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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO INFLATION EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE
Speech by Darryl R. Francis
President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
at the
University of Mississippi School of Banking
Oxford, Mississippi
June 13, 1971

I am glad to have this opportunity to speak to
Mississippi bankers about some vital issues relating to
inflation and price stabilization. The numerous proposals
advanced in the past year to stabilize prices indicate the
wide concern of this nation for the inflation problem.
Some persons view the continuing rise in prices and the
large wage increases negotiated in some sectors as
evidence that monetary and fiscal actions have been
ineffective. They suggest that other measures must be
applied to stem the tide of rising wages and prices. Such
proposals include Governmental admonishment, wage
and price guidelines, and mandatory wage, price, and
credit controls.
The Committee for Economic Development (CED),
a proponent of voluntary wage and price controls, in a
recent discussion of measures for controlling inflation
stated that, "...while appropriately stabilizing fiscal




-2and monetary policies are clearly essential for the
containment of inflation, it seems doubtful that these
policies alone can fully succeed in reconciling price
stability and high employment."

The CED further

stated "...that the United States should include
voluntary wage-price policies among its tools for reconciling
price stability and high employment."2L I find, however,
that in May 1946, near the end of mandatory controls,
the CED issued a statement which represents a different
view. At that time it concluded that "prices cannot be
centrally controlled for any sustained period without
inefficiency, inequity, breakdown of respect for law and,
most important, serious danger to our personal and
political freedoms."—

"The government has a responsibility

tosupplementand supplant price control by anti-inflation
measures which do not restrict the full and free operation
of the American productive system. In the traditional governmental functions of taxation, public expenditure, and
monetary control we can find the necessary tools."4

\l_ Committee for Economic Development, Research and
Policy Committee, Further Weapons Against Inflation,
Measures to Supplement General Fiscal and Monetary
Policies, (New York, November 1970), p. 12.
2/_ Ibid., p. 22.
3/_ Committee for Economic Development, Research Committee,
The End of Price Control - How and When? (New York, May 1946),
p. 4.
4/

Ibid., p. 10.




-3I prefer the Committee's 1946 statement made
while experiencing the impact of direct government controls
on wages and prices. It then recognized that the mandatory
controls interfered with the profit incentive and led to a
breakdown of respect for law. I see no reason why voluntary
controls will engender greater respect for law or governmental
authority than mandatory controls.
It is my view that the general stabilization measures
will work if applied with patience. Neither official admonishments, voluntary controls, nor direct controls are workable;
they are useless as substitutes for and long-run supplements
to less expansive monetary actions. The elimination of
inflation requires great patience; with ideal monetary
policies it takes longer than most of the public realizes.
Direct Controls Not Workable
in United States
Our most extensive experience with "jawboning,"
"moral suasion," and general controls on wages and prices
was during World War II and a short period following the
war. Beginning in early 1941, the forerunner to the
Office of Price Stabilization issued schedules setting
maximum rents and prices on other "critical" items.

5/_ U. S. Office of Price Administration, Chronology of the
Office of Price Administration, January 1941 - November 1946,
prepared by Lawrence E. Tilley under the direction of Harvey
C. Mansfield, Chief, Policy Analysis Branch (Washington, D. C :
Government Printing Office, November 30, 1946).




-4Although these schedules were issued on the basis of dubious
legal authority, this deficiency was remedied in early 1942
following the United States declaration of war. Retail prices of
most items were frozen at the March 1942 level, and
mandatory price controls remained in effect for most items
until October 1946. —

However, as a result of excessive

monetary growth, demand for goods and services grew
rapidly.
During the period of jawboning and dubious price
schedules (January 1941 to March 1942), the stock of
money rose at a 16 per cent annual rate and the consumer
price index at a 12 per cent annual rate. —

While

mandatory controls were in effect (March 1942 to
October 1946), the stock of money rose at an 18 per cent
rate and consumer prices at a 6 per cent rate. Such data,
however, tend to underestimate the real increase in
prices, since they exclude numerous black market
transactions and deterioration of quality.
By the end of the war, most Americans had

6/_ Ibid.
7/_ Money stock data through 1946 from Milton Friedman and
Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United
States 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963), Appendix A, Table A-l; 1947-71 from Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. Consumer price data from U. S.
Department of Labor.




-5become disenchanted with rationing, price controls,
empty grocery shelves, and queuing up for purchases.
After a year of post-war domestic crises, including
numerous strikes and food shortages combined with a
high rate of inflation, direct controls were largely ended.
During the three years following the termination of
controls on most items in October 1946, money rose at
less than a one per cent rate and consumer prices
increased at a 4 per cent rate.
We have noway of knowing how much inflation
would have occurred during World War II had free market
conditions prevailed, nor how stable prices would have
been following the war had controls continued. Generally accepted economic theory does tell us something
about such controls. If prices or wages are arbitrarily
set above equilibrium levels, sales will decline and fewer
workers will be employed. On the other hand, if wages
and prices are set below equilibrium levels, consumers
will want to purchase more goods and services than are
available, and output must be rationed.
... Nor in Western Europe
The foreign experience with direct controls has
been no more favorable than our own. A study for the




-6President's Council of Economic Advisers of the experience with controls in Western Europe following World
War II reports "holders of public office . . . have sought
. . . to avoid the excessive exercise of private power,
not by eliminating the source of such power but by
preventing its full exploitation. This is the essence
0/

of what has come to be known as incomes policy."—
It was concluded that none of the methods used were very
effective, and public disillusionment was reflected in
the decline or abandonment of such controls in most of
these nations by the end of the last decade.
Typical of the experience with direct controls in
Western Europe is that of the Netherlands where these
methods received their most determined and innovative
0/

support. — The Dutch Government passed a labor relations act in 1945 which provided mediators with stringent
powers to control labor markets and wages. With the
Socialists in power the incomes policy in the early postwar period was quite effective, but the honeymoon did
8l_ Lloyd Ulman, University of California, Berkeley, and
Robert J. Flanagan, University of Chicago, "Wage Restraint:
A Study of Incomes Policies in Western Europe" (unpublished
study made possible by grant from Council of Economic Advisers, 1971), p. i.
9/ Ibid., Chapter I.




-7not last long. The guidelines kept all wages below
equilibrium rates as intended. In 1951, with a balance
of trade deficit and a high rate of inflation, real
wages actually fell. Labor shortages developed, and
considerable pressure built up for additional labor resources, especially in the high profit industries. The
willingness of employers to grant wage increases in
excess of the legal limits began to undermine the
guidelines. Black market wages were common, and prosecutions, fines, and even jail sentences followed.
When union leadership agreed to a wage increase
of only 3 per cent in 1955, members began to criticize
their leaders for supporting the guidelines, an unusual
action in the Netherlands. As a result, the wage negotiating agency failed to function, and the government
was forced to grant higher wages through arbitration.

In

1957, with wages rising 8 to 9 per cent per year and a
balance-of-payments crisis developing, the union leadership again accepted a policy of extreme restraint. This
time, however, the leadership could not carry the members
with them. The new policy required that all wage increases
in excess of 3 per cent come out of profits, but it failed
as both wages and prices soared above guideline rates, and
the balance of payments worsened.




-8The Labor government was replaced in 1959 by a more
conservative government which espoused greater freedom
in wage determination. More flexible limits on wage settlements and increased use of collective bargaining were permitted at the industry level. This policy achieved more
government regulation but failed to control wages and prices.
A 1961 law limited wage increases to increases in productivity.
It acknowledged no role for interoccupational wage differences, however, and ran into difficulty a I most immediately.
A new wage policy was adopted in 1963, which
based wages on the Central Planning Bureau's econometric
model. The model was no more competent to establish
wages than the mediators. It implied a wage increase
of 1.2 percent, but this was arbitrarily raised to 2.7
per cent. Pressure for higher wages developed within
the unions, and employers, short of help at the established
scale, openly announced plans to pay more. As a result,
wages and salaries rose 13 per cent in 1963, 15 per cent
in 1964, and II per cent in 1965. No agreements were
reached in 1966 and 1967, and, by the autumn of 1967, all
factions of labor refused to participate in the policy
any longer.
In response to these challenges, the Government
decided in 1969 to introduce more stringent legislation




-9which gave it formal authority to freeze wages after
consultation with the Social and Economic Council and
the Foundation of Labor. The measure, finally passed in
1970, was strongly opposed by the unions, and they withdrew
from the Social and Economic Council and from central
bargaining. The minister in charge was warned that
Parliament had given him nothing but a "paper sword."
Thus the Sixties witnessed the collapse of an
ambitious attempt by the Netherlands Government to supervise a private incomes policy, and the Seventies revealed
the failure of a policy based on compulsion. Yet, the
policy's popularity in principle has thus far proved almost as durable as the problem which it was designed to
solve.
Stable Prices Not Inconsistent with
Current Economic Structure
Despite the failures of direct controls abroad,
the arguments for their use in the United States continue. Such arguments are generally based on the belief
that a large portion of the labor and commodity markets
is comprised of monopolistic elements and is not sensitive to a reduction in demand.

Most analysts admit

that demand for goods and services can be increased by




-10public policies. Nevertheless, some contend that after
periods of excessive demand, the monopolistic elements
in Labor and business can continue to push prices upward
despite less expansive monetary policies.
It is my view that in the absence of excessive
demand average prices cannot be pushed up significantly,
even by monopolistic elements. The price lag relative
to declining demand probably reflects imperfect information in forming price expectations rather than monopolistic
power. Current wage settlements are made on the basis of
recent price trends rather than on conditions prevailing
during the period covered by the agreements.
When the rate of monetary growth is reduced, consumers and business firms find themselves with less money
than anticipated. They reduce their rate of spending
in an attempt to maintain cash balances. Some producers
will find themselves with excessive inventories. They
may first attempt to cut costs by reducing hours worked
or overtime. Then, if the price incentive is not sufficient to maintain current output at current wage rates,
producers will lay off workers until output clears the
market at a profitable price. The workers who are laid
off will eventually find jobs, but probably at lower wage




-IIrates. The total work force and total output is unchanged
when the unemployed find jobs, and average wages and prices
in all sectors must reflect overall demand and supply
conditions. Thus, neither labor unions nor business can
ignore basic economic forces without penalty or have a
major long-run impact on average prices. These monopolistic
elements tend to restrict output and increase prices only
in specific sectors.
Economy Still Subject to Competitive Forces
Even if large unions and business firms could induce price changes, we have no evidence that they have
greater power than during the mid-1950's when the rate
of inflation was slowed to less than 2 per cent per year.
Let me quickly add that I do not condone monopolistic
power either in the hands of unions or of businesses.
It has without doubt caused misallocation of resources
and higher levels of unemployment, but we have no evidence that such power has been an important factor
contributing to the current inflation. For example, in
the early 1950's (1950-1951) we experienced a sharp increase in the rate of inflation (6 per cent per year, GNP
price deflator basis). The stock of money rose at a 5
per cent rate. Nevertheless, the rate of inflation was




-12reduced to 2 per cent by 1955 with a slower rate of money
growth (3 per cent), despite the fact that a larger per
cent of the labor force was unionized than is the case
today. The share of nonagricultural workers in unions
declined from 34 to 28 per cent and the total labor force
in unions from 25 to 23 per cent during the period
1953-68. —

Such data point to the probability that

union power has weakened.
No evidence is available of an increase in monopoly
power in commodity markets since the mid-1950's. The
fifty largest manufacturing firms had 23 per cent of value
added in 1954, 25 per cent in 1963, and 25 per cent in
1966. —

Shipments accounted for by the largest four

firms in each of twenty-two selected industries showed
little change in concentration from 1947 to 1966. The
largest four firms increased their share in half the
industries, and in the other half the share of the largest
four declined. More than offsetting any tendency toward
domestic concentration has been the rising competition
from manufacturing firms abroad.
If additional competition is desired, there are
actions which the government can appropriately take

JO/ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
11/

Ibid.




-13within a free market framework to Improve both labor
and product markets. These actions offer greater opportunity for enhanced well-being than do efforts to directly
control wages and prices. I suggest further relaxation
of tariffs and other import controls. The resulting
increase in worldwide competition would tend to stabilize
prices for all goods and services traded in international
markets. The removal of archaic building codes would aid
the construction industry.
Action should also be taken to completely eliminate
discriminatory restrictions on entry into unions. Relatively higher pay scales for trainees after attaining
moderate skills might be helpful in attracting more labor
into some sectors. Where bottlenecks to entry are retained
through union action, I suggest the application of antitrust legislation. Minimum wage laws which restrict the
employment of students, the unskilled, and the handicapped
should be repealed. An incomes policy that includes only
these actions will not only improve the functioning of the
labor and product markets, but will also enhance output of
goods and services for the entire community.
Excessive Money Growth Cause of Inflation
In contrast to the view that imperfect labor and
commodity markets are an important cause of inflation is




-14my belief that an excessive rate of monetary growth is
the chief culprit. All substantial and prolonged general
price increases throughout history have been associated
with a rapid increase in the stock of money.

Following

successive debasements, the precious metal content of
the Roman coin had been reduced until it was almost
worthless in the early 300's. Prices had increased
four to eight times their former level. Through price
and wage edicts, an incomes policy was established
which quickly failed because people began to make most
payments, including taxes, with commodities or other
12/
nonmoney assets. —
A similar debasement followed by a rapid rise
in prices occurred in England under Henry VIII in the
early 1500's.

Landowners who had long-term crop-share

leases maintained their living conditions of prior years.
Many, however, had long-term fixed payment leases, and
their real rental returns were reduced while their
tenants received a windfall.

12/ Paul-Louis, Ancient Rome at Work, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1927), pp.313-315.
13/ William Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry and
Commerce During the Early and Middle Ages, 5th ed. (Cambridge:
At the University Press, 1910-27), p. 543.




-15A hyper-inflation in Germany following World War
I can be traced to monetary growth. From July 1922 to
June 1923, the quantity of money rose 86-fold and the
cost of living (food) rose 137-fold. By June 1923, German
money was worth less than one per cent its value a year
,.
14/
earlier.—
Our experience with excessive money growth and inflation has been consistent with the experience elsewhere.
Many of you are doubtless familiar with the excessive money
creation and the consequent inflation in the Confederate
States during the Civil War. By January 1864 the stock
of currency in circulation had increased about elevenfold
and prices had increased faster as a result of declining
15/
output of goods and services. —
One contemporary reporter
observed, "before the war I went to market with the money
in my pocket and brought back my purchases in a basket;
now I take the money in the basket and bring the things
home in my pocket."-^-

14/ Constantino Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation;
A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany 1914-1923,
trans. MillicentE. Sayers (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1937),
p. 35.
15/ Margaret G. Myers, A Financial History of the United States
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 169.
16/ Harold Underwood Faulkner, American Economic History, 7th
ed. (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 357.




-16Our more recent inflations, although on a much
smaller scale than these hyper-inflations, can be traced
to the same causal forces. For example, from 1915 to
1920 the stock of money rose at the annual rate of 14 per
cent and wholesale prices 17 per cent. —

From 1938 to

1948 the stock of money rose at a 14 per cent rate and
wholesale prices at a 7 per cent rate, despite the sharp
increase of resource utilization during the period. In
the recent inflation from 1965 to 1970 the stock of money
grew at a 5 per cent rate, wholesale prices at a 3 per
cent rate, and the general price index at a 4 per cent
rate. The leveling off or a prolonged decline in the
stock of money likewise is associated with a leveling
off or decline in prices. For example, in 1920 and early
1921, both the stock of money and prices declined, a pattern which
was repeated in the period 1929-33. The decline in the
stock of money in this latter period was sufficiently
18/

prolonged and intense to cause a major depression. —
Slower Money Growth the Solution
The solution to inflation, as well as to other problems, is the elimination of its cause. Actions were taken

17/ Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History; Board of
Governors; Department of Labor.
18/

Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, Chart 62.




-17in early 1969 to slow the rate of money growth. The
stock of money rose only about 3 per cent during the
year, down from an 8 per cent rate in the previous two
years. In response to slower money growth, spending
on goods and services began to moderate late in the year.
Such spending rose at a 4 per cent annual rate from
the third quarter of 1969 to the end of 1970, following
an 8 per cent rate of advance in the previous five
quarters. Consistent with past experience, however,
the momentum of the inflation continued following
the reduced rate of spending growth.
By mid-1970 the rate of inflation began to
decline. Since last June consumer prices have risen
at the annual rate of 4 per cent, compared with a 6
per cent rate in the previous year. While the rate of
inflation was slowing, the nation was paying for the
previous excesses. Unemployment was rising, and real
product was down. The immediate impact of a change in
monetary growth was on spending and output, but there
was a lagged effect on prices.
Early last year monetary policies were relaxed in
consequence of the decline in output and higher unemployment. During the year the stock of money rose 5 per cent,




-18but the recovery of spending and production may have been
delayed a few months by the automobile strike last fall.
Early this year the growth rate of money again accelerated.
In the last three months it rose at a 13 per cent annual
rate ~ the highest rate of any three-month period since
1950. Recovery is now underway. Retail sales have risen
markedly, housing starts have increased, and industrial
production is up. Again an early impact of monetary growth
on economic activity is observed, while prices are affected
only in the longer run.
Expectations Have Exceeded Possibilities
The relatively long lag between monetary actions
and their impact on prices has probably been the major
disappointment with the progress made in slowing the rate
of inflation to date. Most people fail to recognize
the length of time required for monetary actions to have
a significant impact on average prices. Monetary restraint
first induces a slower rate of growth in cash balances
relative to money demand. Individuals and firms reduce
their rate of spending in an attempt to build up cash
balances to desired levels. This reduction in spending
growth reduces nominal GNP growth and the growth rate of
overall demand for goods and services. Expectations
based on past trends in prices and wages, however, continue to provide inflationary momentum until offset by




-19basic supply and demand conditions. The lag between
appropriate monetary actions and the achievement of relatively stable prices may thus be expected to extend over
a period of three or four years, following a prolonged
and relatively high rate of monetary expansion as in 1967
and 1968.
The slowdown is aggravated by imperfect functioning of labor markets as reflected by a relatively high
unemployment rate. In addition to higher unemployment
in the civilian sector, unemployment has been aggravated
by a sharp decrease in some types of defense expenditures.
Aircraft manufacturers on the West Coast have made sharp
cutbacks.
In some occupations unemployment was further
increased by the sufficiently strong bargaining power of
unions. Excessive wage rate settlements relative to supply
and demand conditions tend to reduce the number employed.
It takes time for the laid-off workers and the new
entrants into the labor market to find jobs. Time is also
required for business firms to adjust to a change in demand.
During this adjustment period the nation's resources are
underutilized, and production of goods and services are well
below potential levels. This is the price we pay for reducing inflation. It is a cost which we must accept, and it




-20cannot be legislated into nonexistence through the provision
for nonworkable controls on our economic system.
CONCLUSION
In summation, direct controls on wages and prices
have been tried both here and abroad and found unworkable.
They may suppress the rate of inflation for a short period
under favorable situations, but the inflationary pressures
soon build up, and the controls are usually abandoned.
Furthermore, all attempts to control inflation by such
methods have led to a reduction in economic efficiency and
a breakdown of respect for the law.
The argument that inflation can no longer be moderated by monetary actions is not valid. Monopolistic elements
in the labor and commodity markets were probably stronger
in the early 1950's, when a similar inflation was slowed.
Excessive money growth is the cause of inflation
and a slower rate of money growth is the solution to the
problem. Money has an early impact on spending and production, but a longer period is required to slow an inflation. The length of this period has been misjudged by
many people who have concluded on the basis of recent experience that monetary actions are ineffective. If we
exercise the patience to wait for the economy to adjust to
a slower rate of demand growth and maintain appropriate




-21monetary policies, I am sure that we can again stabilize
prices at a relatively low rate of unemployment.
Stabilization can be attained at higher levels of
employment and output if we adopt policies to eliminate
sharp changes in the rate of monetary growth and reduce
barriers to a more rapid adjustment to market forces. The
stop-and-go method of monetary actions in recent years
tends to reduce both output and employment.
Expectations of future price trends must be changed
before reduced demand growth can have a major impact on
prices. This changed outlook, first evident about mid-1970
has caused the momentum of the current inflation to
slacken. I am vitally concerned, however, about the
rapid rate of money growth in recent months. There is
great danger of rekindling the flames of inflation.
Furthermore, if we attempt to halt the inflation
through direct controls, I fear that we will not exercise
the necessary monetary restraint and will lose much of
the gain achieved from the slower rate of money growth
in 1969. In addition, such controls will mean further
losses of freedom for individual action which has through
the years provided us the world's most efficient economy.