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For release on delivery
9.30 A M. EST
February 28, 1990

Testimony by

Alan Greenspan

Chairman

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the

Committee on the Budget

U S. House of Representatives

February 28, 1990

Mr

Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to have the

opportunity to appear before you once again

As you know, the Federal

Reserve's semiannual Policy Report, which was submitted to the Congress
last week, provided an extensive picture both of recent economic
developments and of the Federal Reserve's policy actions and intentions
Rather than take you through the details of that report this morning, I
would like briefly to review some of its main themes and then turn to
some of the specific budgetary issues that the committee has asked me to
address
Economic and Monetary Policy Developments in 1989
About a year ago, in early 1989, Federal Reserve policy was in
the final phase of a period of gradual tightening, designed to inhibit a
buildup of inflation pressures

However, as the year progressed, the

threat of accelerating inflation seemed to diminish, and at the same
time, there emerged an increasing risk of an undue weakening in economic
activity

Conseguently, the Federal Reserve in June embarked on a series

of measured steps to ease reserve positions, and those steps continued
through late last year

Interest rates, which had turned downward in the

spring, declined further in the second half of the year, to levels about
1-1/2 percentage points below March peaks

In the event, output growth

slowed from the unsustainable pace of the two previous years, but still
was sufficient to support the creation of 2-1/2 million jobs and keep the
civilian unemployment rate steady at 5-1/4 percent

Inflation was held

to a rate no faster than that of recent years, but unfortunately no
progress was made in 1989 toward price stability

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The policy adjustments that we undertook over the course of 1989
were more in the nature of a mid-course correction, rather than a
reflection of a fundamental shift in policy.

Our more basic goals and

strategies remained unchanged from what they had been in previous years.
The ultimate goal of monetary policy still is that of ensuring price
stability so as to promote the maximum sustainable rate of economic
growth

Similarly, the strategy for moving toward this goal still is

that of restraining growth in money and aggregate demand in coming years
enough to establish a clear downward tilt to the trend of inflation and
inflation expectations, while avoiding a recession
Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook for 1990
Thus far in 1990, monetary policy basically has stayed on an
even keel, and the federal funds rate has remained around 8-1/4 percent
Nonetheless, the interest rates on Treasury securities and longer-term
private instruments have reversed, on net, some of their earlier
declines, reflecting the reaction of investors to stronger-than-expected
economic data, a firming of oil prices, and the prospect of greater
demands on world saving to support development of the economies of
Eastern Europe
In assessing the economic prospects for 1990 as a whole, the
Federal Reserve Governors and the Reserve Bank Presidents foresee
continued moderate economic expansion, consistent with conditions that
will foster progress toward price stability over time.

At its meeting

earlier this month, the FOMC selected ranges for growth in money and debt
it believes will promote this outcome

In brief, the FOMC reaffirmed the

tentative 3 to 7 percent growth range for M2 in 1990 that it set last

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July, and it reduced the M3 targets from their tentative range

The M2

range for 1990, which is the same as that used in 1989, is expected by
most FOMC members to produce somewhat slower growth in nominal GNP this
year

The new M3 range of 2-1/2 to 6-1/2 percent is intended to embody

the same degree of restraint as the M2 range, but it was lowered to
reflect the continued decline in thrift assets and funding needs
anticipated to accompany the ongoing restructuring of the thrift
industry

The monitoring range for debt was lowered from a range of

6-1/2 to 10-1/2 percent in 1989 to a range of 5 to 9 percent in 1990
The overwhelming majority of the Committee believes that money
growth within these annual ranges will be compatible with expansion of
nominal GNP in a range of 5-1/2 percent to 6-1/2 percent.

Expectations

of real GNP growth center on a range of 1-3/4 to 2 percent over the four
quarters of the year

A slight easing of pressures on resources probably

is in store, and inflation pressures should remain contained, even though
the decline in the dollar's value since last summer likely will reverse
some of the beneficial effects on domestic inflation stemming from the
dollar's earlier appreciation

The CPI this year is projected to

increase 4 to 4-1/2 percent, as compared with last year's 4-1/2 percent
rise
Risks to the Economic Outlook
Economic forecasting, of course, is not an exact science, and at
present, there are obvious risks in the outlook

For example, it is

possible that the weakness in economic activity evident around the turn
of the year may tend to cumulate, causing members' forecasts about
production and employment this year to be overly optimistic

However,

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two major depressants of growth now seem behind us

Boeing has returned

to full-scale production after last fall's long strike, and in January
the auto industry greatly reduced its inventory problems by slashing
production and boosting incentives to customers
Still, we shall need to remain attentive to the risks posed in
several areas where the undercurrents have been troubling of late.
Profit margins, for example, have deteriorated substantially in recent
quarters, and a continuation of this trend could seriously undercut the
expansion in capital investment.
Another concern is the increase in financial leverage in the
economy

In recent years, business debt burdens have been enlarged

through corporate restructurings, and as a consequence interest costs as
a percent of cash flow have risen markedly.

Among households, too, debt-

servicing burdens have risen to historic highs relative to income, and
delinquency rates have moved up a bit

Clearly, should the economy fall

into a recession, excess debt service costs would intensify the problems
of adjustment

While these strains seem unlikely in themselves to

precipitate a downturn, they are nonetheless worrisome

Fortunately, the

growth of nonfmancial debt has slowed from its frenetic pace of the mid1980s, and a continuation of this recent trend, along the lines that the
FOMC is anticipating, should lessen the financial strains and hopefully
the threat to the economy.
The Federal Budget Deficit and Social Security
A risk in the longer-run outlook for the economy—and one that
is closer to the day-to-day work of this committee—is the possibility
that the federal government might fail to build upon the progress that

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has been made to date in moving toward reduced federal budget deficits
and eventually, I would hope, toward a position of surplus
I have testified often before committees of the Congress about
the adverse effects on our economy of sustained large budget deficits.
Put simply, my central concern on this score is that deficits cut into
national saving and investment and thereby limit our ability to expand
and upgrade the nation's stock of productive capital

It is the size of

that stock, together with the quality of the labor force, that ultimately
determines overall productive capacity and the future standard of living
of our population
Unfortunately, much of the recent policy debate has shifted away
from the budget deficit per se, and toward the financing over time of the
nation's social security program

Senator Moynihan has introduced

legislation to cut payroll taxes and return the system to a pay-as-you-go
basis, and others would like to move its finances fully off-budget

As I

stated yesterday in my testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, I
am concerned that these changes, if enacted, will ultimately prove
counterproductive and will hamper the efforts needed to meet our longerterm fiscal responsibilities

They also would likely increase the

difficulty of providing for the needs of an aging population in a way
that is equitable across generations
most basic way

If I may frame the issue in the

we need to save and invest now in order to have the

productive economy that can support a rapidly growing population of
retirees two or three decades in the future, pay-as-you-go would not be
supportive of that saving-investment relationship, in addition to
undermining the notion of equity across generations

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The need to take a long view of the issue arises from the
compelling demographic trends that are now in progress.

In 1960, there

were twenty beneficiaries for every one hundred workers contributing to
social security, currently there are thirty

The Social Security

Administration—under intermediate economic and demographic assumptions—
expects that number to approach fifty by about the year 2025 and to
remain at that level at least through the middle of the 21st century
Assuming that their living standards keep pace with those of the
working population, the elderly will of necessity consume a growing
proportion of total output in the future

They will finance their

consumption out of private and public pensions and by drawing down their
own assets

Nonetheless, the goods and services they buy can only come

from the output of then-active workers, whose productivity will depend on
the investments that we make in capital and new technologies in the
interim
Investment is possible, of course, only if there is saving—the
diversion of part of the nation's current production away from
consumption, both private and public

The present buildup in the social

security trust funds is one source of the needed saving

While, in a

sense, these funds exist on paper only, they also are very real claims on
future taxpayers and hence on future real output.

All else constant, the

accumulation of saving in the trust funds increases the likelihood that
the real output will be available to meet the needs of retirees without
denting the living standards of their children too deeply, if at all

In

particular, to the extent that the surpluses are not offset by reductions
in the saving of households and businesses or by larger dissaving, that

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is, deficits, elsewhere in the federal budget, they should boost
investment and thus foster growth of the nation's capital stock

And

with more capital per worker than would otherwise be in place, productive
capacity and output also will be higher
At present, the contribution of the trust funds to national
saving is being swamped by the large deficits in the rest of the budget
As long as the non-social security deficits remain sizable, Senator
Moynihan and others are correct in pointing out that we are doing little
to solve the future retirement problem.

If, however, actions are taken

to bring the non-social security part of the budget into balance, the
trust funds no longer will be financing current government spending, but
will translate dollar for dollar into national saving
Ultimately, where saving takes place in the total unified
budget—social security or elsewhere—is of secondary importance

What

matters in terms of reaching our longer-term growth objective is the
government's overall net contribution to national saving

Thus, a chief

criterion for evaluating the major proposals regarding social security
should perhaps be whether they would in fact help us to achieve the
needed saving and investment

For example, is the federal government

more likely to shift toward a position of positive net saving if social
security is returned to pay-as-you-go financing7

Given the large revenue

loss implied by the plan, I think not
A second key criterion for evaluating the proposals is whether
they meet the test of equity across generations

Without going into

great detail on this point, it would seem to me that the pay-as-you-go
proposal again falls short

Indeed, returning now to pay-as-you-go

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fmancing would confer a significant windfall on the "baby boomers" who,
in effect, would benefit doubly from the size of their age cohort.

Given

their numbers, each would make a disproportionately small contribution
during his or her working years to the retirement of their elders. Yet,
in retirement, each would expect to receive full benefits, which could
come only at a disproportionately high cost to their children

The

present structure, in my view, is more likely to ensure that an
individual's contributions are linked equitably to his or her benefits.
Moving Soaial Security "Off-Budget"
I also have deep reservations about proposals that would move
the social security system fully "off-budget," so that the trust funds
would be excluded from the official summary budget figures and from the
setting of deficit targets.

First, splitting off social security—or any

other program—would highlight a distinction that has little
macroeconomic or analytical significance.

Regardless of which numbers

are reported, government saving or dissaving would continue to be wellapproximated by the surplus or deficit in the total federal budget as
currently defined in the National Income and Product Accounts, a close
variant of the total unified budget.
Second, the way budget numbers are presented can influence
public perceptions of important fiscal issues and thereby—for good or
ill—play a role in decisions that affect the size of the overall deficit
or surplus.

In particular, I fear that adopting a system that draws

attention to the surpluses in the trust funds might foster the illusion
that saving already is great enough to meet future obligations

-9-

In large part, my concerns are grounded in the analytical issues
I discussed earlier.

But they are compounded by a technical factor,

namely that much of the growth in the trust funds is reflecting interest
received from the holdings of government debt

Such intragovernmental

interest payments, which will approach 1 percent of GNP in a few years,
are both an inflow to the trust funds and an outlay from the general
funds, and they wash out when the accounts are consolidated

But,

because they result in an overstatement of both the saving taking place
in the trust funds and the dissaving elsewhere, they can contribute to a
significant misreading of saving trends when either part of the budget is
considered in isolation

Moreover, the very growth in anticipated social

security surpluses, in large part the result of interest received, is
mirrored in the increasing interest costs and widening deficits projected
in the non-social security part of the budget

The implied deficit-

reduction targets might then be well out of political reach
Accordingly, I fear that moving away from the unified budget
concept will impede the achievement of the sizable deficit reductions
that the country so sorely needs

In addition, the inevitable pressures

to expand social security benefits or cut payroll taxes if the system
were not subject to the discipline of an overall deficit constraint would
mount

In the absence of offsetting changes elsewhere in the budget,

such actions would reduce national saving and over time worsen the burden
on the generation after the baby boom
Responsible budgeting requires a comprehensive framework for
setting priorities and assessing competing claims on national resources
That function currently is filled by the unified budget process

If

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deficit targets were to be set exclusive of social security, for example,
they could be m e t — a t least in part—by moving related programs into the
social security account or by shifting other trust funds off the books
Such actions would shrink the on-budget deficit but would not reduce
federal demands on private saving or on credit markets
The Need for Further Deficit Reduction
Most important, we must not allow the choice of a budget
accounting system to divert attention from the pressing need for
meaningful deficit reduction, but rather must take actions to set the
federal government's claim on saving—however the budget deficit is
measured—on a firm downward track

Making a serious commitment to

eliminating the unified deficit within the foreseeable future is an
essential first step, and meeting that commitment will be a formidable
challenge

But it is just a first step

If households and businesses

continue to save relatively little, then the federal government should
compensate by moving its budget in the direction of greater surplus
I would remind you in closing that budget decisions often have
been shaped by short-run concerns and pressures.

Those same decisions,

though, many times have had longer-run repercussions that were unintended
or perhaps even contrary to original intentions

I hope that in your

deliberations on the budget—and particularly in your actions on the
social security issue—you will give special attention to the long-run
needs of the economy

It is the process of saving, investment, capital

accumulation, and rising productivity that largely will determine the
economic prospects of the next generation

These goals will be fostered

to the extent that you keep us on the path toward reduced government
deficits and increased national saving