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For release on delivery
4:3Q p.m. EST
March 10, 1994

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOLLAR PAYMENTS SYSTEM

Remarks by
Edward W. Kelley, Jr.
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

at the
International Symposium
on
Banking and Payment Services

Washington, D.C.
March 10, 1994

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen.
interesting series of presentations today.

We have had a very
The main focus of my

concluding talk this afternoon will be on the Federal Reserve's
public policy objectives for the dollar payment system and some
of the Federal Reserve's recent policy initiatives in this area.
First, however, I would like to make a few remarks about the
Federal Reserve's broad central banking responsibilities and
objectives.
The past two decades have posed extraordinary challenges not
only for the Federal Reserve but also for central banks in other
industrialized countries.

These challenges have included

worldwide inflationary impulses in the 1970s, and their
aftermath; an international debt crisis that threatened financial
institutions in both developed and developing countries; a
worldwide stock market crash of historic dimensions; and the
prospect of rekindled inflation, followed by recession and a
credit contraction.

Today we have moved in the United States

toward sustainable real growth coupled with a low level of
inflation.

It is imperative that the hard won gains in

stabilizing the U.S. economy, along with its financial
institutions, not be lost.

Other industrialized countries are

also moving, at different rates, toward this same objective.
It is against this backdrop that I would like to address
recent discussions in the United States involving the public
benefits of the broad central banking role of the Federal
Reserve.

Throughout the difficulties of the past 20 years, the

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Federal Reserve has played an important role both in stabilizing
monetary conditions and in helping to ensure the stability of the
institutional framework for trade and finance.

Conceptually, the

multiple responsibilities of the Federal Reserve are sometimes
separated, for simplicity, into monetary policy, banking
supervision, and payment system functions.

In practice these

responsibilities are closely intertwined, and the same broad
public policy objectives animate all three central banking
functions.

These policy objectives are well known and aim at

undergirding the financial system through prudent banking and
market practices, sound institutional arrangements, and stable
monetary conditions.

The ultimate goal of all these objectives

is to encourage steady, non-inflationary growth and rising
standards of living.
Consideration of the role of the Federal Reserve requires
special attention to international factors.

The prominent

international use of the dollar, the importance of U.S. financial
institutions in international markets, and the role of the United
States as a leading international financial center, all argue
strongly for maintaining a practical, well tested central banking
system that is attuned to major international developments.
These developments include changes in worldwide macro-economic
conditions and policies, along with closely linked changes in the
financial condition of major monetary institutions.

Moreover,

the day-in and day-out give and take of the policy process calls
for well informed policy management, particularly because rapid,

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global communications have helped create complex, worldwide
institutional and market linkages. Informed and effective policy
development and implementation in the "real world" is only
possible for a central banking organization with everyday
"hands-on" involvement in all facets of central banking,
including monetary policy, banking supervision, and the payment
system.
The Federal Reserve's responsibilities in the payment system
arena vividly illustrate the interrelated nature of the functions
of a central bank.

As their name implies, central banks occupy a

unique position and perform a special banking function for the
financial system.

At a minimum, this role involves the provision

of accounts and risk-free central bank money balances to eligible
financial institutions, and also typically involves the provision
of key interbank payment and settlement services.

These

deceptively simple arrangements are at the heart of the monetary
infrastructure of modern economies.
Central banks generally provide oversight for a nation's
payment system.

This oversight responsibility builds on a

combination of the account relationships central banks have with
commercial banking organizations and the "hands on" supervisory
role of central banks vis-a-vis these organizations.

In the case

of the Federal Reserve, account relationships are the point of
operational contact to critical interbank money settlements in
the domestic and international financial system.

In addition,

account relationships provide daily information on key money

flows within the banking system.

Supervisory activities provide

an early warning system for potential major institutional
problems in the payment system and also provide important tools
for helping to resolve or manage these problems.
In times of financial stress, in particular, supervisory
authority arms a central bank with important information and
credibility, and in certain cases legal authority, needed to help
resolve complex problems that can arise in the payment system.
Without supervisory tools, a central bank must rely solely on its
account relationships, and possibly credit powers, to obtain
information and resolve payment system problems.

I do not

believe, as a practical matter, that sufficiently vital and
timely information about major monetary institutions in the
payment system would be available to the Federal Reserve based
solely on account and credit relationships.
Let me now focus more specifically on payment system policy.
Although there may be somewhat different public policy objectives
for payment systems in different countries, two themes
increasingly dominate all others.

First, payment systems must

contribute to the stability of financial markets and the banking
system during times of financial stress.

This theme is an

integral part of the general central banking policy objectives
that I noted above.

Most importantly, payment systems should be

designed and used so that they do not amplify financial problems
originating in other quarters, but rather help dampen the effects
of these problems and bolster confidence in the financial system.

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Second, payment systems must be efficient.

They must

operate dependably at low cost and encourage innovative financial
and payment practices.

Efficiency over the long run requires

investments in new technologies today that provide the
flexibility to adapt to changing markets tomorrow.

It is part of

a central bank's responsibilities to encourage constructive
innovations, both in the systems it operates and in discussions
with banking organizations that operate private systems.
I would like to mention three specific areas where the
Federal Reserve has recently taken payment system initiatives:
the announcement of expanded Fedwire operating hours beginning in
1997, the recent adoption of Regulation EE dealing with financial
netting, and the charging of fees for daylight overdrafts.
first initiative — expanded Fedwire hours—

The

should be viewed in

the context of efforts to find new ways to reduce settlement risk
in the foreign exchange markets, also known as Herstatt risk.
Despite enormous increases in the volume of foreign exchange
trading, foreign exchange contracts are settled today, in many
important respects, as they were at the time of the now famous
closure of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974.

For example, in the case

of contracts involving European currencies, these currencies are
paid out hours before contra-payments in dollars are made and
settled in New York.

In the case of yen-dollar contracts, yen

payments are often made and settled as much as 18 hours before
dollar contra-payments are finally settled.

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I believe that the international banking community must take
up the challenge of developing new technologies and settlement
practices that will help solve one of the oldest problems in the
international financial system.

Attention to Herstatt risk

should be an important part of the operational planning of
individual banking organizations and clearing groups.

The issue

should also be highlighted in discussions both within the banking
community and between banking organizations and central banks.
To be sure, very important steps have been taken since 1974
by the New York Clearing House to strengthen the CHIPS payment
system, which is often used today to settle the dollar leg of
foreign exchange transactions.

These steps have included the

"same-day" settlement of payments, enhanced risk controls, and
settlement support arrangements.

Yet large time gaps between the

settlements of different international currencies remain, in part
because of central bank operational policies, and more needs to
be done to reduce these gaps.
Last month the Federal Reserve announced that beginning in
1997 the operating day for Fedwire will be expanded from the
current 10 hours to 18 hours.

Specifically, the Fedwire funds

transfer service will operate from 12:30 a.m. until 6:30 p.m.
Eastern time.

(The current operating hours are from 8:30 a.m.

until 6:30 p.m.)

A specific date for the new Fedwire operating

schedule will be announced at least one year in advance.
For the time being, no changes are being made in the
operating hours of the Fedwire securities transfer system.

The

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Federal Reserve staff, however, is working on the design of new
features for that system that might allow longer operating hours
without imposing significant, unwanted operating costs on users
of the system.

It is expected that new features for the

securities system will be proposed for public comment this year.
I would like to emphasize several key points about the
Federal Reserve's decision to expand Fedwire operating hours.
First, the primary impetus behind this decision is the potential
public benefit to the United States and the international
financial system from expanding the opportunities for banking
organizations to settle their obligations in central bank money
in a timely fashion.

The Fedwire system is the ultimate system

for making "instantaneous" and irrevocable, electronic interbank
funds transfers in the U.S. dollar.

The Federal Reserve believes

strongly that concrete actions need to be taken that will remove
operational barriers to private-sector efforts to employ the
Fedwire as a tool, along with new technologies and settlement
techniques, to help reduce Herstatt and other settlement risks.
Some of these techniques may eventually involve settlements using
delivery-versus-payment principles.
Second, the financial industry has strongly urged the
Federal Reserve to establish clear longer term operational goals
for Fedwire so that the industry can plan effectively their
settlement practices, payment services, and technology
strategies.

The Federal Reserve understands that the financial

industry has a very important need to make careful and rational

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technology decisions, particularly over the next few years that
promise to be a time of continuing change.

Thus, the Federal

Reserve's announcement of a clear decision for substantially
expanded Fedwire operating hours, but with a three-year lead
time, should be seen as a positive step to help simplify
strategic planning.
Third, central banks in other countries may wish to review
the operating hours of their Fedwire-like payment systems to
increase the period of time these operating hours overlap with
the newly announced Fedwire hours.

Further increases in the

overlap of payment system hours may provide even more flexibility
to banking organizations as they review their current operations.
Fourth, I would emphasize that the use of Fedwire during
expanded operating hours will be entirely voluntary.

The service

will be available, but any banking organizations that do not find
it in their business interest to use the service will not have to
expand their own banking hours.

Indeed, our analysis indicates

that there are no burdens placed on banks, including reserve
maintenance burdens, from choosing not to use Fedwire during
expanded hours of operation.

This is especially important to the

many thousands of smaller institutions that use the Fedwire
service, but may not find it useful to expand their own banking
hours.

Finally, the Federal Reserve staff will continue to be

available to discuss with the private sector new approaches to
reducing Herstatt and other settlement risks.

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In addition to the Fedwire initiative, the Federal Reserve
continues to support other steps aimed at helping the private
sector to devise new means to help reduce settlement risk.

For

example, the Federal Reserve has supported the work of the
international central banking community to develop common minimum
standards — the Lamfalussy standards—

that should guide the

design of new multilateral clearing arrangements, such as those
for interbank foreign exchange contracts.

These types of

arrangements, if soundly designed, offer the possibility of
reducing and better controlling settlement risk.

Great care must

be exercised in the design of these systems, however, because
they also have the potential to concentrate settlement risk at a
single point in a pivotal international institution.

We will

hear more about these projects tomorrow.
In a second area of payment system initiatives, the Federal
Reserve recently issued Regulation EE, which became effective on
March 7.

The regulation was authorized by the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, and aims at strengthening
the legal foundation for financial "netting contracts" that have
increasingly been used in the foreign exchange, swaps, and other
"over-the-counter" markets.

In using these netting contracts,

parties agree that they will pay or receive net amounts due on a
series of financial contracts or payment orders, rather than the
gross amounts due on each obligation.

The new regulation

establishes relatively simple generic tests that will permit
financial institutions, which are acting as market-makers, to

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enter into netting contracts that will be valid under federal
law, even in the event of bankruptcy.

The goal of Regulation EE

is to enhance efficiency and reduce systemic risks in major
financial markets through the reduction of legal uncertainty.
In a third area of payment system initiatives, the
Federal Reserve will begin charging fees for daylight overdrafts
incurred by banking organizations in their reserve and clearing
accounts, beginning in mid-April.

The aim of this policy, along

with related programs to control daylight overdrafts, is not to
impose new costs on the banking industry, but to reduce risk in
the payment system.

These efforts have already been a catalyst

for changes in the measurement and control of risk.

One of the

latest and most impressive efforts has been undertaken under the
aegis of the Public Securities Association.

In recent

experiments to expedite the daily processing of settlements for
repurchase agreements involving government securities, major
securities dealers have been able to reduce the average daily
aggregate value of the banking system's daylight overdrafts by as
much as one third.

I look forward to even greater progress as

more financial firms become engaged in efforts to manage and
control their use of daylight credit, as we approach mid-April.
Overall, the Federal Reserve is monitoring closely the
significant efforts now being undertaken to reduce and better
manage the use of daylight credit.

These efforts and their

results will be studied carefully as the Board evaluates the

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potential impact of further increases in daylight overdraft fees,
which are currently scheduled to take effect in 1995 and 1996.
I would also like to take a moment to mention the situation
with consumer payments, particularly since this topic is often
neglected at international conferences.

Although the large-value

payment systems in major countries carry 80 to 90 percent of the
value of all payments, smal1-value, consumer-oriented payment
systems carry 80 to 90 percent of the number of all payments.

A

large proportion of these small payments is still made using
paper checks or paper vouchers.
At the same time that we continue to used paper-based
payment methods, new technologies for information processing and
communications are developing at a very rapid rate.

I believe it

is time that we redouble our efforts to improve the efficiency of
consumer payment systems, both within and between countries.
Significant steps are likely to include new mechanisms for the
collection and processing of paper instruments, to the extent
consumers continue to rely on traditional payment methods.
More fundamentally, we need to continue to find means of
making payments electronically in ways that are cost effective
and acceptable to consumers and businesses so that we can improve
the efficiency of the payment system.

In the longer term, I

would not rule out the possibility that entirely new payment
systems and technologies may be developed, as the full impact of
new communications technologies and advanced consumer electronics
begin to be felt.

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In conclusion, I believe that we have new opportunities to
help reduce risk and improve efficiency in the payment system.
Much has been done, and much is being done.
needs to be done.

However, much more

A vast array of new technologies has created

an ever-more tightly interdependent world financial system.
These same technologies can and should be used to help provide
modern, safe, and effective mechanisms, around the world, for
settling domestic and international transactions and ensuring the
integrity of globally expanding daily flows of money.