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For release on delivery
8 P.M. local time (2 P.M. EDT)
May 7, 1996

Remarks by

Alan Greenspan

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

at the

VIIIth Frankfurt International Banking Evening

Frankfurt am Main, Germany

May 7, 1996

Lord Mayor, ladies, and gentlemen, it is an honor to be in this city to talk about the
evolution of global finance

To be sure, participants in Frankfurt's financial markets have not

been coronated as were some of the Holy Roman Emperors depicted in this magnificent
room

But the impact of the Bundesbank, of the private institutions active here, and of the

prospective European Central Bank has been, and no doubt will be, profound

This evening, I

will not talk specifically about Frankfurt or the implications of EMU, and certainly not about
the Holy Roman Empire, but rather about the evolution of global financial markets in general.
World financial markets are far more efficient today than ever before

Changes in

communications and information technology, and the new instruments and nsk-management
techniques they have made possible, enable an ever wider range of financial and nonfinancial
firms to manage their financial risks more effectively

They can now concentrate on

managing the economic risks associated with their primary businesses
Still, for central bankers with responsibilities for financial market stability, the new
technologies and new instruments have presented new challenges

Some argue that market

dynamics have been altered in ways that increase the likelihood of significant market
disruptions

Whatever the merits of this argument, there is a clear sense that the new

technologies, and the financial instruments and techniques they have made possible, have
strengthened interdependencies between markets and market participants, both within and
across national boundaries As a result, a disturbance in one market segment or one country
is likely to be transmitted far more rapidly throughout the world economy than was evident in
earlier eras

-2 A global financial system, of course, is not an end in itself It is the institutional
structure that has developed over the centuries to facilitate the world-wide production of
goods and services Accordingly, we can better understand the evolution of today's
burgeoning financial markets by parsing the extraordinary changes that have emerged, in the
past century or more, in what we conventionally call the real side of economies the
production of goods and services The same technological forces currently driving finance
were first evident in the production process and have had a profound effect on what we
produce, how we produce it, and how it is financed

Technological change or, more

generally, ideas have increasingly altered the nature of output so that it has become
progressively more conceptual and less physical
In the United States, for example, the weight of our gross domestic product today
measured in tons is only modestly higher than several decades ago The huge rise in the real,
or price-adjusted, value of output since then is the result much more of the generation and
development of ideas than of the exploitation and transformation of physical resources

As a

consequence, a much smaller proportion of the measured real gross domestic product
constitutes physical bulk currently than in past generations

Because the accretion of

knowledge is, with rare exceptions, irreversible, this trend almost surely will continue into the
21st century and beyond
The changes in what we usually view as physical product have been dramatic

The

purpose of production, of course, has remained the same to serve human needs and values
But output of comparable utility now generally is smaller and lighter Our radios used to be
activated by large vacuum tubes, today we have pocket-sized transistors to perform the same

-3 function

Thin fiber optics have replaced huge tonnages of copper wire Advances in

architecture and engineering, as well as the development of lighter but stronger materials, now
give us the same working space in buildings but with significantly less concrete, glass, and
steel tonnage than was required in an earlier era The process is interactive

The

development of the insights that brought us central heating enabled lighter-weight apparel
fabrics to displace the heavier cloths of the past The breakthroughs in medical research that
have revolutionized health care are only the beginning of a growing list of almost wholly
conceptual elements in our economic output
As the relative cost of transporting goods falls dramatically as a consequence of such
physical downsizing, the rising conceptual content of output becomes a major factor in the
increasingly rapid globalization of merchandise trade International trade in, say, construction
gravel or scrap metal is limited by weight or bulk High-value computer products, in
contrast, make up an expanding share of world trade Obviously, the less the bulk and the
lower the weight, the easier goods are to move, especially over long distances and across
national boundaries

Thus, for the United States, after we adjust for average price changes,

tons shipped per real dollar of both U S exports and imports are now less than half of what
they were in 1970 The downsizing of American trade is patently a reflection of the extent to
which conceptualization is also dominating the economies of our trading partners throughout
the world
Of course, a significant part of the pronounced expansion in international trade has
resulted from the breaking down of trade barriers over the years However, the political

-4processes that have led in that direction to an important extent have been themselves pushed
by the technological changes in the composition of goods and services
Not unexpectedly, as goods and services have moved across borders, the necessity to
finance them has increased dramatically

But what is particularly startling is how large the

expansion in cross-border finance has become, relative to the trade it finances

To be sure,

much cross-border finance supports investment portfolios, doubtless some largely speculative
But in the end, even they are part of the support systems for the efficient international
movement of goods and services The relative expansion of cross-border financial
transactions is, in itself, another manifestation of conceptual trade, as a single financial
product is broken into many pieces that, in turn, are traded
Specifically, world trade measured in nominal dollars was 2 1/3 times as large in 1994
as it was a decade earlier The stock of cross-border assets held on balance sheets by banks
at the end of 1994, also in dollars, was more than 3 times as large as at the end of 1984
Off-balance-sheet growth has been, of course, much larger Nonbank cross-border
transactions have also grown enormously
Such rapid expansion in cross-border banking and finance should not be surprising
given the extent to which low-cost information processing and communications technology
have improved the ability of customers in one part of the world to avail themselves of
opportunities offered anywhere in the world on a real-time basis
These developments enhance the process whereby an excess of saving over investment
in one country finds an appropriate outlet in another In short, they facilitate the drive to
equate risk-adjusted rates of return on investments worldwide

They thereby improve the

-5 worldwide allocation of scarce capital and, in the process, engender a huge increase in risk
dispersion and hedging opportunities

If we can resist protectionist pressures in our societies

in the financial arena as well as in the interchange of goods and services, we can look
forward to the benefits of the international division of labor on a much larger scale in the 21 st
century
What we don't know for sure, but strongly suspect, is that the accelerating expansion
of global finance may be indispensable to the continued rapid growth in world trade in goods
and services It is becoming increasingly evident that many layers of financial intermediation
will be required if we are to capture the full benefits of our advances in finance

Certainly,

the emergence of a highly liquid foreign exchange market has facilitated basic forex
transactions, and the availability of more complex hedging strategies enables producers and
investors to achieve their desired risk positions

This owes largely to the ability of modem

financial products to unbundle complex risks in ways that enable each counterparty to choose
the combination of risks necessary to advance its business strategy, and to eschew those that
do not This process enhances cross-border trade in goods and services, facilitates portfolio
investment strategies, enhances the lower-cost financing of real capital formation on a
worldwide basis and, hence, leads to an expansion of international trade and rising standards
of living
Achieving those benefits surely will require the maintenance of a stable
macroeconomic environment An environment conducive to stable product pnces and to
maintaining sustainable economic growth is a prime responsibility of governments and, of
course, central banks How well we central bankers do our job has implications for

-6participants in financial markets We provide the backdrop against which individual market
participants make their decisions
In the context of rapid financial market changes, disruptions are inevitable

The

turmoil in the European Exchange Rate mechanism in 1992 and the plunge in the exchange
value of the Mexican peso at the end of 1994 and early in 1995 have shown, for example,
how the new world of financial trading can punish policy misalignments with amazing
alacrity Notwithstanding, the economic consequences of such disruptions will be minimized
if they are not further compounded by financial instability associated with fluctuations in
underlying inflation trends Reserve currency countries, like the United States, have a special
responsibility to provide an anchor of stability for themselves and the world at large

Such

countries face a high demand for their financial instruments, a substantial share of which is
related to volatile portfolio motives
As international financial markets continue to expand, central banks thus have twin
objectives fostering macroeconomic stability and maintaining safe and sound financial
institutions that can take advantage of stability while exploiting the advantages of new
technological advances
The changing dynamics of modern global financial systems require that central banks
address the inevitable increase of potential systemic risk It is probably fair to say that the
very efficiency of global financial markets, engendered by the rapid proliferation of financial
products, also has the capability of transmitting mistakes at a far faster pace throughout the
financial system in ways that were unknown a generation ago, and not even remotely
imagined in the 19th century

-7Certainly, last year's Barings Brothers collapse shows how much more rapidly losses
can be generated in the current environment relative to a century earlier when Barings
Brothers confronted a similar episode

Current technology enables single individuals to

initiate massive transactions with very rapid execution

Clearly, not only has the productivity

of global finance increased markedly, but so, obviously, has the ability to generate losses at a
previously inconceivable rate
Moreover, increasing global financial efficiency, by creating the mechanisms for
mistakes to ricochet throughout the global financial system, has patently increased the
potential for systemic risk

Why not then, one might ask, bar or contain the expansion of

global finance by capital controls, transaction taxes, or other market inhibiting initiatives9
Why not return to the less hectic and seemingly less threatening markets of earlier years'7
Endeavoring to thwart technological advance and new knowledge and innovation
through the erection of barriers to the spread of knowledge would, as history amply
demonstrates, have large, doubtless adverse, unintended consequences

Suppressed markets in

one location would be rapidly displaced by others outside the reach of government controls
and taxes

Of greater importance, risk-taking, so indispensable to the creation of wealth,

would surely be curbed, to the detriment of rising living standards We cannot turn back the
clock, and we should not try to do so
Rather, we should recognize that, if it is technology that has imparted the current
stress to markets, technology can be employed to contain it Enhancements to financial
institutions' internal nsk-management systems arguably constitute one of the most effective

-8countermeasures to the increased potential instability of the global financial system
Improving the efficiency of the world's payment systems is clearly another
The availability of new technology and new derivative financial instruments has
facilitated new, more rigorous approaches to the conceptualization, measurement, and
management of risk There are, however, limitations to the statistical models used in such
systems owing to the necessity of overly simplifying assumptions

Hence, human judgments,

based on analytically looser but far more realistic evaluations of what the future may hold,
are of critical importance in nsk management

Although a sophisticated understanding of

statistical modeling techniques is important to risk management, an intimate knowledge of the
markets in which an institution trades, and of the customers it serves, is turning out to be far
more important
In one sense, risk-management systems were exposed to a very severe real-life stress
test in 1994, when sharp increases in interest rates created large losses in fixed income
markets I assume that as a consequence, firms' models and judgments are sounder today
than those that prevailed in early 1994 But the Barings episode suggests that further
improvements to internal risk-management systems as well as internal controls are needed, in
some instances very significant improvements
To be sure, we should recognize also that if we choose to have the advantages of a
leveraged system of financial intermedianes the burden of managing risk in the financial
system will not lie with the pnvate sector alone With leveraging there will always exist a
remote possibility of a chain reaction, a cascading sequence of defaults that will culminate in
financial implosion if it proceeds unchecked

Only a central bank, with unlimited power to

-9create money, can with a high probability thwart such a process before it becomes destructive
Hence, central banks will of necessity be drawn into becoming lenders of last resort But
implicit in the existence of such a role is that there will be some sort of allocation between
the public and private sectors of the burden of risk of extreme outcomes

Thus, central banks

are led to provide what essentially amounts to catastrophic financial insurance coverage
Such a public subsidy should be reserved for only the rarest of disasters, triggered, at most, a
handful of times per century If the owners or managers of private financial institutions were
to anticipate being propped up frequently by government support, it would only encourage
reckless and irresponsible management practices
In theory, the allocation of responsibility for risk-bearing between the private sector
and the central bank depends upon an evaluation of the private cost of capital

In order to

attract, or at least retain, capital, a private financial institution must earn at minimum the
overall economy's rate of return, adjusted for risk In competitive financial markets, the
greater the leverage, the higher the rate of return, before adjustment for risk If private
financial institutions have to absorb all financial risk, then the degree to which they can
leverage will be limited, the financial sector small, and its contribution to economic growth,
minimal

On the other hand, if central banks effectively insulate private institutions from the

largest potential losses, however incurred, increased laxity could threaten a major drain on
taxpayers or produce inflationary instability as a consequence of excess money creation In
practice, the policy choice of how much, if any, of the extreme market risk that central banks
should absorb is fraught with many complexities Yet we central bankers make this decision
every day, either explicitly or by default

- 10It does seem clear, however, that under the currently structured international financial
system, if central banks do not choose to absorb the most extreme risks, private financial
institutions will surely be daunted by the specter of unlikely, but enormous and unhedgable
losses Private institutions would naturally adopt an attitude of caution that would render
them far less effective in the financing of wealth creation Nonetheless, as experience amply
demonstrates, all risk with limited and extreme exceptions must remain within the private
financial system
The probability that central banks can thwart the kind of chain reaction to which I just
referred will be immeasurably enhanced if world payment systems can achieve something
closer to real time settlement

Herstatt and other time dependent risks are deceptively large,

as the report issued in March by the BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems has
now made clear
Technology has already markedly contained this nsk by shortening the payment and
settlement cycle of a broad segment of financial transactions Reducing float, of course,
requires costly investments in computer and telecommunications technology, as well as the
opportunity costs associated with holding large cash and securities balances to effect
settlements

In that sense reducing float implies a significant tradeoff between risk reduction

and cost But while technological advances and lower costs have increased the risk of
systemic breakdown, so has the same technology enabled the financial community, both
pnvate and public, to contain such nsks
In conclusion, we must assure that our rapidly changing global financial system retains
the capacity to contain market shocks This is a never-ending process

-11 Mutual self interest in an expanding global financial system is fostering broadening
cooperation among the monetary authorities of the larger trading nations The markets are
beginning to dictate a merging of interests not only on the monetary front, but in fiscal
affairs, as well As last year's G-10 study on Saving, Investment and Real Interest Rates
pointed out, "the effects on real interest rates of changes in fiscal deficits in one country are
now spread across all countries integrated into the global financial system "
Clearly, the challenges of the changing international environment in which we all
operate dictate that public officials and pnvate market participants maintain and strengthen the
sound working relationships that we have built up in recent years These relationships
epitomize the kinds of contacts that will be essential in meeting the common challenges of the
rest of this decade and into the 21st century