View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

For release on delivery
12:40 p.m. EST
November 17, 2021

Reflections on Stablecoins and Payments Innovations

Remarks by
Christopher J. Waller
Member
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
“Planning for Surprises, Learning from Crises”
2021 Financial Stability Conference, cohosted by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the Office of Financial Research
Cleveland, Ohio
(via webcast)

November 17, 2021

The U.S. payment system is experiencing a technology-driven revolution.
Shifting consumer preferences and the introduction of new products and services from a
wide variety of new entities have led to advancements in payments technology. This
dynamic landscape has also sparked an active policy debate—about the risks these new
developments pose, how regulators should address them, and whether the government
should offer an alternative of its own.
Earlier this year, I spoke about the last of these questions: whether the Fed should
offer a general-purpose central bank digital currency (CBDC) to the American public. 1
My skepticism about the need for a CBDC, which I still hold, comes in part from the real
and rapid innovation taking place in payments. My argument—simple as it sounds—is
that payments innovation, and the competition it brings, is good for consumers. The
market and the public are telling us there is room for improvement in the U.S. payment
system. We should take that message to heart and provide a safe and sound way for those
improvements to occur.
My remarks today focus on “stablecoins,” the highest-profile example of a new
and fast-growing payments technology. 2 Stablecoins are a type of digital asset designed
to maintain a stable value relative to a national currency or other reference assets.
Stablecoins have piggybacked off the recent increase in crypto-asset activity, and their
market capitalization has increased almost fivefold in just the past year. 3 Stablecoins can

See Christopher J. Waller (2021), “CBDC: A Solution in Search of a Problem?” speech delivered at the
American Enterprise Institute, Washington (via webcast), August 5,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20210805a.htm.
2
These views are my own and do not represent any position of the Board of Governors or other Federal
Reserve policymakers.
3
See President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (2021), Report on Stablecoins (Washington: PWG, FDIC, and OCC,
November) https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/StableCoinReport_Nov1_508.pdf.
1

-2be thought of in two forms. Some serve as a “safe, liquid” asset in the decentralized
finance, or DeFi, world of crypto-trading. Examples include Tether and USD Coin.
Alternatively, there are stablecoins that are intended to serve as an instrument for retail
payments between consumers and firms. Although these types of stablecoins have not
taken off yet, some firms are working to assess the viability of such stablecoins as a retail
payment instrument. This growth in usage of stablecoins and their potential to serve as a
retail payment instrument has prompted regulatory attention, including a new report from
the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG). This report urges the
Congress to limit the issuance of “payment stablecoins” to banks and other insured
depository institutions.
Fostering responsible payments innovation means setting clear and appropriate
rules of the road for everyone to follow. We know how to handle that task, and we
should tackle it head-on. The PWG report lays out one path to responsible innovation,
and I applaud that effort. However, I also believe there may be others that better promote
innovation and competition while still protecting consumers and addressing risks to
financial stability. This is the right time to debate such approaches, and it is important to
get them right. If we do not, these technologies may move to other jurisdictions—posing
risks to U.S. markets that we will be much less able to manage.
Stablecoins: What’s Old, and What’s New
Stablecoin arrangements involve a range of legal and operational structures across
a range of distributed ledger networks. They are a genuinely new product, based on
genuinely new technology. But despite the jargon surrounding stablecoins, we can also

-3understand them as a new version of something older and more familiar: the bank
deposit. 4
As I have said before, both the government and the private sector play
indispensable roles in the U.S. monetary system. The Federal Reserve offers both
physical “central bank money” to the general public in the form of physical currency and
digital “central bank money” to depository institutions in the form of digital accounts.
Commercial banks, in turn, give households and businesses access to “commercial bank
money,” crediting checking and savings accounts when a customer deposits cash or takes
out a loan. This privately created money serves as a bridge between the central bank and
the public.
Commercial bank money is a form of private debt. The bank issuing that debt
promises to honor it at a fixed, one-to-one exchange rate with central bank money. The
bank itself is responsible for keeping that promise. However, the bank is supported in
that task by a tried-and-true system of public support. That includes regulation and
supervision, which ensure banks are safe and sound, not taking imprudent risks in their
day-to-day business; the availability of discount window credit, which ensures wellcapitalized banks can meet their emergency liquidity needs; and deposit insurance, which
protects consumer deposits if the bank fails. Put together, those programs leave very
little residual risk that a depositor in good standing will ever have to leave the teller
empty handed. They make a bank’s redemption promise credible, and they make
commercial bank money a near-perfect substitute for cash. As a result, households and
businesses overwhelmingly use commercial bank money for everyday transactions. 5
4
5

This analogy applies to the economics of stablecoins; I make no comment on their legal status.
See Waller, “CBDC,” in note 1.

-4This arrangement has many advantages. Small retail customers do not have to
spend their time vetting the safety and soundness of their banks—regulators and
supervisors do that for them. Consumers have a safe place to keep their savings and a
nearly risk-free way to make payments, which are settled in ultrasafe central bank
liabilities. Banks can focus their effort on investments, products, and services from a
place of safety and soundness. Communities and customers benefit from those efforts in
the form of more efficient capital allocation and higher-quality, lower-cost financial
products.
These advantages, however, are not cost free. Regulation ensures that
commercial banks issue “sound money” by making sure those banks are safe and stable,
and that they bear the risks of their own investment decisions. But regulation also
imposes costs, from the expense and time required to seek a banking charter to the costs
of compliance with an array of regulations. While regulations are necessary, they also
limit free entry into at least some of the markets in which banks operate. As a result,
regulatory oversight can insulate banks from some forms of direct competition. The
Congress has long recognized the importance of private-sector competition and customer
choice, particularly in payments, and the Congress and the Federal Reserve take regular
steps to preserve a competitive payments marketplace. 6
The objective of stablecoins is to mimic the safe-asset features of commercial
bank money. They typically offer a fixed exchange rate of one-to-one to a single asset or
a basket of assets. Payment stablecoins tend to choose a sovereign currency as their

See Federal Reserve System (2021), “Fostering Payment and Settlement System Safety and Efficiency,”
in The Fed Explained: What the Central Bank Does, 11th ed. (Washington: FRS), pp. 84–111,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/the-fed-explained.pdf.

6

-5anchor, typically the U.S. dollar. Stablecoin issuers suggest that one can redeem a
stablecoin from the issuer for one U.S. dollar, although redemption rights are not always
well defined. Nor is the entity responsible for conducting redemption always clearly
specified.
To enhance the credibility of redemption at par, some stablecoin issuers go
further, promising to limit the investments they make with the money backing each
stablecoin by keeping it in cash or other highly liquid assets. In this respect, stablecoins
can resemble a “narrow bank,” a well-known payment-only banking structure that
monetary economists have studied for more than half a century. 7 Constructed this way,
stablecoins also resemble currency boards, which peg a foreign currency to the dollar and
hold dollar reserves to back up redemption promises.
Although stablecoins try to mimic commercial bank money, they differ
dramatically in terms of the payment networks they use. Dollar-denominated commercial
bank money is a settlement instrument in a wide range of asset markets, and customers
can transfer it using a wide range of payment platforms. However, commercial bank
money is not “native” to public blockchains, the distributed networks that support trading
and other activity involving crypto-assets. Stablecoins help fill that gap as a less volatile
anchor for crypto-asset transactions and an “on-ramp” for digital asset trading.
Promises and Risks
This role—as a more stable private asset in digital markets that otherwise lack
such assets—has meaningful benefits by itself, helping make those markets deeper and
more liquid. A well-designed, well-regulated stablecoin could also have other benefits,
See, for example, Milton Friedman (1960), A Program for Monetary Stability (New York: Fordham
University Press).

7

-6which go well beyond digital asset markets. It might allow for different activity on
distributed ledger technology, or DLT, platforms, like a wider range of automated (or
“smart”) contracts. It might serve as an “atomic” settlement asset and thus help bring
some of the speed and potential efficiencies of digital asset markets into more traditional
ones. With the right network design, stablecoins might help deliver faster, more efficient
retail payments as well, especially in the cross-border context, where transparency can
still be low and costs can still be high. Stablecoins could be a source of healthy
competition for existing payments platforms and help the broader payments system reach
a wider range of consumers. And, importantly, while stablecoins and other payment
innovations could create new risks, we should not foreclose the possibility that they may
help address old ones—for example, by providing greater visibility into the resources and
obligations that ultimately support any system of privately issued money.
These benefits are substantial, and even where they are still uncertain, it is
important to recognize them. But to capture those benefits, stablecoins must bridge the
biggest gap between them and commercial bank money: robust, consistent supervision
and regulation and appropriate public backstops. Strong oversight, combined with
deposit insurance and other public support that comes with it, is what makes bank
deposits an acceptable and accepted form of money. Today stablecoins lack that
oversight, and its absence does create risks. The PWG described several such risks in its
report, but I will highlight just three.
The first is the risk of a destabilizing run. The United States has a rich history of
privately created money, stretching back to promissory notes that merchants and lawyers

-7issued on the early frontier. 8 Some of these instruments worked well for long periods;
others came from unregulated or unscrupulous issuers, who promised safety and stability
at a more attractive rate of return. When these instruments went bad, the consequences
could extend well beyond the depositors, investors, or even institutions who put their
principal at risk. It is important not to overstate these risks; if the investors that
participate in stablecoin arrangements know their money is at risk, then a run on one
issuer is less likely to become a run on all of them. But without transparency into those
risks, or with retail users that are less able to monitor them, the possibility of widespread
losses is more of a concern. As I mentioned, for commercial bank money, regulation,
supervision, deposit insurance, and the discount window make this dynamic more remote
by giving a bank’s creditors less reason to run.
The second risk is the risk of a payment system failure. Stablecoins share many
of the functions of a traditional payment system. If stablecoins’ role in payments activity
grows—which, again, could be a good development—their exposure to clearing,
settlement, and other payment system risks would grow, too. Stablecoins also present
some unique versions of these risks because responsibility for different payment
functions is scattered across the network. The United States does not have a national
payments regulator, but it does have strong standards for addressing payment system risk,
especially where those payment systems are systemically important. Regulators should
draw on those standards with care and take a fresh look at what should or should not
apply in the stablecoin context.

See Justin Simard (2016), “The Birth of a Legal Economy: Lawyers and the Development of American
Commerce,” Buffalo Law Review, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 1059–1134.

8

-8The third risk is the risk of scale. Stablecoins, like any payment mechanism, can
exhibit strong network effects; the more people use a payment instrument, the more
useful it is, and the greater the value it delivers to each participant. For this same reason,
network effects can be (and usually are) highly beneficial. As a result, rapid and broad
scaling of a payment instrument is socially desirable. In fact, in a perfect world, there
would be one payment system and one payment instrument that everyone uses. The
problem with this is that, in our imperfect world, this would confer monopoly power over
the payment system. Any entity that has control over a large and widely used payment
system has substantial market power and thus the ability to extract rents in exchange for
access—which, again, hurts competition and decreases the network benefits to
consumers. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the efficiency of having one large network
and the cost of monopoly control of that network. I believe that we are a long way from a
monopoly in stablecoin issuance; I see a lot of interest in offering this type of payments
competition and ensuring that there are relatively few barriers to entry. In my view,
having stablecoins scale rapidly is not a concern as long as there is sufficient competition
within the stablecoin industry and from the existing banking system. In this world, some
form of interoperability is critical to ensure that competition allows consumers to easily
move across stablecoin networks, just as they can move between different commercial
bank monies or sovereign currencies.
Looking Beyond the Banking Model
Jurisdictions around the world are grappling with these same risks, trying to foster
the potential benefits of stablecoin arrangements while minimizing their costs. The PWG
report described one approach to that cost-benefit equation: restricting the issuance of

-9“payment stablecoins” to insured depository institutions and imposing strict limits on the
behavior of wallet providers and other nonbank intermediaries. Given the economic
similarities between payment stablecoins and bank deposits, I have no objection to the
idea of banks issuing both instruments. The United States has a tried-and-true system for
overseeing and supporting the creation of commercial bank money, and there is no reason
to suggest it could not be adapted to work in this context.
However, I disagree with the notion that stablecoin issuance can or should only be
conducted by banks, simply because of the nature of the liability. I understand the
attraction of forcing a new product into an old, familiar structure. But that approach and
mindset would eliminate a key benefit of a stablecoin arrangement—that it serves as a
viable competitor to banking organizations in their role as payment providers. The
Federal Reserve and the Congress have long recognized the value in a vibrant, diverse
payment system, which benefits from private-sector innovation. That innovation can
come from outside the banking sector, and we should not be surprised when it crops up in
a commercial context, particularly in Silicon Valley. When it does, we should give those
innovations the chance to compete with other systems and providers—including banks—
on a clear and level playing field.
To do so, the regulatory and supervisory framework for payment stablecoins
should address the specific risks that these arrangements pose—directly, fully, and
narrowly. This means establishing safeguards around all of the key functions and
activities of a stablecoin arrangement, including measures to ensure the stablecoin
“reserve” is maintained as advertised. But it does not necessarily mean imposing the full
banking rulebook, which is geared in part toward lending activities, not payments. If an

- 10 entity were to issue stablecoin-linked liabilities as its sole activity; if it backed those
liabilities only with very safe assets; if it engaged in no maturity transformation and
offered its customers no credit; and if it were subject to a full program of ongoing
supervisory oversight, covering the full stablecoin arrangement, that might provide
enough assurance for these arrangements to work.
There should also be safeguards for other participants in a stablecoin arrangement,
like wallet providers and other intermediaries. Again, however, not all of the restrictions
that apply to bank relationships might be necessary. For example, there is no need to
apply restrictions on commercial companies from owning or controlling intermediaries in
these arrangements. The separation of banking and commerce is grounded in concerns
about captive lending—the idea that banks might lend to their owners on too favorable
terms, giving the owners an unfair subsidy and putting the bank on shaky ground. These
traditional concerns do not apply to wallet providers and other intermediaries who abstain
from lending activities. There are new questions to consider, such as around the use of
customers’ financial transaction data, but where anticompetitive behavior happens,
existing law (and particularly antitrust law) should still apply.
Policymakers will continue to work through these questions in the coming
months, but in the process, we should not let the novelty of stablecoins muddy the waters.
The United States has a long history of developing, refining, and integrating new
payment technologies in ways that maintain the integrity of its financial institutions and
its payment system. Stablecoins may be new, but their economics are far from it. We
know how to make this kind of privately issued money safe and sound, and, in designing

- 11 a program of regulation and supervision to do so, we have plenty of examples to draw on.
In the interest of competition and of the consumers it benefits, we should get to work.