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THE INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS SYSTEM AND OUR
EFFORTS TO INCREASE FARM EXPORTS
A Speech by Darryl R. Francis
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
to the
St. Louis Agribusiness and World Trade Clubs
October 22, 1970

It is good to have this opportunity to discuss with
you some vital issues of international trade. Each of us
has an interest in this subject - some as producers of goods
which compete with imports, others as producers who export
part of their output, and all as consumers who gain from the
efficiencies of international specialization of labor and resource
use.
First, I shall briefly review some historical
developments in our international payments system. Then I
shall discuss certain policy actions that have been taken to
increase foreign trade and, finally, basic factors which
tend to limit foreign trade expansion.
Earlier Payments System - Self-Adjusting
In the half century prior to World War I the Western
World had a self-equilibrating system of settling international
accounts. Most commercial nations were on the gold standard




-2with the domestic stock of money tied to the stock of gold.
A balance of payments deficit led to a gold outflow, which,
in turn, led to a reduction in the nation's money stock. A
decline in the stock of money reduced domestic demand for
goods and services, thereby discouraging imports and
encouraging exports. This process continued until the
balance of payments deficit was eliminated.
With the monetary disruptions during the war most
nations left the gold standard. In the 1920's attempts were
made to restore the system, but the relationships established
between currencies and gold were often set at the pre-war rates
and the currencies were generally overvalued. In those
countries where currencies were overvalued imports were
stimulated and exports declined, thereby depressing their
economies. Nations attempted to make the necessary adjustments,
but the depression of the 1930's dealt a death blow to the gold
standard before new equilibrium rates could be restored.
Losing gold in a period of growing unemployment
meant further contraction of national money stocks and
further deflation. Most nations consequently broke the link
between gold and domestic money, being unwilling to let
international gold movements influence the domestic money
stock with the resulting destabilizing effects. Following the




-3breakdown of the gold standard, most nations moved to a gold
exchange system in which national currency values were
arbitrarily pegged to the dollar and the dollar pegged to gold.
Current System Not Self-Adjust ing
The gold exchange system permits free convertability
among major western currencies. Funds flowing out of a
country reduce its international reserves just as under the
gold standard in former years. Now, however, these flows can
be offset by monetary actions, and they have no automatic
impact on domestic money and prices. Actions can be taken
by central bankers to reduce the stock of money and the
demand for goods and services and put a brake on domestic
prices when international reserve outflows occur, but such
actions now reflect conscious policy rather than the automatic
operation of the system. Because of these destabilizing
effects, such actions are taken with extreme caution. We
are thus at times torn between actions for implementing
balance of payments objectives and actions for optimum domestic
conditions.
A few nations have altered their exchange rates when
large excesses or shortages developed in their foreign exchange
accounts. The United Kingdom reduced the value of the pound
as a result of a large deficit while Germany increased the




-4value of its currency following a surplus. This method of
changing the terms of trade has not proven a practical
solution to the U. S., as the dollar is a key international
reserve currency widely held for official balances. Any
reduction in its value in terms of gold would result in an
immediate loss to all foreign dollar holders.
Other methods used to maintain currency convertability
in the case of payment imbalances include tariffs, import
quotas, capital export controls, and foreign travel restrictions.
Each of these methods, however, tends to reduce the volume
of international trade and are, in most instances, arbitrary
and subject to extreme abuse by the enforcing agencies.
The special drawing rights (SDRs) activated by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) early this year extended
the period over which an imbalance of international payments
can occur. These rights essentially increase the quantity of
international money by permitting the IMF to create credits
to participating nations. Although serving to ease the problem
of short run payment imbalances, SDRs do nothing to alter
the terms of trade and reverse basic imbalances. Terms of
trade between two nations are altered in the market by changes
in national price levels and exchange rates. The credits permit
more time for a nation to take actions to alter the terms of
trade and are beneficial in this respect. Nevertheless, if basic




-5steps are not taken to equilibrate the terms of trade, an
imbalance of international payments on the basis of fixed
exchange rates cannot persist indefinitely without total loss
of foreign exchange holdings.
Recent U. S. Experience
With this background let's briefly review the U. S.
situation with reference to the balance of payments and
holdings of foreign exchange. Following World War I I , this
country had a gold balance of $24 billion, about two-thirds of
the free world's stock of gold. We were likewise endowed with
a large proportion of the free world's productive capacity.
Justifiably, domestic policies were instituted to provide other
nations of the free world with a better balance in foreign
exchange. We generally maintained expansive monetary and
fiscal policies and engaged in massive foreign aid programs,
which tended to reduce U. S. gold stocks. By early 1968 our
gold stock had declined to $10.7 billion, only slightly more
than one-fourth the world total. Our gold holdings have
since increased slightly, but the basic factors underlying
our balance of payments position have not improved.
Our needs for foreign exchange, like an individual's
needs for cash balances, depend upon the volume of transactions
to be settled. Since international trade by the U.S. accounts
for only about one-sixth the world's total, we apparently do




-6not need two-thirds the free world's stock of gold possessed
twenty years ago. Yet, in view of the volume of our international
transactions and foreign claims held on the U.S., we do need
a sizable stock of gold. Most importantly, however, we require
means for altering the balance of payments to avoid further loss
of liquidity. To alleviate this problem I would suggest greater
flexibility in setting exchange rates between the dollar and
other currencies. A system of "crawling" exchange rates
whereby the rates are permitted to change a small amount
each week or month toward new market levels when imbalances
occur would be a major improvement over the current system.
By altering rates to meet payment imbalances, the monetary
authorities can concentrate on the appropriate actions for
domestic stabilization.
Protection, The Major Trade Restraint
Although the international payments system has
imperfections, it probably is not the major factor tending to
retard trade growth. Policies designed to protect domestic
producers from foreign competition have probably been
a more important restraint to foreign trade. All commercial
nations pursue protectionist policies which reduce the
quantity of goods and services available to consumers, and
we are equally guilty of this national welfare depressing
practice. When the nation was in its infancy, it levied tariffs




-7for income in preference to domestic taxes. Later, tariffs
were raised to protect our so-called infant industries from
foreign competition. The protectionist argument still prevails
in one form or another. Between 1865 and 1935 our average
rate on dutiable imports never fell below 39 per cent, except
for the period during and immediately following the First World
War when other nations had a very small output of civilian
goods for

export.

The Underwood Law in 1914 imposed an

average rate of 29 per cent on dutiable imports, which was
raised to 39 per cent in 1923 under the Fordney-McUmber Law
and further increased to 53 per cent in 1930 under the
Hawley-Smoot Law.
Since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,
the nation has pursued an announced policy of "freeing"
international trade. Numerous tariff reductions have been
negotiated. Nevertheless, duties have often remained so
high and other restrictions so effective that

export

trade

has not been greatly affected.
Protection Now Through Nontariff Barriers
While tariffs have traditionally been the chief means
of protecting domestic producers from foreign competition, other
protective devices have increasingly been used in recent years.

\l_ Don D. Humphrey, American Imports, The Twentieth Century
Fund, New York 1955, p. 74.




-8Chief among them are import quotas, special clearing agreements,
domestic subsidies, bilateral trade agreements, import licensing,
and domestic monopolies operating under governmental
authority.

In some instances the restrictions have involved

special legislation. In others, informal agreements have
been sufficient to limit trade to arbitrarily determined levels.
With the aid of one or more of these measures, nations can
maintain tariff duties at relatively moderate levels and still
protect producers from foreign competition. This change in method
of protection provides an opportunity for great obscurity in
discussing trade policies and results of tariff reduction
agreements. A reduction in tariff rates may have little
meaning since real barriers to trade often remain unchanged.
International trade barriers are as unreasonable
under competitive production and marketing conditions as
are trade barriers between states, cities, or counties. To
the extent that they reduce the international volume of goods
and services they reduce welfare.
Our country has not been innocent with respect
to the use of these protective devices. Even in agriculture,
which has such a large stake in free trade, we have established
highly protectionist policies. We have sugar import quotas
which, based on the New York wholesale price, cost U. S.




-9consumers an additional 22 cents for each five pounds of
2/
sugar purchased.— We have subscribed to international
trade agreements which set minimum prices on coffee and
wheat, thereby limiting trade in these commodities. We have
meat import quotas which provide limits on imports of beef.
Our cotton export subsidy, designed to offset the trade retarding
features of our domestic price support program, is sufficient
to permit exports of cotton to Japan and imports of goods made
from the cotton to the U.S. for sale in competition with our
own mills. In order to avoid excessive disruptions from such
competition, however, we have a tacit agreement with the
Japanese to limit cotton goods exports to the U.S. Such tacit
arrangements are apparently preferred to formalized legal
actions, but if they are equally effective in reducing trade, they
are likewise equally effective in reducing welfare.
Domestic Subsidies Restrictive
Also important in limiting foreign trade are production
controls and subsidies. For a number of years the British
have subsidized their farm producers, maintaining excessive
labor in agriculture which, in effect, limits their imports and
our exports of farm products to them. These workers could
earn more in nonfarm pursuits, and under free trade conditions
the British would export more nonfarm products and import more
farm products, thereby enhancing total production and welfare.
2/_ International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
Sept. 1970, p. 29.

-10Our own domestic farm programs inhibit world trade.
Despite an announced policy of free trade since 1934 and lower
tariff rates, our domestic farm policies have probably offset
the advantages gained from the reduced tariff levies. Farm
production control and price support programs were initiated
in the mid-1930's which contributed to higher farm production
cost and higher prices for farm products both here and abroad.
Our farm products became less competitive in the world market
and worse, from a long range view, was the fact that our policy
of arbitrary farm product pricing at higher than free
market levels led to a loss of confidence in the U. S. as a
long run source of farm products. This move from competitive
to arbitrary pricing indicated to our customers abroad that
hereafter prices of U.S. farm commodities would be in excess
of free market prices. Higher export prices in turn indicated
higher food and fiber costs to importing nations. Their costs
of imported food thus hinge on the decisions of our price making
authorities who are likely to be more influenced by political
pressures at home than by living costs elsewhere.
International Trade Retarded
Our tariff reduction policies have not led to more
trade relative to total output. In the 1920 to 1934 period, prior
to the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, U.S. commodity
exports averaged 5.1 per cent and imports 4.1 per cent of gross






-II national product (Table I). In contrast, since the announced
liberal trade policies in the mid-1930's, total exports have
averaged only 4.1 per cent and imports only 2.9 per cent of GNP.
The proportion of foreign trade in farm products declined even
more sharply than the total. Exports declined from 17.4 per
cent of farm output in the 1920-34 period to 8.6 per cent since
1934 and imports from 19.9 to 10.9 per cent. In the five years
1965-69 commercial farm exports totaled 12 per cent of cash
farm receipts, somewhat above the 1935-69 average but well
below the per cent exported prior to the so-called change to
more liberal trade policies. Furthermore, export subsidies
such as government credits and guarantees, government commodity
sales at less than market prices and export payments in cash
were responsible for a large portion of recent exports.
We view such practices as dumping when other countries
export products to us under similar conditions.
Thus, despite our announced freer trade policies,
our new barriers to international trade have offset our
trade freeing actions. The trade barriers are usually imposed
in such a way as to inhibit trade growth rather than have a
strong immediate impact, thus becoming successively more
restrictive over time.
It is my conclusion that the predominent political
forces in most nations today do not really want large increases

-12-

Table I
Relative Importance of Foreign Trade
to Total U. S. Economy and to Agriculture

Per cent of GNP

Per cent of
Cash Farm Receipts
Commercial
Farm Exports*

Farm
_ Imports

Period

Exports

Imports

1920-24

6.4

4.6

21.3

22.0

1925-29

5.0

4.3

16.4

20.6

1930-34

3.4

3.1

13.5

15.5

1920-34

5.1

4.1

17.4

19.9

1935-39

3.2

2.7

9.6

14.8

1940-44

5.0

1.9

3.1

10.7

1945-49

5.2

2.3

6.0

9. 4

1950-54

4.1

2.9

7.4

14.0

1955-59

4.1

2.8

8.0

12.6

1960-64

3.8

2.8

10.0

10.8

1965-69

3.9

3.4

12.0

10.4

1935-69

4J

2.9

8.6

10.9

* Commercial (dollar) sales; i.e., shipments under specified Government-financed
programs are excluded.
Sources:

USDA, Agricultural Statistics, Farm Income Situation, and Foreign
Agricultural Trade of the United States; U. S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business and The Statistical History of the United States.







-13in foreign trade. Large gains in trade upset markets and
cause changes in resource use. Some hardships occur in the
short run in the relatively less efficient industries. Gains
occur immediately, however, in the relatively more efficient
industries and among all consumer groups. In the longer
run all groups gain from the greater efficiency of international
specialization. But, neither this nation nor other nations have
to date indicated a willingness to adopt policies that will assure
these major gains at the expense of minor adjustments among
some producer groups.
Restrictive Arguments are Fallacies
Despite the fact that international welfare could
be greatly enhanced through freer trade practices, the
arguments of trade restrictive proponents have been predominent
in determining public policies in leading commercial nations
in the last half century. Reasons given for import
restrictions are as follows:
1.

Large imports of farm products lower
domestic prices and farm incomes.

2.

It is unfair to domestic labor to compete
with producers under "sweatshop" conditions
abroad.

3.

Imports are not a reliable source of vital
products, such as food and critical defense
items.




-144.

Excessive imports damage vital defense
3/
industries which are necessary for survival.—

Implicit in each of these arguments is the belief that
import restrictions aid certain producer groups or that some
industries are so vital to national survival that we cannot
afford to take the risk of relying on imports exclusively for
such products.
The argument that import restrictions aid some
producer groups is true only in the short run. Over the longer
run, labor and other resources adjust to new supply and
demand conditions and real gains accrue to all groups.
Furthermore, even in the short run such restrictions are at
the expense of the rest of the nation.
Let's take agriculture as an example and consider
the impact of greater exports of American farm products
to Western Europe. Such exports will first cause a reduction
in prices to European farmers and a reduction in food costs
to European consumers. Their farm incomes will decline,
providing incentive for farm workers seeking higher paying
jobs in the nonfarm sector. The larger nonfarm labor force
which is relatively more efficient will achieve greater output
of nonfarm goods and services, and exports of these products
to the U.S. will increase. Greater efficiencies will occur in

3/

Humphrey, Chapter 7.




-15both their farm and nonfarm sectors and a larger volume
of all products will be available at lower prices, enhancing real
incomes and welfare. On the American scene, the larger
volume of farm exports will tend to increase domestic farm
prices and incomes. This will attract new resources into
agriculture from other sectors or more likely reduce the outflow
of resources from agriculture. The larger imports of nonfarm
products by the U.S. will reduce demand for resources in our
nonfarm sector, but, similar to the European case, the
increased efficiencies will provide more goods and services
to our people.
The argument that imports from low cost factories
abroad are unfair to labor is similar to the farm import argument.
Import restrictions aid workers in import competing industries
in the short run but injure workers in export industries. But,
once workers and other resources have adjusted to the new
market forces, greater output is achieved and the benefits
of greater production efficiency accrue to all.
Almost all major countries subscribe to the vital
industries argument for protection. Certain industries are
assumed to be vital for national survival. England, for example,
has in the past attempted to maintain domestic food production
at about 50 per cent of domestic usage. These policies
originated from a lack of confidence in supplies from abroad




-16at critical periods, such as during wartime blockades. Many
other nations, including our own, prefer to maintain sufficient
resources in vital lines of production to provide a minimum
level of output in case of loss of supplies from abroad. Oil
and sugar quotas here are an example of such protection.
Nations are willing to maintain inefficient production of these
vital products despite the fact that such use of resources
is a waste of effort. Protection for these industries against
competition from abroad maintains stability of employment for
a few at the expense of many. Nations are willing to tax more
for defense items and pay higher prices for the civilian output
of such industries in order to maintain these industries,
despite the fact that methods of modern warfare have made
such excuses obsolete. Nations now have the power to destroy
one another long before supplies of such critical products are
depleted. The solution lies in increased confidence that world
trade channels will remain open and supply sources unimpaired.
From the standpoint of U.S. agriculture we look
abroad at rapid growth of Western European nations and see
great opportunities for farm commodity exports, provided
these nations will only open their trade doors and invite us in.
It is my conclusion that we have not earned the invitation.
Despite our numerous pronouncements, our policies have




-17not contributed to two-way trade arrangements. We have
done little to merit the dependence by Western European nations
upon us for an indefinite source of vital products at competitive
prices. We have neither consistently followed a free trade
policy nor domestic pricing policies that are conducive to free
trade.
Although the arguments are overwhelming in favor
of more trade between nations, I am quite pessimistic as to
its future course. Forces tending to reduce welfare through
trade barriers are better financed and more powerful than the
forces active in promoting welfare through freeing trade
channels. As an indication of the power of protective groups,
about 590 import quota proposals were introduced in the recent
session of Congress prior to the end of August .—
One bill was approved by the House Ways and Means Committee
which was described by the New York Times as the "most
5/
protectionist and reactionary trade legislation in forty years."—
Signs admonishing us to purchase American goods and protect
American jobs can be observed daily. Only the textbooks, however,
are available to point out the gains from free trade and few
professors are out shouting the story to the general public.

4/_

International Commerce, Sept. 7, 1970, p. 10.

5/

New York Times, Sept. 21, 1970.




-18SUMMATION
In summary, our international payments system
has imperfections. It is not self-equilibrating as it was under
the gold standard prior to the 1930's. It has not, however,
been the major factor tending to retard foreign trade growth.
This growth has been retarded because neither the political
forces in this nation nor other nations are willing to forego
the short run interests of a few producer groups for the general
welfare of the nation.
There are few who deny the gains from greater
exports, but powerful groups fear a rise in imports. Both
exports and imports enhance total welfare. The removal of
trade restrictions would be especially beneficial to American
agriculture. We have a major relative advantage in the
production of farm commodities. Under free world trade
policies and free domestic producing conditions, world-wide
food prices could be lowered and world diets improved. The
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, the recent Kennedy Round
and numerous other acts were designed to achieve these
objectives. Proposed modern liberal policies, however, are
often followed by restrictive actions more typical of the
medieval and ancient ages. In practice we still follow the
outdated theories of several centuries ago.




-19Most of the arguments used against free trade
practice are not applicable to modern world conditions. The
implied disruptions in local industries are generally
overstated and are often excuses for maintaining resources
in inefficient lines of production. Current unemployment
and labor retraining social programs minimize hardships
to the labor force resulting from the change. Little capital
loss would likely occur with the high rate of obsolescense
due to technological change. The vital industries argument
is no longer applicable, since, in case of all-out war under
modern conditions, no industry is secure regardless of
where it is located.
The United States should take the lead in dropping
the trade barriers. Tariffs are not the only item to consider.
\A/e should move immediately to build world confidence in us
as a supplier and market. Real accomplishments will require
more than the rhetoric of recent decades followed by high
level conferences which tend to free trade where no potential
trade exists. We must be willing to reduce barriers and permit
major increases in imports and oppose the power of producer
groups who have made their short run interest paramount
to the welfare of the nation. We must be willing to dismantle our
inefficient production controls in agriculture and assure foreign




-20consumers that our farm products will be available at competitive
prices. A move toward free trade is a move toward less Government
control of prices and production and greater reliance on market
forces for resource adjustment.
These moves are counter to our great surge to
alleviate all individual hardships through general legislation
which temporarily aids the few but reduces national welfare.
Their adoption can reverse the trend to isolationism in the
current century and greatly enhance the welfare of both
our own citizens and those of the rest of the world.