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For Release on Delivery
1-00 p.m E D.T
May 2, 1990

Remarks by

Alan Greenspan

Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the

Joint Conference

of the

Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Futures Industry Institute

Washington, D.C.

May 2, 1990

It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss some of the issues
that confront our financial markets

I was heartened to observe that in

the title of this conference, "Futures and Options Markets in the 1990's
—

Innovation, Regulation and Jurisdiction," innovation took priority

over regulation and jurisdiction

This being Washington, a greater

portion of our time and energy will be devoted to the latter subjects,
my own remarks included
I think it appropriate that innovation be an important
consideration in regulatory discussions
has heated up

The debate over jurisdiction

The outcome could affect the long-term health of our

markets, including the ability of domestic markets to maintain their
role as a leader in creating innovative products

For that reason, it

is important to examine our goals for regulation and the regulatory
structure that will best achieve those goals
Consider first what we would like financial market regulation
to accomplish

Most fundamentally, we want to ensure that the financial

system efficiently allocates capital resources and that financial
disturbances do not spill over to the real economy

Achieving these

goals requires that investors be well informed of risks and generally
have confidence in the contractual terms of their investments

It also

necessitates limiting systemic risks within our financial markets, a
matter of particular interest to the Federal Reserve
objective was embodied in the Act that created the Fed

Indeed, this
By systemic

risks, I refer to problems that, because they potentially affect a broad
range of markets and market participants, threaten the overall stability
of the system

It is important to distinguish between these risks and

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the risks faced by individual market participants

Regulatory actions

and the design of regulatory structures should not be directed toward
preventing the failure of individual firms

Rather, the focus should be

on reducing the potential for such a failure to endanger other market
participants

The recent dissolution of Drexel Burnham Lambert might be

viewed as a case in point

Although several problems encountered during

the wind-down threatened to have broader ramifications, the failure of
this major securities firm did not precipitate other failures
Some believe that another objective of regulation is to prevent
excessive price volatility

Specifically, they have argued that

differences in the regulatory treatment of margins in securities and
derivative markets have contributed to increased volatility in
securities markets and that a more consistent treatment of margins would
reduce volatility

As I have discussed in recent Congressional

testimony, I remain skeptical of such assertions
The objective of margin regulation should be to protect the
integrity of financial market participants

The role for oversight is

to ensure that margins are set at levels covering potential losses of
clearing houses or creditors under a wide variety of economic
circumstances

Oversight of margins is particularly important because

margins have implications for systemic risk

In particular, I have been

concerned about the tendency for clearing organizations to lower margins
in periods of price stability to such a degree that margins must be
raised during periods of heightened volatility

The practice has the

potential for compounding liquidity pressures on market participants and
payment systems in times of stress

In this area, I have reluctantly

-3-

come to the view that private market decisions may not always fully
reflect systemic concerns.
Another goal of regulatory policy is to ensure competitive
balance among market participants

While the need for competitive

balance is widely recognized for its role in fostering efficiency, what
is not always recognized is the importance of competitive balance in
fostering innovation

If some markets or their participants are

disadvantaged by regulation, they may be hampered in generating and
introducing products

Alternatively, their innovative efforts may be

channeled in unproductive directions, or innovation may shift offshore
This is not to imply that a single regulatory agency necessarily fosters
innovation because it can achieve competitive balance

Unified

regulation may stifle innovation in other ways, a topic that I will turn
to later

Rather, looking at the issue broadly, competitive balance

implies an equal opportunity for firms and markets to develop and trade
new products.
These goals of regulation provide a context for evaluating the
current debates over jurisdiction
they first develop

Many markets may be unregulated when

The recognition of some problem, or market failure,

prompts the imposition of regulation
regulations and regulators

But markets are more dynamic than

Markets change, and as they change, the

legislative response has been to graft new regulatory authority onto the
existing structure

This response generally is to be expected because

developments in markets are incremental

They accumulate with time,

however, and it is sometimes necessary to review regulatory structures
in a wider perspective

Now is such an occasion

Re-evaluations of

-4-

regulations should include the benefits and coats of existing
regulations as well as new regulations

We should be as open to the

possibility that some regulation should be relaxed as we are to the
possibility for additional regulation
Different regulatory structures allow us to approach our
regulatory goals in different ways

In the past, we have focused on

entities trading or offering particular types of products as a way of
structuring our regulation

However, the possible ways of organizing

regulatory regimes are limited only by the number of products, markets,
and firms that exist.

An alternative approach that has gotten quite a

bit of attention recently is one that would base regulation around
closely related product lines
The current system results in different regulators for banks,
broker-dealer firms, and futures commission merchants

Under this

framework, each exchange is regulated by a single authority, the one
that also regulates the firms trading on them

It is not surprising

that much of our regulation is organized in this way because financial
firms and exchanges traditionally undertook specialized activities.

The

regulation of a bank or broker-dealer, for example, focused on a type of
firm offering a well-defined set of products.

Institutional regulation

recognizes the common characteristics of firms offering similar products
and exploits the specialized knowledge about institutions that a
regulator can build over time

Perhaps even more important,

institutional regulation recognizes the interdependence of firms trading
on the same exchanges and using the same clearing organizations
Despite the often diverse nature of the products traded on an exchange

-5-

or the business of individual firms, institutional regulation looks
through these differences to the common features and financial
responsibilities of exchanges and firms
In contrast, products connected through a pricing mechanism
could be regulated by a single entity even though such a structure might
result in more than one regulator for an exchange or clearing
organization

Stock-index futures, stock-index options, stocks, and

options on individual stocks would be an example of a cluster of
products connected through a single pricing mechanism

Similarly,

Treasury securities along with options and futures on Treasuries, and
foreign exchange along with foreign exchange derivatives, represent
other product clusters

Participants in futures and options markets

have long been aware of the relationship between derivatives and their
underlying instruments

The conclusion of the studies of the 1987

stock-market plunge that stocks, stock-index futures, and stock-index
options are, in effect, one market undoubtedly had long been understood
by market participants.

The organization of regulation around groups of

related products recognizes this economic reality.
The two regulatory structures that I have sketched out are by
no means the only viable alternatives

Nonetheless, I think these two

models provide interesting contrasts, for they are at the heart of
regulatory and jurisdictional issues currently being debated
The most obvious limitation of institutional regulation arises
from the increasing diversification of financial institutions

No

longer are banks solely in the business of making commercial loans and
brokers-dealers solely in the business of underwriting and trading

-6-

securities

Even when banks, broker-dealers, and futures commission

merchants are not offering precisely the same products, they are
offering products that functionally substitute for each other

Once

such product diversification occurs, the consistent application of
regulations across similar products is difficult
Differences in regulatory treatment may have consequences for
competitive balance among market participants.

In this regard, having a

common regulator of a pricing mechanism or product group has appeal
However, such an approach also has its limitations

More than one

regulator would have responsibility for products trading on a single
exchange, implying a need for coordination among the regulators of
exchange and clearing house rules

Problems also may arise in the

practical implementation of this approach

Just as stocks, stock-index

futures, and stock-index options are linked, other financial products
are linked with varying degrees to this cluster of instruments.

For

example, if contracts on foreign stock indexes are included in this
pricing process, foreign exchange contracts also might be a part of the
pricing mechanism.

Absent a single regulator, it will be necessary,

legislatively or, one fears judicially, to draw lines around product
clusters, and substantial coordination among regulators will still be
required
The choice between regulatory schemes based on an institutional
approach or on a pricing mechanism approach is not an obvious one
way of evaluating these alternatives is to measure them against the
goals of regulation

The institutional approach to regulation

recognizes the financial interdependences of the firms within an

A

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exchange or other organization

The pricing approach recognizes the

financial interdependencies of participants in one product or market on
the outcomes of trading in closely connected markets.

Both of these

interdependencies are important from a systemic standpoint because
interdependence is at the core of systemic risk

For my part, I have

come out slightly in favor of having a common regulator of equity
products, the common products approach

Such a regulatory structure

would mean, for example, that prudential margin requirements across cash
and derivative instruments were based on the same assessment of price
volatility

This approach would avoid competitive imbalances that might

arise when different regulators have different outlooks and different
concerns
margins

A single regulator, of course, does not imply equality of
Instead, it would imply consistency of prudential standards.

Having one regulator responsible for other aspects of prudential
regulation would seem reasonable as well
One way to avoid the tradeoffs in a choice of types of
regulation is to have a single regulator for all products and firms
This entity could look at both firms and exchanges as single units,
functioning as an institutional regulator, and could look at products
connected through their prices

Such unified regulation would have

several advantages over our current system
more quickly, with less debate

Decisions might be reached

This would be particularly true if the

regulator were structured with a single individual at its head rather
than a board or commission

Problems that we have currently, such as

discussion among regulators over where particular products should be
traded, would arise less frequently

In principle, issues of

-8-

competitive balance also could be resolved across instruments and
exchanges, at least within national boundaries.
Although this unified, even monolithic, regulation could lead
to more simple and consistent regulation, I am not convinced it would
lead to the best regulation

The process of discussion among regulators

better ensures that relevant issues surface and are addressed.

Also,

having different regulators of products that are functionally similar
provides more scope for regulatory experimentation and innovation

A

unified system, in contrast, likely would be more sluggish and more
vulnerable to entrenched interests, possibly leading to a less
responsive regulatory system
To some extent, regulatory competition in the future will be
provided by foreign authorities
unified system domestically
domestic regulation

Some argue that this justifies a more

No doubt competition abroad will constrain

Nonetheless, it is unlikely that we would get as

much innovation, or innovation of the same kind, as we would with
multiple domestic regulators

Competition can prove as effective a tool

in government regulatory organizations as in other areas of human
affairs

We would be shortsighted to ignore its potential benefits
Impediments to innovation, of course, can exist in any

structure.

Under our current system, the so-called exclusivity

provision of the Commodity Exchange Act prevents competition among types
of exchanges and firms that offer products having an element of
futurity

While once reasonable, this provision may now be more costly

than beneficial.

In essence, all financial instruments have an element

of futurity in them because their value depends on future events.

A

-9-

broad interpretation of contracts having elements of futurity thus
serves to discourage the development of financial products offered
outside of futures exchanges

Index participations are frequently cited

as an example of how this provision has halted the trading of a product
In addition, concerns about the application of the exclusivity provision
to swap contracts reportedly has led to a more cautious approach to
developing new products
A way to deal with this impediment to innovation is to end the
single regulation of products with futures attributes

The exclusivity

provision was created to prevent fraudulent activity and this objective
could still be met, perhaps by exemptions of transactions subject to
other federal regulatory safeguards, by exemptions for sophisticated
traders, or by more stringent fraud liability

Such a system would

allow products with similar attributes to be traded on a variety of
exchanges or regulatory regimes

It is unlikely that all products would

succeed, but the decision regarding the success or failure of a product
would be determined not by the judiciary but by individual market
participants through their investment decisions
The choice among regulatory structures is a difficult one
Each of the alternatives has significant drawbacks

One choice with

which I feel uncomfortable is the concentration of regulatory authority
in a single agency

I am concerned that the costs could well outweigh

the benefits from a simpler decision-making process
Once we have determined that a regulatory system involving
competing interests is desirable, we still are left with the issue of
how that system will be organized.

Both regulation along institutional

-10-

lines and along common pricing mechanisms have strengths and weaknesses,
which I have tried to identify
evident

The choice between the two is not self-

As I noted, I come down slightly in favor of the pricing

mechanism approach, although some operational difficulties still need to
be addressed

Whether the system adopted follows institutional or

product lines, however, substantial coordination will be required among
regulators
As we resolve these very difficult issues, we should do so with
an eye toward the future

Substantial competition is developing abroad,

and the development of new instruments proceeds apace

Our regulatory

system must be one that is flexible, encompassing and encouraging
changes in our markets, and at the same time, providing safeguards that
minimize systemic risk