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immediate release
Pfidayt May 28, 1971

Two Key Issues of Monetary Policy

Remarks of Arthur F, Burns
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
1971 International Banking Conference
Munich, Germany

May 28, 1971
(Text By Cable From Munich)

TOO JOEY ISSUES OF MONSTARY POLICY

I intend to focus this morning on two problems that concern
practically all of our countries• We have just experienced an international monetary crisis* the ultimate repercussions of which are not
yet clear. We shall therefore need to exchange ideas on how to deal
with large short-term capital flows in the future.
The other major problem that haunts industrialized countries
is the power and persistence of cost-push inflation*

Let us turn to

this at once.
Virtually all industrialized countries are suffering from
inflation at present*

In some> aggregate demand for goods and services

is still booming, so that a rising price level can be expected*

In

others , however, costs and prices are continuing to advance in the
face of substantial unemployment and increasing idle capacity of industrial plant*
We are living in an age in which cost-push inflation has
emerged as a major obstacle to economic stability*

Unless we find

workable solutions to this problem* our best efforts to promote
economic progress and the general welfare may be thwarted.
Clearly, countries that are now experiencing demand-»pull infla*
tion must pursue monetary and fiscal policies that aim to eliminate
excess demand*

But they may well find, as others have, that elimi-

nation of excess demand does not assure a prompt return to price
stability*

The recent experience of the United States is a case in point*
During the past year and a half, our unemployment rate has risen from
3-1/2 per cent to about 6 per cent. Labor is now readily available
across the range of skills and in most sections of the country* Virtually all industries have substantial amounts of excess capacity*

In

such circumstances, past experience would have led us to expect a substantial reduction in the rate of increase of costs and prices, if not
actual declines*

In fact, however, the improvement thus far has been

modest•
True, we have made progress over this past year in regaining
normal rates of growth in productivity. However, increases in average
compensation per manhour have shown no sign of abatement, and the
advance of unit labor costs has therefore moderated less than we had
hoped* With profit margins remaining very low, businessmen have taken
available opportunities to pass their cost increases through to higher
prices•

The continuance of a rising price level in the midst of
substantial unemployment thus stems, basically, from continuing rapid
increase in wages* Understandably, workers are seeking to obtain
wage gains large enough to offset the effects of past increases in
prices on their real incomes and savings, but this development also
reflects the weakening of competitive forces in both our labor and
product markets* Wages and prices have not been responding as sensitively as they once did to shifts in the balance between supply and
demand*

-3Xhe American economy is -not unique in. this respect. The problem
of cost-push inflation has been plaguing many nations in recent years.
In Canada31 for example, unemployment began rising in 1966, and ha® bean
increasing irregularly since then. Mew wage settlements under collective bargaining agreements, howeverf have yet to show amy appreciable
sign of moderation,, In the United Kingdom^ the unemployment rate has
been slowly rising over the past fita years or so#

Nonetheless, the

upward movement of wages aad prices appears to have accelerated in the
past eighteen months*
Cost-push inflation cannot be dealt with effectively by using
monetary and fiscal tools alone®

la todayfs environment, efforts to do

so would Inevitably reduce output and employment far beyond the
limits that our governments can accept ©r their citizens tolerate*
On the other hand$ I fear that cost pressures may become so intractable in our countries that they will ultimately weaken democratic
institutionsf besides stifling economic progress».
Over a year agof i reluctantly came to the conclusion that
monetary and fiscal instruments needed t© be supplemented for a time
by incomes policies in the United States—that is* policies designed
to enable labor and commodity markets to approxissata more closely the
competitive model* My conviction has been strengthened by developments during the past year*
I recognize that governmental involvement in the determination
of wages and prices can give ris* to ifiaquiti**, to snigs&llocation of

resources, to the blunting of private initiative, and to an administrative morass, but I am also aware of the moral force of governmental
leadership over private decisions in key industries, to say nothing
of the capacity of a vigilant government to remove or reduce the
special market power that privileged groups now have*
We need in the United States, and I believe also in other
countries, greater reliance on policies that promise to change the
structure and functioning of labor and product markets, so that upward
pressures on costs and prices may be reduced.

To cope with the infla-

tionary bias presently at work in our economies, I see no acceptable
alternative to experimentation with incomes policies—"including wage
and price review boards that stop short of mandatory controls.
Let me turn next to the problem posed by massive short-term
capital movements. Recently, as we all know, heavy speculation in
favor of a few currencies has led to changes in the exchange-rate
regimes of several countries• It may be helpful to say a few words
about the background of these events before asking what we can learn
from the crisis we have been through.
The heavy flow of short-term funds from Europe to the United
States in 1968-69 and the return flow during the past year resulted
from a disparity in the phasing of the business cycle in the two
areas•

The United States experienced serious demand-pull inflation,

and also moved to combat it, before Europe did. More recently,

while demand conditions have remained strong in Europe$ we in the
United States have sought to prevent a sluggish economy from slipping
into a cumulative recession*
Differences in economic and credit conditions thus account for
the swings in short-term capital flows of recent years*

In particular,

the flow across the Atlantic since early 1970 reflected not only a
push from the United States but a pull from Europe• The push from the
United States resulted from the easing of our credit conditions* The
pull from Europe was just as clearly the result of a continuing demand
for Euro-dollars by corporations and governmental entities that sought
to escape from tight credit within their domestic itiarkets.
It was against this background of a massive return of shortterm capital to Europe in 1970-71 that speculative fever broke out a
few weeks ago*

Oddly enough, there were good reasons to believe that

we had already passed the peak of capital flow*
The U« S, Government issue of three billion dollars in special
securities to foreign branches of American banks had served to check
the flow of dollars to European central banks * After mid-March, a
convergence of interest rates got under way, with short-term rates
rising in the United States and declining in Europe*

By April

the repayment by U, S f banks to their foreign branches had slowed
sharply*

Not only that, steps were already being taken to check the

creation of Euro—dollars by European central banks which had Inadvertently,

but on a disconcertingly large scale, added to the dollar reserves
that resulted from the balance~of~payments deficit of the United
States*

In addition* major plans were being developed by the U# S*

Treasury to provide improved investment outlets for central bank
reserves in the United States*
Unhappily, the calm that appeared to exist in these unfolding circumstances was disrupted by various events in Europe with which
you are all familiar*
The events of the past two weeks have left a residue of
resentment among European countries and toward the United States#

If

some of you feel that the United States depended excessively on monetary ease in the past year, there are surely grounds for holding that
European countries relied excessively on monetary stringency during
this period#
I must remind you of two facts• First, the United States
recently resorted to a far more restrictive policy to wring excess
demand out of its economy than any country in the world, with the
possible Exception of Canada,

Second, if a cumulative recession ted

been allowed to occur in the United States, it would almost certainly
have brought serious economic and political trouble to other nations
of the free world.
Let me turn briefly now to several lessons we can derive
from recent events.

First, in a world of convertible currencies, with many business firms and financial institutions commanding large sums, differences
in monetary conditions can induce sizable movements of short-term capi^
tal amang nations* Let us recognize that such flows are the result
of a pull from the receiving countries as well as a push from the
capital exporting countries*
Second, the amplitude of short-term capital movements will
become smaller if we manage to reduce differences in monetary condi*»
tions* This would require, in all major countries* a more active
use of fiscal policy for domestic stabilization purposes* The political obstacles here are formidable but, I hope, not insurmountable. We
should keep this goal before our minds as we deal with day-to-day
problems*
Third, the Euro-currency markets no doubt facilitate the
international movement of short-term capital* but let us not deceive
ourselves regarding cause and effect* The flow of funds through
these markets is a response to differences in basic economic and
monetary conditions among countries, not a cause of such differences*
Fourth, some industrialized countries lack the facilities to
neutralise the disruptive effects of large capital inflows or outflows
on their domestic money supply*

It is important that we all press

forward, individually and jointly with other nations, in devising
institutions that may serve to reduce the destabilizing impact of
short-term capital flows*

Fifth, we live in a world in which private citizens &ftd
nesses ate expected to act in response to the profit motive. Central
banks, on the other hand, have a stabilizing function that should not
be influenced by considerations of profit or loss*

If central banks

are to respond to the same factors that motivate private entities,
they are likely to aggravate their own problems, as happened during
the past year when a significant volume of central bank reserves was
placed in the Euro-dollar market*
Sixth, there is a tendency in some quarters to identify the
th S» balance of payments as the common cause of inflation in other
countries*

I recognise that the flow of short-term capital has had

the effect, to some degree, of undermining motietary policies in some
countries. But let us not exaggerate this effect* The wage explosions
experienced by European countries in recent years cannot be attributed
to the U. S* balance of payments*
Seventh, what 1 have just said represents in no sense an
attitude of complacency about the U. S* balance of payments. In a
reaent appearance before a Senate committee, I stressed once again
the overriding need to restore price stability at home and, in present
circumstances, to maintain our governmental constraints on private
capital outflows. I also took that occasion to note the need to develop
more effective methods for recycling funds across national boundaries
when substantial short-term capital flows occur, the need for some
to relax their restrictions on commidity imports and capital

outflows, and the need for Americafs allies to make a significantly
larger contribution to the defense of the free world*
In closing, I would like to repeat what I told the Senate
Banking Committee about the prospects for the U* S. balance of payments • I see no reason for gloom about these prospects•
Our price performance has recently been better than that of
many other industrial countries. This advantage is likely to continue
and it should permit us to regain competitive strength that we probably
lost in the second half of the 196O's«
Our receipts of investment income from abroad have been rising
rapidly. We expect this to continue even as rewards from investment at
home, which affect both our capital and current accounts, loom larger#
We have seen in recent years a large increase of foreign
investment in the U« S* stock market* This too should continue, pro*
vided we maintain a strong and healthy economy and take measures to
prevent recurrences of the sort of speculative crisis that occurred
recently*
The reduction of our troops in Vietnam is diminishing the
military drain on our balance of payments. We expect this reduction
to continue.
Finally, the bulk of the short-term capital outflow through
our banks is now behind us* American banks have reduced the liabilities
to their foreign branches from over $14 billion in early 1970 to less
than $2 billion presently»

Thus, even before our underlying payments

position improves, our deficit on the official settlements basis should
fall sharply from its rate of the last year or so*
These favorable prospects can be hastened if they are accommodated to by other countries* After all, the counterpart of the U# S»
deficit is the rest of the world's surplus* We and our major trading
partners need to respect, in a spirit of candor and understanding, the
policy implications of this simple arithmetic truism*

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