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For Release on Delivery
100PM
CDT
(2 0 0 P M
April 30, 1990

E D T )

Remarks by

Alan Greenspan

Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the

International Conference

of the

National Association of Purchasing Management

New Orleans, Louisiana

April 30, 1990

This afternoon I'd like to focus on some of the major factors
that are driving industrial activity in the United States.

First, I

plan to spend some time outlining what I believe to be the key forces
that seem to have damped the inventory cycle in recent years

Then, I'd

like to move toward a different level of stock or inventory appraisal,
and an evaluation of the overall demand for long-lived goods.
Inventories or ownership of these types of goods interact with material
inventory fluctuations to create a major element of underlying demand
for industrial products.

And, finally, I'll close with a few

observations on the effects of the changing structure of imports and
exports on industrial activity
After a brisk expansion through 1988 and the first quarter of
1989, the American economy began to behave like a tire with a slow leak
The economy's momentum began to fade and the typical prerecession
symptoms became progressively manifest.
By autumn, increasingly negative signals on the economic
outlook started to develop

The emerging weakness in manufacturing,

especially in the durable goods sector, seemed to be cumulating and
prospectively spreading to the nonmanufacturing areas of the economy
In the event, however, the weakness in industrial activity
bottomed around the turn of the year

And, although the performance

since can scarcely be described as robust, it nonetheless has markedly
assuaged the concerns that recessionary forces were mounting for the
American economy as a whole
The obvious question is, what went wrong with the recession
forecasts or, more exactly, what went right with the

economy?

While

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analysts can never be certain of such things, there is at least
presumptive evidence that a major reason, perhaps the key reason, is the
marked change in inventory behavior on the part of purchasing managers
in manufacturing and elsewhere
Most, if not all, past American recessions have been sparked,
or at least aggravated, by large inventory swings

Purchasing managers,

seeking to protect their production schedules, accelerated inventory
accumulation as their suppliers' delivery lead times stretched out
during periods of diminishing excess capacity

But the process of heavy

buying put increasing pressure on suppliers' capacity, inducing still
further lead- time extensions, which inevitably required still further
increases in days' supply of inventories of materials on hand

This

cycle generally led to inventories being built up at unsustainable
rates, or to excessive levels often accompanied by strained corporate
balance sheets
Purchasing managers would then reduce forward orders to match,
rather than exceed, prospective levels of materials consumption.
Suppliers were then able to cut back on frenetic production levels
which, in turn, set into motion declines in lead times promised to
prospective customers and allowed those customers to reduce the days'
supply of inventory required to protect their productions schedules
That, not surprisingly, led to a still lesser flow of orders, lower
production, and still shorter lead times
classic inventory cycle.

In short, I am outlining the

That cycle, which has been a key element in

American business history, obviously has not been evident on the
industrial scene in recent years

The historical sequence apparently

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has been broken, enabling purchasing managers to meet their production
schedules throughout the expansion of the 1980s without the historic
runup in lead times, accumulation of inventory, and its inevitable
liquidation

Several explanations of the change suggest themselves

First, but not necessarily the most important, has been the
dramatic expansion of real-time inventory monitoring

The expansion of

computer technology and rapidly decreasing costs of telecommunications
has enabled management to become quickly informed of inventory patterns,
by product and stage of processing, within a corporate complex and, to
an increasing extent, beyond the factory gates to stocks in the hands of
distributors and customers

This has fostered a reduction in

uncertainty in inventory scheduling, which historically had probably led
business to hold larger safety stocks than were otherwise required
Implicit in this trend has been increasing sophistication in
transportation scheduling of the movement of goods and materials between
plants and between production facilities and customers
Another factor reducing uncertainties of product availability
has been the broadening tendency of customers to provide suppliers in
recent years with projected requirements well into the future
Moreover, sophisticated production techniques have improved quality
reliability so that "just in time" deliveries would be associated with a
lower reject rate and, consequently, a lower required safety buffer than
had earlier been the case
Second, in part because of the increased "downsizing" of the
spectrum of products produced by the world's industries, goods, in
recent years, generally have become easier to move internationally

-4-

Thus, the ability of customers in the United States to draw on foreign
facilities when domestic supplies become tight has kept average lead
times on deliveries from accelerating as excess capacity began to
disappear at our plants
As a consequence, it is not surprising that average delivery
lead times for production materials, as reflected in your surveys, have
remained at levels that in the past would have been consistent only with
periods of substantial slack in domestic production facilities
One indication of the success of inventory management
techniques and tighter controls is that the proportion of materials and
supplies in total manufacturing inventories has trended down since the
late 1970s

Moreover, typical nationwide inventory-sales ratios, which

we employ to measure the degree of potential inventory deficiency or
excess, are becoming increasingly skewed by imported goods that find
their way into our inventory system

For example, we estimate that the

proportion of wholesale and retail trade inventories (marked down to
factory gate values), which are foreign sourced, has risen from less
than 20 percent in the early 1980s to around 25 percent currently
While heavy buildups of inventories of imported goods can precipitate
cutbacks in domestic production, it seems likely that a large part of
that adjustment falls on foreign facilities rather than domestic,
although obviously there are a number of products for which there are
multiple supply sources, both domestic and foreign
One must assume that, with delivery lead times relatively short
now for a number of years, the transition process to "just in time" and
other inventory slimming control measures must soon be reaching a

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plateau

But hopefully not

That issue, of course, is certainly far

more in your hands than in the hands of the rest of us involved in
production or finance
Does all of this suggest that we've beaten the inventory cycle
and, perhaps, the business cycle, as well? The immediate answer is, not
likely

Historically, inventory cycles were precipitated by a perceived

shrinking of excess domestic production capacity or potential commodity
price increases for production and maintenance materials

It is

perfectly rational for a purchasing manager to attempt to accumulate
inventories, in terms of days' supply, as some function of the time it
takes the manager to obtain additional materials from his suppliers

If

worldwide stringencies in the production system were to occur, for
example, and lead times, accordingly, were to stretch out, reasonable
inventory management could still readily imitate the type of inventory
accumulation and liquidation cycles that have plagued us in the past
One, of course, would be hard pressed to find such indications in our
current materials supply/demand balances

Nonetheless, we should not

presume that the extraordinary changes that have occurred in inventory
management in recent years have fundamentally altered inventory
purchasing patterns in a manner that will eliminate, henceforth, any
concerns we may have of inventory excess and inventory induced
recessions.

Nor should it be necessary to add, there are many reasons

for business cycle fluctuations other than inventory movements
Although inventory excesses often trigger production cutbacks and
generally exacerbate cyclical change, they can be far less important in

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governing the amplitude and extent of business cycles than fluctuations
in capital goods markets or residential construction, for example
In fact, the broader forces of fluctuations in demand for
products reflects a different type of inventory analysis; one looking at
the ownership of, for example, cars and trucks on the road, the stock of
residential buildings, the stock of office buildings, or the stock of
capital equipment

In short, the physical parts of the balance sheet of

the American economy can be viewed as inventories in a certain larger
sense

The notions of deficiency and excess in such items affect the

demand for goods and services and the levels of economic activity in
ways not all that distinct from conventional inventories, although,
granted, the time cycle is appreciably longer
Indeed, while materials inventories have exhibited little
downward pressure on economic activity of late, on balance the overhang
of stocks of long-lived physical assets is likely to be a restraint on
growth in the period ahead

A fundamental characteristic of such items

is that the demand for them is shaped, in part, by the size of the
outstanding stocks relative to current household and business needs
Viewed in this light, the slowing in economic growth last year
represented, at least to an extent, a pause in the pace of accumulation
of physical assets so that levels of ownership would not get too far out
of line with the long-term desired levels

In a sense it represented a

form of inventory correction
Because of their importance in understanding the recent
economic situation, it is worth examining some of these stock adjustment
relationships in detail

Motor vehicles are key items among these

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durable assets

Auto assemblies in the first quarter were at a

5-1/2 million unit seasonally adjusted annual rate, well below the
7 million unit rate over 1989 as a whole, as a result of soft demand and
rising dealer inventories last fall

However, reflecting the liberal

use of incentive programs, sales have picked up since the turn of the
year, which, combined with the cut in assemblies, has reduced dealer
inventories to more acceptable levels, and automakers recently have
stepped up production
Looking beneath these short-run variations in sales,
production, and dealer inventories, however, current and prospective
developments in the auto market reflect, in part, longer-range demand
factors, such as the existing number of motor vehicles owned per
household and the average age of the auto and truck stocks

Between

1979 and 1983, for example, the number of vehicles per household—which
had been on a strong uptrend throughout the postwar period—fell nearly
3 percent

A decline of 3 percent may not sound very large until you

consider that it represented a shortfall on the order of 10 million cars
and trucks between the actual stock of motor vehicles and the underlying
trend stock.

This decline in the per household ownership of motor

vehicles was likely a result of consumer reaction to the relative
increase in gasoline prices and the downturn in economic activity that
occurred during the period

Also, during the late 1970s and early 1980s

consumers slowed the pace at which they scrapped their existing cars and
light trucks, the combination of lower scrappage and the lower sales of
new vehicles lengthened the average age of both the autos and trucks on
the road by approximately one year to over 7 years

-8-

The combination of an enormous pent-up demand—reflecting the
gap between actual and trend levels of ownership—as well as increased
replacement needs associated with an aging auto stock provided the
stimulus for the extraordinarily strong pace of auto sales posted from
1983 through much of the remainder of the decade

This rebuilding of

the motor vehicle stock suggests that the number of autos owned by
households and businesses is now adequate to meet much of the desired
demand for transportation equipment, and sales are at this point likely
to reflect primarily replacement needs and decelerating growth in the
driving-age population.
In the housing market, longer-run demographic factors are also
having a subduing effect on the underlying stock demand—especially the
rate of household formation

This rate has been slowing and will slow

further as more and more of the low birth cohort of the 1960s and 1970s
matures into adulthood

What this means, of course, is that what

constitutes "normal" levels of homebuilding activity during the 1990s
will tend to be lower than it was in the 1980s
How the broad decade averages of demand get distributed from
year to year depends in large part on financial conditions

Interest

rates on home mortgages have increased since the turn of the year, and,
from the homebuyer's perspective, financial considerations have become
at least somewhat less favorable

In recent months, however, segments

of the construction industry have reported difficulty in obtaining
credit in the wake of newly imposed restrictions on lending by thrift
institutions.

Some added lender caution in acquisition, development,

and construction lending has emerged, given the riskiness of this

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activity, but the difficulties now being experienced by builders should
diminish considerably over time as they secure other financing sources
for their creditworthy projects
In the case of nonresidential structures, there are indications
of serious excesses in a number of areas, with vacancy rates for office
space in most metropolitan areas at near-record levels

Moreover,

lending institutions—stung by a long series of retrospectively dubious
investments—are more carefully scrutinizing loan applications than in
the past, so that highly risky projects are not getting funded as
readily.

Reflecting these developments, nonresidential building permits

have turned down and new construction spending has been stagnant over
the past year in all major sectors except industrial building
Business demands for new equipment also reflect, to a large
degree, stock-adjustment motives

Business spending for a number of

types of capital equipment has softened noticeably since the middle of
last year, reflecting a general slowdown in economic activity and
expected sales

Looking forward, recent data tend to suggest that

capital spending this year will grow less than in 1988 and 1989

For

example, surveys of plant and equipment expenditures indicate that real
capital spending will grow more slowly this year, although the most
recent survey of 1990 spending plans was somewhat more positive than
earlier ones

In any event, demand for long-lived assets is still

growing in some areas, creating opportunities for moderate production
growth

This is most clearly evident in the case of civilian aircraft

for which the level of the orders backlog has doubled over the past two
years

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Finally, I would like to employ the remaining minutes allotted
to me to focus on the prospective impact of foreign trade as a key
addition to the two inventory elements of demand for industrial goods
discussed so far

We estimate that during 1987 and 1988 foreign demand

for American goods accounted for close to a third of the growth in
domestic output of manufactured goods

Although real exports of

manufactured goods posted another increase in 1989, the gain was
appreciably less than the torrid pace registered during the previous two
years

Indeed, the deceleration in export growth contributed to about

half of last year's softening in factory output
It is the case that exports of a few industries, for example,
chemicals, electrical machinery, and aircraft, continued to grow in 1989
at a rate equal to or better than their pace during the two previous
years

However, a number of manufacturing industries experienced a

noticeable slackening in export growth last year, and in some industries
real exports actually declined

Special factors may have held down

production and exports of some types of goods last year

For example,

there have been reports that lumber production was reduced, owing to
restrictions on logging in the Pacific Northwest

On the other hand,

capacity constraints—which reportedly restrained export growth in some
industries in 1988—were much less pervasive last year.
On the import side, we estimate that the share of domestic
absorption of manufactured goods supplied by foreign-based firms has
been essentially flat at about 16 percent since 1986, after having risen
considerably earlier in the 1980s

It is noteworthy that this share did

not decline, even in 1987 and 1988, when the export share was rising

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The fact that import penetration has not turned down may be an
indication of how strongly foreign producers resist losing a share of
the vast US market, even when exchange rate movements are unfavorable to
them
Nonetheless, it appears that in recent months the volume of
imports of merchandise excluding oil actually has declined

In part,

this may be related to inventory corrections that have occurred recently
in a number of sectors, especially among department stores.

Imports

account for a significant portion of the goods sold at these stores
Consequently, when inventories are high relative to sales—as was the
case an the retail sector late last year—as I indicated earlier,
foreign-based suppliers share in the ensuing production adjustment
In conclusion, the risks of a sharp or prolonged decline in
manufacturing output clearly have abated since last autumn, owing, in
part, to prompt inventory adjustments fostered by improved inventory
control procedures

However, of the underlying determinants of demand

for manufacturing goods, stock level demands by households and
businesses for long-lived assets is likely to be restraining while
foreign demand for US goods should be positive—albeit less so than,
say, in 1987 and 1988

Overall, these indicators point to somewhere

between modest and moderate growth in factory output over the coming
year
The actual outcome, of course, will depend on the broader
financial and other economic forces driving the total American economy
And these forces, in turn, are likely to be significantly shaped by the
increasingly relevant global economic environment

However the

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industrial economy develops in the years ahead, I suspect that members
of the National Association of Purchasing Management will play a key
role in its evolution