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Statement of Darryl R. Francis,
President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
on behalf of the Farm Credit Administration,
before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Agriculture, July 19, 1971,
regarding the Farm Credit Act of 1971

Mr. Chairman, my name is Darryl R. Francis.
I am President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
and am appearing here on behalf of the Farm Credit Administration.

For a number of years I had the opportunity

of working with the Farm Credit System as secretary of a
Production Credit Association, and more recently I served
as Chairman of its Advisory Committee on Finance which
conducted a study of its future financing requirements.
Thus I am vitally interested in portions of this bill,
especially the method whereby the System obtains its funds.
Each of the three separate parts of the Farm
Credit System —

the Federal Land Banks (FLBs), the Federal

Intermediate Credit Banks (FICBs), and the Banks for Cooperatives (BCs) —

have in the past raised funds in the nation's

capital markets as separate entities.

The Federal Land

Banks have generally issued long-term obligations while the
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks and the Banks for Cooperatives largely limit their debt instruments to nine and
six month obligations, respectively.




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Under existing legislation debt instruments
may be issued, with the approval of the Farm Credit Administration, by the individual FLBs and FICBs and by
the Central Bank for Cooperatives.

Consolidated instru-

ments may be issued by banks in each part of the threepart System.

As a practical matter, most debt issues

have been of the consolidated type with the proceeds
allocated to individual banks on the basis of local
fund demands.
Although the practice of issuing consolidated
debt instruments, by each bank group, in contrast to
individual bank issues, tends to reduce the System's
number of marketings, it still markets securities with
great frequency.

In 1969 the Farm Credit System went

to the market 28 times, more frequently than all other
Government agencies combined.

The total offerings

amounted to $11 billion, most of which was used for
refunding old debt.
billion.

New funds raised totaled only $1.2

In the first half of 1970 it went to the mar-

ket 15 times with total offerings of $6.9 billion and
new funds raised of $1.1 billion.
Most of the System's current obligations are
of relatively short maturities because of its reluctance
to issue longer-term securities at the higher interest
rates of recent years. As of June 30, 1970, more than




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30 per cent of the FLB obligations, 96 per cent of the
FICB debentures and all of the BC debentures matured
within one year.

Of the $12.8 billion capital market

debt for the three-part System, over -50 per cent
matured within one year.

Since mid-1970 some longer

term maturities have been issued by each of the three
agencies, but the overall maturity schedule is still too
short in view of their asset maturities.
The Farm Credit System can maximize its
effectiveness in the capital markets by offering a
single consolidated instrument rather than separate
securities for each of the three bank groups. With
one debt instrument for all banks in the System it
can reduce its trips to the market, provide funds at
more frequent intervals for each bank group, and gain
from the greater diversity of risks. A unified security
will thus be of mutual benefit to all three groups.
Although it is difficult to compare interest
costs among the three Bank groups, evidence indicates
that purchasers have no preference for the securities
of one group over those of another.

For example, on

January 20, 1970, the FLBs issued bonds with a 42-month
maturity which sold at an 8.45 per cent yield.

Three

months later, they issued another 42-month bond at a
yield of 7.80 per cent.

In between the two FLB issues,




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the FICBs issued a 36-month debenture at a yield of
8.15 per cent.

A gradual reduction of rates on Aaa

the FICB securities were priced at yields about midway
between the two FLB issues indicates little difference
in the public's pricing of issues of the two bank groups.
In September 1970 the FLBs sold bonds with a 42-month
maturity at a yield of 7.30 per cent and the FICBs sold
debentures with a 34-month maturity at a yield of 7.32
per cent, a further indication that little difference in
quality is recognized between issues of these two bank
groups.

An issue with a 36-month maturity was sold in

October 1970 by the BCs at a yield of 7.3 per cent, about
the same rate as similar issues sold by the FLBs and
FICBs during this period of relatively stable interest
rates•

In the absence of sizable differences in risk,
basic statistical knowledge tells us that a unified
security for the System will usually be less risky than
a security issued by either bank group separately.

A

unified security in which all banks of the System are
jointly and severally liable will probably sell at a
lower yield and provide lower cost funds for lending
than a security offered by any one bank group.

A unified

security provides greater diversity in farm credit assets




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as security for Farm Credit Bank indebtedness.

For

example, if farm mortgages weaken and the FLBs are
unable to meet their share of principal or interest
payments, owners of the unified security would still
be protected, provided the FICBs and BCs can meet the
remaining portion of the FLBs obligation.

Such a

security provides an automatic mechanism for greater
cooperation among the three parts of the System•

I

suspect that this type of assistance is essential
since the inability of one group to meet its obligations would cause the market for securities issued by
the other two to weaken.
A unified security would likely result in a
better secondary market for Farm Credit System securities as it would be better known than securities of
the separate bank groups.
Such a security would involve fewer and more
regular market entries.

This would result in some effi-

ciencies through lower printing, marketing, and servicing
costs.
With a unified security each bank group can prepare for new financing at regularly scheduled offerings
and still choose financing terms subject to individual
needs and preferences.

Each group can still maintain its

separate identity in lending operations.

Their lending

is inherently regional, whereas their borrowing is primarily national and on an impersonal basis.




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The belief that major efficiencies can be.
achieved with the use of a single debt instrument for
the entire System was uniformly expressed in a recent
study by the Advisory Committee on Finance for the System,
I am thus pleased to note that the proposed legislation
extends the opportunity for the System to issue such obligations.

Nevertheless, in view of the long period of

separate financing, the great resistance to change from
established practices, the preponderance of evidence for
more orderly marketing of obligations, and the prospective efficiencies of a single offering, I suggest that this
means of obtaining capital funds be expressed in the Act
as the intent of Congress.
In addition, it is my belief that the Act could
be further improved by authorizing the Central Bank for
Cooperatives to function as a central bank for the entire
System.

This move would conform with the marketing of a

single security and formalize some of the activities that
are already being performed by the Central Bank.

For

example, its balance sheet for May 1971 shows loans of
$50 million to the BCs, $42 million to the FICBs, and
$18 million to the FLBs.

At the same time it showed bor-

rowings of $16 million from the BCs, $4 million from the
FICBs and $1 million from the FLBs.




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These operations are evidence of the fact that
the Central Bank for Cooperatives is in reality a central
bank for the three-bank group.

It currently receives

surplus funds from all banks in the System and makes loans
to all banks.

Therefore, it should be the agency to re-

ceive and dispense funds from the System-wide obligations
outlined in this proposal.

I thus suggest that its real

function be outlined and its ownership and management be
changed in this legislation to conform to this broader
functional pattern.
In summary, my view of the proposed Farm Credit
Act as currently constituted is that the permissible move
toward a single debt instrument is a progressive step,
that the desirability of raising funds in this manner
should be expressed as the intent of Congress, and that
the Central Bank for Cooperatives operations should actually
be formalized in the legislation to make it a Central Bank
owned and operated by the entire Farm Credit System.

I

would be glad to amplify these views or receive any other
questions you may wish to ask.