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For release on delivery
10 00 a m E S T
Tuesday, January 21. 1997

Testimony by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
January 21. 1997

Mr

Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to

appear here today

In just a few weeks the Federal Reserve Board will

submit its semiannual report on monetary policy to the Congress

That

report and my accompanying testimony will cover in detail our
assessment of the outlook for the U S
facing monetary policy

economy and the challenges

This morning, I would like to offer some

personal perspectives on the current economic situation
I think it is fair to say that the overall performance of the
U S

economy has continued to surpass most forecasters' expectations

The current cyclical upswing is now approaching six years in duration,
and the economy has retained considerable vigor, with few signs of the
imbalances and inflationary tensions that have disrupted past
expansions

Although the data for the fourth quarter are still

incomplete, it is apparent that real gross domestic product posted an
increase in the neighborhood of 3 percent over the four quarters of
1996

This increase may seem quite moderate compared with the gains

registered in some earlier years of the postwar period, however, at a
time when the working-age population is expanding relatively slowly
and unemployment is already low, this economic growth is appreciable
indeed

It was enough to generate more than 2-1/2 million new payroll

jobs last year and to cause the unemployment rate to edge down to 51/4 percent--a figure roughly matching the low of the last cyclical
upswing, in the late 1980s

But, in contrast to that earlier period,

we have not experienced a broad increase in inflation, in fact, by
some important measures of price trends, inflation actually slowed a
bit in 1996
The balance and solidity of the expansion last year can be
seen in the composition of the growth

Notably, consumers appear to

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have been rather conservative in their spending

In some instances,

they may have been constrained by the debt-service burdens accumulated
over the previous few years, but in the aggregate, households
experienced an enormous further accretion of net worth as the stock
market continued to climb at a breathtaking rate

Judging from

historical patterns, such an increase in wealth might have inspired
households to spend an enlarged share of their current income, but,
if we take the available data at face value, households appear instead
to have set aside a greater share of their income for financial
investment

Perhaps Americans are finally becoming conscious of the

need to accumulate additional assets to ensure not only that they can
handle temporary interruptions in employment but also that they will
have the wherewithal to enjoy a lengthy retirement down the road
Be that as it may, the increased flow of private savings--and
a reduced call upon those savings by the Treasury--helped to fund
substantial increases in fixed investment last year

Homebuilding

activity was up considerably, notably, single-family housing starts
were robust once again and helped to push the nation's homeownership
rate to a fifteen-year high
posted another strong advance

In addition, business fixed investment
Firms acquired large amounts of

computing and telecommunications equipment in particular, seeking to
enhance the efficiency of their operations as well as their overall
productive capacity
rather cautiously

At the same time, they accumulated inventories
Stock-to-sales ratios, which had risen in 1995,

were in many cases near historic lows as of November 1996, the most
recent month for which statistical information is available
The growing economy had beneficial effects on the finances of
many states and localities, which consequently could spend more on
needed infrastructure and vital services and, in some instances, trim

-3-

taxes

Of course, overall government sector purchases were held down

by the ongoing efforts to reduce the federal deficit

It clearly was

private demand that drove economic growth last year
To be more specific, it was domestic private demand that did
so, for net exports fell, on balance, in 1996

The volume of goods

and services we sold abroad grew appreciably, despite moderate
economic expansion by our major trading partners, but our imports
continued to grow at a rapid clip
valve in a U S

In fact, imports provided a safety

economy marked by a high degree of resource

utilization
I've already noted that our unemployment rate reached the
lowest level in some time

Moreover, throughout the year, we heard

reports from around the country that qualified workers were in tight
supply

Although increases in hourly compensation remained relatively

subdued--an important fact to which I shall return in a few moments-they did become more sizable, and they raised unit costs when
employers were unable to enhance productivity commensurately

Thanks

to the very substantial additions to facilities in the past few years,
physical capacity in the manufacturing sector was not greatly
strained
The question is, of course, where do we go from here?

Can we

continue to achieve significant gains in real activity while avoiding
inflationary excesses?

Because monetary policy works with a lag, it

is not the conditions prevailing today that are critical but rather
those likely to prevail six to twelve months, or even longer, from
now

Hence, as difficult as it is, we must arrive at some judgment

about the most probable direction of the economy and the distribution
of risks around that expectation

-4-

Fortunately, economic events are not wholly random and
unforecastable

There are certain principles, and certain empirical

regularities in behavioral relations, that we can follow with some
degree of confidence

For example, capital investment responds in a

predictable way to the rate of growth of the economy, expected
profitability, and the cost of capital

Similarly, housing activity,

with some qualifications, moves inversely with mortgage rates

And

the largest component of final demand, personal consumption
expenditures, generally follows income over time

Many of these

relationships are embedded in the traditional notion of the business
cycle developed by Wesley Clair Mitchell three-quarters of a century
ago and worked out with Arthur F

Burns, one of my predecessors, in

the definitive tome, Measuring Business Cycles

Their insights remain

relevant today
Even so, each cycle tends to have its own identifying
characteristic

For example, in the late 1980s and the recessionary

period of the early 1990s, the economy was dominated by the sharp fall
in the market value of commercial real estate, because such real
estate served as a major source of loan collateral, the drop in its
value had a profoundly restrictive influence on the willingness and
ability of commercial banks to lend

As you may recall, at that time,

I characterized the economy as trying to advance in the face of fiftymile-an-hour headwinds

The severe credit restraint was only

grudgingly responsive to the extended efforts of the Federal Reserve
to ease monetary conditions
Similarly, the dramatic rise of inflation and of inflation
expectations in the 1970s was key in shaping the cyclical patterns of
that period

One manifestation was the impetus to spending on houses,

cars, and other consumer durables from buyers' efforts to beat future

-5-

price increases

Countering this inflation required a major monetary

tightening, which moved both nominal and real interest rates up
sharply and led to substantial contractions in housing and other
interest-sensitive sectors in the early 1980s
In contrast, as I've mentioned several times to the Congress
over the past few years, perhaps the dominant characteristic of the
current expansion is low inflation and quiescent inflation
expectations, which have helped create a financial environment
conducive to strong capital spending and longer-range planning
generally

I emphasized this point in our Humphrey-Hawkins testimony

of a year ago

Since then, increases in hourly compensation as

measured by the employment cost index have continued to fall far short
of what they would have been had historical relationships between
compensation gains and the degree of labor market tightness held
Reaching some judgment about the reasons for this departure
from past patterns is important

As I see it, heightened job

insecurity explains a significant part of the restraint on
compensation and the consequent muted price inflation
Surveys of workers have highlighted this extraordinary state
of affairs

In 1991, at the bottom of the recession, a survey of

workers at large firms indicated that 25 percent feared being laid
off

In 1996, despite the sharply lower unemployment rate and the

demonstrably tighter labor market, the same survey organization found
that 46 percent were fearful of a job layoff
The continued reluctance of workers to leave their jobs to
seek other employment as the labor market has tightened provides
further evidence of such concern, as does the tendency toward longer
labor union contracts

For many decades, contracts rarely exceeded

-6-

three years

Today, one can point to five- and six-year contracts--

contracts that are commonly characterized by an emphasis on job
security and that involve only modest wage increases

The low level

of work stoppages of recent years also attests to concern about job
security
Thus, the willingness of workers to trade off smaller
increases in wages for greater job security seems to be reasonably
well-documented for this particular business-cycle expansion

The

unanswered question is why this insecurity has persisted even as the
labor market has, by all objective measures, tightened considerably
One possibility is the ongoing concern of workers about job skill
obsolescence

The reality of this obsolescence is evidenced by the

marked expansion of on-the-job training programs, especially in
technical areas, in many of the nation's corporations

No longer can

one expect to obtain all of one's lifetime job skills with a highschool or college diploma

Indeed, continuing adult education is

perceived to be increasingly necessary to retain a job
Certainly, there are other possible explanations of the
softness in compensation growth in the past few years

The sharp

deceleration in health care costs, of course, is cited frequently
Another possibility is the heightened pressure on firms and their
workers in industries that compete internationally

Domestic

deregulation has had similar effects on the intensity of competitive
forces in some industries

In addition, the continued decline in the

share of the private workforce in labor unions has likely made wages
more responsive to market forces --indeed, the converse is also true in
that the new competitive realities have in many instances undermined
union strength

In any event, although I do not doubt that all these

explanations are relevant, I would be surprised if any were dominant

-7-

Another potential explanation is that persistently low price
inflation is constraining wage increases

Historical evidence clearly

indicates that price inflation is a factor in wage change

But, if

the causation is running mainly from product markets, where prices are
set, "to labor markets, where wages are set, then we would expect to
see some squeeze on profit margins
present

Clearly, this is not the case at

Rather, owing in part to the subdued behavior of wages,

profits and rates of return on capital have risen to high levels

The

high rates of return, in turn, seem to be inducing competitive
pressures that limit the ability of firms to raise prices relative to
their underlying cost structures because they fear that competitors
anxious to capture a greater share of the market will not follow suit
Thus, the evidence seems more consistent with the view that wage
restraint is damping price increases than the other way around
If the job insecurity paradigm that I have outlined is the
key, then we must recognize that, as I indicated in last February's
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony, "suppressed wage cost growth as a
consequence of job insecurity can be carried only so far

At some

point in the future, the trade-off of subdued wage growth for job
security has to come to an end "

In short, this implies that even

if the level of real wages remains permanently lower as a result of
the experience of the past few years, the relatively modest wage gains
we've seen are a transitional rather than a lasting phenomenon
unknown is how long the transition will last

The

Indeed, the recent

pickup in some measures of wages suggests that the transition may
already be running its course

If so, the important question from a

monetary policy point of view is whether prospective labor market
conditions will be consistent with the maintenance of satisfactory
price performance

-8-

I would like to conclude with a brief discussion of some
issues of measurement and economic data that may be useful as you
begin your deliberations on the 1998 budget

One issue you will have

to grapple with is the growing consensus that the consumer price
index--and other broad price measures that rely heavily on CPI data in
their construction--are substantially overstating changes in the true
cost of living

From your perspective, one important implication of

the CPI bias is that it creates an automatic and presumably unintended
real increase in social security and other indexed federal benefits
and a real cut in indexed individual income taxes each year

Less

widely recognized is the fact that, for a given level of nominal
spending, the upward bias in the CPI in many cases is mirrored in a
downward bias in estimates of real spending, this muddies the
interpretation of both recent economic developments and longer-run
trends in our economic performance
Several researchers have attempted to quantify the bias In
the CPI and other broad measures of prices

One set of studies has

examined the detailed microstatistical evidence on price measurement
The Boskin Commission drew heavily on these studies and concluded that
the CPI is currently overstating changes In the true cost of living by
approximately 1 percentage point per year

In addition to some

technical factors associated with its construction, the CPI overstates
inflation because of the slow introduction of new products and
inadequate adjustment for quality improvements
Recently, researchers at the Federal Reserve Board have
looked at the measurement Issue from a macroeconomic perspective
This analysis, which questions whether the pattern implied by the
published price, output, and productivity statistics makes sense, also
suggests that the inflation rate is overstated

In particular, the

-9-

research finds that measured real output and productivity in the
service sector of the economy are implausibly weak, given that the
return to the owners of these businesses that is implicit in our
aggregate statistics on GDP apparently has been well-maintained

The

published data indicate that the level of output per hour in several
service-producing industries has been falling for more than two
decades --that is, that firms in these industries have been getting
less and less efficient for more than twenty years
highly unlikely

This pattern is

Price mismeasurement seems to be the most probable

explanation of the data anomalies, and the order of magnitude appears
consistent with the microstatistical results
The evidence that inflation has been slower and that real
growth has been faster than the official measures indicate is welcome,
in part because it suggests that the nation's current level of
economic well-being is higher than we had thought

But I want to make

clear that revising our historical estimates of real growth to
incorporate better price data would have no material effect on
measures of the degree of resource utilization, because such a
revision implies faster growth in potential output, as well as actual
output, accordingly, it does not alter the relationship between
resource utilization and inflation

Nor does it change the outlook

for the federal budget deficit, apart from any modifications to the
indexing formulas for entitlements and income taxes
Certainly, the judgment that aggregate productivity has been
growing faster than indicated by the official statistics seems
reasonable in light of the significant business restructurings and
extraordinary improvements in technology in recent years

I do not

mean to imply, however, that we should assume that the full
productivity gain from information technology has already been reaped

-10-

Clearly, it takes some time for firms to adopt production techniques
that translate a major new technology into increased output

In an

intriguing parallel, electric motors in the late nineteenth century
were well-known as a technology but were initially integrated into
production systems that were designed for steam-driven power plants
Not until the gradual conversion of previously vertical factories into
horizontal facilities, mainly in the 1920s, were firms able to take
full advantage of the synergies implicit in the electric dynamo and
thus achieve dramatic increases in productivity

Analogously, not all

of today's production systems can be easily integrated with new
information and communication technologies
cannot be controlled by computer, for example

Some existing equipment
Thus, the full

exploitation of even the current generation of information and
communication equipment may occur over quite a few years and only
after a considerably updated stock of physical capital has been put in
place
While such a scenario is quite plausible, we cannot be
certain when, or if, it will occur

Thus, we must be vigilant to

ensure that our economy remains sufficiently flexible for
entrepreneurial initiatives

And we must continue our efforts to

further enhance productivity growth by raising national saving and
spurring capital formation

Attaining a higher national saving rate

quite soon is crucial, particularly in view of the anticipated shift
in the nation's demographics and associated pressures on federal
retirement and health programs in the first few decades of the next
century

Reducing the size of the federal budget deficit, and over

time moving the unified budget into surplus, would go a substantial
way in that direction