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THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY- - IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE
Speech by

Darryl R. Francis, President
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Before
The Fifth Annual Governor's Conference on Agriculture
Ramada Inn, Jefferson City, Missouri
Monday morning, November 22, 1971




It is good to have this opportunity to discuss
with you some implications of the President's new

economic program with respect to agriculture.

I am

particularly interested in this topic since the program
has elicited high-pitched discussion and even more
important it could have a serious impact on the volume

of agricultural trade in world markets.

Major features of the program are:
1.

A tax credit on investment.

2.

Repeal of the 7 per cent excise tax
on automobiles.

3.

A speedup of the scheduled personal
income tax exemptions.

4.

A $4.7 billion reduction in Federal
spending and a 5 per cent cut in the
number of government employees.

5.

A 10 per cent cut in foreign economic
aid.

-2 6.

A 90-day freeze on wages and prices
followed by a mechanism for achieving
wage and price stability.

7.

Suspension of the convertibility of
foreign held dollars into gold.

8.

An additional 10 per cent tax on goods
imported into this nation. 1/

Most of this discussion will be limited to the

foreign trade features of the program and specifically
to the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar and

the higher tax on imports. This is done for several

reasons. First, farm products are excluded from the
direct controls on wages and prices. Second, the Phase 11
announcements leave numerous questions unanswered as

to how the proposed wage and price controls will be

implemented. Third, the other proposals will likely have
only marginal impacts on agriculture.
Foreign Trade Profitable

Although international trade represents only

about five per cent of the nation's Gross National Product,
it has a much greater impact on agriculture. Farm
commodity exports totaled almost $8 billion in the last fiscal

year and accounted for more than fifteen per cent of total

1/



"Address by the President," August 15, 1971

-3farm product sales. Exports are thus a vital factor in
determining total demand for farm products and total farm

income.
Farm products cannot be sold abroad indefinitely,

however, unless we are willing to purchase something
in return.

International trade must be a two-way

exchange. A refusal to permit imports will soon cause

depletion of the means-of-payment for our products. We
could decide that accepting imports is too high a price
to pay for the opportunity of selling products abroad.
This nation can produce virtually any commodity or service

that it consumes; thus we could abstain from international
trade altogether. This highly protective route is, of

course, the least desirable alternative because inter­
national trade is profitable.
Gains Accrue to Both Exporting and
Importing Nations

International transactions provide the same

opportunity for gain as domestic transactions. We do
not question the gains resulting from domestic speciali­

zation of productive resources and the exchange of the
resulting output. When a dairy farmer sells milk to an
automobile worker and in turn purchases an automobile,




-4-

the welfare of both dairy farmer and automobile worker
are increased. The value of the output is greater than

if each tried to produce both dairy products and auto­

mobiles. Similarly, the value of total output of goods

and services in the State of Wisconsin and the City of
Detroit is greater as a result of the exchange of milk
from Wisconsin for automobiles manufactured in Detroit.
Just because Wisconsin happens to be in the United States

rather than in Canada has no influence on the gains.
Well-being would have been enhanced an equal amount if

Wisconsin were in Canada.

International trade is thus

profitable to both farmer and other producers of products
for export and to consumers of foreign produced goods

and services. Exporters and consumers in other nations
receive similar benefits.

Since ail trade is profitable to both parties,
any hinderance to trade through taxes, quotas, or other
restrictions reduces welfare.

Both dairy farmers and

automobile workers would have fewer goods and services if

the exchange of dairy products for automobiles was arti­

ficially reduced through restrictions. Similarly, any
interference with international trade leaves each trading

nation with fewer goods and services.




-5 Some contend that protective trade barriers are

necessary for the U. S. to maintain a high level of

employment, high wages, and a high standard of living.
I contend that trade restrictions are neither conducive
to high real wages nor to a high living standard. They

aid producers in the protected industries by shielding
them from competition from more efficient producers
abroad.
Nations following restrictive trade practices

retain productive resources in less efficient lines of
output thereby reducing the total volume of goods and

services available to consumers. Let's view the problem
in terms of protection carried to its extreme. All foreign
competition for each actual and potential domestic

industry would be eliminated and international trade

would soon come to a halt. Each nation would be selfsufficient but, like our dairy farmer and automobile

worker, self-sufficiency involves each nation trying to
produce everything.

It will result in less total output

of goods and services. With less product, wages in

terms of purchasing power for goods and services will
decline. Thus in contrast to contentions of the pro­

tectionists that trade barriers which limit competition

are beneficial they actually reduce real wages and well-being.



-6 -

The number of jobs in the protected industries
will increase but the gain will be offset by a decline

in jobs elsewhere. The total number of jobs in the nation
over the longer run is limited only by the number of people

who want to work at the market wage rate and the legal or
other restrictions on employment. Farmers have always

known that those who wanted to work and could not find an

acceptable job with another person or firm became self-

employed producers of valuable goods and services.

Unem­

ployment is a short run phenomenon during which produc­

tive workers are searching for the market price of their
labor and is not affected by free trade in the longer run.

Since international trade enhances well-being
it is important that a means of payment be maintained
which will be conducive to such trade. Like all other

valuable goods, imports must be paid for, and exports are
the ultimate means of payment.

But, since item by item

matching of imports and exports is extremely inefficient,

we avoid it by using the international payments mechanism,

just as we avoid the matching of goods and services in
domestic transactions with the use of money.

Instead of

one currency, many are used in foreign transactions, and

the determination of their relative value - the exchange




-7-

rate - is one of the major results of the workings of an
international payments system.

The International Payments System
The international payments mechanism, as estab­
lished by the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, provided
that countries can fix their exchange rates either in terms
of gold or in terms of the dollar. As it turned out, the

United States established the price of the dollar at $35
per ounce in terms of gold, and most other countries estab
lished the prices of their currencies in terms of the dollar.

Exchange rates were required to be maintained by foreign
central bank intervention. The central banks were re­

quired to buy dollars when the price of the dollar showed
a tendency to fall in terms of their currencies and sell

dollars when the price of the dollar tended to rise.

Until the latter half of the 1960's the United
States experienced a significantly lower rate of inflation

and a lower amplitude of cyclical fluctuations than did

other major foreign economies. Therefore, the dollar was
the most stable of all major currencies.

It was extensively

used as an international means of payment despite some
overall balance of payments deficits. A large resulting

deficit-induced dollar balance was thus held willingly and
provided a service as internat ional money.



-8-

During the late sixties, however, the U. S. balance
on goods and services began to decline and capital
outflows accelerated. At the same time, our overly expan­

sive monetary and fiscal policies resulted in large decreases
in the purchasing power of the dollar, both domestically

and internationally. Thus, in world trade we had an increas
ing rate of dollars being supplied and a reduced demand for

them.
As private individuals abroad stopped accumulating
dollars the international price of the dollar could remain

fixed only through massive accumulations by central banks.

Foreign central banks soon found their dollar reserves
excessive and began converting them into gold.

By

September of this year our gold supply has dwindled to
$10 billion, and we were reluctant to permit its con­

tinued depletion.

With these pressures increasing, and with no
hope for redress, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium

announced that they would no longer purchase additional

dollars, thus floating their currencies and permitting

them to appreciate.

Meanwhile, Switzerland and Austria

undertook outright revaluation by announcing that their
central banks would continue to purchase dollars but
only at a lower price. The U. S., faced with the impossi­

bility of maintaining the fixed dollar to gold ratio,



-9-

suspended convertibility.

Fixed Exchange Rates Unworkable

In view of the failure of the fixed exchange

rate system the question of selecting an alternative
payments mechanism arises. To demonstrate the problem,

let's assume that I buy a Japanese radio and send a

check for $30 to the Japanese exporter, who deposits the
check in his bank.

On the dollar exchange standard which existed
until recently, the price of a dollar is fixed in terms
of gold, and the price of Japanese currency is fixed in
terms of the dollar.

In order for the exchange rate to

remain constant, the supply of dollars must be matched by
an equivalent quantity demanded or the central bank of

Japan is committed to purchase the thirty dollars at the
fixed exchange rate, thus increasing their foreign re­

serves.

If the fixed rates are not consistent with market

values of the two currencies, such reserves could build
up as long a s foreign central banks are willing to hold

our liabilities.

The fact that our purchases abroad have in recent
years exceeded foreign purchases in the U. S. is

evidence that the exchange rate has not reflected the




- 10 market value of the dollar in the foreign exchange market.

The imbalance simply means that the U. S. has been pur­
chasing more goods, services, and capital assets abroad

than foreigners have been purchasing from the U. S. The
difference has been settled through gold shipments and
rising foreign liquid claims on the U. S. Thus the real

value of these purchases from abroad was greater than

the dollar expenditures by those making the purchase.

The goods and services were thus obtained at subsidized
prices with the subsidies provided in the form of U. S.

Government gold shipments and excessive foreign central

bank dollar holdings.

The value of the dollar in terms of other cur­
rencies could be made consistent with the fixed exchange
rate. This would involve a contraction of money income

and prices in the U. S. relative to money incomes and prices
abroad when our purchases abroad became excessive. To date

we in the United States have not indicated a willingness
to pay such a price for a viable fixed rate system because

attempts to reduce money income and the rate of inflation

is followed by substantial unemployment. As a consequence
the adjustment mechanism for the fixed rate is not per­

mitted to work and both farm and nonfarm exports have suffered.




- II Flexible Rates Workable

Most of our foreign exchange problems of recent

years could be avoided by the provision for greater flexi­

bility in the exchange rates. A flexible exchange standard
implies that the price of the dollar will be determined by

market forces without official intervention.

In the example

of my purchase of the Japanese radio, the Japanese bank would

offer my $30 on the foreign exchange market.

If there are

buyers of U. S. goods and services at existing prices, the $30

will be purchased by them, and the exchange rate will not
change.

But if Japanese importers view U. S. prices as being

too high, they will offer less Japanese currency for my $30
check, and the transaction will be consummated only at a

lower price of the dollar in terms of Japanese money. Thus

my import is still paid by an export, but only when accom­
panied by a change in the exchange rate.

The flexible exchange rate would permit the
necessary currency adjustments and establish a balance
between imports and exports. An excess of imports by the

United States will cause a decline in the price of the

dollar in terms of foreign currencies. This would make
foreign goods more expensive to us and our commodities

cheaper to foreigners. This change in relative prices
would discourage imports and encourage exports.
A flexible rate does not require major central



bank or government actions in the foreign exchange market.

- 12 With the fixed exchange rate system such actions have been
taken in attempting to mitigate the adjustments necessary
to correct a disequilibrium in international trade. Such

actions have resulted in persistent and fundamental trade
deficits and surpluses. These imbalances have in turn

produced crises requiring periodic adjustments in the ex­
change rate, direct controls, and other arbitrary impedi­

ments to international trade.
A flexible exchange rate does not imply domestic

fluctuations in income and employment.

It is self-adjusting

and reacts quickly to imbalances, thus providing for smoother

trade patterns.

It is therefore more likely to be permitted

to function without excessive interference.
Virtually all national governments are committed

to the achievement of stable conditions in their domestic
economies. For example, it is difficult to imagine that,

given an import balance, the United States would be willing
to permit a contraction of domestic production and higher
unemployment.

It is just as difficult to visualize Japan

deliberately submitting to inflation because their exports

have exceeded their imports.

In the choice of an exchange

rate system, it seems to me, the crux of the matter is not
the ability of a system to make necessary adjustments. They
all can be made to correct imbalances provided we are will­



- 13
ing to pay the price in terms of domestic employment and
income.

Given, however, the demonstrated political

necessity of maintaining full production and employment,
it is a matter of selecting a system which will be permitted

to remain viable and correct imbalances. Flexibility in

the exchange rates will meet this requirement, which is
not met by fixed rates.

Impact on Total Foreign Trade

With this background of recent economic actions
and some alternative possibilities available for an inter­

national payments mechanism, let's take a look at the

probable impact of these actions on total volume of foreign
trade.

The additional tax on imported goods will likely
have little impact on total exports in the near future.

It

will, however, tend to reduce imports, and it could trigger
retaliatory measures if maintained for an extended period.

Furthermore, as indicated earlier, any reduction of trade
in one direction will cause imbalances and ultimately a re­

duction of trade in the opposite direction.

I am thus hopeful

that conditions will permit the early removal of this tempor­
ary restriction.

The suspension of the convertibiiity of the dollar
into gold has already led to a substantial readjustment of




- 14exchange rates. For example, the Canadian dollar has in­

creased 7.8 per cent relat ive to our own. Other currencies
with important gains relative to our own are the German

mark, up 9.7 per cent; the Netherlands guildor, up 8.1 per

cent; the Belgium franc, up 7.3 per cent; and the Japanese
yen, up 9.4 per cent.
A rise in the value of these currencies rela­

tive to the dollar means that importers in these countries
can purchase U. S. products at a lower price in terms of

their currencies. This should stimulate U. S. exports.
How long this additional export stimulus will continue de­
pends on the exchange rates required to avoid imbalances

in trade between the U. S. and the rest of the world.
If floating or relatively flexible rates are
maintained indefinitely, it is my belief that they will
contribute to a moderately rising volume of international

trade. One reason for this view is that such a payments
mechanism is not as likely to induce governments to inter­
fere with the profitable exchange of goods and services
between nations. No nation in the absence of gold shipments
can expect to increase its holdings of precious metals or

lose them to other nations. Thus there will be less rea­
son for restricting imports to avoid gold losses. Neither




- 15
will it be necessary for governments to worry about their

holdings of other types of foreign exchange if exchange
rates are permitted to float freely. Any nation's ex­
change rates will be determined by the value of its pro­

ducts in the export market. Without such worries there is

little reason for government interference with the payments
mechanism or with normal trade patterns.
Flexible exchange rates are also likely to in­

volve less risk to exporters and importers over an extended

period than fixed rates, thereby contributing to a rising
volume of trade. There is little doubt, however, that daily

fluctuating in flexible rates induce marginally greater daily

risks and somewhat greater costs of international currency
convertibility. This is supported by the sparse historical

evidence and by the recent behavior of the forward rate.
The forward rate, which, among other things, reflects the
insurance premium for delivery of some currency at a speci­

fied price at some future date, has increased.

Interestingly

enough, however, the increases are minimal where the float

is "clean" and large where central bank intervention is
either present or anticipated. This seems to indicate that

actual flexibility is a small contributor to increased costs,
while intervention or anticipated revaluations under a fixed




- 16-

rate are the real culprit.
Most of our domestic commodity, stock, and money
markets have hourly fluctuations, and the premium associated
with frequent changes does not appear to be prohibitive nor

does it impair the efficiency of these markets.

Here too,

large fluctuations in forward prices occur when there are

anticipations of some natural disaster, a strike or some

institutional interference, events not unlike anticipated
changes in the exchange rate.

The question that should be asked is not whether
costs of converting one currency to another is higher under

a flexible exchange rate as compared with the fixed rate,

but whether the total costs of periodic actual or anticipated
revaluations are higher. Since 1944, out

of 92 countries which have established parities under the
International Monetary Fund, forty-five have changed par

values seventy-four times. Several of these changes were

accompanied by serious international economic disturb­
ances, and most of them by domestic resource reallocations.
Every sudden change in the official exchange rate causes

a movement of resources between export and import competing

industries, and each movement implies some structural

unemployment.




These greater risks from anticipated and actual

- 17revaluations thus probably inhibit more trade than the day-to-day
fluctuations in floating rates. Furthermore, the
day-to-day type of risks are taken by businessmen regularly

in domestic price movements. They know that such risks are
likely to be offset by price movements in the opposite direc­

tion tomorrow. On the other hand, businessmen are not adept

at planning for arbitrary revaluations of exchange rates.
Thus, with the greater freedom of market forces under the
floating or flexible system, it is my view that businessmen
will feel safer in making long range investment plans for

exports and imports and that trade between nations will rise.

Impact on Agriculture

How do these prospects for increased foreign trade

affect our agricultural industries? Agriculture is one of

our more efficient industries, and given improved trading

conditions both here and abroad, farm exports should rise
markedly.

Nevertheless, the picture is not as bright as a
cursory view would indicate. Most nations that can pay for
our farm products have programs designed to protect their

farm commodity markets and to increase their farm incomes.

Their programs maintain an excess of national resources in

agriculture. They will therefore likely permit only limited




- 18-

amounts of our farm products to enter their markets. Any
gains in our farm exports resulting from the President's new

policies are thus likely to cause increased resistance abroad
to imports of American farm products.

Furthermore, we are not in a strong position to
bargain with foreign governments with respect to this pro­

tectionist problem.

Our country has not been innocent in

the use of these protective devices. Even in agriculture,
which has such a large stake in free trade, we have estab­
lished highly protectionist policies. We have sugar import

quotas which, based on the New York wholesale price, cost

U. S. consumers an additional 22 cents for each five pounds
of sugar purchased. —

We have subscribed to international

trade agreements which set minimum prices on coffee and

wheat, thereby limiting trade in these commodities. We

have meat import quotas which provide limits on imports of

beef. Our cotton export subsidy, designed to offset the
trade-retarding features of our domestic price support

program, is sufficient to permit exports of cotton to Japan
and imports of goods made from the cotton to the U. S. for

sale in competition with our own mills.

In order to avoid

\J_ International Monetary Funds, International Financial
Statistics, Sept. 1970, p. 29.




- 19-

excessive disruptions from such competition, however, we
have a tacit agreement with the Japanese to limit cotton

goods exports to the U. S. Such tacit arrangements are

apparently preferred to formalized legal act ions, but if
they are equally effective in reducing trade, they are

likewise equally effective in reducing welfare.

A recent study by the University of Illinois
found that Illinois farmers favor foreign trade but prefer

to restrict beef and ham imports, their major farm product.
This view demonstrates the fact that our farm sector has

not thought out a consistent free trade policy.

Despite

its great stake in free trade, agricultural interests are

confused and offer no rational program for reducing re­
strictive practices and freeing world markets.

However, despite our inconsistent policies, it is
my conclusion that the current floating exchange rate will

provide some short run stimulus to farm exports, and if greater
flexibility of the rates are a permanent feature of our pay­
ments mechanism, foreign trade could rise substantially.

If

this occurs we could have a larger volume of farm exports
indefinitely.

2I_ Harold D. Guither, "Illinois Farmers View Current Policy
Issues," Illinois Agricultural Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2 and
Vol. II, No. I, July 1970 - Jan. 1971, p. 23.



-20-

SUMMARY
In summation, I am hopeful that the objectives

which prompted the higher tax on imports will soon be achieved

and that this restriction will soon be removed.

Its removal

could again place this nation back in the forefront of the

major commercial nations for free trade policies.
I view the break with the unworkable fixed ex­
change mechanism as a move toward reducing international

trade restrictions.

It should remove us another step from

the discredited mercantilistic trade policies of three or

four centuries ago where each nation thought that its wel­
fare depended on an excess of commodity exports. With
greater flexibility in the payments mechanism there will

be less reason for destabi lizing government actions in an
attempt to stimulate exports or reduce imports.

Given free reign to sell throughout the world
at free market prices our own businessmen, as well as

businessmen in other nations, will make long range plans
for greater exports and imports. They can understand and

cope with day-to-day exchange rate fluctuations. Major

exchange rate revaluations by governments, however, can be
disastrous.

It is the possibility of major revaluations

and the restrictions on trade in an attempt to avoid them
that tend to reduce exports and imports.



-21 If a larger volume of foreign trade develops,
an anticipated, some increase in farm exports should occur.
But, despite the great potential for farm exports, agri­

cultural interests in this nation have no consistent free
trade policy or program. We are in a weak bargaining
position relative to the removal of foreign trade barriers
since like our foreign trading partners, we also have

highly restrictive policies. Thus, the U, S. and foreign
farm protectionist policies will likely continue and pre­

vent major gains in farm exports despite the improvement

in the international payments mechanism.