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August 26, 2011

The Near- and Longer-Term Prospects for the U.S. Economy

Remarks by
Ben S. Bernanke
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium
Jackson Hole, Wyoming

August 26, 2011

Good morning. As always, thanks are due to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City for organizing this conference. This year’s topic, long-term economic growth, is
indeed pertinent--as has so often been the case at this symposium in past years. In
particular, the financial crisis and the subsequent slow recovery have caused some to
question whether the United States, notwithstanding its long-term record of vigorous
economic growth, might not now be facing a prolonged period of stagnation, regardless
of its public policy choices. Might not the very slow pace of economic expansion of the
past few years, not only in the United States but also in a number of other advanced
economies, morph into something far more long-lasting?
I can certainly appreciate these concerns and am fully aware of the challenges that
we face in restoring economic and financial conditions conducive to healthy growth,
some of which I will comment on today. With respect to longer-run prospects, however,
my own view is more optimistic. As I will discuss, although important problems
certainly exist, the growth fundamentals of the United States do not appear to have been
permanently altered by the shocks of the past four years. It may take some time, but we
can reasonably expect to see a return to growth rates and employment levels consistent
with those underlying fundamentals. In the interim, however, the challenges for U.S.
economic policymakers are twofold: first, to help our economy further recover from the
crisis and the ensuing recession, and second, to do so in a way that will allow the
economy to realize its longer-term growth potential. Economic policies should be
evaluated in light of both of those objectives.
This morning I will offer some thoughts on why the pace of recovery in the
United States has, for the most part, proved disappointing thus far, and I will discuss the

-2Federal Reserve’s policy response. I will then turn briefly to the longer-term prospects of
our economy and the need for our country’s economic policies to be effective from both a
shorter-term and longer-term perspective.
Near-Term Prospects for the Economy and Policy
In discussing the prospects for the economy and for policy in the near term, it
bears recalling briefly how we got here. The financial crisis that gripped global markets
in 2008 and 2009 was more severe than any since the Great Depression. Economic
policymakers around the world saw the mounting risks of a global financial meltdown in
the fall of 2008 and understood the extraordinarily dire economic consequences that such
an event could have. As I have described in previous remarks at this forum, governments
and central banks worked forcefully and in close coordination to avert the looming
collapse. The actions to stabilize the financial system were accompanied, both in the
United States and abroad, by substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus. But
notwithstanding these strong and concerted efforts, severe damage to the global economy
could not be avoided. The freezing of credit, the sharp drops in asset prices, dysfunction
in financial markets, and the resulting blows to confidence sent global production and
trade into free fall in late 2008 and early 2009.
We meet here today almost exactly three years since the beginning of the most
intense phase of the financial crisis and a bit more than two years since the National
Bureau of Economic Research’s date for the start of the economic recovery. Where do
we stand?
There have been some positive developments over the past few years, particularly
when considered in the light of economic prospects as viewed at the depth of the crisis.

-3Overall, the global economy has seen significant growth, led by the emerging-market
economies. In the United States, a cyclical recovery, though a modest one by historical
standards, is in its ninth quarter. In the financial sphere, the U.S. banking system is
generally much healthier now, with banks holding substantially more capital. Credit
availability from banks has improved, though it remains tight in categories--such as small
business lending--in which the balance sheets of potential borrowers remain impaired.
Companies with access to the public bond markets have had no difficulty obtaining credit
on favorable terms. Importantly, structural reform is moving forward in the financial
sector, with ambitious domestic and international efforts underway to enhance the capital
and liquidity of banks, especially the most systemically important banks; to improve risk
management and transparency; to strengthen market infrastructure; and to introduce a
more systemic, or macroprudential, approach to financial regulation and supervision.
In the broader economy, manufacturing production in the United States has risen
nearly 15 percent since its trough, driven substantially by growth in exports. Indeed, the
U.S. trade deficit has been notably lower recently than it was before the crisis, reflecting
in part the improved competitiveness of U.S. goods and services. Business investment in
equipment and software has continued to expand, and productivity gains in some
industries have been impressive, though new data have reduced estimates of overall
productivity improvement in recent years. Households also have made some progress in
repairing their balance sheets--saving more, borrowing less, and reducing their burdens of
interest payments and debt. Commodity prices have come off their highs, which will
reduce the cost pressures facing businesses and help increase household purchasing
power.

-4Notwithstanding these more positive developments, however, it is clear that the
recovery from the crisis has been much less robust than we had hoped. From the latest
comprehensive revisions to the national accounts as well as the most recent estimates of
growth in the first half of this year, we have learned that the recession was even deeper
and the recovery even weaker than we had thought; indeed, aggregate output in the
United States still has not returned to the level that it attained before the crisis.
Importantly, economic growth has for the most part been at rates insufficient to achieve
sustained reductions in unemployment, which has recently been fluctuating a bit above 9
percent. Temporary factors, including the effects of the run-up in commodity prices on
consumer and business budgets and the effect of the Japanese disaster on global supply
chains and production, were part of the reason for the weak performance of the economy
in the first half of 2011; accordingly, growth in the second half looks likely to improve as
their influence recedes. However, the incoming data suggest that other, more persistent
factors also have been at work.
Why has the recovery from the crisis been so slow and erratic? Historically,
recessions have typically sowed the seeds of their own recoveries as reduced spending on
investment, housing, and consumer durables generates pent-up demand. As the business
cycle bottoms out and confidence returns, this pent-up demand, often augmented by the
effects of stimulative monetary and fiscal policies, is met through increased production
and hiring. Increased production in turn boosts business revenues and household
incomes and provides further impetus to business and household spending. Improving
income prospects and balance sheets also make households and businesses more
creditworthy, and financial institutions become more willing to lend. Normally, these

-5developments create a virtuous circle of rising incomes and profits, more supportive
financial and credit conditions, and lower uncertainty, allowing the process of recovery to
develop momentum.
These restorative forces are at work today, and they will continue to promote
recovery over time. Unfortunately, the recession, besides being extraordinarily severe as
well as global in scope, was also unusual in being associated with both a very deep slump
in the housing market and a historic financial crisis. These two features of the downturn,
individually and in combination, have acted to slow the natural recovery process.
Notably, the housing sector has been a significant driver of recovery from most
recessions in the United States since World War II, but this time--with an overhang of
distressed and foreclosed properties, tight credit conditions for builders and potential
homebuyers, and ongoing concerns by both potential borrowers and lenders about
continued house price declines--the rate of new home construction has remained at less
than one-third of its pre-crisis level. The low level of construction has implications not
only for builders but for providers of a wide range of goods and services related to
housing and homebuilding. Moreover, even as tight credit for some borrowers has been
one of the factors restraining housing recovery, the weakness of the housing sector has in
turn had adverse effects on financial markets and on the flow of credit. For example, the
sharp declines in house prices in some areas have left many homeowners “underwater”
on their mortgages, creating financial hardship for households and, through their effects
on rates of mortgage delinquency and default, stress for financial institutions as well.
Financial pressures on financial institutions and households have contributed, in turn, to
greater caution in the extension of credit and to slower growth in consumer spending.

-6I have already noted the central role of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 in
sparking the recession. As I also noted, a great deal has been done and is being done to
address the causes and effects of the crisis, including a substantial program of financial
reform, and conditions in the U.S. banking system and financial markets have improved
significantly overall. Nevertheless, financial stress has been and continues to be a
significant drag on the recovery, both here and abroad. Bouts of sharp volatility and risk
aversion in markets have recently re-emerged in reaction to concerns about both
European sovereign debts and developments related to the U.S. fiscal situation, including
the recent downgrade of the U.S. long-term credit rating by one of the major rating
agencies and the controversy concerning the raising of the U.S. federal debt ceiling. It is
difficult to judge by how much these developments have affected economic activity thus
far, but there seems little doubt that they have hurt household and business confidence
and that they pose ongoing risks to growth. The Federal Reserve continues to monitor
developments in financial markets and institutions closely and is in frequent contact with
policymakers in Europe and elsewhere.
Monetary policy must be responsive to changes in the economy and, in particular,
to the outlook for growth and inflation. As I mentioned earlier, the recent data have
indicated that economic growth during the first half of this year was considerably slower
than the Federal Open Market Committee had been expecting, and that temporary factors
can account for only a portion of the economic weakness that we have observed.
Consequently, although we expect a moderate recovery to continue and indeed to
strengthen over time, the Committee has marked down its outlook for the likely pace of
growth over coming quarters. With commodity prices and other import prices

-7moderating and with longer-term inflation expectations remaining stable, we expect
inflation to settle, over coming quarters, at levels at or below the rate of 2 percent, or a bit
less, that most Committee participants view as being consistent with our dual mandate.
In light of its current outlook, the Committee recently decided to provide more
specific forward guidance about its expectations for the future path of the federal funds
rate. In particular, in the statement following our meeting earlier this month, we
indicated that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a
subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally
low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013. That is, in what the
Committee judges to be the most likely scenarios for resource utilization and inflation in
the medium term, the target for the federal funds rate would be held at its current low
levels for at least two more years.
In addition to refining our forward guidance, the Federal Reserve has a range of
tools that could be used to provide additional monetary stimulus. We discussed the
relative merits and costs of such tools at our August meeting. We will continue to
consider those and other pertinent issues, including of course economic and financial
developments, at our meeting in September, which has been scheduled for two days (the
20th and the 21st) instead of one to allow a fuller discussion. The Committee will
continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming information and is prepared
to employ its tools as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context
of price stability.

-8Economic Policy and Longer-Term Growth in the United States
The financial crisis and its aftermath have posed severe challenges around the
globe, particularly in the advanced industrial economies. Thus far I have reviewed some
of those challenges, offered some diagnoses for the slow economic recovery in the United
States, and briefly discussed the policy response by the Federal Reserve. However, this
conference is focused on longer-run economic growth, and appropriately so, given the
fundamental importance of long-term growth rates in the determination of living
standards. In that spirit, let me turn now to a brief discussion of the longer-run prospects
for the U.S. economy and the role of economic policy in shaping those prospects.
Notwithstanding the severe difficulties we currently face, I do not expect the
long-run growth potential of the U.S. economy to be materially affected by the crisis and
the recession if--and I stress if--our country takes the necessary steps to secure that
outcome. Over the medium term, housing activity will stabilize and begin to grow again,
if for no other reason than that ongoing population growth and household formation will
ultimately demand it. Good, proactive housing policies could help speed that process.
Financial markets and institutions have already made considerable progress toward
normalization, and I anticipate that the financial sector will continue to adapt to ongoing
reforms while still performing its vital intermediation functions. Households will
continue to strengthen their balance sheets, a process that will be sped up considerably if
the recovery accelerates but that will move forward in any case. Businesses will continue
to invest in new capital, adopt new technologies, and build on the productivity gains of
the past several years. I have confidence that our European colleagues fully appreciate
what is at stake in the difficult issues they are now confronting and that, over time, they

-9will take all necessary and appropriate steps to address those issues effectively and
comprehensively.
This economic healing will take a while, and there may be setbacks along the
way. Moreover, we will need to remain alert to risks to the recovery, including financial
risks. However, with one possible exception on which I will elaborate in a moment, the
healing process should not leave major scars. Notwithstanding the trauma of the crisis
and the recession, the U.S. economy remains the largest in the world, with a highly
diverse mix of industries and a degree of international competitiveness that, if anything,
has improved in recent years. Our economy retains its traditional advantages of a strong
market orientation, a robust entrepreneurial culture, and flexible capital and labor
markets. And our country remains a technological leader, with many of the world’s
leading research universities and the highest spending on research and development of
any nation.
Of course, the United States faces many growth challenges. Our population is
aging, like those of many other advanced economies, and our society will have to adapt
over time to an older workforce. Our K-12 educational system, despite considerable
strengths, poorly serves a substantial portion of our population. The costs of health care
in the United States are the highest in the world, without fully commensurate results in
terms of health outcomes. But all of these long-term issues were well known before the
crisis; efforts to address these problems have been ongoing, and these efforts will
continue and, I hope, intensify.
The quality of economic policymaking in the United States will heavily influence
the nation’s longer-term prospects. To allow the economy to grow at its full potential,

- 10 policymakers must work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability; adopt
effective tax, trade, and regulatory policies; foster the development of a skilled
workforce; encourage productive investment, both private and public; and provide
appropriate support for research and development and for the adoption of new
technologies.
The Federal Reserve has a role in promoting the longer-term performance of the
economy. Most importantly, monetary policy that ensures that inflation remains low and
stable over time contributes to long-run macroeconomic and financial stability. Low and
stable inflation improves the functioning of markets, making them more effective at
allocating resources; and it allows households and businesses to plan for the future
without having to be unduly concerned with unpredictable movements in the general
level of prices. The Federal Reserve also fosters macroeconomic and financial stability
in its role as a financial regulator, a monitor of overall financial stability, and a liquidity
provider of last resort.
Normally, monetary or fiscal policies aimed primarily at promoting a faster pace
of economic recovery in the near term would not be expected to significantly affect the
longer-term performance of the economy. However, current circumstances may be an
exception to that standard view--the exception to which I alluded earlier. Our economy is
suffering today from an extraordinarily high level of long-term unemployment, with
nearly half of the unemployed having been out of work for more than six months. Under
these unusual circumstances, policies that promote a stronger recovery in the near term
may serve longer-term objectives as well. In the short term, putting people back to work
reduces the hardships inflicted by difficult economic times and helps ensure that our

- 11 economy is producing at its full potential rather than leaving productive resources fallow.
In the longer term, minimizing the duration of unemployment supports a healthy
economy by avoiding some of the erosion of skills and loss of attachment to the labor
force that is often associated with long-term unemployment.
Notwithstanding this observation, which adds urgency to the need to achieve a
cyclical recovery in employment, most of the economic policies that support robust
economic growth in the long run are outside the province of the central bank. We have
heard a great deal lately about federal fiscal policy in the United States, so I will close
with some thoughts on that topic, focusing on the role of fiscal policy in promoting
stability and growth.
To achieve economic and financial stability, U.S. fiscal policy must be placed on
a sustainable path that ensures that debt relative to national income is at least stable or,
preferably, declining over time. As I have emphasized on previous occasions, without
significant policy changes, the finances of the federal government will inevitably spiral
out of control, risking severe economic and financial damage.1 The increasing fiscal
burden that will be associated with the aging of the population and the ongoing rise in the
costs of health care make prompt and decisive action in this area all the more critical.
Although the issue of fiscal sustainability must urgently be addressed, fiscal
policymakers should not, as a consequence, disregard the fragility of the current
economic recovery. Fortunately, the two goals of achieving fiscal sustainability--which
is the result of responsible policies set in place for the longer term--and avoiding the
creation of fiscal headwinds for the current recovery are not incompatible. Acting now to
1

See Ben S. Bernanke (2011), “Fiscal Sustainability,” speech delivered at the Annual Conference of the
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Washington, June 14,
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110614a.htm.

- 12 put in place a credible plan for reducing future deficits over the longer term, while being
attentive to the implications of fiscal choices for the recovery in the near term, can help
serve both objectives.
Fiscal policymakers can also promote stronger economic performance through the
design of tax policies and spending programs. To the fullest extent possible, our nation’s
tax and spending policies should increase incentives to work and to save, encourage
investments in the skills of our workforce, stimulate private capital formation, promote
research and development, and provide necessary public infrastructure. We cannot
expect our economy to grow its way out of our fiscal imbalances, but a more productive
economy will ease the tradeoffs that we face.
Finally, and perhaps most challenging, the country would be well served by a
better process for making fiscal decisions. The negotiations that took place over the
summer disrupted financial markets and probably the economy as well, and similar
events in the future could, over time, seriously jeopardize the willingness of investors
around the world to hold U.S. financial assets or to make direct investments in jobcreating U.S. businesses. Although details would have to be negotiated, fiscal
policymakers could consider developing a more effective process that sets clear and
transparent budget goals, together with budget mechanisms to establish the credibility of
those goals. Of course, formal budget goals and mechanisms do not replace the need for
fiscal policymakers to make the difficult choices that are needed to put the country’s
fiscal house in order, which means that public understanding of and support for the goals
of fiscal policy are crucial.
Economic policymakers face a range of difficult decisions, relating to both the

- 13 short-run and long-run challenges we face. I have no doubt, however, that those
challenges can be met, and that the fundamental strengths of our economy will ultimately
reassert themselves. The Federal Reserve will certainly do all that it can to help restore
high rates of growth and employment in a context of price stability.