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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

Remarks by
BRUCE K. MacLAURY
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

at the
Mid-year Economic Outlook Conference
The Conference Board

The Century-Plaza Hotel
Los Angeles, California
May 2, 1973

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

Nearly 30 years ago, Herblock of the Washington Post drew a
famous cartoon depicting the negotiations that were to result in the Bretton
Woods Agreement.

The cartoon showed a long conference table heaped high

with papers and two exhausted diplomats, one saying to the other, "Okay, let's
start over again.

Now if you have three apples and I have two oranges . . . "

The exchange market turmoil of the past few months is once again
pressuring negotiators to try to reconcile the irreconcilable.

The Group of

Twenty, with representation from all members of the International Monetary
Fund, is busily beavering away on a proposed framework for the reform of the
international monetary system in hopes of presenting Its findings at the
annual International Monetary Fund meeting in Nairobi this fall.

Meanwhile,

other experts in capitals around the world are gearing up for the trade
negotiations scheduled to begin in Tokyo this September.

There is an air of

urgency in all this activity, and at the same time an undeniable air of un­
certainty as well, since the potential exists 1n any tough bargaining either
for productive agreements, or endless recriminations.
On the issue of international monetary reform, the agenda 1s full
of tough problems.

It's clear that any new agreement is going to have to

provide for greater flexibility in exchange rates than was practiced under
the old Bretton Woods Agreement.

Indeed, the rules will presumably have to

be designed to accommodate floating exchange rates, since regimes of this
sort have become too numerous to suppress or Ignore.

Then there is the

question of eventual convertibility of the dollar into reserve assets, and
the necessary preconditions to achieve this.

Among those preconditions, surely,

are 1) some concrete evidence that past exchange rate changes are bringing the




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U.S. balance of payments into surplus; 2) that the excess liquidity in the
system at the moment (often referred to as the "dollar overhang") has been
at least partially funded or reabsorbed; and 3) that some method has been
found for dealing with disruptive short-term capital movements.
Despite the complexity of the issues involved, I have strong hopes
that meaningful progress can be made in resolving differing views on inter­
national monetary reform, partly because a good deal of "reform" has in
practice already taken place.

To be sure, last February's second devalu­

ation of the dollar did not produce the hoped-for stability in international
financial markets.

On the contrary, it made abundantly clear that one cannot

tamper with the value of a reserve currency at frequent intervals, and expect
the holders of dollar reserves to stand still for yet another change.

As a

result, the world 1s trying to have its cake and eat it too, as exemplified
In the wonderful phrase the IMF Governors' Committee agreed on to describe
their aspirations — a regime based on "stable but adjustable par values."
In practice, when the official foreign exchange markets reopened in March,
the world was de facto faced with a variety of floating exchange rates.
Now firm supporters of fixed exchange rate parities still argue
that world trade and investment will be held back by a system that tolerates
floating exchange rates,

fty own Impression, however, is that businessmen,

bankers, foreign exchange dealers, and investors are adapting to the current
situation without too much difficulty.

A few months without a crisis cer­

tainly doesn't prove the viability of present arrangements, as we learned to
our regret last year.

But at least the present calm may help to dispell the

undeserved black eye given the so-called floating system that existed during
the Interregnum from August to December in 1971.




In some respects, of course, the present situation with its many

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uncertainties ^s. analogous to the period between the closing of the gold
window in August 1971 and the Smithsonian Agreement the following December.
However, in other important respects I believe that the situation today is
considerably more stable.

In the first place, in 1971 we experienced the

traumatic breakdown of a system that had lasted for more than 20 years.
This spring, having already survived one devaluation of the dollar and having
witnessed the floating of several major currencies, we were more prepared to
take change in our stride.
In the second place, in the fall of 1971 we were faced with the
monumental task of attempting to find some reasonable realignment for exchange
rates that had become substantially distorted over many years.

Today, much

of the necessary adjustment has already taken place.
If there is a threat to international monetary stability at the
moment, it seems to me to lie in the excess liquidity that exists within
the system.

Vast sums of money, reacting to rumor or to speculative oppor­

tunities, are available to move from one currency to another, driving exchange
rates out of line with underlying balance of payments needs.

These large

capital flows also interfere with the monetary authorities' ability to
control money supplies in a manner appropriate for the domestic economy.
Indeed, the proliferation of controls on capital movements in the last
18 months 1s testimony to the absence of any mutually acceptable means for
controlling or sterilizing such flows.

In these circumstances, I am not

convinced that floating rates can by themselves absorb or deflect currency
speculation in the manner for which they're given credit in the textbooks —
resort to certain types of controls is perhaps as inevitable at the moment
with floating rates as it would be in a fixed parity system.




A different aspect of the current situation that seems to cause some

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worry 1s the possibility that floating exchange rates, or joint floats
against the dollar, are harbingers of a world that is breaking up into
competing currency blocs.

As I see it though, the tendency for the world

to align itself into currency areas is a natural outgrowth of the changed
structure of the world econoiny.

The effects of this new structure on trade

and financial relationships will be dictated more by the degree of economic
cooperation and harmony among countries generally than by the particular
form of currency links they adopt.

Outward oriented policies by currency

blocs are just as conducive to growth in world trade and investment as are
such policies undertaken by individual countries.
Other observers of the current scene are distressed by the fact
that ostensibly "floating" rates are not being wholly determined by market
forces.

Central banks have retained the right to intervene in foreign

exchange markets when they feel it is necessary.

This has given rise to

charges of "dirty floats" which, coupled with a fear of world trading blocs,
has led some to express concern that we are heading into an era of competitive
exchange rate devaluations and trade controls.
While such a scenario can't be ruled out, I think we do ourselves a
disservice in failing to make more discriminating use of the term "dirty float".
Official intervention to maintain orderly market conditions or to prevent
speculative flows of funds from distorting fundamentally viable exchange rates
seems to me perfectly appropriate and indeed desirable.

I regard a "dirty"

float as one in which the authorities purposely attempt to achieve or maintain
a basically undervalued exchange rate.

This was the case in the 1930's when

country after country attempted to "export its unemployment."

More recently,

countries have at times tried to maintain undervalued currencies 1n an effort
to preserve export markets, even in the face of full employment and inflationary




- 5 -

pressures at home.

Because of the strong temptations to misbehave 1n this

way, I believe the most pressing issue of international monetary reform at
the present time is the devising of rules that will identify and bring to
account cases of dirty floating, in the restricted and pernicious sense
that I have defined the term.

To be effective, such rules will have to

have the broad support of the leading industrial nations, and this is no
mean task.
Whatever the eventual design of a reformed international system,
it seems clear that the dollar will play a somewhat lesser role than in the
past.

This is neither good nor bad in itself, but simply a reflection of

the changes in real economic relationships that have already taken place.
The attempts by the Common Market to move toward a European "central bank"
as a step toward monetary union seem quite natural, especially in light of
the recent instability in the dollar.

By intervening in each other's

currencies rather than the dollar to maintain a joint float, part of their
previous reliance on the dollar as an intervention currency has already
been displaced.

And it's probably not unreasonable to expect a reduced

scope for the dollar as a reserve currency as well.

At the same time, I

think Dr. Emminger of the German Central Bank 1s quite right when he said
recently that the dollar should continue in some pivotal role whatever the
final design of a reformed system.

Whether or not it will be able to

shoulder this role will depend in large part on the strength of the dollar
at home.
Negotiations on International monetary reform are not being conducted
in a vacuum; the negotiators are very much aware of the trade talks waiting
in the wings.

In fact, the outcome of the current negotiations with the Common

Market on concessions due the United States as a result of the entry of the




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United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark will give some indication of how coop­
erative we can expect the Common Market to be in this area.

Although we

have heard the usual remarks about the threat to the Common Agricultural
Policy posed by the tough negotiating stance taken by the United States,
some members of the Common Market have taken a more conciliatory stance.
In this context, it's worth noting that the Common Market Commission
in Brussels has commented favorably upon President Nixon's proposed trade
legislation.

And for what it's worth, I would like to add my support as well

for that legislation.

It is of great importance, particularly to our

European trading partners, that U.S. negotiators have the authority to make
firm trading commitments, as contemplated 1n the trade bill.

Although the

bill itself would give the President the authority to raise as well as
lower tariffs and quotas, the Administration has taken pains to present the
bill as the basis for trade liberalization rather than restriction.

If the

legislation is enacted and used in fashion intended, it will symbolize U.S.
leadership 1n expanding the world economy, and make a significant contri­
bution to the success of the GATT negotiations.
The breakdown of the old monetary system was an acknowledgment of
the many structural changes that have occurred in the world.

The old system

was based on the dominance of the United States both as the leading economic
power and as custodian of the international currency.
no longer the dominant econoniy in the Industrial world:
learn to live with powerful equals.

The United States 1s
instead, we must

The realities Imposed by the economic

power of Japan and the enlarged Common Market will have to be recognized in
all future negotiations on monetary and trade reform.
It 1s because of these great changes 1n economic relationships
between nations that I feel the formulation of a new international monetary




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system cannot be hurried.

In this regard, I agree with Bob Roosa, former

Under Secretary of the Treasury, who recently stressed the importance of
taking time to analyze the impact of changes that have already taken place,
particularly in view of the rate at which these changes have occurred in
recent years.

My own belief is that we have time now to do a thorough and

thoughtful job, provided we rather quickly devise some "rules of the road"
to guide our present patchwork "system" over the inevitable bumps in the
path ahead.