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For release on delivery
10:00 A.M. EDT
June 18, 1991

Testimony by

Alan Greenspan

Chairman

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the

Committee on Ways and Means

United States House of Representatives

June 18, 1991

I am pleased to appear before this committee to discuss
U.S. international competitiveness.

This topic has received much

attention over the past two decades as the U.S. economy has
become increasingly more open.
The concept of competitiveness can mean different things
to different people, depending on their particular perspective,
so let me begin by defining terms.

At the level of the

individual firm, competitiveness is, of course, gauged by bottomline performance in the market.

Competitive firms are those

whose costs of production lie sufficiently below the market price
of the output they sell that they earn a rate of return on equity
at or above the market cost of capital.

Competitive firms

survive, increase their market share, and prosper; uncompetitive
firms do not.

A similar concept of competitiveness is often

applied at the national level as well.

The country's

international performance is frequently monitored by such
measures as the shares of its exports in world markets, movements
in its trade balance, and movements in its aggregate price level
and production costs relative to those of other countries.- At the national level, however, such conventional
measures of competitiveness lose much of their meaning, or at
best, are difficult to interpret.

In today's open world trading

system, exchange rates tend to adjust over time to ensure that
the country's international accounts return to balance.

For

example, if overall production costs rose in the United States,
everything else equal, the dollar wwould depreciate against other
currencies, restoring the price and profit competitiveness of

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U.S. firms, thereby enabling them to maintain their sales abroad.
However, a gain in price competitiveness associated with
a depreciation of the dollar, while good for U.S. firms that
compete internationally, could actually worsen overall economic
well-being in the United States.

A lower dollar means that we

must sell more of our output to buy a given amount of foreignproduced goods and services.
Our competitiveness as a nation, therefore, goes beyond
movements in the shares of our exports in world markets and the
international price competitiveness of our firms and industries.
The ultimate test of the country's competitiveness is what is
happening to the standard of living of our citizens over time.
Over the past four decades, U.S. real—or inflation
adjusted--per capita national income has more than doubled.

The

United States continues to enjoy the highest standard of living
among major industrial countries.

In 1990, U.S. real per capita

income was on the order of 30 percent above that in both Japan
and Germany, our major competitors among industrial countries.
We enjoy a similar advantage in total manufacturing productivity.
It is also clear, however, that the gap between the
United States and other major industrial countries has narrowed
substantially over the post-war period, as per capita income and
productivity have grown substantially faster abroad.

In some

areas, individual firms and even entire industries in other
countries may well have caught up to and passed their U.S.
counterparts.

Does this narrowing of the productivity gap mean

we are a nation in decline?

Not in and of itself.

- 3 -

To a considerable extent, the narrowing of the gap has
been inevitable, reflecting economic forces that are shrinking
the globe, providing a strong stimulus to international trade,
and making countries better informed about each others' products
and production techniques.

It is clearly easier to grow fast by

catching up, using techniques and processes that have already
been developed, than by breaking new ground through technological
innovation.
One important factor that has contributed to this
process of economic convergence, as well as to the rapid
expansion of world trade in the post-World War II period is what
I have broadly referred to elsewhere as the "downsizing of
economic output."

Goods now derive a smaller proportion of their

value from the volume of physical matter embodied in them.
Advances in design and engineering, the use of lighter but
stronger materials, and the availability of smaller but more
reliable electronic components all have contributed to the
downsizing of output.

The increasing importance of conceptual

content in output reflects in part the explosive growth of
information gathering and processing, which has greatly extended
our analytical capabilities of substituting ideas for physical
volume.
The downsizing of output, combined with significant
advances in intercontinental transportation and communication,
has facilitated the rapid growth in international trade we have
seen in recent decades.

Moreover, information about new products

and new technologies spreads further and much more rapidly today

- 4 -

than it did just a few years ago.

As information processing

capabilities increase in all countries, technological and
productivity gaps likely will continue to narrow further.
While other countries have benefitted greatly from
technology that has been developed first in the United States,
U.S. residents, too, have benefitted significantly from the rapid
growth of productivity abroad.

As goods and services produced

abroad improve in quality and/or decline in price, opportunities
for international trade are enhanced, and U.S. consumers who
import foreign goods and services benefit directly.
The rapid growth of international trade over the past
four decades has enhanced our standard of living more generally,
in several respects.

One is the well known gains from

specialization and exchange, commonly referred to as the law of
comparative advantage.

Just as individuals within a country gain

by devoting their energies to what they do relatively well and
exchanging their output for the output of others, so do entire
countries gain through specialization and exchange.

By

specializing in industries where they are relatively efficient
producers, and trading for products in which they are relatively
inefficient, the citizens of all countries increase the total
amount of goods and services available for their own consumption.
Another source of gains from trade is the stimulus to
the efficiency of domestic production that is provided by
international competition.

For example, increases in the quality

of U.S. automotive products since the early 1970s were stimulated
in part by the competition of Japanese and European automakers.

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Although the implications for workers in the domestic automobile
industry were not always positive, those for consumers and their
standard of living were definitely so.

In addition, the rapid

expansion of U.S. exports over the past several years owes much
to a period of capacity enhancements and productivity
improvements by U.S. manufacturing firms earlier in the 1980s
when the dollar was strong and foreign competition was intense.
In a dynamic competitive world economy, with new
products, technologies, and production processes continually
coming on stream, some firms and industries will always be on the
decline as others are on the rise.

Protectionist pressures

often arise when foreign competition intensifies for a domestic
industry that is in decline.

The ailing industry has a strong

incentive to seek protection from foreign competition; the losses
of those put out of business and out of jobs are real.

However,

the appropriate policy response to an industry that is losing
ground to foreign competition is not to erect barriers to
imports, but rather to facilitate the redirection of workers who
do lose their jobs to more productive employment opportunities
elsewhere.

If the protectionist route is followed, newer, more

efficient industries will have less scope to expand, and overall
output and economic welfare will suffer.
It is noteworthy that despite the alleged weakening of
our international competitive position during the 1980s, it can
scarcely be argued that jobs have been lost, on balance.

In

fact, the unemployment rate by the latter part of the 1980s, at
below 5-1/2 percent, was the lowest level since the early 1970s.

- 6 -

Moreover, the view that employment growth has been concentrated
in less productive areas more recently is not supported by the
data.

Indeed, real wages and salaries per worker grew almost as

fast during the 1980s as they did during the 1970s.
It is, of course, prudent to be vigilant against unfair
trade practices or excessive concentration of market power on the
part of foreign firms.

Nevertheless, the current level of

protection in the United States seems well in excess of the
response that would be warranted by the actual existence of
unfair trade practices abroad.

By some plausible estimates, the

unilateral removal of quantitative restrictions now placed on
U.S. imports of textiles, apparel, and various agricultural
products would result in net gains to U.S. consumers amounting in
the tens of billions of dollars.

Moreover, the complete removal

of existing foreign restrictions on US exports probably would
reduce our trade deficit by only modest amounts.
While the traditional impetus for protection has been
the loss of domestic market share and jobs to foreign
competition, a new school of thought argues that a case can be
made for government intervention in the form of promotion of
technological change and innovation in particular industries.
Certain industries promise the possibility of high profits or
above-average wages to employees because of increasing returns to
scale in production, spill-over benefits to related industries,
and barriers to market entry associated with high initial
research and development costs.

As the argument goes, other

countries are beating us to the punch in such high value-added

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areas because their governments have heavily subsidized initial
R&D expenditures.
This argument has some appeal, but I would caution
against adopting a policy of targeting particular industries for
special support from the government, for several reasons.

First,

if the potential returns to specific industries are really as
high as promised, in many cases private investment could be
expected to respond.

Second, it is not at all clear that the

government is in any better position than the private market to
identify those particular firms or industries that are most
deserving of R&D support.

Third, even if the spillovers were

significant and obvious enough in a given case to warrant
government subsidies, making an exception in one case would risk
the spread of government intervention to less clear-cut cases.
I have suggested that the narrowing of the gap between
U.S. productivity and that of our major trading partners, to a
considerable extent, has been both inevitable and beneficial.
Nevertheless, more could be done to promote U.S. productivity
growth in the United States.
Some observers have suggested that a case can be made
for government support for basic research and development, that
is, support not directed at specific products or industries.
However, it is important that government involvement in this area
be implemented in such a way that it reinforces but does not
supplant private market decisions.

Much the same could be said

for additional government expenditures on education and training.

- 8 -

More could be done to remove outmoded or unnecessary
government restrictions on U.S. private industry.

In areas where

high value added and spillovers are present, the gains in terms
of our standard of living could be significant.

To take an

example, legislation is now pending to put U.S. banks on a more
equal footing with foreign banks by allowing them to provide a
more complete range of financial services to their customers.

In

the absence of such banking reform, we could see a decline in the
prominence of the United States as an international financial
center, and a potential loss of highly skilled jobs in financial
services and allied industries.
Because the arguments for free trade are so compelling,
one sure way to enhance the prospects for our national standard
of living is to continue to work to remove existing barriers to
trade globally.

Indeed, the primary thrust of U.S. trade policy

has been and must continue to be to strive for multilateral
reduction of trade restrictions under the auspices of the GATT.
I attach great importance to bringing the current Uruguay round
negotiations to a successful conclusion.

Much progress already

has been made in the talks, and prospects may have improved for
ironing out remaining nettlesome areas, particularly in
agriculture.

Any significant step that could be taken toward

tearing down the extremely inefficient and costly worldwide
system of government subsidies to agriculture would be a
breakthrough that would have many benefits.
The recent extension of the fast-track authority was an
important step both for the GATT talks, and for the establishment

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of a North American Free Trade Agreement.

With respect to our

impending negotiations with Mexico, predictably, some U.S.
industries may be hurt by increased competition from that
country.

But all of the comprehensive studies that I have seen

on the subject indicate that the increase in trade with Mexico
that will follow a removal of existing trade barriers, on the
whole, will result in a net gain in both jobs and incomes for
U.S. residents, as well as for the residents of Mexico.
Perhaps the most important means at the government's
disposal to improve U.S. international competitiveness and our
standard of living in the long run is to pursue sound
macroeconomic policies.

It goes without saying that a stable

financial system and steady progress toward price stability will
tend to minimize risk and enhance the attractiveness of investing
in the United States —
abroad.

both by U.S. investors and by those from

Policies that contribute to low inflation among our

major trading partners at the same time will lead to more stable
exchange rates and contribute to further sustained growth of
international trade and, accordingly, domestic real incomes.
On the fiscal side, the connection between movements in
our budget deficits and our external performance, within the
equation between national saving and investment, was confirmed by
events during the 1980s.

The widening of the federal budget

deficit, along with a downtrend in the U.S. private saving rate,
contributed to an increase in both real interest rates and the
dollar's exchange rate during the first half of the 1980s.
stronger dollar and associated decline in the price

The

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competitiveness of U.S. firms, in turn, contributed to a sharp
widening of the trade deficit and declines in the world market
shares of U.S. exports.

In the second half of the 1980s, the

budget deficit turned around, interest rates and the dollar fell,
the U.S. trade deficit began to narrow, and the world market
shares of U.S. exports recovered strongly.
Despite the swing in the U.S. external position during
the 1980s, U.S. investment continued to show reasonably strong
growth, and productivity in manufacturing advanced at an above
average annual rate of 3-1/2

percent.

However, given the low

and declining U.S. saving rate, the growth in investment was
necessarily at the expense of future consumption by U.S.
residents.

The shortfall of U.S. domestic saving was made up by

a substantial net inflow of capital from abroad.

All told, the

increase in our net debt to foreigners over the past 10 years
amounted to something on the order of $750 billion.

Servicing

that increased net debt over the years ahead will mean that the
rate of consumption in the United States relative to our output
will be lower than it would otherwise have been.
There is no guestion that the decline in the U.S.
national saving rate has been costly, and that the recovery of
that saving rate should be a national priority.

At a minimum, we

should ensure that progress toward eliminating the federal budget
deficit over the next five years, as envisioned in last year's
budget agreement, is achieved.