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SOME LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE PRESENT INFLATION
A Speech by Darryl R. Francis,
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
to the
University of Miami
Commercial Bank Forum
Doral Country Club
Miami, Florida
September 24, 1970

It is good to have this opportunity to discuss with you some
of my views regarding the inflation which has plagued our economy
for the past five or six years. It seems important to me that all of us
understand current economic stabilization problems and the efforts
of our public officials to handle them.
If our economy is ever to contain inflation, we must have
leaders who are aware of the causes of inflation, of its costs to our
society, and of the difficulties inherent in reducing inflation once
it is allowed to run rampant.
Since late 1964 prices have been rising with increasing rapidity, with effective attempts to control this situation
only in the last two years. Now that we have undergone for
several years our worst inflation since World War II,. it is




-2appropriate to reflect on this experience and to draw some conclusions.
If the obvious lessons of the last six years are remembered in the
future, the likelihood of repeating unnecessary mistakes should be
reduced considerably. Only by avoiding such mistakes can our economy
experience economic growth at a high level of employment with a
reasonably stable price level. These, of course, are widely accepted
national economic goals.
Before going to the main part of my remarks, let me review
the course of the present inflation and steps we have taken to curb it.
Our economy had a oeriod of substantial price stability from 1958 to
1964. During this period the wholesale orice index was virtually
unchanged, the consumer price index rose about one per cent a year,
and the GNP price deflator rose at only a slightly faster rate than
consumer prices. Those six years of relatively stable prices marked
the end of the inflation generated during World War II and the Korean
War. By 1964 we had achieved a high level of resource utilization
and prospects were good for continuing price stability. Our economy
was moving into a period when it could be said that the goals of
economic stabilization had become essentially achieved.
But, then, from 1964 to just recently, an era of ever more
rapidly increasing prices developed. This inflation was caused by
growth of total spending for goods and services at an eight per cent




-3annual rate from 1964 to 1968, or about twice as rapid as our economy's
ability to increase the production of goods and services. This excessive
expansion in total spending was fostered by very stimulative monetary
actions of the Federal Reserve System, supported by the Administration,
the Congress, and public opinion. The nation's money stock, except
for a brief interlude in 1966, rose at rates which approximated those
prevailing during the World War II and the Korean War inflations.
One of the main reasons for such extremely high rates of
monetary growthappearsto have been a decision toexpandwelfare
programs and the Vietnam War simultaneously and to finance these
increases, in large part, by inflating the monetary system rather than
exclusively by taxes or borrowing from the planned saving of the public.
These latter two sources of Government finance are basically noninflationary, because most of an increase in Government expenditures
is then made at the expense of private expenditures. On the other hand,
when increased Government expenditures are accompanied by excessive
monetary expansion, there is little, if any, direct reduction in private
spending. In fact, there are strong secondary repercussions from
such a method of Government finance which greatly enlarge spending
by business firms and consumers.
Significant actions to curb inflation, either fiscal or monetary,
were delayed well into 1968, despite acknowledgment of the existence of
a serious inflation and often expressed desires to do something about it.




-4Then, in mid-1968 a program of reducing the rate of increase in
Government spending and increasing taxes was adopted with a view
to bringing the excessive rate of growth in total spending more into
line with growth in potential output of goods and services. However,
it was not until the rate of growth in the money stock was reduced
markedly in 1959 that the stage was set to bring total spending more
in line with growth in our economy's productive potential.
Curbing such a long inflation has proven, once again,
to be both slow and costly. Only in recent months has there
been any evidence of a slowing in the rate of price increase, and the
period is still too short to conclude definitely that there has been a
marked waning of inflation. I am confident, though, that if monetary
growth is limited to a moderate rate for the next several months, there
will be significant, but slow, abatement of inflation. On the cost side
of setting the stage for reducing inflation there has been a slowdown
in output of goods and servicesaccompaniedby a rise in unemployment.
It should be pointed out, however, that the present slowdown has been
much less than during any of the other such slowdowns of the
past twenty-five years.
I turn now to the main theme of this discussion — some
lessons to be learned from the present inflation. In developing these
lessons, I will point up some of the failures of commonly accepted




-5economic ideas regarding economic stabilization which have been
instrumental in permitting our present inflation to develop. By the
commonly accepted economic ideas, I mean the very simple form of
analysis taught in the majority of undergraduate economic courses
for the past twenty-five years. Although most economists have now
advanced beyond this rather limited analysis, it still permeates the
thinking of the general public, many business and financial leaders,
news writers, politicians, and public policymakers.
One lesson, and I believe the most important, is
that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, whereas the
conventional view has placed great stress on Government deficits,
union power, and business monopolies as causes of inflation. There
is now considerable evidence from studies at our Bank and by others
that the excessive total spending which led to a high and accelerating
rate of price advance was generated, for the most part, during 1964 to
1963 by the exceedingly high rate of monetary expansion of that period.
As I pointed out earlier, rapid growth in Government spending
and deficits is not a major source of inflation unless accomodated by
growth in the money stock. Likewise, upward pressures on prices
from union or business monopoly actions are not likely to initiate a
period of inflation unless accompanied by rapidly rising total spending.
Such a rise in total spending requires expansive actions on the part




-6of monetary authorities. Thus, the price level effect of often mentioned
fiscal and monopoly causes of inflation can be contained if they are not
validated by monetary actions which generate a rapid growth in total spending.
Another lesson to be learned from our recent inflation is that
the popular economic analysis of the past quarter century has been illequipped to correct inflation. A major aspect of this conventional
analysis, as I mentioned earlier, is that the general price level is
believed to be only remotely influenced by monetary actions. Instead,
in addition to fiscal actions, considerable emphasis is given to controlling undesired price level movements by measures to reduce monopoly
power or by exertion of Government pressure, such as guide lines, to
induce those who set prices to act in a manner consistent with national
objectives. This view which was developed, in large part, from the
experience of the Great Depression of the 1930's is still prevalent in
the economic theory which underlies much of popular thought regarding economic stabilization. 8y being developed within such a depression
orientation, this body of theory is not particularly useful, in my
opinion, in developing programs to cope with an inflationary situation
such as we have experienced since 1964. Also, reliance on such devices
as the wage-price guide lines during the 1960's became a substitute for sound
stabilization policy, and thereby, contributed to the emergence of inflation.
A further lesson from our experience of recent years is
that monetary actions rather than fiscal actions should be given the
major role for stabilizing the economy. Until recently, fiscal actions



-7in the form of Government spending and taxing orograms have been
given the main emphasis in economic stabilization efforts to the
virtual exclusion of monetary actions. Such adevelopmentwas an
outgrowth of conventional economics which for the oast thirty-five
years has taught that Federal Reserve actions exercise little influence
on total demand for goods and services. According to this conventional
thought, changes in the money stock bring about changes in market
interest rates, while total demand is little influenced by interest rate
movements. Consequently, monetary actions have been thought to be
of little use in any program of economic stabilization. On the other
hand, increased Government expenditures are viewed as adding directly
to total demand and tax reductions are thought to add to disposable
income which subsequently is used to purchase goods and services.
Consequently, this view has argued that fiscal actions have an immediate
and powerful influence on total spending.
This conventional analysis, possibly because of its simplicity
which helps in the teaching of undergraduate economics, has received
wide acceptance as evidenced in discussions of economic stabilization
by the general public, in the press, in the Congress, and even in some
of the Reports of the Council of Economic Advisers during the mid-1959's.
It should bepointedout that this view of the influence of fiscal actions
does not take into consideration the importance of choice among the




-8three alternative means of financing Government expenditures —
taxes, borrowing from the public, and monetary expansion.
At the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank we have reported
several studies regarding the relative importance of monetary and
fiscal actions for economic stabilization. Our empirical studies for
the United States economy from 1919 to 1959 and for several foreign
countries in the post-World War II period support the view that monetary actions, measured by changes in the money stock, should receive
the main emphasis in economic stabilization, not fiscal actions.
The accelerating inflation of the last half of the 1960's can
be attributed, in large part, to the great emphasis given to fiscal
actions and the downgrading of monetary influence. Monetary
authorities did not reduce the rapid rate of monetary expansion during
a large part of that period because there was a desire to let fiscal
actions curb inflation and a belief by some that only fiscal actions
would be effective. Then, when restrictive fiscal actions were taken
in mid-1953 — the surtax and slower increases in Government spending —
many economists, on the basis of prevalent theories, predicted "fiscal overkill" by early 1969. In response to such predictions, monetary authorities
engaged in even more expansionary actions in the last half of 1969. Continuation of accelerating inflation after fiscal actions had been expected to
provide a quick cooling of the inflationary fires should burn firmly into our




-9memories the lesson that monetary actions are more effective than
fiscal actions in promoting economic stability.
But I do not want there to be any misunderstanding regarding
our view concerning fiscal actions. Some have interpreted us as
saying that Government spending and taxing have no influence on
the course of the economy, but this is not the case. Our research
indicates that accelerations and decelerations in the rate of increase
in Government spending, even if there is no accommodating change
in money, cause corresponding short-run changes in total spending.
Also, financing of large Government deficits have in the past caused
the Federal Reserve to expand the money stock at excessive rates.
This is one reason for rapid monetary growth in 1967 and 1953.
Finally, Government spending and taxing programs, insofar as they
affect the amount of resources allocated to private investment and
to Government outlays of a similar nature, may have a significant
influence on long-run economic growth.
An additional lesson we have learned from our present inflation
is that the usual method of carrying out monetary policy in the 1950's
and 1960's was faulty. Although stated monetary policy was to control
inflation, the method used for implementing this policy actually
contributed to the inflation rather than to its control.
Discretionary monetary policy was reinstated in 1951, after
its suspension during World War II and up through the early part of




-10the Korean War. The purpose of the 1951 change was to permit
monetary authorities to fight the inflation of the Korean War. In
conducting its monetary policy responsibilities since then, the
Federal Open Market Committee until very recently has relied largely
on measures of money market conditions as guides to its operations.
I am sure that most of you are familiar with the view that falling
interest rates or rising free reserves indicate easy monetary actions,
while tight actions are indicated by rising interest rates or falling
free reserves.
Such a view was in general agreement with the widely held
belief that monetary actions work primarily through changes in market
interest rates. It also was in agreement with the view that the Federal
Reserve has great ability to "set" market interest rates. Recent research
and experience, however, have tended to reject these propositions.
For example, rapid monetary expansion, such as in 1967 and 1953,
stimulates total spending and thereby generates rapidly growing
demand for credit and rising interest rates.
By using market interest rates to indicate the thrust of
monetary actions, many public policy makers concluded
that despite very rapid monetary growth, rising interest rates were
evidence of monetary restraint during 1967 and 1963. In fact, there
was a belief by many that the extent of the increase in market interest
rates was too great because of the dislocations which occurred in the
savings and housing industries. There was a desire to hold back the



-11extent of interest rate increases, but attempts to do so required
injections of bank reserves which contributed to a rapid growth in
the money stock. This, in turn, fostered excessive total demand
and fed further the fires of inflation. In retrospect, it is now apparent
that the traditional reliance on such measures of money market
conditions as market interest rates contributed to our present inflation.
Sound economic stabilization requires guides to the thrust
of monetary actions other than money market conditions. Recent
experience demonstrates that use of a monetary aggregate, such as
the money stock, would have produced far better results than we got
during the last half of the 1960's. Excessive total spending followed
the very rapid rates of monetary expansion from early 1965 to early
1966 and during 1967 and 1968. But when money ceased to grow in
the last eight months of 1966 and grew only slowly in 1969, total
spending after a short lag slowed markedly. Conclusions I have
advanced from this casual analysis have been supported by a growing
body of empirical research.
A further lesson concerns the importance of price
mentioned earlier, much of economic theory upon which recommendations for stabilization actions during the 1969's rested did
not give adequate consideration to the basic forces influencing the




anticipa

-12price level. Little consideration was given to the well-known fact
that consumers, businessmen, and labor unions do take into
consideration anticipated price level changes when making decisions
to purchase goods and services in the present and when negotiating
contracts for the future. Once growth of total demand exceeds growth
of potential output and inflation has been underway for a period of
time, these decision makers tend to extrapolate the past trend of
prices into the future in an attempt to protect their positions from the
ravages of inflation.
This process provides a momentum to inflation which causes
prices to continue to rise. This inflationary momentum may carry
on well after public policy steps have been taken to bring total demand
growth into line with potential output growth. Such a development
has. been seen in recent experience in which, after a year or so of
reduced rate of growth of total spending, the price level has continued
to rise rapidly.
Another manifestation of inflationary expectations during
the past several years has appeared in financial markets. There is
a considerable body of economic theory which holds that market
interest rates are greatly influenced by expected price level movements.
This proposition was not incorporated into the conventional theory
underlying stabilization efforts of the 1960's. We who maintain that
market interest rate movements reflect inflationary expectations argue




-13that when prices are expected to rise, borrowers are willing to pay
higher interest rates because they will pay back with depreciated
dollars. In addition, any delay in making purchases using borrowed
funds will result in high costs in the future. We also argue that
lenders will ask for higher interest rates in order to protect the
purchasing power of their funds. Thus, both demand and supply
forces during a period of inflation lead to higher and higher interest
rates.
Many who followed conventional views were at a loss to
explain the marked rise in interest rates from 1965 to 1968 at a
time when the money stock was rising rapidly. At the St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank we have reported empirical evidence that
inflation caused almost all of this increase in market interest rates.
The recent experience demonstrates that rapid monetary expansion
produces high, not low, interest rates. The truth is the reverse of
conventional wisdom regarding interest rate movements.
This lesson leads to the conclusion that the theoretical
foundation of economic stabilization must give adequate recognition
to the pervasive influence of price level expectations. Not to do so,
would be to repeat the mistakes of the past. I believe that this lesson
has already shown up in the expressed views of many policymakers,
but there has been little evidence that it has been learned by the




-14general public, by the Congress, or by economic commentators in
the news media and market news letters.
Another lesson from the recent experience is that ceilings
on interest rates paid by commercial banks on time deposits set by
the Federal Reserve under Regulation Q are not an effective device
for slowing growth in total spending, as many maintained in the
late 1950's. Instead, such ceilings merely create inefficiencies
in our financial markets. Commercial bankers are well aware of
the rechanneling of loan funds away from banks and into such
markets as the one for commercial paper when free market interest
rates exceed Regulation Q ceiling rates.
Some have argued that since banks can make fewer loans
under such circumstances, total spending will be restrained. The
fact of the matter is that while spending by potential bank borrowers
may be reduced, spending by those who have access to the money
markets will rise by about the same amount. As a result, total
spending is little affected by manipulation of Regulation Q interest
rate ceilings.
These ceiling rates on time deposits, however, have led to
inefficiencies in the flow of funds and in utilization of real resources
in recent years. As a result of Q, customary movements of loan
funds from one corporation to another through commercial bank




-15channels flow instead through the more direct commercial paper
market or through the less direct and less efficient Euro-dollar
market. Such rechanneling of loan funds reduces the size of the
commercial banking system relative to the total market for funds, a
process which is not essential for stabilization policy. Other interest
rate ceilings including state usury laws and ceilings set on funds
raised by savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks
also lead to less efficient channeling of funds and use of resources.
Another lesson from recent experience is that there are
great costs of adjusting to accelerating inflation. Everyone is familiar
with such losses from inflation as reduced purchasing power of
fixed income groups and of holders of wealth in the form of fixed
money claims. It is true that if inflation is anticipated correctly, a
large number of individuals can adjust their contracts and wealth
holdings so as to avoid most of the effects of rising prices. And, in
recent years Congress has kept Social Security benefits more or
less abreast of the price increase, thereby helping to maintain the
purchasing power of a large number of retired persons.
However, when the rate of inflation is changing rapidly,
and holders of wealth attempt to adjust their holdings, there are
losses in addition to that from reduced purchasing power. For
example, the great drop in the bond market during our present




-16inflation and the recent bear stock market are partly a consequence
of attempts of investors to adjust to accelerating inflation. This
recent experience demonstrates that even the stock market may not
be a very good hedge against inflation when the rate of price advance
is accelerating.
There are also considerable losses to the whole economy
resulting from the adjustment process which accompanies accelerations in the rate of price advance. Inefficiencies develop in product,
resource, and financial markets in the process of adjusting prices
and contracts to rising prices. Normal business transactions
become more difficult. For instance, we have reports that some
business firms in recent years quoted list prices only on a day-today basis. Their salesmen were required to contact the home office
before any price could be quoted. Labor contract negotiations
become more difficult to settle. In financial markets investors
have to pay greater attention to ascertaining the impact of inflation
on their portfolios and on alternative outlets for their funds.
A final lesson is that curbing a rapid, prolonged,
and accelerating inflation is a slow and difficult process, and is not
without considerable costs. As I mentioned earlier, anticipations of
price increases provide a powerful momentum to inflation. Such




-17anticipations respond slowly to actual price movements and are not
reduced until the rate of inflation has actually subsided for some
time. As a result of this slow process of reducing anticipated rates
of price increase, the general price level continues to rise rapidly
for some time after restraint is applied to growth in total spending.
Many have been surprised and disappointed that restraint
of the past two years has not produced greater results in terms of
the price level. Some have even expressed despair at ever seeing
relative price stability again. It should be pointed out, however,
that inflation was permitted to develop for almost five years before
effective restraint was applied. By then, inflation was moving along
under its own momentum, and only moderate restraint was applied.
It should, therefore, not be surprising that five years of inflation
cannot be eliminated in a short period of time. Moreover, it should
be remembered that the inflations of World War II and the Korean
War were not curbed until the late 1950's and that much greater
restraint was applied in that effort.
There is also considerable cost in eliminating inflation.
With restricted growth in total spending and with prices continuing to
rise for some time, output of goods and services stagnates or is reduced.
As a consequence, there is a loss of jobs and income to many individuals




-18and a loss of goods and services to the whole of our society. Labor
strife is accentuated, as we now see, when unions attempt to catch
up with inflation and to anticipate further inflation at a time of
declining corporate profits.
Let me now draw a few general conclusions from this
discussion of our recent experience. Inflation, because of the many
problems and costs it creates, should never be permitted to start.
This may seem obvious and trivial, but many have argued that these
costs are small compared to alleged large gains flowing from a high
level of employment. Our research indicates, however, that inflation
is not required for our economy to have a high level of employment.
Another conclusion is that the main body of economic
thought of the 1950's and the 1960's has not proven very useful in
handling economic stabilization problems. In fact, there is
considerable evidence that reliance on this body of thought contributed
greatly to the present inflation — both as a cause of rapid price level
advances and as a hindrance to their control.
Finally, monetary policy has a major responsibility for
promoting price level stability. If such policy is to be applied in an
effective manner, the public, the Congress, the Administration, and
the Federal Reserve should reflect on the lessons to be learned from
the experience of the past six years.