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For release on delivery
10AM EST
February 24, 1998

Statement of
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy
Committee on Banking and Financial Services
U S House of Representatives
February 24, 1998

Introduction
Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity to
present the Federal Reserve's semiannual report on economic conditions and the
conduct of monetary policy
The U S Economy in 1997
The U S economy delivered another exemplary performance in 1997 Over
the four quarters of last year, real GDP expanded close to 4 percent, its fastest
annual increase in ten years To produce that higher output, about 3 million
Americans joined the nation's payrolls, in the process contnbuting to a reduction in
the unemployment rate to 4-3/4 percent, its lowest sustained level since the late
1960s And our factories were working more intensively too Industrial production
increased 5-3/4 percent last year, exceeding robust additions to capacity
Those gains were shared widely The hourly wage and salary structure rose
about 4 percent, fueling impressive increases in personal incomes Unlike some prior
episodes when faster wage rate increases mainly reflected attempts to make up for
more rapidly rising prices of goods and services, the fatter paychecks that workers
brought home represented real increments to purchasing power Measured consumer
price inflation came in at 1-3/4 percent over the twelve months of 1997, down about
1 -1/2 percentage points from the pace of the prior year While swings in the prices
of food and fuel contributed to this decline, both narrower price indexes excluding
those items and broader ones including all goods and services produced in the
United States also paint a portrait of continued progress toward price stability
Businesses, for the most part, were able to pay these higher real wages while still

2
increasing their earnings Although aggregate data on profits for all of 1997 are not
yet available, corporate profit margins most likely remained in an elevated range not
seen consistently since the 1960s These healthy gains in earnings and the
expectations of more to come provided important support to the equity market, with
most major stock price indexes gaining more than 20 percent over the year
The strong growth of the real income of workers and corporations is not
unrelated to the economy's continued good performance on inflation

Taken

together, recent evidence supports the view that such low inflation, as closely
approaching price stability as we have known in the United States in three decades,
engenders many benefits When changes in the general price level are small and
predictable, households and firms can plan more securely for the future

The

perception of reduced risk encourages investment Low inflation also exerts a
discipline on costs, fostering efforts to enhance productivity Productivity is the
ultimate source of rising standards of living, and we witnessed a notable pickup in
this measure in the past two years
The robust economy has facilitated the efforts of the Congress and the
Administration to restore balance in the unified federal budget As I have indicated
to the Congress on numerous occasions, moving beyond this point and putting the
budget in significant surplus would be the surest and most direct way of increasing
national saving In turn, higher national saving, by promoting lower real long-term
interest rates, helps spur spending to outfit American firms and their workers with
the modem equipment they need to compete successfully on world markets

We

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have seen a partial down payment of the benefits of better budget balance already
It seems reasonable to assume that the decline in longer-term Treasury yields last
year owed, in part, to reduced competition-current and prospective--from the federal
government for scarce private saving However, additional effort remains to be
exerted to address the effects on federal entitlement spending of the looming shift
within the next decade in the nation's retirement demographics
As I noted earlier, our nation has been experiencing a higher growth rate of
productivity—output per hour worked~in recent years The dramatic improvements
in computing power and communication and information technology appear to have
been a major force behind this beneficial trend Those innovations, together with
fierce competitive pressures in our high-tech industries to make them available to as
many homes, offices, stores, and shop floors as possible, have produced double-digit
annual reductions in pnces of capital goods embodying new technologies

Indeed,

many products considered to be at the cutting edge of technology as recently as two
to three years ago have become so standardized and inexpensive that they have
achieved near "commodity" status, a development that has allowed businesses to
accelerate their accumulation of more and better capital
Critical to this process has been the rapidly increasing efficiency of our
financial markets—itself a product of the new technologies and of significant market
deregulation over the years Capital now flows with relatively little friction to
projects embodying new ideas

Silicon Valley is a tribute both to American

ingenuity and to the financial system's ever-increasing ability to supply venture

4
capital to the entrepreneurs who are such a dynamic force in our economy
With new high-tech tools, American businesses have shaved transportation
costs, managed their production and use of inventories more efficiently, and
broadened market opportunities

The threat of rising costs in tight labor markets

has imparted a substantial impetus to efforts to take advantage of possible
efficiencies

In my Humphrey-Hawkins testimony last July, I discussed the

likelihood that the sharp acceleration in capital investment in advanced technologies
beginning in 1993 reflected synergies of new ideas, embodied in increasingly
inexpensive new equipment, that have elevated expected returns and have broadened
investment opportunities
More recent evidence remains consistent with the view that this capital
spending has contributed to a noticeable pickup in productivity—and probably by
more than can be explained by usual business cycle forces

For one, the combination

of continued low inflation and stable to rising domestic profit margins implies quite
subdued growth in total consolidated unit business costs With labor costs
constituting more than two-thirds of those costs and labor compensation per hour
accelerating, productivity must be growing faster, and that stepup must be roughly
in line with the increase in compensation growth For another, our more direct
observations on output per hour roughly tend to confirm that productivity has
picked up significantly in recent years, although how much the ongoing trend of
productivity has risen remains an open question
The acceleration in productivity, however, has been exceeded by the

5
strengthening of demand for goods and services As a consequence, employers had
to expand payrolls at a pace well in excess of the growth of the working age
population that profess a desire for a job, including new immigrants As I pointed
out last year in testimony before the Congress, that gap has been accommodated by
declines in both the officially unemployed and those not actively seeking work but
desirous of working The number of people in those two categories decreased at a
rate of about one million per year on average over the last four years By December
1997, the sum had declined to a seasonally adjusted 10-1/2 million, or 6 percent of
the working age population, the lowest ratio since detailed information on this series
first became available in 1970 Anecdotal information from surveys of our twelve
Reserve Banks attests to our ever tightening labor markets
Rapidly nsing demand for labor has had enormous beneficial effects on our
work force Previously low- or unskilled workers have been drawn into the job
market and have obtained training and experience that will help them even if they
later change jobs Large numbers of underemployed have been moved up the career
ladder to match their underlying skills, and many welfare recipients have been added
to payrolls as well, to the benefit of their long-term job prospects
The recent acceleration of wages likely has owed in part to the ever-tightening
labor market and in part to nsing productivity growth, which, through competition,
induces firms to grant higher wages It is difficult at this time, however, to
disentangle the relative contributions of these factors

What is clear is that, unless

demand growth softens or productivity growth accelerates even more, we will

6
gradually run out of new workers who can be profitably employed It is not possible
to tell how many more of the 6 percent of the working-age population who want to
work but do not have jobs can be added to payrolls A significant number are socalled frictionally unemployed, as they have left one job but not yet chosen to accept
another

Still others have chosen to work in only a limited geographic area where

their skills may not be needed
Should demand for new workers continue to exceed new supply, we would
expect wage gains increasingly to exceed productivity growth, squeezing profit
margins and eventually leading to a pickup in inflation

Were a substantial pickup

in inflation to occur, it could, by stunting economic growth, reverse much of the
remarkable labor market progress of recent years I will be discussing our assessment
of these and other possibilities and their bearing on the outlook for 1998 shortly
Monetary Policy in 1997
History teaches us that monetary policy has been its most effective when it
has been preemptive The lagging relationship between the Federal Reserve's policy
instrument and spending, and, even further removed, inflation, implies that if policy
actions are delayed until prices begin to pick up, they will be too late to fend off at
least some persistent price acceleration and attendant economic instabilities
Preemptive pohcymaking is keyed to judging how widespread are emerging
inflationary forces, and when, and to what degree, those forces will be reflected in

actual inflation

For most of last year, the evident strains on resources were

sufficiently severe to steer the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) toward

7
being more inclined to tighten than to ease monetary policy Indeed, in March,
when it became apparent that strains on resources seemed to be intensifying, the
FOMC imposed modest incremental restraint, raising its intended federal funds rate
1/4 percentage point, to 5-1/2 percent
We did not increase the federal funds rate again during the summer and fall,
despite further tightening of the labor market

Even though the labor market heated

up and labor compensation rose, measured inflation fell, owing to the appreciation
of the dollar, weakness in international commodity prices, and faster productivity
growth Those restraining forces were more evident in goods-price inflation, which
in the CPI slowed substantially to only about 1/2 percent in 1997, than on serviceprice inflation, which moderated much less-to around 3 percent Providers of
services appeared to be more pressed by mounting strains in labor markets

Hourly

wages and salaries in service-producing sectors rose 4-1/2 percent last year, up
considerably from the prior year and almost 1 -1/2 percentage points faster than
no means all, traced to commissions in the financial and real estate services sector
related to one-off increases in transactions prices and in volumes of activity, rather
than to increases in the underlying wage structure

Although the nominal federal funds rate was maintained after March, the
apparent drop in inflation expectations over the balance of 1997 induced some
firming in the stance of monetary policy by one important measure-the real federal
funds rate, or the nominal federal funds rate less a proxy for inflation expectations

8

Some analysts have dubbed the contribution of the reduction in inflation
expectations to raising the real federal funds rate a "passive" tightening, in that it
increased the amount of monetary policy restraint in place without an explicit vote
by the FOMC While the tightening may have been passive in that sense, it was by
no means inadvertent Members of the FOMC took some comfort in the upward
trend of the real federal funds rate over the year and the rise in the foreign exchange
value of the dollar because such additional restraint was viewed as appropnate given
the strength of spending and building strains on labor resources They also
recognized that in virtually all other respects financial markets remained quite
accommodative and, indeed, judging by the rise in equity prices, were providing
additional impetus to domestic spending
The Outlook for 1998
There can be no doubt that domestic demand retained considerable
momentum at the outset of this year Production and employment have been on a
strong uptrend in recent months Confident households, enjoying gains in income
and wealth and benefitting from the reductions in intermediate- and longer-term
interest rates to date, should continue to increase their spending Firms should find
financing available on relatively attractive terms to fund profitable opportunities to
enhance efficiency by investing in new capital equipment

By itself, this strength in

spending would seem to presage intensifying pressures in labor markets and on
pnces Yet, the outlook for total spending on goods and services produced in the
United States is less assured of late because of storm clouds massing over the

9
Western Pacific and heading our way
This is not the place to examine in detail what triggered the initial problems
in Asian financial markets and why the subsequent deterioration has been so
extreme I covered that subject recently before several committees of the Congress
Rather, I shall confine my discussion this morning to the likely consequences of the
Asian crisis for demand and inflation in the United States
With the crisis curtailing the financing available in foreign currencies, many
Asian economies have had no choice but to cut back their imports sharply
Disruptions to their financial systems and economies more generally will further
damp demands for our exports of goods and services American exports should be
held down as well by the appreciation of the dollar, which will make the pnces of
competing goods produced abroad more attractive, just as foreign-produced goods
will be relatively more attractive to buyers here at home As a result, we can expect
a worsening net export position to exert a discernible drag on total output in the
United States For a time, such restraint might be reinforced by a reduced
willingness of U S firms to accumulate inventories as they foresee weaker demand
ahead
The forces of Asian restraint could well be providing another, more direct
offset to inflationary impulses arising domestically in the United States In the wake
of weakness in Asian economies and of lagged effects of the appreciation of the
dollar more generally, the dollar prices of our non-oil imports are likely to decline
further in the months ahead These lower import pnces are apparently already

10
making domestic producers hesitant to raise their own prices for fear of losing
market share, further contributing to the restraint on overall prices Lesser demands
for raw matenals on the part of Asian economies as their activity slows should help
to keep world commodity prices denominated in dollars in check Import and
commodity prices, however, will restrain U S inflation only as long as they continue
to fall, or to nse at a slower rate than the pace of overall domestic goods prices
The key question going forward is whether the restraint building from the
turmoil in Asia will be sufficient to check inflationary tendencies that might
otherwise result from the strength of domestic spending and tightening labor
markets The depth of the adjustment abroad will depend on the extent of weakness
in the financial sectors of Asian economies and the speed with which structural
inefficiencies in the financial and nonfinancial sectors of those economies are
corrected If, as we suspect, the restraint coming from Asia is sufficient to bring the
demand for American labor back into line with the growth of the working-age
population desirous of working, labor markets will remain unusually tight, but any
intensification of inflation should be delayed, very gradual, and readily reversible
However, we cannot rule out two other, more worrisome possibilities On the one
hand, should the momentum to domestic spending not be offset significantly by
Asian or other developments, the U S economy would be on a track along which
spending could press too strongly against available resources to be consistent with
contained inflation

On the other, we also need to be alert to the possibility that the

forces from Asia might damp activity and prices by more than is desirable by

11
exerting a particularly forceful drag on the volume of net exports and the prices of
imports
When confronted at the beginning of this month with these, for the moment,
finely balanced, though powerful forces, the members of the Federal Open Market
Committee decided that monetary policy should most appropnately be kept on hold
With the continuation of a remarkable seven-year expansion at stake and so little
precedent to go by, the range of our intelligence gathering in the weeks ahead must
be wide and especially inclusive of international developments
The Forecasts of the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board and the
Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks
In these circumstances, the forecasts of the governors of the Federal Reserve
Board and presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks for the performance of the U S
economy over this year are more tentative than usual Based on information
available through the first week of February, monetary policymakers were generally
of the view that moderate economic growth is likely in store The growth rate of
real GDP is most commonly seen as between 2 and 2-3/4 percent over the four
quarters of 1998 Given the strong performance of real GDP, these projections
envisage the unemployment rate remaining in the low range of the past half year
Inflation, as measured by the four-quarter percent change in the consumer price
index, is expected to be 1-3/4 to 2-1/4 percent in 1998-near the low rate recorded in
1997 This outlook embodies the expectation that the effects of continuing
tightness in labor markets will be largely offset by technical adjustments shaving a
couple tenths from the published CPI, healthy productivity growth, flat or declining

12
import prices, and little pressure in commodity markets

But the policymakers'

forecasts also reflect their determination to hold the line on inflation
The Ranges for the Debt and Monetary Aggregates
The FOMC affirmed the provisional ranges for the monetary aggregates in
1998 that it had selected last July, which, once again, encompass the growth rates
associated with conditions of approximate price stability, provided that these
aggregates act in accord with their pre-1990s historical relationships with nominal
income and interest rates These ranges are identical to those that had prevailed for
1997--1 to 5 percent for M2 and 2 to 6 percent for M3

The FOMC also reaffirmed

its range of 3 to 7 percent for the debt of the domestic nonfinancial sectors for this
year I should caution, though, that the expectations of the governors and Reserve
Bank presidents for the expansion of nominal GDP in 1998 suggest that growth of
M2 in the upper half of its benchmark range is a distinct possibility this year Given
the continuing strength of bank credit, M3 might even be above its range as
depositories use liabilities in this aggregate to fund loan growth and securities
acquisitions Nonfinancial debt should come in around the middle portion of its
range
In the first part of the 1990s, money growth diverged from historical
relationships with income and interest rates, in part as savers diversified into bond
and stock mutual funds, which had become more readily available and whose returns
were considerably more attractive than those on deposits This anomalous behavior
of velocity severely set back most analysts' confidence in the usefulness of M2 as an

13
indicator of economic developments

In recent years, there have been tentative signs

that the historical relationship linking the velocity of M2--measured as the ratio of
nominal GDP to the money stock-to the cost of holding M2 assets was reasserting
itself However, a persistent residual upward drift in velocity over the past few years
and its apparent cessation very recently underscores our ongoing uncertainty about
the stability of this relationship The FOMC will continue to observe the evolution
of the monetary and credit aggregates carefully, integrating information about these
variables with a wide variety of other information in determining its policy stance
Uncertainty about the Outlook
With the current situation reflecting a balance of strong countervailing forces,
events in the months ahead are not likely to unfold smoothly In that regard, I
would like to flag a few areas of concern about the economy beyond those
mentioned already regarding Asian developments
Without doubt, lenders have provided important support to spending in the
past few years by their willingness to transact at historically small margins and in
large volumes Equity investors have contributed as well by apparently pricing in
the expectation of substantial earnings gains and requinng modest compensation for
the risk that those expectations could be mistaken Approaching the eighth year of
the economic expansion, this is understandable in an economic environment that,
contrary to historical experience, has become increasingly benign

Businesses have

been meeting obligations readily and generating high profits, putting them in
outstanding financial health

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But we must be concerned about becoming too complacent about evaluating
repayment nsks All too often at this stage of the business cycle, the loans that
banks extend later make up a disproportionate share of total nonperforming loans
In addition, quite possibly, twelve or eighteen months hence, some of the securities
purchased on the market could be looked upon with some regret by investors As
one of the nation's bank supervisors, the Federal Reserve will make every effort to
encourage banks to apply sound underwriting standards in their lending

Prudent

lenders should consider a wide range of economic situations in evaluating credit, to
do otherwise would risk contributing to potentially disruptive financial problems
down the road
A second area of concern involves our nation's continuing role in the new
high-tech international financial system By joining with our major trading partners
and international financial institutions in helping to stabilize the economies of Asia
and promoting needed structural changes, we are also encouraging the continued
expansion of world trade and global economic and financial stability on which the
ongoing increase of our own standards of living depends If we were to cede our role
as a world leader, or backslide into protectionist policies, we would threaten the
source of much of our own sustained economic growth
A third nsk is complacency about inflation prospects The combination and
interaction of significant increases in productivity-improving technologies, sharp
declines in budget deficits, and disciplined monetary policy has damped product
price changes, bringing them to near stability While part of this result owes to

15
good policy, part is the product of the fortuitous emergence of new technologies and
of some favorable price developments in imported goods However, as history
counsels, it is unwise to count on any string of good fortune to continue indefinitely
At the same time, though, it is also instructive to remember the words of an old sage
that "luck is the residue of design " He meant that to some degree we can
deliberately put ourselves in position to experience good fortune and be better
prepared when misfortune stnkes For example, the 1970s were marked by two
major oil-pnce shocks and a significant depreciation in the exchange value of the
dollar But those misfortunes were, in part, the result of allowing imbalances to
build over the decade as policymakers lost hold of the anchor provided by price
stability

Some of what we now see helping rein in inflation pressures is more likely

to occur in an environment of stable prices and pnce expectations that thwarts
producers from indiscriminately passing on higher costs, puts a premium on
productivity enhancement, and rewards more effectively investment in physical and
human capital
Simply put, while the pursuit of pnce stability does not rule out misfortune, it
lowers its probability If firms are convinced that the general pnce level will remain
stable, they will reserve increases in their sales prices of goods and services as a last
resort, for fear that such increases could mean loss of market share Similarly, if
households are convinced of price stability, they will not see variations in relative
pnces as reasons to change their long-run inflation expectations Thus, continuing
to make progress toward this legislated objective will make future supply shocks less
likely and our nation's economy less vulnerable to those that occur