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For release on delivery
7:30 p.m. CDT, 8:30 p.m. EDT
September 30, 1999

Remarks by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Before the
Minnesota Meeting
Minneapolis, Minnesota
September 30, 1999

I am pleased to be back in the Twin Cities and to appear before this gathering. I last
addressed the Minnesota Meeting in 1990, speaking in the wake of events in the Persian Gulf. In
the near-decade since, I have written many words on the crucial nexus between global events and
U.S. economic well-being.
Thus, knowing the interests of this audience, my good friend Gary Stern, the president of
the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, suggested that I focus on some issues related to
international trade and technology that I have raised recently in other forums. Recognizing that
those topics are of vital concern almost everywhere in our economy, I had no trouble following
his advice.
The evidence is overwhelmingly persuasive that the massive increase in world
competition—a consequence of broadening trade flows—has fostered markedly higher standards
of living for almost all countries that have participated in cross-border trade. I include most
especially the United States. And yet, there are reasons to be concerned that the benefits of
increasingly open trade may not be allowed to be as readily forthcoming in the future as they
have been in the past half-century.
Although many forces have been at play, the post-World War II surge in trade has clearly
owed, in large part, to significant advances in technological innovation. Since the dawn of the
industrial revolution, there has been an inexorable drive to leverage physical brawn and material
resources into ever-greater value added or output. New insights into the laws of nature brought
steam and later electric power. The development of precision production standards that
facilitated interchangeable parts brought assembly-line production. And the development of
railroads facilitated the evolution of mass markets.

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Almost all the rise in value added relative to physical input has reflected the substitution
of ideas—new insights—for brute human effort and material bulk. Some of the most impressive
advances in labor productivity over the decades have come in sectors of the economy in which
physical effort was the most demanding-agriculture, for example. Aggregate value added by the
farm sector has more than tripled in real terms over the past half-century, but the number of hours
required to produce it has fallen by three-fourths. Manufacturing has displayed similar, though
less pronounced, tendencies in recent decades-factory employment is down about 13 percent
from its peak of twenty years ago, but output of the sector has risen about 75 percent.
Like labor inputs, material requirements per unit of output also have fallen in many
sectors of the economy. The insights of metallurgy and architectural and engineering design, for
example, enabled the construction of buildings that use far less physical material per unit of
space than, say, a half-century ago. The insights that led to central heating, as well as synthetic
fiber, facilitated reduced clothing weight, while the development of the jet engine brought far
greater annual passenger miles per unit of aircraft size.
But doubtless it has been the advent in recent decades of the synergies of the
microprocessor, lasers, and fiber optics that has fostered a distinct quickening in the
displacement of physical weight of output with concepts. The ability to miniaturize transistor
electronic circuits has displaced huge tonnages of copper and enhanced the speed of calculation.
As high tech became an increasing part of our national product, the relative physical
dimensions of our value added fell dramatically. The per capita physical weight of our gross
domestic product is evidently only scarcely higher today than it was fifty or one hundred years ago.

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By far the largest contributor to growth of our price-adjusted GDP, or value added, has
been ideas-insights that leveraged physical reality. The consequent downsizing of output, of
course, meant that products were easier, and hence less costly, to move, and most especially
across national borders as well as domestically.
It is thus not surprising that the price-adjusted level of international trade, as I indicated
earlier, has expanded at a far faster pace than gains in real domestic demand. Imports of goods
and services as a percentage of gross domestic products worldwide, on average, have risen from
approximately 14 percent twenty-five years ago to 24 percent today.
The growth in physical weight of such trade, as with the national product generally, has
been far less. Real U.S. exports of computers and other high-tech products, which pack
considerable value into small volumes, have posted spectacular gains, while exports of weightier
commodities have grown much less rapidly. In agriculture, exports of bulk products, such as
grain, have lagged, trade having been dominated, to a considerable degree, by international
transfer of the technologies for growing these commodities more efficiently. The expansion of
farm exports that has taken place has tended to be concentrated more among high-value
perishables, shipments of which have been bolstered, in part, by transportation and storage
innovations.
Technology has augmented international trade for reasons beyond the downsizing of
material output. New telecommunications technologies made it very difficult for the autarchic
societies of the former Soviet Union to sustain their isolation in the face of the growing relative
affluence of the West. News could no longer be bottled up. Even in the West, the stultification

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of protectionism became increasingly evident as new consumer products entered the world
markets en masse. The political pressures to deregulate moribund industries and open up borders
to trade soon became irresistible.
The international trading system that evolved has enhanced competition and fostered the
continuous scrapping of old technologies to make way for the new. Standards of living rise
because the depreciation and other cash flows of industries employing older, increasingly
obsolescent, technologies are marshaled to finance the newly produced capital assets that almost
always embody the cutting-edge technologies. This is the process by which wealth is created
incremental step by incremental step. It presupposes a continuous churning of an economy in
which the new displaces the old, and its most concrete and meaningful result is that a growing
and increasingly diverse mix of goods and services is made available to consumers here and
abroad. With future changes in technology likely to create greater possibilities for tailoring
products that meet consumer needs more precisely, new trade opportunities may open up over
time even for producers of some of the bulk commodities that have lagged.
But there is also little doubt that this transition to the new high-tech economy, of which
rising trade is a part, is proving difficult for a large segment of our workforce that interfaces with
our rapidly changing capital stock day-by-day.
Moreover, while major advances in standards of living are evident among virtually all
nations that have opened their borders to increased competition, the adjustment trauma has also
distressed those who once thrived in companies that were then at the cutting edge of technology,
but which have since become increasingly less competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.

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Economists will say that workers should move from the steel districts of western Pennsylvania to
a vibrant Silicon Valley. And eventually they, or more likely, their children, will. But the
adjustment process is wrenching to an existing workforce made redundant largely through no
fault of their own. It may be argued that all workers should have the foresight to recognize shifts
in long-term job opportunities and move in advance of obsolescence. This regrettably is a skill
not in great abundance-among business managers or the economists who counsel them, as well
as among workers.
Yet the protectionist propensity to thwart the process of the competitive flow of capital
from failing technologies to the more productive is unwise and surely self-defeating. History
tells us that not only is it unwise to try to hold back innovations, it is also not possible over the
longer run. Generation after generation has experienced episodes in which the technologically
obsolescent endeavored to undermine progress, often appealing to the very real short-term costs
of adjusting to a changing economic environment. From the Luddites to the Smoots and the
Hawleys, competitive forces have been attacked. In the end, the opponents of change did not
prevail, and long-term advances in standards of living resumed.
Nonetheless, the campaign to expand free trade is never won. Legislation to further lower
trade barriers, for example, is becoming increasingly more difficult to pass in our Congress. It is
a continuing battle. Further, while tariffs in industrial countries have come down sharply over
the past half-century, other barriers have become more prevalent. Administrative protection in
the form of antidumping suits and countervailing duties is a case in point. While these forms of
protection have often been imposed under the label of promoting "fair trade," oftentimes they are

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just simple guises for inhibiting competition. Typically, antidumping duties are levied when
foreign average prices are below average cost of production. But that also describes a practice
that often emerges as a wholly appropriate response to a softening in demand. It is the rare case
that prices fall below marginal cost, which would be a more relevant standard. Antidumping
initiatives should be reserved, in the view of many economists, for those cases in which
anticompetitive behavior is involved. Contrary to popular notions about antidumping suits,
under U.S. and WTO law, it is not required to show evidence of predatory behavior, or intention
to monopolize, or of any other intentional efforts to drive competitors out of business.
In the end it is clear that all economic progress rests on competition. It would be a great
tragedy were we to stop the wheels of progress because of an incapacity to assist the victims of
progress.
Our efforts should be directed at job skills enhancement and retraining-a process in
which the private market is already engaged. Thwarting competition, by placing barriers to
imports, will prevent the needed transitions of the productive capital stock of the United States
and other nations that enable it to continuously concentrate on producing those goods and
services most desired by consumers. Protectionism will also slow the inevitable transition of the
workforce to more productive endeavors. To be sure, an added few years may enable some
workers to reach retirement with dignity, but it will also keep frozen in place younger workers
whose better job opportunities decline with time.
I regret that trade policy has been inextricably linked with job creation. We too often try
to promote free trade on the mistaken ground that it will create jobs. The reason should be that it

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enhances standards of living through the effects of competition on productivity and widens the
range of choices available to consumers. It is difficult to find credible evidence that trade has
affected the level of total employment in this country over the long run. Indeed, we are currently
experiencing the widest trade deficit in history with a level of unemployment close to record
lows.
Certainly, the distribution of jobs by industry is affected by international trade-but it is
also affected by domestic trade. It is the relative balance of supply and demand in a competitive
market economy that determines the mix of employment. When exports fall or imports rise,
domestic demand and relative prices have invariably adjusted in the long run to leave total
employment relatively unaffected. As economists like to say, all imports are eventually paid for
with exports.
I also regret that despite the remarkable success over a near half-century of GATT, the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and its successor, the World Trade Organization, in
reducing trade barriers, our trade laws and negotiating practices are essentially adversarial. They
presume that a trade concession extracted from us by our trading partners is to their advantage at
our expense, and must be countered.
Few economists see the world that way. And I am rash enough to suggest that we
economists are correct, at least in this regard: Trade is not a zero sum game.
If trade barriers are lowered by both parties, each clearly benefits. But if one lowers
barriers and the other does not, the country that lowered barriers unilaterally will still be better
off having done so. Raising barriers to achieve protectionist equality with reluctant trading

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partners would be neither to our benefit nor to theirs. The best of all possible worlds for
competition is for both parties to lower trade barriers. The worst is for both to keep them up.
For these reasons, I am concerned about the recent evident weakening of support for free
trade in this country. Should we endeavor to freeze competitive progress in place, we will almost
certainly slow economic growth overall and impart substantial harm to those workers who would
otherwise seek more effective longer-term job opportunities. Protecting markets from new
technologies has never succeeded. Adjustments to newer technologies have been delayed, but
only at significant cost.
Even should our trading partners not retaliate in the face of increased American trade
barriers, an unlikely event, we do ourselves great harm by lessening the vigor of American
competitiveness. The United States has been in the forefront of the postwar opening up of
international markets, much to our, and the rest of the world's, benefit.
It would be a great tragedy were that process reversed. I do not believe that will be
allowed to happen. There is too much at stake for us and our trading partners.