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For Release on Delivery
(Approximately 2:00 p.m.,
Friday, May 17, 1957.)




Summary of Remarks
by
C. Canby Balderston, Vice Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
before the
Massachusetts Bankers Association Convention,
Swampscott, Massachusetts,
Friday, May 17, 1957.

Summary of Remarks
on
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM IN A CHANGING ECONOMY
Federal Reserve policy is not the result of abrupt or arbitrary
actions.

The general monetary policy for which the Federal Reserve is re­

sponsible is featured by flexibility,
the economic tides.

It shifts with the ebb and flow of

Just as businessmen seek to determine business trends

by observing the signs and portents that have been found historically to
have some meaning, so monetary authorities appraise business tendencies by
the same signs and act accordingly.
The problem of judging the state of business is two-fold.
the time-lag before business data become available.

One is

The other is the low

visibility during certain phases of the cycle.
For monetary authorities, the most fundamental problem of timing
is to perceive changes in the business climate quickly enough to take com­
pensatory action.

Promptness of action is imperative to avoid the danger

of continuing a given policy after it is no longer applicable.

If the au­

thorities wait until the figures demonstrate beyond question that further
credit restraint or stimulation is needed, the action may lose its effec­
tiveness, in whole or in part.

But the perils of action based on judgments

in advance of confirmatory information are obvious!
Another timing difficulty stems from the integration of monetary
and fiscal policy.

Actions by either the Fed or the Treasury may create

difficulties for the other one, however firmly these two agencies resolve
to work in concert.
Monetary policy should be adapted to future contours that can be
discerned only dimly and for a short distance ahead,

Consequently, shifts

in business outlook are rarely so definite and clear-cut that monetary au­
thorities can decide abruptly to shift credit policy from restraint to ease,




or vice versa.

Nor is a shift in policy emphasis usually decided suddenly

without extended consideration.

Just as a paddler guides his canoe through

the ever-changing currents of a swift-flowing river, so must monetary author­
ities use as much foresight as possible in adapting their policies to changes
in direction and condition.
Sometimes, of course, crises develop suddenly*

In the spring of

1953, ebullience was high, plant expansion was rapid, inventory accumulation
was large, and credit demands were strong with prospects for large Treasury
borrowing ahead*

The monetary authorities countered by increasing restraint

on bank credit expansion*

Suddenly, in a matter of days, money became so

tight as to endanger the smooth conduct of business, and the restraints were
eased.

In retrospect, it appears that the subsequent decline in activity is

to be attributed largely to curtailment of governmental defense expenditures,
— a curtailment that had not been scheduled when the monetary restraints were
imposed.
However, typical changes in the use of open market operations,
changes in discount rate and reserve requirements evolve gradually from a
whole sequence of developments in manufacturing, in commerce, in finance, and
in the markets of the world.

A striking example happened in the middle of

1956 when the Minneapolis and San Francisco Banks used discount rates dif­
ferent from the rest of the Reserve Banks. The commercial banks in those
districts were experiencing such loan demand as to cause them to borrow
heavily from their respective Federal Reserve Banks.

The Federal Reserve

directors of those two districts felt that the business sentiment reflected
by this loan demand was sufficiently exuberant to require curbing.




Accordingly,

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3

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they decided to increase their discount rates, subject to review and deter­
mination by the Federal Reserve Board,

The Federal Reserve Board, likewise,

was watching with concern the expansionist tendencies of that period, and
it approved the changes in these two districts even though the other ten
districts did not all follow suit for over four months,
If the value of money is to be stable and to assist the economy
to move steadily upward, its supply must be harmonized with the flow of
goods. The impact of the general money supply upon the economy is so great
as to make it of prime concern to citizens generally.

Thus, the supervi­

sion and control by government is required not only to make available suf­
ficient money to make possible economic growth, but also to avoid making
available so much as to cause inflation.

As far as the total supply of money

and credit is concerned, we have a managed currency.

The apportionment of

this supply among individual borrowers, however, is not primarily a matter
for Government but for private lenders.

The selection of the particular

customer to whom loans are to be made is and should be left to the discre­
tion of commercial institutions.

Only if the allocation is the result of

the operation of a free market will it be as impersonal as is desirable.
When the Government intervenes in this market allocation to take care of
especially sheltered groups through subsidies, guarantees, or direct loans,
it is increasing the difficulties of those not so sheltered.

Under the

free enterprise system it is axiomatic thct not all groups can be pro­
tected by such special shelters.
To minimize Government control over credit allocation is not to
deny the essential role of Government in providing services or relief for




distress situations that cannot be appropriately supplied through the market
by private enterprise or in regulating unsound credit or other business
practices.

These governmental activities inevitably affect the allocation

of resources.

The points I wish to make are two-fold:

(l)

Governmental

measures that influence the uses of credit should be kept to a minimum con­
sistent with its traditional responsibilities; and (2)

Government funds,

whether by direct payments or by extension of credit, used to promote or
subsidize particular activities should ordinarily be raised as much as pos­
sible through taxation rather than through borrowing. Any deficits, that
might be necessary, should be financed in a manner that is consistent with
monetary policies aimed at sustained economic growth.