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For release on delivery
10 30 a m EST
March 3, 1998

Statement of
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
of the
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
March 3, 1998

The global financial system has been evolving rapidly in recent years

New

technology has radically reduced the costs of borrowing and lending across traditional
national borders, facilitating the development of new instruments and drawing in new players
Information is transmitted instantaneously around the world, and huge shifts in the supply and
demand for funds naturally follow, resulting in a massive increase in capital flows
This burgeoning global system has been demonstrated to be a highly efficient structure
that has significantly facilitated cross-border trade in goods and services and, accordingly, has
made a substantial contribution to standards of living worldwide

Its efficiency exposes and

punishes underlying economic imprudence swiftly and decisively

Regrettably, it also

appears to have facilitated the transmission of financial disturbances far more effectively than
ever before
Three years ago, the Mexican crisis was the first such episode associated with our
new high-tech international financial system

The current Asian crisis is the second

We do not as yet fully understand the new system's dynamics

We are learning fast,

and need to update and modify our institutions and practices to reduce the nsks inherent in
«
the new regime

Meanwhile, we have to confront the current crisis with the institutions and

techniques we have
Many argue that the current crisis should be allowed to run its course without support
from the International Monetary Fund or the bilateral financial backing of other nations
They assert that allowing this crisis to play out, while doubtless having additional negative
effects on growth in Asia, and engendering greater spill-overs onto the rest of the world, is
not likely to have a large or lasting impact on the United States and the world economy

-2They may well be correct in their judgment

There is, however, a small but not

negligible probability that the upset in East Asia could have unexpectedly large negative
effects on Japan, Latin America, and eastern and central Europe that, in turn, could have
repercussions elsewhere, including the United States

Thus, while the probability of such an

outcome may be small, its consequences, in my judgment, should not be left solely to chance
We have observed that global financial markets, as currently organized, do not always
achieve an appropriate equilibrium, or at least require time to stabilize
Opponents of IMF support for member countries facing international financial
difficulties also argue that such substantial financial backing, by cushioning the losses of
imprudent investors, could encourage excessive risk-taking There doubtless is some truth in
that, though arguably it has been the expectation of governments' support of then- financial
systems that has been the more obvious culprit, at least in the Asian case

In any event, any

expectations of broad bailouts have turned out to have been disappointed

Many if not most

investors in Asian economies have to date suffered substantial losses

Asian equity losses,

excluding Japanese companies, since June 1997, worldwide, are estimated to have exceeded
$700 billion, at the end of January, of which more than $30 billion had been lost by U S
investors

Substantial further losses have been recorded in bonds and real estate

Moreover, the policy conditionality, associated principally with IMF lending, which
dictates economic and financial discipline and structural change, helps to mitigate some of the
inappropriate risk-taking Such conditionality is also critical to the success of the overall
stabilization effort

At the root of the problems is poor public policy that has resulted in

misguided investments and very weak financial sectors

Convmcing a sovereign nation to

-3alter destructive policies that impair its own performance and threaten contagion to its
neighbors is best handled by an international financial institution, such as the IMF

What we

have in place today to respond to crises should be supported even as we work to improve
those mechanisms and institutions
Some observers have also expressed concern about whether we can be confident that
IMF programs for countries, in particular the countries of East Asia, are likely to alter their
economies significantly and permanently

My sense is that one consequence of this Asian

crisis is an increasing awareness in the region that market capitalism, as practiced in the
West, especially in the United States, is the supenor model, that is, it provides greater
promise of producing nsing standards of living and continuous growth
Although East Asian economies have exhibited considerable adherence to many
aspects of free-market capitalism, there has, nonetheless, been a pronounced tendency toward
government-directed investment, using the banking system to finance that investment

Given

a record of real growth rates of close to 10 percent per annum over an extended penod of
tune, it is not surprising that it has been difficult to convince anyone that the economic
system practiced in East Asia could not continue to produce positive results indefinitely
Following the breakdown, an mcreasing awareness, bordering in some cases on shock, that
their economic model was incomplete, or worse, has arguably emerged in the region
As a consequence, many of the leaders of these countries and their economic advisors
are endeavoring to move their economies much more rapidly toward the type of economic
system that we have in the United States

The IMF, whatever one might say about its policy

advice in the past, is trying to play a critical role in this process, providing advice and

-4incentives that promote sound money and long-term stability

The IMF's current approach in

Asia is fully supportive of the views of those in the West who understand the importance of
greater reliance on market forces, reduced government controls, scaling back of governmentdirected investment, and embracing greater transparency-the publication of all the data that
are relevant to the activities of the central bank, the government, financial institutions, and
private companies
It is a reasonable question to ask how long this conversion to embracing market
capitalism in all its details will last in countries once temporary IMF support is no longer
necessary

We are, after all, dealing with sovereign nations with long traditions, not always

consonant with market capitalism

There can be no guarantees, but my sense is that there is

a growing understanding and appreciation of the benefits of market capitalism as we practice
it—that what is being prescribed in IMF programs fosters their own interests
The just-inaugurated president of Korea, from what I can judge, is unquestionably
aware of the faults of the Korean system that contributed to his country's crisis, he appears to
be very strenuously endeavonng to move his economy and society in the direction of freer
markets and a more flexible economy

In these efforts, he and other leaders in the region

with similar views, have the support of many younger people, a large proportion educated in
the West, that see the advantages of market capitalism and who will soon assume the mantle
of leadership
Accordingly, I fully back the Administration's request to augment the financial
resources of the IMF by approving as quickly as possible U S participation in the New
Arrangements to Borrow and an increase in the U S quota in the IMF

Hopefully, neither

-5will turn out to be needed, and no funds will be drawn

But it is better to have it available if

that turns out not to be the case and quick response to a pending cnsis is essential