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For release on delivery
11 00 a m , E D T
June 10, 1998

Testimony by

Alan Greenspan

Chairman

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the

Joint Economic Committee

United States Congress

June 10, 1998

Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to
present an update on economic conditions in the United States
Such an assessment cannot be made in isolation but rather depends critically on what
is happening in the rest of the world and how those developments affect the performance of
the American economy

In my previous appearance before this Committee last October, my

remarks focused mainly on the turbulence that was then evident in world financial markets
and, in particular, on the problems that had emerged in a number of Asian economies The
tentative assessment offered then was that the economies of Asia were in for some trying
times but that the situation did not seem likely to threaten the expansion of this country's
economy
That assessment, I believe, still is essentially correct, although uncertainties about the
degree of restraint that will be coming from abroad remain substantial

Earlier this year, the

situations in most of the Asian countries seemed to be stabilizing in some respects, but, as the
events of the past few weeks have demonstrated, the restoration of normally functioning
economies will not necessarily go smoothly

In some cases, the adjustments that are needed

to improve external balances and to correct existing misallocations of resources have been
accompanied by sharp increases in inflation, rising unemployment, abrupt cutbacks in living
standards, and increases in uncertainty and insecurity The heightened social and political
pressures that can develop in such circumstances not only introduce added complications into
economic policymaking but also make it even more difficult to foresee how the processes of
adjustment will play out across the afflicted economies
That the American economy would be affected to some degree by spillover from the
problems in Asia was never in doubt, even though the timing and magnitude of the impact

2
have been difficult to predict with much confidence

Many months ago, businesses in this

country began anticipating a worsening of our trade balance with the Asian countries, and
incoming economic data have since confirmed those expectations

Meanwhile, other

influences on trade—such as the strength of demand growth in the United States and a dollar
that has been strong against a wide array of currencies—have persisted

In total, U S exports

of goods and services turned down in real terms in the first quarter of 1998, the first such
decline in four years, and real imports of goods and services continued to rise very rapidly
The combined effect of these changes exerted a drag of 2-1/2 percentage points on the annual
growth rate of real GDP last quarter

Weaknesses in Asia appear to account for

approximately one-half of that deterioration

Not only have export volumes been affected, but

producers in both industry and agriculture also are having to adjust to the lower product
prices that have come with slower economic growth abroad and the increase in the
competitiveness of foreign producers induced largely by depreciations of their currencies
But even with substantial drag from the external sector, the U S economy has
continued to expand at a robust pace
had in 1997

In the first quarter, real GDP grew even faster than it

Employment has continued to increase rapidly this year, and the unemployment

rate has fallen further, reaching its lowest level since 1970 Incomes have continued to climb,
and gains in household and business expenditures have been exceptionally strong

Although

the data on hours worked suggest that growth of the economy has likely slowed this quarter
from the first quarter's torrid pace, the degree of slowdown remains in question

Evidence to

date of a moderation in underlying domestic spending still is sparse
The strength of domestic spending has been fueled, in part, by conditions in financial

3
markets

Although real short-term interest rates have been rising, equity prices have moved

still higher, credit has been readily available at slender margins over Treasury interest rates,
and nominal long-term interest rates have remained near the lowest levels of recent decades
Rapid growth of money this year is a further indication that financial conditions are
accommodating strong domestic spending, although we still are uncertain how reliable that
relationship will prove to be over time
In short, our economy is still enjoying a virtuous cycle, in which, in the context of
subdued inflation and generally supportive credit conditions, rising equity values are
providing impetus for spending and, in turn, the expansion of output, employment, and
productivity-enhancing capital investment

The hopes for accelerated productivity growth

have been bolstering expectations of future corporate earnings and thereby fueling still further
increases in equity values
The essential precondition for the emergence, and persistence, of this virtuous cycle is
arguably the decline in the rate of inflation to near price stability

Continued low product

price inflation and expectations that it will persist have brought increasing stability to
financial markets and fostered perceptions that the degree of risk in the financial outlook has
been moving ever lower

These perceptions, in turn, have reduced the extra compensation

that investors require for making loans to, or taking ownership positions in, private firms
To a considerable extent, investors seem to be expecting that low inflation and
stronger productivity growth will allow the extraordinary growth of profits to be extended into
the distant future

Indeed, expectations of per share earnings growth over the longer term

have been undergoing continuous upward revision by security analysts since 1994 These

4
rising expectations have, in turn, driven stock prices sharply higher and credit spreads lower,
perhaps to levels that will be difficult to sustain unless economic conditions remain
exceptionally favorable—more so than might be anticipated from historical relationships

In

any event, primarily because of the rise in stock prices, about $12 trillion has been added to
the value of household assets since the end of 1994

Probably only a few percent of these

largely unrealized capital gains have been transformed into the purchase of goods and services
equipment investment, which has stemmed from the low cost of both equity and debt relative
to expected profits on capital, has propelled the economy forward

The current economic

performance, with its combination of strong growth and low inflation, is as impressive as any
I have witnessed in my near half-century of daily observation of the American economy

The consequences for the American worker have been dramatic and, for the most part,
highly favorable

A great many chronically underemployed people have been given the

opportunity to work, and many others have been able to upgrade their skills as a result of
work experience, extensive increases in on-the-job training, or increased enrollment in
technical programs

Welfare recipients appear to have been absorbed into the work force in

significant numbers
Government finances have improved as well

The taxes paid on huge realized capital

gains and other incomes related to the stock market, coupled with taxes on markedly higher
corporate profits, have joined with restraint on spending to produce a unified federal budget
surplus for the first time in nearly three decades
the largest monthly surplus on record

April's budget surplus of $125 billion was

Widespread improvement also has been evident in the

5
financial positions of state and local governments
The fact that economic performance strengthened as inflation subsided should not have
been surprising, given that risk premiums and economic disincentives to invest in productive
capital diminish as product prices become more stable But the extent to which strong growth
and high resource utilization have been joined with low inflation over an extended period is
nevertheless extraordinary

Indeed, the broadest measures of price change indicate that the

inflation rate moved down further in the first quarter of this year, even as the economy
strengthened

Although declining oil prices contributed to this result, pricing leverage in the

goods-producing sector more generally was held in check by rising industrial capacity,
reduced demand in Asia that, among other things, has led to a softening of commodity prices,
and a strong dollar that has contributed to bargain prices on many imports Some elements in
this mix clearly were transitory, and the very recent price data suggest that consumer price
inflation has moved up in the second quarter
moderate overall

But, even so, the rate of rise remains quite

At this point, at least, the adverse wage-price interactions that played so

central a role in pushing inflation higher in many past business expansions—eventually
bringing those expansions to an end-do not appear to have gained a significant toe-hold in
the current expansion
There are many reasons why the wage-price interactions have been so well-contained
in this expansion

For one thing, increases in hourly compensation have been slower to pick

up than in most other recent expansions, although, to be sure, wages have started to accelerate
in the past couple of years as the labor market has become tighter and tighter
In the first few years of the expansion, the subdued rate of rise in hourly compensation

6
seemed to be, in part, a reflection of greater concerns among workers about job security

We

now seem to have moved beyond that period of especially acute concern, though the flux of
technology may still leave many workers with fears of job skill obsolescence and a
willingness to trade wage gains for job security

This may explain why, despite the recent

acceleration of wages, the resulting level of compensation has fallen short of what the
experience of previous expansions would have led us to anticipate given the current degree of
labor market tightness

In the past couple of years, of course, workers have not had to press

especially hard for nominal pay gains to realize sizable increases in their real wages In
contrast to the pattern that developed in several previous business expansions, when workers
required substantial increases in pay just to cover increases in the cost of living, consumer
prices have been generally well-behaved in the current expansion

Changes this past year in

prices of both goods and services have been among the smallest of recent decades
In addition, the rate of rise in the cost of benefits that employers provide to workers
has been remarkably subdued over the past few years, although a gradual upward tilt has
become evident of late

A variety of factors-including the strength of the economy and

rising equity values, which have reduced the need for payments into unemployment trust
funds and pension plans, and the restructuring of the health care sector—have been working to
keep benefit costs in check in this expansion

But, in the medical area at least, the most

recent developments suggest that the favorable trend may have run its course

The slowing of

price increases for medical services seems to have come to a halt, at least for a time, and,
with the cost-saving shift to managed care having been largely completed, the potential for
businesses to achieve further savings in that regard appears to be rather limited at this point

7
There have been a few striking instances this past year of employers boosting outlays for
health benefits by substantial amounts
A couple of years ago—almost at the same tune that increases in total hourly
compensation began trending up in nominal terms—evidence of a long-awaited pickup in the
growth of labor productivity began to show through more strongly in the data, and this
accelerated increase in output per hour has enabled firms to meet workers' real wage demands
while holding the line on price increases

Gains in productivity usually vary with the strength

of the economy, and the favorable results that we have observed during the past two years or
so, when the economy has been growing more rapidly, surely overstate the degree of pickup
that can be sustained

But evidence continues to mount that the trend has picked up, even if

the extent of that improvement is as yet unclear

Signs of a major technological

transformation of the economy are all around us, and the benefits are evident not only in
high-tech industries but also in production processes that have long been part of our industrial
economy
Notwithstanding a reasonably optimistic interpretation of the recent productivity
numbers, it would not be prudent to assume that rising productivity, by itself, can ensure a
non-inflationary future

Certainly wage increases, per se, are not inflationary

To be avoided

are those that exceed productivity growth, thereby creating pressure for inflationary price
increases that can eventually undermine economic growth and employment

Because the level

of productivity is tied to an important degree to the physical stock of capital, which turns
over only gradually, increases in the trend growth of productivity probably also occur rather
gradually

By contrast, the potential for abrupt acceleration of nominal hourly compensation

8
is surely greater

Still, a strong signal of inflation pressures building because of compensation

increases markedly in excess of productivity gains has not yet clearly emerged in this
expansion

Among nonfinancial corporations, our most reliable source of consolidated costs,

trends in costs seem to have accelerated from their lows, but the rates of increase in both unit
labor costs and total unit costs are still quite low
Nonetheless, as I have noted in previous appearances before Congress, I remain
concerned that economic growth will run into constraints as the reservoir of unemployed
people available to work is drawn down

The annual increase in the working-age population

(from 16 to 64 years of age), including immigrants, has been approximately 1 percent a year
in recent years

Yet employment, measured by the count of persons who are working rather

than by the count of jobs, has been rising 2 percent a year since 1995 despite the acceleration
in the growth of output per hour

The gap between employment growth and population

growth, amounting to about 1 2 million a year on average, has been made up, in part, by a
decline in the number of individuals who are counted as unemployed—those persons who are
actively seeking work—of approximately 700,000 a year, on average, since the end of 1995
The remainder of the gap has reflected a rise in labor force participation that can be traced to
a decline of more than 500,000 a year in the number of individuals (age 16 to 64) wanting a
job but not actively seeking one

Presumably, many of the persons who once were in this

group have more recently become active and successful job-seekers as the economy has
strengthened, thereby preventing a still sharper drop in the official unemployment rate In
May, the number of persons aged 16 to 64 who wanted to work but who did not have jobs
was 9 7 million on a seasonally adjusted basis, slightly more than 5-1/2 percent of the

9
working-age population This percentage is a record low for the series, which first became
available in 1970
The gap between the growth in employment and that of the working-age population
will inevitably close

What is crucial to sustaining this unprecedented period of prosperity is

whether that closing occurs in a disruptive or gradual, balanced manner The effects of the
crisis in Asia will almost certainly damp net exports further, potentially moderating the
growth of domestic production and hence employment

The strength of domestic spending

that has been been bolstering output growth and the demand for labor also could ebb if recent
indications of a narrowing in domestic profit margins were to prove to be the forerunner of a
reassessment of the expected rates of return on plant and equipment

Reduced prospects for

the return to capital would not only affect investment directly but could also affect
consumption as stock prices adjusted to a less optimistic view of earnings prospects

Finally,

the clearly unsustainable rise of inventories that has been evident in recent quarters will be
slowing at some point, perhaps abruptly

An easing of the demand for labor would be an

expected consequence of a slowdown in either final sales or inventory accumulation

Of

course, the demand for labor that is consistent with a particular rate of output growth also
could be lowered if productivity were to continue to accelerate And, on the supply side of
the labor market, faster growth of the labor force could emerge as the result of delayed
retirements or increased immigration
If developments such as these do not bring labor demand into line with its sustainable
supply, tighter economic policy may be necessary to help guard against a buildup of pressures
that could derail the current prosperity

Fortunately, fiscal policy has been moving toward

10
restraint to some degree, although recent budgetary discussions do not appear to be focused
on extending that tendency

Monetary policy might need to tighten if demand were to

continue to exhibit few signs of abating noticeably, thereby threatening to place still further
strains on our labor markets

We at the Federal Reserve, recognizing the powerful forces of

productivity growth and global restraint on inflation, have not perceived to date the need to
tighten policy in response to strong demand, beyond what has occurred through falling
inflation's upward pressure on the real federal funds rate and the modest increase in the
nominal rate that we initiated in March of 1997 But, we are monitoring the evolving forces
very closely to determine whether the recent acceleration of costs, albeit moderate, is likely to
prove transitory or the start of a more worrisome pattern that may well require a response
In summary, Mr Chairman, our economy has remained strong this year despite
evidence of substantial drag from Asia, and, at the same tune, inflation has remained low

As

I have indicated, this set of circumstances is not what historical relationships would have led
us to expect at this point in the business expansion, and while it is possible that we have, in a
sense, moved "beyond history," we also have to be alert to the possibility that less favorable
historical relationships will eventually reassert themselves

That is why we are remaining

watchful for signs of potential inflationary imbalances, even as the economy continues to
perform more impressively than it has in a very long time