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INFLATION AND THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
By
Darryl R. Francis, President
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
To
Steel Plate Fabricators Association
Key Biscayne, Florida
April 29, 1974

It is good to have this opportunity to present my
views regarding inflation and the economic outlook. I find
it rather sobering to reflect that our country, as well as
most other major industrial countries, has experienced
almost a decade of rising inflation. In reviewing economic
history, I find that we are at a point similar to 1939 in that
then too our country, along with the rest of the world, was
ending a decade of economic difficulty -- a recession. The
disquieting similarity is that in both instances some
prominent individuals could see no end to the situation in
sight and counseled us to learn to live with it.
I rejected the idea then and I reject it now. I continue to believe that we have the knowledge to bring this
devastating inflation under control. Economic stabilization
actions formulated and acted upon now will be the most




important influence on our economy, not only during late 1974,

2
but over the balance of the 1970's. Our present concern
is for simultaneously reducing inflation and permitting
growth of output to return to a rate consistent with optimal
utilization of our nation's productive potential.
Recently, two sharply divergent views have been
advanced regarding the proper course of economic stabilization policy at this time. One view is that expansionary
actions must be taken immediately to guide the economy
to so-called "full employment." The other view is that
restrictive actions must be taken to reduce the rate of inflation.
The recognized importance of stabilization actions
for the outlook, and the conflicting recommendations
surfacing around us, dictate that we examine the experience
of stabilization actions over the last decade to seek out some
lessons which can be helpful in selecting an appropriate
course of action now and for the future. The last decade
was one of accelerating inflation and, at times, deviations
of output growth from our nation's productive potential.
In developing some of the lessons from past
stabilization efforts, it is helpful to make a brief survey
of the premises which had a dominant influence on policy
actions taken over much of the past decade. Once these




3
have been outlined, the experience of the past decade will
be reviewed to evaluate the usefulness of these premises
as a basis for undertaking future stabilization actions.
Finally, against the background of these lessons, the implications for inflation and the economic outlook of the two
policy alternatives will be discussed.
Let us now review the premises which guided
stabilization efforts during the past decade. A foremost
premise was that positive government actions were required
to produce proper growth of output of goods and services so
as to assure "full employment" of our labor and industrial
resources. In other words, many observers contended
that without active government guidance our economy
would tend to produce an unacceptable level of employment
and growth of output.
There were two premises regarding the causes of
inflation. One premise was that inflation, for the most
part, did not normally occur unless aggregate demand for
goods and services was "pushed" to a level close to or
greater than our economy's ability to produce. But this need
not happen, it was argued, because government actions could
be used to assure that the level of aggregate demand would




never be in excess of capacity output.

4
The other premise was that special factors could,
at times, cause inflation. Some important factors cited
were the use of industrial monopoly power, the exercise of
labor market power by powerful unions, special conditions
in major domestic markets, and rising prices of internationally traded commodities.
In summary, it was believed that so-called "full
employment" of our resources would not naturally occur?
therefore, government should take actions for promoting
growth of aggregate demand so that output would be at our
economy's productive potential. Given skillful application
of aggregate demand management, inflation need not occur,
except for that attributed to special factors which were




believed to be beyond the control of traditional stabilization
tools.
Four major propositions guided the implementation
of economic stabilization policy over most of the last decade.
First, the dominant view was that fiscal actions, that is,
changes in government spending and taxing programs, were
the most effective means for guiding the course of output
along a non-inflationary, "full employment" path. Second,
monetary actions were viewed as being of minor importance.
Federal Reserve actions were assigned an accommodative role

5
in the sense that they should be directed toward promoting
a level of market interest rates consistent with the over-all
intent of stabilization policy. In other words, fiscal policy
was given the major responsibility for guiding economic
activity; and monetary policy was given an accommodative
responsibility for assuring that high interest rates did not
choke off desired expansion of output.
A third proposition was that management of aggregate
demand should be conducted on a short-run basis of a few
quarters. The last proposition was that selective incomes and
price policies were necessary to control inflation arising in
monopolized industries and in industries dominated by
powerful labor unions.
An examination of the record indicates that stabilization authorities were very busy over the past decade. The
policy tool that received the most public attention during that
time was fiscal actions. I will cite just a few examples of its
use. There was the Revenue Act of 1964 which included
across-the-board rate reductions in personal and corporate
income taxes; the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of
1968 which imposed a temporary ten percent surcharge on
personal and corporate income taxes; and the on-again, offagain, investment tax credit. At times, such as in 1969, 1971,




6
and 1973, attempts were made to hold down increases in
government spending.
The Federal Reserve was also very active in economic stabilization during the past ten years. For
example, from 1964 to 1973, the Federal Open Market Committee, commonly referred to as the FOMC, met 141 times,
and at seventy percent of these meetings a policy of restraint
was adopted. Only in 1967 and 1970 did the FOMC adopt a




policy of ease at virtually every meeting.
Throughout most of the past decade FOMC actions
were directed mainly toward promoting an appropriate level
of market interest rates. For the most part, these actions
can be said to have been accommodative, in the sense that
although interest rates were permitted to rise, the FOMC
attempted to restrict interest rates to levels believed to be
not so high as to interfere with the achievement of full employment. Even though more emphasis was given to movements in monetary aggregates late in the decade, open
market transactions continued to be subject to an interest
rate constraint.
Finally, when inflation threatened to reaccelerate
in 1971, a time of excess capacity, it was believed by many
that the inflationary situation was due to special factors,

7
and price and wage controls were adopted. Since then, these
controls have gone through two complete cycles — from freeze
to guidelines, and thaw, and back to freeze, guidelines, and
phase-out. For the most part, these controls were administered
on a selective basis.
What have been the end results of these activist
economic stabilization actions taken over the past decade?
Our economy has experienced a high, and accelerating rate
of inflation, which still persists. There was a shallow recession in 1970, followed by a period of slow recovery. At the
present time our economy is undergoing what some have labeled
"stagflation." Market interest rates rose to their highest levels
in fifty years. At times severe dislocations occurred in commodity, labor, and financial markets.
From these events it is quite apparent that, in spite
of good intentions and much effort, economic stabilization
actions have not produced desired results. So let us now
examine this experience for some lessons which may be helpful
in planning future stabilization efforts.
Some important lessons regarding inflation can be
derived from the experience of the past decade. Accelerating
inflation started when our economy began to operate at
capacity levels In the mid-1960's, tending to confirm the view




8
that mismanagement of aggregate demand could cause
inflation. But then in 1970 and 1971, when output fell
and continued to remain considerably below capacity, inflation remained high, contrary to the view that inflation
would quickly subside when aggregate demand was less than
capacity output. So, the cause of inflation Was then attributed to monopoly and labor union power. But the record of
the decade indicates that there was little, if any, increase
in industrial concentration and that membership in labor
unions as a percent of the labor force declined.
Thus, it appears that it was a fallacy to base
monetary and fiscal actions on the proposition that they
need to be concerned about inflation only when aggregate
demand is pushed in the neighborhood of our economy's
productive potential. A second fallacy, suggested by this
experience, was that the rate of inflation will quickly subside
if aggregate demand is held below productive potential for only
a few quarters. A third fallacy was that industrial monopolies
and labor unions are an important cause of inflation.
Another lesson from the past decade's experience
is that an activist policy cannot easily guide aggregate demand
in such a manner as to promote a relatively low unemployment rate with little inflation. Since 1961, the beginning of




9
activitism in economic stabilization, the unemployment rate
has averaged 4.9 percent. This is the same as in the Eisenhower years, a period which most activists would contend was
not particularly noted for efforts to promote a substantially
lower unemployment rate. The major difference between
these two episodes is the rate of inflation. The over-all price
index rose at a 2 percent average annual rate from 1952 to
1960, and continued to rise slowly until the mid-1960's. But
then the rate of price increase accelerated, and has been at
about a 5 percent rate since 1968.
Another lesson is that price and wage controls
are not an effective method of curbing inflation when
aggregate demand is above capacity output, contrary to the
dominant view of the past decade. The implementation of
such controls in 1971 quickly led to many disruptions in




the functioning of markets and reported inflation remained
high, except in the freeze periods. After almost three years
they have been abandoned.
Experience over the past ten years casts strong
doubts regarding the effectiveness of fiscal actions in guiding
the economy along a desired path. Adoption of the income
surtax of 1968, and the imposition of curbs on government
spending since 1968, were taken for the purpose of slowing

10
growth of aggregate demand. With the exception of 1970, a
recession year, growth of aggregate demand accelerated each
year. For the period 1968 to 1973, current dollar GNP rose
at an average 8 percent annual rate, compared with a 7 percent rate from 1960 to 1968, and a 5 percent rate from 1952
to 1960.
A final set of lessons, and I believe the most important ones, are in regard to prevailing views regarding
monetary actions. One view was that monetary actions were
important in only an accommodative sense of keeping interest
rates from rising too fast. Another view was that the influence
of monetary actions was best measured by movements in market
interest rates, not changes in growth of the money stock.
Experience over the past decade has led to questioning of the validity of these propositions. As a result, an
extensive body of research has emerged regarding the influence
of monetary actions, measured by changes in the money stock,
on economic activity. Rather than cite specific research
studies, I will summarize some conclusions of these studies.
First, there is considerable evidence consistent
with the proposition that inflation is primarily a monetary
phenomenon. This proposition holds that an increase in the
trend growth of money is followed by an increase in the rate




11
of inflation. This proposition thus attributes the basic
cause of our present inflation to the accelerating trend
growth of money since the early 1960's. The money stock
rose at about a 2 percent average annual rate from 1952 to
1962, accelerated to a 4 percent rate to 1966, accelerated
further to a 6 percent rate to 1971, and has been at about a
7 percent rate since then. Accelerations in the rate of inflation have followed accelerations in the trend growth of
money.
Second, these studies present evidence consistent
with the proposition that short-run accelerations and decelerations in the rate of money growth are followed, with
a short lag, by similar movements in growth of real output.




It is thus concluded that monetary actions, measured by
changes in the money stock, are an important cause of economic fluctuations.
A third lesson is that market interest rates are a
poor indicator of the tightness or ease of monetary actions,
and that the use of market interest rates in conducting
monetary policy can ultimately lead to accelerating inflation.
Most economists now accept the proposition, which was rediscovered in the past decade, that market interest rates
embody an inflation premium. According to this proposition,

12
accelerating inflation is accompanied by rising market
interest rates. To the extent that an accelerating trend
growth of money results in accelerating inflation, the high
interest rates of the past decade do not indicate monetary
restraint. Instead, they indicate previous excessive monetary ease. Moreover, attempts by monetary authorities to
resist rising market interest rates, following their recommended accommodative role, required larger purchases of
government securities in the open market which ultimately
resulted in faster money growth, greater inflation, and
still higher interest rates.
Another lesson is that government deficits are
an important cause of accelerating money growth. Large
deficits, other factors constant, tend to increase market
interest rates, which in turn have been resisted by monetary authorities. Such resistance was consistent with the
accommodative role assigned to monetary actions. These
rapidly growing purchases of government securities provided much of the basis for the accelerating growth of money.
A final lesson regarding monetary actions is that,
if inflation is to be avoided, these actions should be directly
concerned with inflation and carried out on a long-run basis.
This is contrary to the prevailing view that monetary actions




13
should be primarily concerned with output and employment
and should be conducted on a short-run basis. Monetary
actions during the last ten years have been directed, at
various times, toward achieving such short-run objectives
as lower market interest rates, protection of thrift institutions and the housing industry, or a reduction of the unemployment rate. In attempting to achieve these objectives,
the trend rate of money growth was ratcheted upward. The
end result has been the present high trend rate of monetary
expansion and high inflation.
It is my opinion that the economic outlook depends
critically on how stabilization actions are altered in view of
aforementioned lessons. With these lessons in the background, let us now examine some of the implications for
inflation and the economic outlook. Over the past four or
five months a wide divergence has developed in economists'
evaluations of the underlying strength in the economy.
There are those who have viewed the economy as being weak
and getting weaker. Considerable concern has been raised
about the prospects for rising unemployment and falling real
output. Other economists believe the economy is basically
strong, and they are greatly concerned about Inflation.




14
Now that the latest report on the national income
accounts indicates, as was widely expected, that output of
goods and services fell sharply in the first quarter, some
politicians from both major political parties and many wellknown economists have called for stimulative government
action. They do so in spite of an acceleration of inflation to
almost an 11 percent annual rate in the first quarter.
They argue that the purchasing power of households is being so eroded by inflation that there is an
insufficient aggregate demand relative to our country's
productive potential. According to that view, a tax cut is
needed immediately to increase household purchasing power
in order to boost aggregate demand and to prevent further
deterioration of output and employment. Some who hold
this view have also urged that the Federal Reserve actively
seek lower market interest rates in order to achieve what
they would consider to be an easier monetary policy designed
to stimulate housing and capital investment. The analysis
underlying this recommendation is based on the same approach
that dominated thinking about stabilization policy over the past
two decades.
In contrast to that position is the one I share with
the other group of economic analysts. That is, the economy




15
is fundamentally very strong and there is more than
adequate aggregate demand to promote real expansion.
I view the slower growth in real output after the first
quarter of 1973 as being attributable to the economy
operating "flat-out" at full capacity in an environment
where price and wage controls severely reduced the
efficiency of the market system in allocating resources
in the productive process.
I do not see how the existence of wide-spread
shortages of commodities and sharply rising prices can
be viewed as characteristics of weak aggregate demand.
The sharp drop in real output in the first quarter of this
year was clearly the result of the oil boycott and related
developments such as the truckers' strike, the allocation
program, and the presence of controls on both prices and
resource movements. Only a few industries were affected
and all of them were energy related. Certainly unemployment in the first few months of this year was much smaller
than one would have expected if the sharp drop in real
output had been widespread and had resulted from funda-




mental weakness in the economy.
One important aspect which has been overlooked
in most analyses of the current economy is that all previous

16
economic recessions were preceded by a period of sharply
reduced growth in the nation's money stock. In my view
the growth of money is a reliable indicator of the tightness
or ease of stabilization policies. Since the growth of money
last year was not much slower, on balance, than in 1972,
and the 7 percent average rate of growth in money over the
past three and one-half years is the fastest for any such period
since World War II, I don't think we have had such restrictive
actions as would cause a recession. In fact, the approach
I would take suggests that so far the steps necessary to bring
an eventual end to the inflation have not been taken.
Now, given that there are two opposing assessments of the economic situation and, therefore, opposing
prescriptions, one is faced with a choice. Suppose we were
to adopt the policies of those who think the economy is weak
and take actions to push interest rates down, accelerate
money growth, and possibly cut taxes. Based on the lessons
of the past, I believe that later this year we would find aggregate demand would have remained excessive. In such
circumstances, inflation would not subside significantly
and further upward adjustment in the premium on interest
rates attributable to expectations about inflation would give us




17
an even higher structure of market rates. Consequently,
the task of cooling the economy would be even more difficult
than it is currently.
Given that situation, it would be necessary to
shift to decisively anti-inflationary policies. To do so would
mean going into 1975 with an even higher structure of interest
rates, a more rapid rate of inflation and, because of the newly
adopted restrictive policies, declining growth in output and
rising unemployment. If my assessment of the economic
situation is correct and we follow policies of those who want
to fight a recession now, then the probability of both a recession and a faster rate of inflation in 1975 is greatly increased.
Let's consider the opposite approach. Those of us
who see aggregate demand as being very strong and inflation
as the most serious problem, would argue that the trend rate
of monetary growth should be reduced immediately to about a
5 percent rate for the balance of this year. The actions necessary to achieve this might involve even higher short-term
market interest rates for a few months, but then late in the
year or early next year we would be making tangible progress
toward both less inflation and lower interest rates. Past experience
suggests that following this course would minimize the risk of
further acceleration in the rate of inflation while also setting the
stage for further real output growth next year.