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For release on delivery
10:00

A . M . , E.S.T.

January 23, 1992

Statement by
David W. Mullins, Jr.
Vice Chairman, Board of Goyernors
of the Federal Reserve System
Before the
Subcommittee on Securities
of the
Committee on Banking, Housing,

and Urban Affairs

U.S. Senate

January 23, 1992

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you
for this opportunity to present the Federal Reserve Board’s
views on reforms to the regulation of the government
securities market.

Since September, when I last testified

before this Committee, staff of the Federal Reserve, the
Treasury Department,

and the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) have conducted an exhaustive examination of
this market, the results of which were released yesterday.
My prepared remarks will touch upon some of the main
conclusions of this report from the particular perspective
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Our perspective differs somewhat from the other agencies
contributing to the report due to differences in legislative
mandates.
The Board of Governors has little direct regulatory
authority for the U.S. government securities market.

While

the Board has general oversight responsibility for all
Federal Reserve District Banks, the District Banks act as
fiscal agents of the Treasury, thus sharing with the
Treasury operating responsibility for the market.

It is the

S EC ’s charge to enforce the securities laws that seek to
foster a high degree of fairness in the marketplace.

With

neither the direct responsibilities of funding the
government nor substantial regulatory oversight, the Board
of Governors can view this market from a somewhat different
vantage point--a policy perspective that allows us to
examine these issues in an economy-wide context.
When we look to the government securities market,
we see a market that works as well as any on earth.
government debt is an ideal trading vehicle,

U.S.

since it is all

closely substitutable and has none of the default risk or
idiosyncratic problems of private issues.

As a result,

market participants, in the aggregate, willingly commit
substantial amounts of risk capital and exchange a large
volume of securities each day.

Positions are large yet

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trading skills are so sharply refined that bid/ask spreads
are razor thin, a small fraction of the size of spreads in
major equity markets.
This market generates widespread macroeconomic
benefits.

The government securities market efficiently

absorbs the large quantity of new issues required to finance
the deficit.

With real-time quotes on a range of

instruments, this market serves as the foundation for
private market rates and a haven for ready liquidity.
Further, this deep and liquid market gives the Federal
Reserve a powerful,

reliable mechanism to implement monetary

policy.
Nonetheless,

the admission of wrongdoing by Salomon

Brothers, episodes of price distortions, and other evidence
uncovered in our joint study all suggest that this market
has faults.

It can be improved.

The proposals contained in

the joint report, along with other reforms announced
earlier,

constitute the comprehensive modernization of the

mechanisms and practices in the government securities
market.

Implementing these proposals represents a

formidable, though feasible, task in our view.
Over the longer term, the most effective force in
enhancing market efficiency and reducing the potential for
manipulative abuses is the force of competition.

And the

joint report provides a blueprint to open up the government
securities market to broader based participation.
Automating Treasury auctions; facilitating direct bidding by
customers, including non-primary dealers; implementing a
single-price, open auction technique; and reducing the
barriers to primary dealer membership all will serve, in
time, to broaden participation in the primary market and in
the secondary market for newly issued securities.

More

depth and breadth in this end of the market should increase
efficiency,

reduce Treasury financing costs, and lessen the

potential for manipulative trading abuses.

In addition, the

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competitive force of broader participation will be
reinforced by proposals targeted at manipulative abuse:
tightening up on the enforcement of auction rules, enhanced
market surveillance by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
to identify potential manipulative episodes that could
trigger SEC investigations,

and Treasury supply management

to reopen securities to combat squeezes.
Taken together, these actions should serve to deter
manipulative practices and quickly detect abuses should they
occur.

Moreover, they are relatively low-cost, market-based

responses that should achieve these benefits without
impairing the efficiency and liquidity of this vital market.
There are, of course, many other alternatives which
could be considered to combat the potential for abuses in
this market.

However, the government securities market is

too important a national resource and works too well to be
put at risk by regulatory change for the sake of change.
From the Board of Governors' perspective, a compelling case
must be established that the benefits outweigh the costs.
For example, there is an alternative way to address
manipulative trading strategies in the domestic market:
pass legislation that constructs a complex and burdensome
apparatus of reporting requirements.

No doubt, the need to

post large trades and end-of-day positions with a regulator
well might cause a potential manipulator to think twice.
Unfortunately, it also would lead other potential
participants to think twice before entering the market.

A

reporting burden falls on the good and the bad, boosting the
cost of every trade.

While the direct costs of additional

record keeping might be kept manageable, an indirect cost
looms larger.

Market participants might withdraw rather

than risk the divulging of their finances and trading
strategies.

Indeed, they have ready alternatives,

since

U.S. government securities trade in an international market.
Margins in this industry are thin and it does not take much

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to lead to sizable shifts in trading behavior.

An elaborate

web of reporting requirements designed to snare manipulators
might well reduce the number of participants, therebyraising the cost of Treasury financing.
stakes are high.

And, of course, the

A tiny increase in Treasury rates

translates into a very substantial increase in cost to U.S.
taxpayers.
The agencies agreed that the Treasury market
differs sufficiently from the stock market to make largetrade reporting unnecessary.

On the other hand, there has

been less agreement concerning the need for large-position
reporting.

The Board of Governors believes little

incremental benefit would accrue from requiring large
holders to report their positions and that the costs might
be quite large indeed.

In view of the extensive nature of

the other changes proposed in this report, one might
question the capacity of this market to absorb, at an
acceptable cost, this additional change--the imposition of
broad-based reporting requirements for large market
participants.

Even backup authority risks sending the same

chilling message about the U.S. market to all participants
choosing a trading arena in the global market place.
The taint of manipulation in trading is
sufficiently damaging to the market that the Board of
Governors would accept large-position reporting--despite the
obvious costs--if there were no other effective remedy.
However, a surer and less costly way to fight manipulative
practices in the market is to modify the way in which the
Treasury sells securities and to take a more active role in
how those securities trade thereafter.

And the interagency

report provides such a market-based solution to the problem
that targets manipulative behavior without impairing the
liquidity of this important market.

There are three basic

elements to this overall strategy, involving improved

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auction mechanisms, enhanced market surveillance,

and active

supply management.
While many aspects of Salomon Brother’s admission
of wrongdoing and the results of the subsequent
investigation cause concern, one is particularly unsettling:
because of the falsification of bids at auctions, the
Treasury was the direct counterparty in attempts to
manipulate the market.

Immediate steps were taken to reduce

the risk of a reoccurrence, including tightening up on
enforcement of auction rules and implementing measures to
encourage more direct bidding.

Looking forward, automation

of the auction process, already under way and expected to be
completed by year end, should efficiently snare any
infraction of the rules.
More important still, automation will facilitate
consideration of alternative auction techniques.
minimum,

At a

switching to single-price awards from the current

multiple-price format should foster greater participation
and likely reduce gaming behavior at the auction.
can be done.

But more

Linking bidders directly by a computer network

and conducting the auction in real time will expose any
would-be manipulator to public scrutiny in time to give the
competition the opportunity to react.

With the element of

surprise gone, the potential return to manipulation should
disappear.

Thus, the auction of the near future may well be

played in the open, on a level field, with sharply defined
and easily policed foul lines.
The report also finds that the benefits of enhanced
monitoring extend to when-issued and secondary-market
trading.

Manipulative behavior leaves its footprints in

market quotes, as a shortage of an issue will be evidenced
by a yield trading below that of similar securities and by
depressed financing rates.

The agencies agreed that the

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, with its substantial
experience as the operating arm of the Federal Open Market

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Committee and (along with the other Reserve Banks) as one of
the fiscal agents of the Treasury,

should have primary

responsibility for market surveillance; the Bank, in turn,
will provide information to the the Treasury, the SEC, and
the Board of Governors.

It is the Board of Governors’ view

that rigorous monitoring of the behavior of market rates
will expose manipulative behavior without the need to gather
the positions of large traders routinely.
Indeed, automation and enhanced market monitoring
also presents the opportunity to correct a long-standing
market misimpression.

Although the Federal Reserve Bank of

New York has no statutory authority to regulate the primary
dealers, many people view the primary dealer system as
evidence of some measure of responsibility and oversight by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of those firms.
Ongoing automation and enhanced monitoring capabilities will
let the Bank move to a more open set of trading
relationships,

thus disabusing market participants of the

notion that the primary dealers have a special status.

To

further that end, the Bank will eliminate its dealer
surveillance unit, showing unambiguously that responsibility
rests with the primary regulator.

The Bank will also lower

the impediments to primary dealer membership, thereby
encouraging a broadening of membership in the primary dealer
system.
The careful monitoring of the market will be made
more credible by action:

persistent and large-scale price

anomalies consistent with a manipulative squeeze will call
forth two sets of policy responses.
evidence,

First, if other

including discussions with market participants,

suggests manipulation, then the SEC will begin an
investigation to determine if any security laws have been
broken.

Second, and more immediately, the Treasury will act

in the market to narrow those price anomalies, thereby
limiting the extent of the market disruption in general and

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reducing the potential gain if manipulative behavior was the
root cause.

The Treasury’s actions will be effected by

either holding a new auction of the sought-after security--a
reopening--or through the sale of those securities into the
market by the trading desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York on behalf of the Treasury--a tap issuance.

The

resulting expansion of supply should slash the manipulator’s
potential gain, making it unlikely that any one would even
try to manipulate the market.

Circumstance and experience

over time will dictate when an increase in supply will be
required and which means of augmenting the issue will be
taken.
It is the Board of Governors’ judgment that the
reforms that I have outlined--changes in auction mechanisms,
active and rigorous monitoring of market rates, and the
clear willingness to use relative supplies to punish
manipulative behavior --will prevent a replay of last y e a r ’s
events.

These are fundamental changes in market mechanisms

that promise to open up this market to broader based
participation while, at the same time, enhancing regulatory
surveillance and remedial capabilities.

Nonetheless, these

are cost-effective, market-based responses to irregularities
in a market that otherwise functions quite well.

These

responses are measured, targeted and commensurate to the
problem at hand, and, in our view, obviate the need to
punish many with reporting burdens because of the actions of
a few.

This strategy also offers flexibility to deal with

future problems as they arise.

It is perhaps ironic that

the most serious abuses in the history of this market--the
Salomon Brothers’ episode--have served as the catalyst for
changes that promise substantial long-term benefits.

Taken

together, these proposals and those already implemented
constitute a thorough, thoughtful, and feasible renovation
of the government securities market and will result in a

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healthier, more efficient market for our U.S. government
securities.