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THE FUNCTION OF 1'ONETARY CONTROLS

Address byChester C# Davis
President, Federal Reserve Bank of St* Louis

Before the
317th reeting of the
National Industrial Conference Board
Sheraton Hotel, Chicago, 111*
Thursday evening, November 16, 19^0

THE FUNCTION OF MONETARY CONTROLS
In an article in last Sunday's St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Raymond P.
Brandt, the chief of its Washington Bureau, wrote?
"Only two major issues will confront the new Congress • . . Restraining
Communist agression abroad and controlling inflation at home • . . All other
issues are minor."
I am to talk to you tonight about one of those two major issues controlling inflation. I approach this task with mixed feelings - on the one
hand -with a strong sense of the importance, the urgency, of the subject; on the
other hand with a sense of inadequacy*

Over the past decade we have heard a lot

of talk about inflation and its control. About everything that could be said on
the subject has been said many times over.
We have been reared to think of a peaceful world as normal, although
it actually has not been peaceful in our adult lifetime. Now we realize that we
aren't going to see what wo thought of as "normal" times for the rest of our lives,
or while Stalin1s ruthless dictatorship controls a large share of the world's
resources, with satellite armies ready to march when he pulls the string, just as
they did in Korea.
The implications are clear. We are going to devote a large share of
our national resources to building and maintaining here and in Europe, if there
is time, a great military force. The renewed military effort must be superimposed on an economy that was already going nearly full blast with comparatively
few unemployed last June. That*s vastly different from 19i|0 when we had ten
million unemployed, and a lot of slack in our production line. The actual effects
of the expenditures and material drains involved in this program haven't been
felt yet, but their anticipation has given us a foretaste.




- 2 To my way of thinking, one of the most significant aspects of this
foretaste is that it has occurred before there has been any large-scale impact
from our renewed military and foreign arms aid program*

The inflationaiy kick

from this factor is still largely in the future. So, too, is the return to
deficit financing on a large scale which I am morally certain is ahead of us.
Wefve had more than a nodding acquaintance with inflation over the
past ten years but there is still a lot of fuzzy thinking about it and its root
causes. Inflation is an old economic disease which has one very curious
characteristic. Most of us like some aspects of it* All of us like to see
inflated prices on what we sell, though none of us likes inflation in what we
buy. Everyone has a sort of a split personality when it comes to controls for
inflation.

wre are apt to favor controls for the other fellow, and freedom for

ourselves.
We have inflation when the rate of flow of spending exceeds the rate
of flow of goods and services into the market. Now that is not a hard idea to
grasp and yet a good many of the prescriptions for inflation tend to ignore its
basic cause, which is, I repeat, a disproportionate increase in the volume of
purchasing power relative to available goods and services.
War, or intense preparation for war, gives a doublebarreled impulse
to inflation. It steps up demand for labor, materials and facilities, while it
subtracts them from the use and service of civilians at the same time civilian
incomes are expanding.

I know that the National Industrial Conference Board has

nice figures to show that inflation hasn't increased much since June 25th, but
brothers, we haven't seen anything yet to what we vdll see if (1) military
spending is as large as projected, and (2) if we don't do better than we have
been doing to finance the government deficit in other ways than through
commercial bank and central bank credit*



A moment ago I used the term "the flow of purchasing power". Let me

- 3paint in a couple of details.

TT

ost purchasing power comes from current income,

but there are two important v/ays to augment it - by the use of past aaving for
current spending, which means a more rapid turnover of existing purchasing
power, and by drawing against future income, that is, by credit expansion.
These two factors widen the disparity between the flow of purchasing power and
the flow of goods and services into the economy, and put more dynamite into the
inflationary kick.
Letfs say that purchasing power is the money supply times its
velocity. If we slow down the rate of spending we reduce applied purchasing
power. If we sop up some of the increased income through taxes or through
savings, we attack inflation at its source. So do we also, when we restrain
growth in credit or perhaps even reduce the amount outstanding.

Let me stress

again that the only real cure for an inflationary situation is to bring the
supply of purchasing power into balance rath the supply of goods and services.
Wo other method cures the disease.
That is the inflationary process, as simply as I can put it. It can
be attacked on two sides - either the rate of flow of civilian goods and services
can be increased or the rate of growth of purchasing power can be restrained.
That's the case in theory. Actually the attack has to be made on the money
supply. Yi/hen an inflation becomes dangerous, the economy generally is producing
at pretty close to capacity. That's the case now.

Obviously it is in the national

interest to keep production for civilian use rolling up to the limits fixed by
the needs of the military program. But a broad increase in available goods and
services over a short period of time is hardly possible. To arm ourselves and
our allies we have to take vast quantities of goods and services from civilian
use.

As far as consumers are concerned, we might just as well sink these goods

in the ocean.



-

h-

So if we are to restrain inflation ?/hen the armament impact hits us,
we will have to act on the money supply - hold down increases in the flow of
purchasing power as well as we can to balance the supply of available goods and
services*
There are several avenues of attack on the money side. I will mention
just a few: voluntary self-restraint; reduction of non-military spending;
taxation to meet military costs as nearly as possible on a pay-as-you-go basis;
greater savings; and a restrictive monetary policy.

I'll have the most to say

about the last.
These are primary steps, aimed at the causes of inflation. You may
wonder why I haven1t listed price and wage controls across the board in this
category. Price and wage controls by themselves do not stop inflation. They
may conceal and defer the effects of inflation, but sonner or later if the
fundamental causes of inflation are not dealt with, there will be an explosion.
A tied-down safety valve on a boiler won't hold the steam in check very long if
you keep shoveling fuel into the fire box.
Prospects are dim that inflation can be overcome by voluntary action,
although general restraint - a willingness to discipline ourselves - is essential
to any successful program.

The reason why individual, voluntary restraints

historically have not sufficed lies in that curious split personality of
individuals and businesses with respect to inflation. The things each individual,
each business, each labor or farm group, each banker and each Government official
must do to overcome inflation through a program of voluntary restraint run counter
to habitual action and preferences. But to the extent voluntary restraint can
be exercised, it is extremely helpful*
Unnecessary spending must be restrained not only by individuals and
businesses but also by Government - Federal, state and local. In the present situation any



decrease in the volume of spending must take place mainly in the non-

- 5military sector of the economy.

Government can do much more than it shows signs

of doing to curtail non-essential expenditures to offset increased military costs.
To the extent it succeeds, inflationary pressures will be reduced.

The difficulty

in government retrenchment, of course, stems from the fact that people and their
political leaders really don't want it applied to their own pet projects or
interests.
A more promising avenue of attack is through increased taxes. If we
can pay as we go with increased taxes to match the added armament costs we could
conceivably sop up an amount of purchasing power equivalent to the amount of
goods that will be taken away from civilians for defense purposes.
The main sources of additional tax revenue may all be employed - taxes
on individual incomes, corporate profits, excess profits and excise taxes. These
taxes have different effects on spending and investing, and it is important to
look at them not only as revenue sources, but also from the point of view of
their general effect on the economy. Today's program touched on some of these
considerations, and I do not have time to go into them.
A fourth avenue of attack is through encouragement of savings. A
successful program of selling government securities to non-bank investors increases savings, reduces private spending,and lets Government spend borrowed
funds without swelling the money supply. Appropriate debt management policy
ml}, lead the government, when it needs to borrow new money, to get all it can
from non-bank sources. And when it has to refund maturing issues, the object
should be to lodge more securities outside the banking system, because it is borrowing from the banks that increases the money supply.
A restrictive monetary policy, the last of the avenues of attack I mentioned, is a powerful force that can be brought to bear on the money supply. It
is harder to understand, and I m i l talk about it most. Teamed with a complementary



- 6policy of debt management and a strong tax program, restrictive monetary action
attacks inflationary forces right at the source*

An easy monetary policy may

not, at times, be very effective in inducing economic revival, but there isnft
much doubt that tight money can check a boom, 'tfhen money becomes tighter, the
spending plans of individuals and of businesses have to be modified dovmward.
A restrictive monetary policy operates through reducing availability
and increasing cost of bank reserves, and is expressed through an increased
cost of money; in other words, in higher interest rates. Restraint is used to
make it more difficult and more costly for the banks to obtain reserve funds,
which, under our system, are necessary to support a further expansion in their
loans and investments.
Of course there arc other and more direct restraints. Selective
controls, such as are applied to stock market, installment, and new housing
credits, are easily understood. But the function of bank reserves, the way the
fractional reserve system works, and the relationship between bank reserves and
the interest rate on the government debt are not generally understood, and since
there will be wide discussion and controversy over them in the days ahead, I want
to spend the rest of my time talking about them.
Everyone of the steps to enforce a restrictive money policy is painful
and hard to take. Part of the responsibility in these steps belongs to the Federal
Reserve system. The agency that tries to meet this responsibility can never be
popular, but perhaps its policy can be understood, at least by intelligent groups
like this.

I'm not too sure of that, either, because the process by which bank

credit expands and contracts, and the effect of such changes on the money supply
are by no means simple to explain or to understand.

Itfs a v/hole lot easier just to

cuss out the Federal Reserve and let it go at that. The problem of monetary




~ 7restraint is made more difficult because bankers, with whom you ordinarily will
discuss it, while they would like to have higher interest rates, oppose any move
to restrict their ready access to lcndable reserves or their freedom to expand
bank credit wherever there is a demand*
Banks in the United States are required to hold certain percentages of
their deposits as reserves, mainly with the Federal Reserve Banks* Tihen the banking system acquires excess reserves it can expand its loans and investments about
six times the amount of the new reserves*

If that happens, it adds about that

much to the country's money supply. Don't ask me to explain how the fractional
reserve system works, for there isn't time*

Just take my word for it*

If the banks want to continue to expand their loans, they must have new
reserve funds*

There are two main ways to get them - from an inflow of gold, and

from the central bank, which in this country of course is the Federal Reserve*
Disregard the gold movement as relatively unimportant at the moment*

The banks

can get Federal Reserve funds in two ways - by borrowing from, and by selling
government securities to, the Federal Reserve Banks*
The Reserve Banks can exercise restraint in their loans to member banks
through the discount rate and in other ways*

But restraint through refusing to

buy government securities offered in the market is more difficult to accomplish*
It is most important to recognize that the Reserve System is not free to reduce
the availability of reserves and of bank credit as long as it is required to hold
a rigid pattern of rates on Government securities*

Holding a rigid pattern means,

of course, that the System has to buy securities at any time they are offered in
surplus on the market to prevent a decline in price and an increase in yields* It
is an absolute guarantee of complete availability of reserves at all times; banks




- 8have automatic access to Federal Reserve funds and at terms that generally yield
them a book profit on the securities they sell*
Action by the Federal Reserve System to make reserves harder for the
banks to get reduces the basis for bank credit expansion, and is appropriate
action under inflationary conditions*

Right here I want to make a most

important point that is not appreciated very widely*

The operations of the

Federal Reserve System in tightening reserves of commercial banks result in an
upward movement of interest rates. We recognize fully that these upward
movements in rates do not do much to restrain borrowers*

The cost of credit,

in other words, is not a major factor as far as borrowers are concerned*

And the

main restraint on lenders does not rest so much on the cost of credit as it does
on these other factors: Rate changes increase bankers1 need for liquidity because
of uncertainty as to whether additional reserves will be available and at what
cost; rising rates reduce the market price of assets on hand and thus make their
sale less attractive; and finally, higher rates on government securities make them
more attractive, thus dampening enthusiasm for other loans and investments*
You all have heard statements to the effect that the Federal Reserve
System thinks it can keep people from borrowing by raising interest rates a
fraction of 1 per cent*
position*

That is a complete misinterpretation of the System

The rise in rates may have no effect whatsoever on the demand for

credit, but it does reduce the availability of credit and that is exactly what
the present and prospective situation seems to call for.




- 9I want to make one more point as clear as I can. Rising interest rates,
which reflect lessened availability of credit, operate both on the private and
public sectors of the money market; in other words, rate increases apply to Government securities as well as to private securities and private loans. But the
question of cost involved in higher rates on Government securities should be put
in proper perspective*

An increase in the interest rate increases the cost to the

government of carrying the public debt. That is part of the price to regain
control over the rate of expansion of bank credit*

The Federal Reserve believes

that this increased cost, which ?rc>uld be counted in millions, should be weighed
against the total cost to the government and the public involved in further
inflation, which would be counted in billions paid in increased prices for each
percentage point the price level goes up. And, finally, any program that tends
to restore confidence in the dollar1s purchasing power, even though it involves
higher interest payments on part of the debt, would produce a stronger and more
stable demand and market for Government securities of all types.
Concern over the cost of servicing the vast public debt is easy to
understand and explain. But the issue is by no means one-sided, and should be
weighed calmly, openly, and as objectively and good-naturedly as possible.
The Federal Reserve on August 18 said it is prepared to use all the
means at its command to restrain further expansion of bank credit consistent
with its responsibility to maintain orderly conditions in the government securities
market. If it does that, it is in for a lot of criticism and opposition. It
isn't a simple, easy problem we face, but then the task of preserving a reasonably
stable economy without surrendering all our individual decisions to government
control isnft an easy one at any stage and particularly so in times like these.
There is a'relationship that is in danger of being overlooked between
the program of general monetary restriction I have been discussing and the preservation of



individual choice and freedom.

General controls leave freedom of business

- 10 choice and decision to the individual; direct controls such as price-and-wagefixing, rationing and allocation of supplies do not.
There is an increasing demand for price and wage fixing, for a more and
more controlled economy*

It comes from all segments of the American people -

from businessmen individually and in organizations, from labor unions, from the
press, from housewives, from all types and kinds of individuals. It is ironic
exaggeration, perhaps, to observe that the so-called economic planners at present
constitute the main vocal group now speaking against all-out direct controls, and
in favor of a general anti-inflation program that will tend to preserve individual
freedom.
The important variable between our system and others is the individual's
freedom of opportunity and choice- The core of that freedom and choice is the
relatively free movement of prices which impersonally and efficiently direct labor,
land and capital into economic uses.

Our economic system is flexible and dynamic

primarily because we use the price mechanism to allocate resources.
A good many people who press for more direct controls believe that
these by themselves vail cure inflation. Nothing could be further from the truth.
True, they tend to suppress inflation and push its effects off into the future.
There may come a time for direct controls, and it will be hastened if we fail to
act courageously and in harmonious teamwork to carry out general restrictive
measures*

Total mobilization of the nation's resources, if it comes, will un-

doubtedly bring government controls straight across the board. Even then, to work,
they Till have to be backed up by strongly restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.
Now I!ll let you come up for air. "That I have talked about is just one
of the skirmish lines in a world-Yddc front. The questions that confront us are
many and immensely complicated, and no one has oil the answers. No one can now
prescribe in full the course we should follow. Yet we must face the future -with

courage and


with understanding. Te must rest our faith on the conviction that

- 11 freedom .and the dignity of individual man m i l survive and we must be willing to
fight to make that come true#

In that spirit lies the hope that today1 s pain and

struggle may be made only a phase in the evolution of a safer and better world one in which freedom of thought and the institutions of human freedom have
survived..