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For use at 10 00 a m
TuesdayFebruary 22, 1994

EST

Testimony by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Credit Formation
of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
U S

House of Representatives
February 22, 1994

Mr

Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to

appear today to present the Federal Reserve's semiannual monetary
policy report to the Congress
In the seven months since I gave the previous HumphreyHawkins testimony, the performance of the U S
appreciably

economy has improved

Private-sector spending has surged, boosted in large

part by very favorable financial conditions

With mortgage rates at

the lowest level in a quarter century, housing construction soared in
the latter part of 1993

Consumer spending, especially on autos and

other durables, has exhibited considerable strength

Business fixed

investment has maintained its previous rapid growth

Important com-

ponents of GDP growth in the second half of last year represented onetime upward adjustments to the level of activity in certain key sectors, and, with output in these areas unlikely to continue to climb as
steeply, significant slowing in the rate of growth this year is widely
expected

In addition, the Southern California earthquake and severe

winter weather may have dulled the force of the favorable trends in
spending in January and February

Nonetheless, as best we can judge,

the economy's forward momentum remains intact
The strengthening of demand has been accompanied by favorable
developments in labor markets

In the second half of the year, em-

ployment continued to post moderate gains, and the unemployment rate
fell further

bringing its decrease over the full year to nearly 1

percentage point

The unemployment rate in January apparently de-

clined again on both the old and new survey bases
On the inflation front, the deterioration evident in some
indicators in the first half of 1993 proved transitory

For the year

as a whole, the Consumer Price Index rose 2-3/4 percent, the smallest

increase since the big drop in oil prices In 1986

Broader inflation

measures covering purchases by businesses as well as consumers rose
even less

While declining oil prices contributed to last year's good

readings, inflation measured by the CPI excluding food and energy also
diminished slightly further, to just over a 3 percent rate for the
whole year
whole

In January the CPI remained quite well behaved on the

Not all signs have been equally favorable, however

For

example, a number of commodity prices have firmed noticeably in recent
months

And indications that such increases may be broadening

engendered a back-up in long-term interest rates in recent days

In

particular, the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank's survey showing a
marked increase in prices paid by manufacturers early this year was
taken as evidence of a more general emergence of inflation pressures
It is important to note, however, that in the past such price
data have often been an indication more of strength in new orders and
activity than a precursor of rising inflation throughout the economy
In the current period, overall cost and price pressures still appear
to remain damped

Wages do not seem to be accelerating despite

scattered reports of some skilled-worker shortages, and advances in
productivity early this year are holding down unit labor costs
Moreover, while private borrowing has picked up, broad money--to be
sure a highly imperfect indicator of inflation in recent years--has
continued to grow slowly
Nonetheless, markets appear to be concerned that a strengthening economy is sowing the seeds of an acceleration of prices later
this year by rapidly eliminating the remaining slack in resource
utilization

Such concerns were reinforced by forecasts that recent

data suggest that revised estimates of fourth-quarter GDP to be released next week will show upward revisions from the preliminary 5 9
percent annual rate of growth

Rapid expansion late last year, it is

apparently feared, may carry over into a much smaller deceleration of
activity in 1994 than many had previously expected
But it is too early to judge the degree of underlying economic strength in the early months of 1994

Anecdotal evidence does

indicate continued underlying strength in manufacturers' new orders
and production, but we will have a better reading on new orders on
Thursday when preliminary data for January are released

The labor

markets are signalling a somewhat less buoyant degree of activity as
initial claims for unemployment insurance in recent weeks have moved
up a notch

Clearly, the Federal Reserve will have to monitor care-

fully ongoing developments for indications of potential inflation or a
strengthening in inflation expectations

As I have often noted, if

the Federal Reserve is to promote long-term growth, we must contribute, as best we can, to keeping inflation pressures contained
In this regard, a clear lesson we have learned over the decades since World War II is the key role of inflation expectations in
the inflation process and in the overall performance of the macroeconomy

As I indicated m

Committee last month

my testimony before the Joint Economic

until the late 1960s, economists often paid

inadequate attention to expectations as a key determinant of
inflation

Unemployment and inflation were considered simple

tradeoffs

A lower rate of unemployment was thought to be associated

with a higher, though constant, rate of inflation, conversely, a
higher rate of unemployment was associated with a lower rate of
inflation

But the experience of the past three decades has demonstrated
that what appears to be a tradeoff between unemployment and inflation
is quite ephemeral and misleading

Attempts to force-feed the economy

beyond its potential have led in the past to rising inflation as expectations ratcheted higher and, ultimately, not to lower unemployment

but to higher unemployment, as destabilizing forces and uncer-

tainties associated with accelerating inflation induced economic contraction

Over the longer run, no tradeoff is evident between infla-

tion and unemployment

Experience both here and abroad suggests that

lower levels of inflation are conducive to the achievement of greater
productivity and efficiency and, therefore, higher standards of
living
In fact, lower inflation historically has been associated not
just with higher levels of productivity, but with faster growth of
productivity as well

Why inflation and productivity growth are

linked this way empirically is not clear

To some extent higher

productivity growth may help to damp inflation for a time by lessening
increases in unit labor costs

But the process of cause and effect in

all likelihood runs the other way as well

Lower inflation and

inflation expectations reduce uncertainty in economic planning and
diminish risk premiums for capital investment

They also clarify the

signals from movements in relative prices, and they encourage effort
and resources to be devoted to wealth creation rather than wealth
preservation

Many people do not have the knowledge of, or access to,

ways of preserving wealth against inflation

for them, low inflation

avoids an inequitable erosion of living standards
The reduced inflation expectations of recent years have been
accompanied by lower bond and mortgage interest rates, slower actual

inflation, falling unemployment, and faster trend productivity growth
The implication is clear

when it comes to inflation expectations, the

nearer zero, the better
It follows that price stability, with Inflation expectations
essentially negligible, should be a long-run goal of macroeconomic
policy

We will be at price stability when households and businesses

need not factor expectations of changes in the average level of prices
into their decisions

How those expectations form is not always easy

to discern, and they can for periods of time appear to be at variance
with underlying economic forces

But history tells us that it is

economic and financial forces and their consequences for realized
inflation that ultimately shape inflation expectations
Fiscal and monetary policy are important among those forces
and have contributed to the decline in inflation expectations in
recent years along with decreases in long-term interest rates

The

actions taken last year to reduce the federal budget deficit have been
instrumental in this regard

Although we may not all agree on the

specifics of the deficit reduction measures, the financial markets are
apparently inferring that, on balance, the federal government will be
competing less vigorously for private saving in the years ahead
Concerns that the deficit is out of control have diminished

In the

extreme, explosive federal debt growth makes an eventual resort to the
printing press and inflationary finance difficult to resist

By

shrinking any perceived risk of this outcome, the deficit reduction
package apparently had a salutary effect on longer-term inflation
expectations
The Federal Reserve's policies in recent years also have
helped to damp inflation and inflation expectations

We were able to

do so, even while adopting an increasingly accommodative policy
stance

By placing our actions in the context of a thorough analysis

of the prevailing situation and of a longer-term underlying strategy
our move to greater accommodation could be seen as what it was--a
deliberate effort to counter the various "headwinds" that were
retarding the advance of the economy rather than a series of shortterm actions taken without consideration for potential inflation
consequences over time
As I discussed with this Subcommittee last July, this longerrun strategy implies that the Federal Reserve must take care not to
overstay an accommodative stance as the headwinds abate

But deter-

mining when a policy stance is becoming too accommodative is not an
easy matter

Unfortunately, although subdued inflation is the hall-

mark of a successful monetary policy, current broad inflation readings
are actually of limited use as a guide to the appropriateness of current instrument settings

Patently, price measurements over short

time spans are subject to transitory special factors

More important

monetary policy affects inflation only with a significant lag

That a

policy stance is overly stimulative will not become clear in the price
indexes for perhaps a year or more

Accordingly, if the Federal

Reserve waits until actual inflation worsens before taking countermeasures, it would have waited far too long

At that point, modest

corrective steps would no longer be enough to contain emerging economic imbalances and to avoid a build-up of inflation expectations and
a significant back-up of long-term interest rates

Instead, more

wrenching measures would be needed, with unavoidable adverse side
effects on near-term economic activity

Inflation expectations likely have more of a forward-looking
character than do measures of inflation itself, and, in principle,
could be used as a direct guide to policy

But available surveys have

limited coverage and are subject to sampling error

As I have tes-

tified previously, price-indexed bonds of various maturities, which
would indicate underlying market inflation expectations, would be a
useful adjunct to our information base for making monetary policy,
providing there were a sufficiently broad and active market for them
In addition, the price of gold, which has been especially sensitive to
inflation concerns, the exchange rate, and the term structure of
interest rates can give important clues about changing expectations
Of course, a number of factors in addition to inflation
expectations affect all of these indicators to a degree
long-term rates

Short- and

for example, tend to be highly correlated through

time, in part because they are responding to the same business cycle
pressures

Thus, when the Federal Reserve tightens reserve market

conditions, it is not surprising to see some upward movement in longterm rates, as an aspect of the process that counters the imbalances
tending to surface in the expansionary phase of the business cycle
The test of successful monetary policy in such a business-cycle phase
is our ability to limit the upward movement of long-term rates from
what it would otherwise have been with less effective policy

Moder-

ate to low long-term rates, with rare exceptions, are an essential
ingredient of sustainable long-term economic growth

When we take

credible steps to head off inflation before it can begin to intensify,
the effects on long-term rates are muted

By contrast, when Federal

Reserve action is seen as lagging behind the need to counter a buildup
of inflation pressures, long rates have tended to move sharply higher,

as eventually happened in the late 1970s
conclusion

This suggests an important

Failure to tighten in a timely manner will lead to higher

than necessary nominal long-term rates as inflation expectations
intensify

Ultimately, short-term rates will be higher as well if

policy initiatives lag behind inflation pressures

The higher short-

term rates are required not only to take account of rising inflation
expectations, but also to provide the additional restraint on real
rates necessary to reverse the destabilizing inflation process
For decades, the monetary aggregates, especially M2, provided
generally reliable early warning signals of emerging inflationary
imbalances

But, as I have discussed in detail in previous testimon-

ies and will touch on later in this statement, the signals they have
sent in recent years have been effectively jammed by structural
changes in financial markets and the unusual nature of the current
business cycle
Our monetary policy strategy must continue to rest, then, on
ongoing assessments of the totality of incoming information and
appraisals of the probable outcomes and risks associated with alternative policies

Our purpose over the longer run is to help the economy

grow at its greatest potential over time

To do so, we must move

toward a posture of policy neutrality --that is, a level of real shortterm rates consistent with sustained economic growth at the economy's
potential

That level, of course, is difficult to discern and.

obviously, is not a fixed number but moves with developments within
the economy and financial markets
Over a period of several years starting in 1989, the Federal
Reserve progressively eased its policy stance, in the process reducing
real short-term interest rates to around zero by the autumn of 1992

We undertook those easing actions in response to evidence of a variety
of unusual restraints on spending

Households and nonfinancial busi-

nesses on the borrowing side and many lenders, including depository
institutions, were suffering from balance-sheet strains

These dif-

ficulties stemmed from previous overleveraglng combined with reductions in net worth from impairments to asset quality, through, for
example, falling values of commercial real estate

Corporate restruc-

turing and defense cutbacks compounded the problems of the economy by
reducing job opportunities and fostering a more general sense of
insecurity about employment prospects
The deliberate maintenance of low short-term rates for a
considerable period was intended to decrease the drag on the economy
created by these headwinds

Households and businesses could refinance

outstanding debt at much reduced interest cost

In addition, lower

rates and improved performance by borrowers would take the pressure
off of depository institutions, helping them recapitalize

Low inter-

est rates, along with reduced financial strains, would encourage private spending to pick up the slack left by defense cutbacks

Once

financial positions were well on the road to recovery, and employment
and confidence began to recover, it was believed that the economic
expansion would gain self- sustaining momentum,

At that point abnor-

mally low real short-term real rates should no longer be needed
As the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) surveyed the
evidence at its February 4 meeting, a consensus developed that the
balance of risks had, in fact, shifted

Debt repayment burdens had

been lowered enough to unleash strong aggregate demand in the economy
Real short rates close to zero appeared to pose an unacceptable risk
of engendering future problems

We concluded that our policy stance

10
could be made slightly less accommodative without threatening either
the continued improvement in balance-sheet structures or, ultimately,
the achievement of solid economic growth

Indeed, the firming in

reserve market pressures was undertaken to preserve and protect the
ongoing economic expansion by forestalling a future destabilizing
buildup of inflationary pressures, which in our judgment would eventually surface if the level of policy accommodation that prevailed
throughout 1993 were continued indefinitely

We viewed our move as

low-cost insurance
The projections of the FOMC members suggest a continuation of
good economic performance in 1994, with reasonable growth and subdued
inflation

The central tendencies of the economic forecasts made by

governors and Bank presidents imply expectations that economic growth
this year likely will be 3 percent or slightly higher

With this kind

of growth, a further edging down of the unemployment rate from its
January reading is viewed as a distinct possibility

Inflation, as

measured by the overall CPI, is seen as rising only a little compared
with 1993, even though last year's benefit from falling oil and
tobacco prices may not be repeated, and last year's crop losses could
buoy food prices in 1994
There are, of course, considerable risks to this generally
favorable outlook

Some observers have pointed to downside risks to

economic activity associated with fiscal restraint and weak foreign
economies, I believe these factors will have some effects, but they
are likely to be less than feared

As for fiscal restraint, a good

portion of the negative impact of last year's budget bill may already
be behind us. as some households and businesses have adjusted their

11
behavior to the new structure of taxes and to curtailments in defense
and other budget programs
The concern about weak foreign economies relates to the
strength of foreign demand for U S

exports going forward

Many of

our major trading partners have been experiencing economic difficulties

But some already appear to be pulling out of recession and a

number of others seem to have improved prospects

Moreover, contain-

ing inflation will keep increases in production costs of traded goods
made in the United States subdued, so that our products will remain
competitive in world markets

With competitive goods and an improving

world economy, the growth of U S

exports should strengthen this year,

lessening the drag from the external sector on our output growth
There are upside risks as well

Inventories have reached a

low level relative to sales, suggesting the possibility of a boost to
production from inventory rebuilding beyond that currently anticipated

In addition, with both borrowers and lenders in stronger

financial condition, low interest rates have proven a powerful stimulant to spending

While we were reasonably convinced at the last FOMC

meeting that a zero real federal funds rate put real short rates below
a "neutral" level, we cannot tell this Subcommittee, with assurance,
precisely where the level of neutrality currently resides

To promote

sustainable growth, history suggests that real short-term rates are
more likely to have to rise than fall from here

I cannot, however,

tell you at this time when any such rise would occur, I would hope
that part of any increase in real short-term rates ultimately would be
accomplished through further declines in inflation expectations rather
than through higher nominal short-term rates

12
In assessing our policy stance, we will continue to monitor
developments in money and credit, but in 1994 as in 1993 the FOMC is
unlikely to be able to put a great deal of weight on the behavior of
these aggregates relative to their ranges

We have set the ranges as

best we can in an evolving financial situation to be consistent with
our objectives for sustained growth and low inflation
Based on our experience in 1993 and expectations about financial relationships for 1994, the FOMC judges that the growth of money
and credit this year will stay within the annual ranges set provisionally last July, which were reaffirmed at its meeting early this month
Specifically, these ranges call for growth of 1 to 5 percent for M2, 0
to 4 percent for M3, and 4 to 8 percent for domestic nonfmancial
sector debt

The ranges are the same as the final specifications

established last July for 1993
The final specifications for last year had gone through two
rounds of technical downward adjustment after they were first set
provisionally in July 1992

These downward revisions reflected the

FOMC's recognition that the relationship between spending and money
holdings was departing markedly from historical norms

Financial

intermediation was moving away from past patterns, as flows of funds
were increasingly being rechanneled away from banks toward securities
markets, notably via bond and stock mutual funds

Also, banks were

relying more heavily on nondeposit funding sources, such as equity and
subordinated debt, as they strengthened their capital positions.
In the event, growth of M2 and M3 last year came in above the
lower bounds of their reduced ranges with only 1/2 percentage point to
spare

M2 grew at 1-1/2 percent and M3 at 1/2 percent over the year

as a whole

Even so, nominal GDP advanced more than 5 percent over

13
the year, extending rapid increases in the velocities of broad money
through another year

The discrepancy between the growth rates of

nominal GDP and broad money diminished some from that of 1992, but was
still unusual in the face of steady short-term interest rates
Somewhat faster growth of M2 and M3 this year than last year
may be in prospect

The governors' and presidents' outlook calls for

a small stepup in nominal spending, and the factors depressing growth
of the broader aggregates relative to the expansion of spending could
well abate to some degree

In particular, the diversion of savings

from retail deposits and money funds toward bond and stock mutual
funds may lessen, as household portfolios more fully complete the
adjustment to the latter's heightened availability

Now that banks

have achieved healthier capitalization, they may more readily issue
large time deposits instead of equity and subordinated debt to support
stepped-up loan growth

Just how far these developments will go,

however, is difficult to predict, so the prospective relationship
between spending and broad money remains highly uncertain

The FOMC

will continue to monitor the behavior of money supply measures for
evidence about underlying economic and financial developments more
generally, but it will still have to base its assessments regarding
appropriate policy actions on a wide variety of economic indicators.
Among those indicators, the Federal Reserve will again pay
attention to credit market developments, especially for any light they
can shed on the strength of household and corporate balance sheets and
spending propensities

The overall debt aggregate put in a repeat

performance last year, again growing by around 5 percent, even as the
advance of nominal GDP moderated to a similar pace

But this steady

14
debt growth incorporated an upturn in private borrowing, as the borrowing of the federal government slackened

Households in particular

showed a heightened willingness to take on debt to help finance strong
purchases of homes and consumer durables

At the same time, massive

mortgage refinancings at much reduced interest rates contributed to
further reductions in household debt-service burdens relative to
income to a level last seen in the mid-1980s

For businesses as well,

the bite taken out of cash flow by interest payments was shrunk to a
size last observed in the mid-1980s, partly through the refinancing of
higher-cost debt and continued equity issuance

Although business

borrowing firmed a little, it remained subdued, as enough internal
funds were available to finance the bulk of hefty capital expenditures
Looking ahead, federal borrowing is scheduled to diminish
further this year, partly reflecting deficit reduction measures
Borrowing by nonfederal sectors should continue to strengthen, prodded
by the anticipated pickup in nominal GDP and the healthier financial
condition already attained by households and businesses
In conclusion, the Federal Reserve has welcomed both the
strengthening in activity and the generally subdued price trends,
because the intent of our monetary policy in recent years has been to
foster precisely this kind of healthy economic performance

Looking

forward, our policy approach will be to endeavor to select on a continuing basis the monetary instrument settings that will minimize
economic instabilities and maximize living standards over time

The

outlook, as a result of subdued inflation and still low long-term
interest rates, is the best we have seen in decades

It is important

15
that we do everything we can to turn that favorable outlook into
reality