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THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Speech by

Darryl R. Francis, President
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Before

The Financial Analysts Federation Conference
At Stouffer's Cincinnati Inn, Cincinnati, Ohio
October 9, 1972

I am pleased to have this opportunity to present to you
my views regarding the economic outlook. My remarks will first

be devoted to a brief presentation of the general outlook. Then,
I will discuss some of the problems facing the nation because of

a Federal budget which is generally acknowledged to be "running
out of control." Decisions made in answer to these budget prob­

lems will have a great effect on the course of our economy over
much of the 1970's.

Let us now examine the general economic outlook for the
next few quarters. The President's Council of Economic Advisers,

in their Annual Report of last January, projected a rapid advance

in total spending (GNP) for 1972. They projected strong real pro­
duct growth and a significant decline in the rate of inflation by

the end of the year.




-2-

Substantial progress has been made in achieving this
optimistic forecast. Total spending has advanced rapidly since
late 1971, largely in response to stimulative monetary and

fiscal actions taken earlier. Growth in the money stock has
been uneven, but has averaged a 6.6 percent annual rate since

early 1971.

I n comparison, money increased at a 4.5 percent

rate from early 1969 to early 1971. Fiscal actions have also been
expansionary, with Federal expenditures rising at a 13 percent

rate since the first quarter of 1971, substantially faster than the
7 percent rate of increase in the previous two years.
A significant portion of the recent advance in total spend­
ing has been manifested in real product growth, with the associ­

ated rate of price inflation being moderate. Real product growth
accelerated to a 7.5 percent annual rate from third quarter 1971
to second quarter 1972, more than triple the increase in the

previous year. The rate of inflation, as measured by the GNP
price deflator, has been at about a 3 percent rate since mid-1971,
compared to a 5 percent increase in the preceding year.
The rapid rise of real product has fostered a strong advance

in employment.

Payroll employment has increased at a 3.4 percent

annual rate since last fall, compared to a 1 percent rise in the

previous year and a trend rate of growth of 2 percent from 1957 to




-3-

1971. The relative strength of these employment gains is note­
worthy since the population of working force age is estimated to

be growing at less than a 2 percent annual rate. Total employ­
ment in mid-summer was over 64 percent of the population of

labor force age, higher than in the prosperous year of 1965.
Given these developments through the second quarter,

substantial progress was made in the first half of the year toward
realizing the Council's goals for 1972. Moderated growth of both

total spending and real product in the final six months of the

year, and continuation of price increases at about the average

rate of the past two quarters would be consistent with attainment
of the goals.
In evaluating the healthy turn of the economy thus far in

1972, I will now present briefly my views regarding the prospects

for sustaining such a rapid expansion of output, the advisability
of relying solely on monetary and fiscal actions to bring the un­

employment rate down much further, and the contribution of
controls to reducing inflation.

First, the very rapid growth of real output in the first part
of the year is probably not sustainable over the longer-run. There
is some evidence that a slowing has already occurred. For example

industrial production has grown at a 4 percent rate since April,
down from a 14 percent rate over the preceding four months.




Pay-

-4-

roll employment has risen at a 2.5 percent rate since April,

after rising at a 4.6 percent rate from December to April. These
slower rates of increase are desirable, I believe, because they

are more consistent with preserving the gains that have been
made in slowing the rate of inflation than would be an attempt to

continue the faster growth rates experienced earlier in the year.
Some will criticize this slower rate of employment growth
because the unemployment rate has fallen only to the neighbor­
hood of 5.5 percent. These critics cite as a desirable goal an un­

employment rate of 4 percent or less. As laudable as such a goal

may be, these critics overlook the costs of attaining such a target
through the use of overall economic stimulus.

Post-war exoeri-

ence demonstrates that whenever the unemployment rate has

moved below 5 percent, inflation has become a serious oroblem.
Given the structure of our labor markets and the way they function,

using monetary and fiscal actions exclusively to achieve significant
further reductions in unemployment runs a serious risk of renewed

inflationary pressure.
On this point I am in agreement with the Chairman of the

Council of Economic Advisers who, in an interview for First National

City Bank last August, pointed out that "there are a number of other
policies which may be involved in getting the rate of unemployment

down." He indicated that what he had in mind was various types

of manpower programs.




-5 Apparently there was a realization of this point when price

and wage controls were instituted thirteen months ago as part of

a program designed to promote economic recovery and a slowing of
inflation. Some have cited, as evidence of the contribution of
these controls to price stability, the 3 percent increase in the

consumer price index in the year ending with August. This was
down from a 4.5 percent increase in the year prior to controls.

It is not clear whether this reduction in the rate of inflation has
been due to controls or to natural economic forces set into motion

by the monetary restraint of 1969 followed by moderate growth in
money in the period immediately thereafter.
I tend to place emphasis on this latter development.
flation reached a peak in early 1970.

In­

In February of that year the

consumer or ice index was over 6 percent higher than a year

earlier. The rate of inflation has been decelerating since then,
declining to 4.5 percent in the year ending August 1971 when the
controls were imposed. The deceleration in consumer prices was

only a little more in the following twelve months than in the year

prior to controls.

With regard to the economic outlook for the balance of

this year and through 1973, most private economic forecasters
expect a continuation of strong economic expansion through the
end of next year. They do not, however, expect the expansion to




-6continue at the rapid rates of the first half of 1972. These fore­

casters generally do not expect much further improvement in

the rate of inflation.

In fact, many forecast the reemergence of

accelerating inflation by the last half of next year.
I am in agreement with the general contours of output and
price movements projected by most private forecasters. The course

of monetary expansion, especially that related to Federal budget

developments, can alter this outlook considerably, however.
Our research indicates that the rate of expansion of the
money stock over a period of five or more years is the major de­

terminant of the rate of inflation. This research also indicates
that a change in the rate of money growth for a period exceeding
two quarters exerts a significant short-run, but temporary,

influence on growth in output and employment. So let us look
at some implications of recent monetary developments in light

of these findings.
Money has grown at a 6 percent trend rate since 1966.

Our research indicates that the rate of inflation in the neighbor­
hood of 4 percent expected by many forecasters for late next year

is consistent with this trend in money growth. Over a shorter
period, money has increased at a 9 percent rate thus far in 1972.
If this rate of growth were to continue much longer, I would
expect inflation to intensify more next year than currently fore­
cast. On the other hand, if we were to revert abruptly to a lower




- 7 growth rate of money, I would expect less expansion of output
next year from that expected by most forecasters. You can see

the problems facing those who have responsibility for promoting
both high employment and price stability.

These problems are further complicated by the outlook for

the Federal oudget. The unified budget moved sharply from a

surplus in the fiscal year 1969 to a deficit in fiscal year 1971.
This shift from surplus to deficit reflected virtually no growth in

receipts while expenditures increased $27 billion.

If the economy

had remained at a high level of resource utilization, and if no

change in tax laws had occurred, receipts would have been about
$37 billion higher than was realized. More than half of this

short-fall in receipts resulted from tax changes following elimi­
nation of the income tax surcharge and the Tax Reform Act of
1969. The remainder of the short-fall was due to the slowing in

economic activity during the recent recession. Some have cited

this move toward budget deficits, which was augmented by further

tax reductions in the Revenue Act of 1971, as a desirable develop­
ment in view of the softness in the economy.

Once getting into this situation, what are the prospects

of getting out of it now that economic activity is expanding quite
rapidly?

In the fiscal year ending June 1972, the deficit was $23

billion. With increased expenditures for existing programs only,




- 8 -

including recently enacted revenue sharing, and revenues from

existing tax laws, it is generally estimated that the deficit will be
about $35 billion in the present fiscal year. The proposed ceiling

of $250 billion on expenditures would reduce this deficit to

around $27 billion. This ceiling would thus contribute little
to eliminating the deficit.
Looking further ahead, we estimate for fiscal year 1975

that existing spending programs and taxing provisions will result
in a minimum deficit of $15 billion if we have full employment.

I believe, along with many others, that the Federal budget is
virtually out of control.
Let us now examine the alternatives which face us as a

result of this bleak budget picture. An obvious step would be to
get the budget back into balance this fiscal year by cutting Govern­

ment exDenditures about 13 percent. This si considerably more
than the 3 percent spending cut implied by the proposed ceiling.
In view of the concern expressed over the proposed $250 billion

ceiling and the ever mounting pressures for expanded programs,
such a marked reduction in spending is unlikely.

A budget balance could also be achieved by increasing taxes.
This would require a 15 percent increase in Federal government

tax collections from all sources. This alternative would also be
difficult to achieve in view of the pressures for tax relief. Further




- 9 more, it may not be desirable for longer-run control of the

budget.

I am afraid that expansion of revenues to meet present

levels of spending would tend to reduce the prospects for close

evaluation of the appropriateness and effectiveness of existing

spending programs. Furthermore, such an expansion would
tend to establish a bad precedent for evaluating the long-run
costs of new programs.

If the prospects are not very good for a marked reduction

in forthcoming deficits, what are the remaining alternatives?
The inflationary impact of the deficits could be reduced consider­
ably by financing the entire deficit by borrowing from the public.

To attract the funds required from competing uses would, however,

result in a marked rise in interest rates.

If past experience is

any guide, such a development would be strongly opposed by
large segments of the general public and by many politicians.
In the face of such opposition, there would be considerable

pressure to finance the deficits by another alternative, that is by
monetary expansion. This is what happened in the 1965 through

1968 period when the Federal Reserve System attempted to resist

an upward movement in interest rates by acquiring an ever in­
creasing proportion of a constantly growing national debt. Just as

in this earlier period, the rate of monetary expansion would ac­
celerate under this alternative, resulting in accelerating inflation
and eventually in higher interest rates.




- 10 In such a case, another alternative is to rely on price
and wage controls to reduce the rate of price increase. Such

measures, however, merely treat the symptoms of inflation and
not its underlying cause, which is a raDid trend rate of monetary

expansion. With a rapid rate of monetary expansion, controls
would have to become progressively more restrictive if continued
progress were to be made in reducing the rate of price increase.

Past exDerience, both here and abroad, indicates that price and
wage controls have not been very effective in reducing the rate

of inflation for any extended period of time.

Some have given up on the fight against inflation, and
recommend still another alternative which I find to be particularly
objectionable. They suggest that the best course of action at this

time is to maintain the present trend rate of money growth and to

learn to live with the current rate of inflation. They argue that
once a rate of inflation becomes fully anticipated, as may be the

Dresent situation, individuals can take steps to protect the Durchas

ing power of their income and savings from the ravages of inflation

On the other hand, they argue that the short-run costs in terms
of reduced output and employment, which would be expected to

accompany steps taken to reduce inflation further, would be too

great to bear.
I do not accept this alternative.

I see no evidence that our

labor, commodity, and financial markets are such as to permit all




-11 -

individuals equal opportunity to protect their purchasing power
from erosion by inflation. Furthermore, it is not just the case

of holding the rate of inflation constant that the country now faces,

but the more likely case of accelerating inflation. There is no as­
surance that the economic policy errors of the past which caused

the present inflation will not be repeated.

If such errors were

repeated after we had decided to try to live with the present inflation,

the result would most likely be an even higher rate of price advance.
There is one final alternative that I would like to present.
This alternative is learning to live with economic stability without

inflation. Our research indicates that it is possible, with appropriate

monetary actions, to achieve output and employment growth at our
economy's potential without inflation.

anything less than such a goal.

I see no reason to settle for

But I realize that attaining this

objective in the near future would entail some temporary, transitional
costs in terms of somewhat slower growth in output and employment

for a while.
The big question remains whether or not our people have

the intestinal fortitude to bear these short-run costs. These costs
of curbing inflation were borne in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

As a result, our economy began to experience economic stability
without inflation in about 1964. Then a stabilization mistake occurred
with the acceleration of government spending in the mid- 1960's.




- 12 Steps were taken to correct this mistake by a sharp reduction

in the rate of monetary expansion in 1966 and again in 1969.
Twice, a large portion of the transitional costs of controlling
inflation was borne.

I n each instance the stage was set for a

resumption of output growth at our country's potential without

inflation, if money growth had been resumed at a lower trend
rate. Following 1966, however, prospective short-run costs
were deemed to be too great and the trend rate of monetary

expansion was accelerated. Following 1969, there was concern
over the short-run costs that had occurred, and money growth
was resumed at a moderate rate for a while. But then it accel­

erated and the trend rate established earlier was not altered.
In conclusion, the outlook for 1973 and beyond is for

continued strong growth in output and employment.

Given the

Federal budget outlook, however, there is also a very pessimistic

aspect to the outlook.

Unless courageous steos are taken to

bring government soending under control, there is a great

likelihood of rising taxes, higher interest rates, more inflation,
or tougher controls — separately or in various combinations.