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For release on delivery
10-00 A.M. E.S.T.
February 26, 1997

Statement by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
U.S. Senate

February 26, 19 97

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee
to present the Federal Reserve's semiannual report on monetary
policy.
The performance of the U.S. economy over the past year has
been quite favorable.

Real GDP growth picked up to more than

three percent over the four quarters of 1996, as the economy
progressed through its sixth year of expansion

Employers added

more than two-and-a-half million workers to their payrolls in
1996, and the unemployment rate fell further

Nominal wages and

salaries have increased faster than prices, meaning workers have
gained ground in real terms, reflecting the benefits of rising
productivity.

Outside the food and energy sectors, increases in

consumer prices actually have continued to edge lower, with core
CPI inflation only 2-1/2 percent over the past twelve months
Low inflation last year was both a symptom and a cause of
the good economy.

It was symptomatic of the balance and solidity

of the expansion and the evident absence of major strains on
resources.

At the same time, continued low levels of inflation

and inflation expectations have been a key support for healthy
economic performance.

They have helped to create a financial and

economic environment conducive to strong capital spending and
longer-range planning generally, and so to sustained economic
expansion.

Consequently, the Federal Open Market Committee

(FOMC) believes it is crucial to keep inflation contained in the
near term and ultimately to move toward price stability.
Looking ahead, the members of the FOMC expect inflation to
remain low and the economy to grow appreciably further

However,

2
as I shall be discussing, the unusually good inflation
performance of recent years seems to owe in large part to some
temporary factors, of uncertain longevity.

Thus, the FOMC

continues to see the distribution of inflation risks skewed to
the upside and must remain especially alert to the possible
emergence of imbalances in financial and product markets that
ultimately could endanger the maintenance of the low-inflation
environment.

Sustainable economic expansion for 1997 and beyond

depends on it.
For some, the benign inflation outcome of 1996 might be
considered surprising, as resource utilization rates-particularly of labor--were in the neighborhood of those that
historically have been associated with building inflation
pressures.

To be sure, an acceleration in nominal labor

compensation, especially its wage component, became evident over
the past year.

But the rate of pay increase still was markedly

less than historical relationships with labor market conditions
would have predicted.

Atypical restraint on compensation

increases has been evident for a few years now and appears to be
mainly the consequence of greater worker insecurity.

In 1991, at

the bottom of the recession, a survey of workers at large firms
by International Survey Research Corporation indicated that 25
percent feared being laid off.

In 1996, despite the sharply

lower unemployment rate and the tighter labor market, the same
survey organization found that 46 percent were fearful of a job
layoff.

3
The reluctance of workers to leave their jobs to seek other
employment as the labor market tightened has provided further
evidence of such concern, as has the tendency toward longer labor
union contracts.
three years

For many decades, contracts rarely exceeded

Today, one can point to five- and six-year

contracts—contracts that are commonly characterized by an
emphasis on job security and that involve only modest wage
increases.

The low level of work stoppages of recent years also

attests to concern about job security.
Thus, the willingness of workers in recent years to trade
off smaller increases in wages for greater job security seems to
be reasonably well documented.

The unanswered question is why

this insecurity persisted even as the labor market, by all
objective measures, tightened considerably

One possibility may

lie in the rapid evolution of technologies in use in the work
place.

Technological change almost surely has been an important

impetus behind corporate restructuring and downsizing.

Also, it

contributes to the concern of workers that their job skills may
become inadequate

No longer can one expect to obtain all of

one's lifetime job skills with a high-school or college diploma.
Indeed, continuing education is perceived to be increasingly
necessary to retain a job.

The more pressing need to update job

skills is doubtless also a factor in the marked expansion of onthe-job training programs, especially in technical areas, in many
of the nation's corporations

4
Certainly, other factors have contributed to the softness in
compensation growth in the past few years.

The sharp

deceleration in health care costs, of course, is cited
frequently.

Another is the heightened pressure on firms and

their workers in industries that compete internationally.
Domestic deregulation has had similar effects on the intensity of
competitive forces in some industries.

In any event, although I

do not doubt that all these factors are relevant, I would be
surprised if they were nearly as important as job insecurity.
If heightened job insecurity is the most significant
explanation of the break with the past in recent years, then it
is important to recognize that, as I indicated in last February's
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony, suppressed wage cost growth as a
consequence of job insecurity can be carried only so far. At
some point, the tradeoff of subdued wage growth for job security
has to come to an end.

In other words, the relatively modest

wage gains we have experienced are a temporary rather than a
lasting phenomenon because there is a limit to the value of
additional job security people are willing to acquire in exchange
for lesser increases in living standards.

Even if real wages

were to remain permanently on a lower upward track than otherwise
as a result of the greater sense of insecurity, the rate of
change of wages would revert at some point to a normal
relationship with inflation.
period will end.

The unknown is when this transition

5
Indeed, some recent evidence suggests that the labor markets
bear especially careful watching for signs that the return to
more normal patterns may be in process.

The Bureau of Labor

Statistics reports that people were somewhat more willing to quit
their jobs to seek other employment in January than previously
The possibility that this reflects greater confidence by workers
accords with a recent further rise in the percent of households
responding to a Conference Board survey who perceive that job
availability is plentiful.

Of course, the job market has

continued to be quite good recently; employment in January
registered robust growth and initial claims for unemployment
insurance have been at a relatively low level of late.

Wages

rose faster in 1996 than in 1995 by most measures, perhaps also
raising questions about whether the transitional period of
unusually slow wage gains may be drawing to a close.
To be sure, the pickup in wage gains has not shown through
to underlying price inflation.

Increases in the core CPI, as

well as in several broader measures of prices, have stayed
subdued or even edged off further in recent months.

As best we

can judge, faster productivity growth last year meant that rising
compensation gains did not cause labor costs per unit of output
to increase any more rapidly.

Non-labor costs, which are roughly

a quarter of total consolidated costs of the nonfinancial
corporate sector, were little changed in 1996.
Owing in part to this subdued behavior of unit costs,
profits and rates of return on capital have risen to high levels

6
As a consequence, businesses believe that, were they to raise
prices to boost profits further, competitors with already ample
profit margins would not follow suit; instead, they would use the
occasion to capture a greater market share.

This interplay is

doubtless a significant factor in the evident loss of pricing
power in American business.
Intensifying global competition also may be further
restraining domestic firms' ability to hike prices as well as
wages.

Clearly, the appreciation of the dollar on balance over

the past eighteen months or so, together with low inflation in
many of our trading partners, has resulted in a marked decline in
non-oil import prices that has helped to damp domestic inflation
pressures.

Yet it is important to emphasize that these

influences, too, would be holding down inflation only
temporarily; they represent a transition to a lower price level
than would otherwise prevail, not to a permanently lower rate of
inflation.
Against the background of all these considerations, the FOMC
has recognized the need to remain vigilant for signs of potentially inflationary imbalances that might, if not corrected
promptly, undermine our economic expansion.

The FOMC in fact has

signaled a state of heightened alert for possible policy
tightening since last July in its policy directives.
have also taken care not to act prematurely.

But, we

The FOMC refrained

from changing policy last summer, despite expectations of a
near-term policy firming by many financial market participants.

7
In light of the developments I've just discussed affecting wages
and prices, we thought inflation might well remain damped, and in
any case was unlikely to pick up very rapidly, in part because
the economic expansion appeared likely to slow to a more
sustainable pace

In the event, inflation has remained quiescent

since then.
Given the lags with which monetary policy affects the
economy, however, we cannot rule out a situation in which a
preemptive policy tightening may become appropriate before any
sign of actual higher inflation becomes evident.

If the FOMC

were to implement such an action, it would be judging that the
risks to the economic expansion of waiting longer had increased
unduly and had begun to outweigh the advantages of waiting for
uncertainties to be reduced by the accumulation of more
information about economic trends

Indeed, the hallmark of a

successful policy to foster sustainable economic growth is that
inflation does not rise.

I find it ironic that our actions in

1994-95 were criticized by some because inflation did not turn
upward.

That outcome, of course, was the intent of the

tightening, and I am satisfied that our actions then were both
necessary and effective, and helped to foster the continued
economic expansion.
To be sure, 1997 is not 1994.

The real federal funds rate

today is significantly higher than it was three years ago

Then

we had just completed an extended period of monetary ease which
addressed the credit stringencies of the early 1990s, and with

8
the abatement of the credit crunch, the low real funds rate of
early 1994 was clearly incompatible with containing inflation and
sustaining growth going forward.

In February 1997, in contrast,

our concern is a matter of relative risks rather than of expected
outcomes.

The real funds rate, judging by core inflation, is

only slightly below its early 1995 peak for this cycle and might
be at a level that will promote continued non-inflationary
growth, especially considering the recent rise in the exchange
value of the dollar.

Nonetheless, we cannot be sure.

And the

risks of being wrong are clearly tilted to the upside.
I wish it were possible to lay out in advance exactly what
conditions have to prevail to portend a buildup of inflation
pressures or inflationary psychology.

However, the circumstances

that have been associated with increasing inflation in the past
have not followed a single pattern.

The processes have differed

from cycle to cycle, and what may have been a useful leading
indicator in one instance has given off misleading signals in
another.
I have already discussed the key role of labor market
developments in restraining inflation in the current cycle and
our careful monitoring of signs that the transition phase of
trading off lower real wages for greater job security might be
coming to a close.

As always, with resource utilization rates

high, we would need to watch closely a situation in which demand
was clearly unsustainable because it was producing escalating
pressures on resources, which could destabilize the economy.

And

9
we would need to be watchful that the progress we have made in
keeping inflation expectations damped was not eroding.

In

general, though, our analysis will need to encompass all
potentially relevant information, from financial markets as well
as the economy, especially when some signals, like those in the
labor market, have not been following their established patterns
The ongoing economic expansion to date has reinforced our
conviction about the importance of low inflation--and the
public's confidence in continued low inflation.

The economic

expansion almost surely would not have lasted nearly so long had
monetary policy supported an unsustainable acceleration of
spending that induced a buildup of inflationary imbalances.

The

Federal Reserve must not acquiesce in an upcreep in inflation,
for acceding to higher inflation would countenance an insidious
weakening of our chances for sustaining long-run economic growth.
Inflation interferes with the efficient allocation of resources
by confusing price signals, undercutting a focus on the longer
run, and distorting incentives
This year overall inflation is anticipated to stay
restrained.

The central tendency of the forecasts made by the

Board members and Reserve Bank presidents has the increase in the
total CPI slipping back into a range of 2-3/4 to 3 percent over
the four quarters of the year.

This slight falloff from last

year's pace is expected to owe in part to a slower rise in food
prices as some of last year's supply limitations ease.

More

importantly, world oil supplies are projected by most analysts to

10
increase relative to world oil demand, and futures markets
project a further decline in prices, at least in the near term.
The recent and prospective declines in crude oil prices not only
should affect retail gasoline and home heating oil prices but
also should relieve inflation pressures through lower prices for
other petroleum products, which are imbedded in the economy's
underlying cost structure.

Nonetheless, the trend in inflation

rates in the core CPI and in broader price measures may be
somewhat less favorable than in recent years.

A continued tight

labor market, whose influence on costs would be augmented by the
scheduled increase in the minimum wage later in the year and
perhaps by higher growth of benefits now that considerable
health-care savings already have been realized, could put upward
pressure on core inflation.

Moreover, the effects of the sharp

rise in the dollar over the last eighteen months in pushing down
import prices are likely to ebb over coming quarters.
The unemployment rate, according to Board members and Bank
presidents, should stay around 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent through the
fourth quarter, consistent with their projections of measured
real GDP growth of 2 to 2-1/4 percent over the four quarters of
the year.

Such a growth rate would represent some downshifting

in output expansion from that of last year.

The projected

moderation of growth likely would reflect several influences: (1)
declines in real federal government purchases should be exerting
a modest degree of restraint on overall demand; (2) the lagged
effects of the increase in the exchange value of the dollar in

11
recent months likely will damp U.S

net exports somewhat this

year; and (3) residential construction is unlikely to repeat the
gains of 1996.

On the other hand, we do not see evidence of

widespread imbalances either in business inventories or in stocks
of equipment and consumer durables that would lead to a substantial cutback in spending.

And financial conditions overall

remain supportive; real interest rates are not high by historical
standards and credit is readily available from intermediaries and
in the market.
The usual uncertainties in the overall outlook are
especially focused on the behavior of consumers.

Consumption

should rise roughly in line with the projected moderate expansion
of disposable income, but both upside and downside risks are
present.
upbeat.

According to various surveys, sentiment is decidedly
Consumers have enjoyed healthy gains in their real

incomes along with the extraordinary stock-market driven rise in
their financial wealth over the last couple of years.

Indeed,

econometric models suggest that the more than $4 trillion rise in
equity values since late 1994 should have had a larger positive
influence on consumer spending than seems to have actually
occurred.
It is possible, however, that households have been reluctant
to spend much of their added wealth because they see a greater
need to keep it to support spending in retirement.

Many

households have expressed heightened concern about their
financial security in old age, which reportedly has led to

12
increased provision for retirement.

The results of a survey

conducted annually by the Roper Organization, which asks
individuals about their confidence in the Social Security system,
shows that between 1992 and 1996 the percent of respondents
expressing little or no confidence in the system jumped from
about 45 percent to more than 60 percent.
Moreover, consumer debt burdens are near historical highs,
while credit card delinquencies and personal bankruptcies have
risen sharply over the past year.

These circumstances may make

both borrowers and lenders a bit more cautious, damping spending.
In fact, we may be seeing both wealth and debt effects
already at work for different segments of the population, to an
approximately offsetting extent.

Saving out of current income by

households in the upper income quintile, who own nearly threefourths of all non-pension equities held by households, evidently
has declined in recent years.

At the same time, the use of

credit for purchases appears to have leveled off after a sharp
runup from 1993 to 1996, perhaps because some households are
becoming debt constrained and, as a result, are curtailing their
spending.
The Federal Reserve will be weighing these influences as it
endeavors to help extend the current period of sustained growth.
Participants in financial markets seem to believe that in the
current benign environment the FOMC will succeed indefinitely.
There is no evidence, however, that the business cycle has been
repealed.

Another recession will doubtless occur some day owing

13
to circumstances that could not be, or at least were not,
perceived by policymakers and financial market participants
alike.

History demonstrates that participants in financial

markets are susceptible to waves of optimism, which can in turn
foster a general process of asset-price inflation that can feed
through into markets for goods and services.

Excessive optimism

sows the seeds of its own reversal in the form of imbalances that
tend to grow over time

When unwarranted expectations ultimately

are not realized, the unwinding of these financial excesses can
act to amplify a downturn in economic activity, much as they can
amplify the upswing.

As you know, last December I put the

question this way. "...how do we know when irrational exuberance
has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to
unexpected and prolonged contractions . ..?l1
We have not been able, as yet, to provide a satisfying
answer to this question, but there are reasons in the current
environment to keep this question on the table.

Clearly, when

people are exposed to long periods of relative economic
tranquility, they seem inevitably prone to complacency about the
future.

This is understandable.

We have had fifteen years of

economic expansion interrupted by only one recession--and that
was six years ago.

As the memory of such past events fades, it

naturally seems ever less sensible to keep up one's guard against
an adverse event in the future.

Thus, it should come as no

surprise that, after such a long period of balanced expansion.

14
risk premiums for advancing funds to businesses in virtually all
financial markets have declined to near-record lows.
Is it possible that there is something fundamentally new
about this current period that would warrant such complacency?
Yes, it is possible.

Markets may have become more efficient,

competition is more global, and information technology has
doubtless enhanced the stability of business operations.

But,

regrettably, history is strewn with visions of such "new eras"
that, in the end, have proven to be a mirage.

In short, history

counsels caution.
Such caution seems especially warranted with regard to the
sharp rise in equity prices during the past two years.

These

gains have obviously raised questions of sustainability.
Analytically, current stock-price valuations at prevailing longterm interest rates could be justified by very strong earnings
growth expectations.

In fact, the long-term earnings projections

of financial analysts have been marked up noticeably over the
last year and seem to imply very high earnings growth and
continued rising profit margins, at a time when such margins are
already up appreciably from their depressed levels of five years
ago.

It could be argued that, although margins are the highest

in a generation, they are still below those that prevailed in the
1960s.

Nonetheless, further increases in these margins would

evidently require continued restraint on costs: labor compensation continuing to grow at its current pace and productivity
growth picking up.

Neither, of course, can be ruled out.

But we

15
should keep in mind that, at these relatively low long-term
interest rates, small changes in long-term earnings expectations
could have outsized impacts on equity prices.
Caution also seems warranted by the narrow yield spreads
that suggest perceptions of low risk, possibly unrealistically
low risk.

Considerable optimism about the ability of businesses

to sustain this current healthy financial condition seems, as I
indicated earlier, to be influencing the setting of risk
premiums, not just in the stock market but throughout the
financial system

This optimistic attitude has become especially

evident in quality spreads on high-yield corporate bonds--what we
used to call "junk bonds."

In addition, banks have continued to

ease terms and standards on business loans, and margins on many
of these loans are now quite thin

Many banks are pulling back a

little from consumer credit card lending as losses exceed
expectations.

Nonetheless, some bank and nonbank lenders have

been expanding aggressively into the home equity loan market and
so-called "subprime" auto lending, although recent problems in
the latter may already be introducing a sense of caution.
Why should the central bank be concerned about the possibility that financial markets may be overestimating returns or
mispricing risk?

It is not that we have a firm view that equity

prices are necessarily excessive right now or risk spreads
patently too low

Our goal is to contribute as best we can to

the highest possible growth of income and wealth over time, and
we would be pleased if the favorable economic environment

16
projected in markets actually comes to pass.

Rather, the FOMC

has to be sensitive to indications of even slowly building
imbalances, whatever their source, that, by fostering the
emergence of inflation pressures, would ultimately threaten
healthy economic expansion.
Unfortunately, because the monetary aggregates were subject
to an episode of aberrant behavioral patterns in the early 1990s,
they are likely to be of only limited help in making this
judgment.

For three decades starting in the early 1960s, the

public's demand for the broader monetary aggregates, especially
M2, was reasonably predictable.

In the intermediate term, M2

velocity--nominal income divided by the stock of M2--tended to
vary directly with the difference between money market yields and
the return on M2 assets--that is, with its short-term opportunity
cost.

In the long run, as adjustments in deposit rates caused

the opportunity cost to revert to an equilibrium, M2 velocity
also tended to return to an associated stable equilibrium level.
For several years in the early 1990s, however, the velocities of
M2 and M3 exhibited persisting upward shifts that departed
markedly from these historical patterns.
In the last two to three years, velocity patterns seem to
have returned to those historical relationships, after allowing
for a presumed permanent upward shift in the levels of velocity.
Even so, given the abnormal velocity behavior during the early
1990s, FOMC members continue to see considerable uncertainty in
the relationship of broad money to opportunity costs and nominal

17
income.

Concern about the possibility of aberrant behavior has

made the FOMC hesitant to upgrade the role of these measures in
monetary policy.
Against this background, at its February meeting, the FOMC
reaffirmed the provisional ranges set last July for money and
debt growth this year-

1 to 5 percent for M2, 2 to 6 percent for

M3, and 3 to 7 percent for the debt of domestic nonfinancial
sectors.

The M2 and M3 ranges again are designed to be consis-

tent with the FOMC's long-run goal of price stability:

For, if

the velocities of the broader monetary aggregates were to
continue behaving as they did before 1990, then money growth
around the middle portions of the ranges would be consistent with
noninflationary, sustainable economic expansion.

But, even with

such velocity behavior this year, when inflation is expected to
still be higher than is consistent with our long-run objective of
reasonable price stability, the broader aggregates could well
grow around the upper bounds of these ranges

The debt aggregate

probably will expand around the middle of its range this
year.
I will conclude on the same upbeat note about the U.S.
economy with which I began

Although a central banker's

occupational responsibility is to stay on the lookout for
trouble, even I must admit that our economic prospects in general
are quite favorable

The flexibility of our market system and

the vibrancy of our private sector remain examples for the whole
world to emulate.

The Federal Reserve will endeavor to do its

part by continuing to foster a monetary framework under which our
citizens can prosper to the fullest possible extent