017
12

Percent

10

8

6

4

2

0
1967

1977

1987

1997

2007

2017

Note: Figures include inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments. Value for 2017 is the average of
the first two quarters of 2017.
Source: BEA, Haver Analytics

20

Figure 13: CPI: Selected Components
2012:Q1 - 2017:Q3

6

Percent Change from Year Earlier

4
2
0
-2
-4

Rent of Primary Residence
Owners' Equivalent Rent

-6

Food Away From Home
Communication

-8
2012:Q1

2013:Q1

Source: BLS, Haver Analytics

2014:Q1

2015:Q1

2016:Q1

2017:Q1

21

Figure 14: Missing Inflation Attributable to
Phillips Curve Flattening

0.8

Percentage Points

0.6

0.4

0.2
Estimated Missing Inflation
95% Confidence Interval
0.0
Food Away From
Owners'
Rent of Primary
Home
Equivalent Rent
Residence

Weighted
Average

Source: BLS; Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Current Policy Perspectives, “Sectoral Inflation and the Phillips Curve:
What Has Changed since the Great Recession?” by María José Luengo-Prado, Nikhil Rao, and Viacheslav Sheremirov
(2017 Series, No. 17-5)

22

Concluding Observations
▶ Statement on Longer-Run Goals provides a
balanced approach to somewhat conflicting factors
▶ So-called “misses” in the mandate are of relatively
similar magnitudes currently
▶ The inflation “miss” is likely temporary, but the
unemployment “miss” is likely more persistent

▶ My own view is that it is quite likely that
unemployment will fall below 4 percent, which is
likely to increase pressures on inflation and asset
prices

▶ In my view, there is a need to continue to gradually
remove monetary policy accommodation, which is
quite consistent with market expectations of
another increase in December
23